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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 AN EXAMPLE OF DIALOGUE: THE HEARSAY SAGA  
In the early 2000s, Mr Al-Khawaja was convicted of indecent assault and Mr 
Tahery of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. They were both 
sentenced to custodial sentences in the UK. These convicts have in common that 
they felt that their trials had been unfair because their conviction was principally 
based on hearsay evidence. At Mr Al-Khawaja’s trial, the statement to the police of 
a woman who made complaints against him was read to the jury. This woman could 
not testify at trial because she had passed away. A witness statement in Mr Tahery’s 
case was also read to the jury because the witness feared attending trial. The UK 
courts to which the applicants complained concluded that their right to a fair trial 
had not been infringed. Consequently, the two men brought an application to the 
European Court of Human Rights (Court) in Strasbourg, which decided otherwise. 
Sitting as a chamber of seven, it held unanimously that the admission of the hearsay 
evidence at trial was in violation of the right to a fair trial, which is protected by 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention).1 A little less 
than three years later, the Court’s Grand Chamber concluded upon referral that Mr 
Tahery’s Article 6-rights had been violated and that there had been no violation of 
Article 6 in respect of Mr Al-Khawaja.2 The latter ruling was supported by a solid 
majority of fifteen votes to two and amongst the fifteen was Judge Bratza, who also 
sat in the chamber that had found a violation in the same case. Why did the Grand 
Chamber reverse the chamber’s judgment in Mr Al-Khawaja’s case? And why did 
Judge Bratza vote, first, for a violation and, then, against finding one in that case? 
Clues to these questions can be found in a judgment of the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom (UK) in the case of R. v. Horncastle and Others.3  
The UK Supreme Court spoke after the chamber had decided and before the 
Grand Chamber considered the case of Mr Al-Khawaja and Mr Tahery anew. The 
British judges were therefore in the exceptional position to comment on a judgment 
in a case that was to be referred and the Grand Chamber was in an equally 
exceptional position to take into account comments of domestic judges directed at 
the very judgment referred to it. The Supreme Court seized this opportunity to 
elaborate on the question of hearsay evidence and to explain applicable safeguards, 
                                                        
1  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, No. 26766/05 et al., 20 January 2009, paras. 42, 43, 47, 48. 
2  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 December 2011, paras. 158, 165.  
3  [2009] UKSC 14.  
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so that there could take place ‘what may prove to be a valuable dialogue’ between 
the two courts.4 A dialogue indeed took place and – at least for Judge Bratza – it 
proved to be valuable, since he wrote in his concurring opinion in the Grand 
Chamber judgment that the cases presented ‘a good example of the judicial 
dialogue between national courts and the European Court on the application of the 
Convention’.5  
In fact, this dialogue is the key to understanding the Court’s and Judge Bratza’s 
changed stand in the case of Mr Al-Khawaja.6 The dialogue enabled the UK 
Supreme Court first of all to air its concerns over Strasbourg’s case law on the 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. That case law had developed ‘largely in cases 
relating to civil law rather than common law jurisdictions’.7 In other words, the 
Court had paid too little attention to the diversity of legal traditions in the states 
parties in the Supreme Court’s view. Further, the case law appeared ‘to have 
developed without full consideration of the safeguards against an unfair trial that 
exist under the common law procedure’.8 The European judges therefore had not 
fully grasped the intricacies of the UK legal system, at least not sufficiently to 
convince the Supreme Court. Nor did the UK judges think highly of the clarity and 
coherency of the chamber ruling.9 In turn, the dialogue offered an opportunity to the 
Grand Chamber to adopt a better informed and probably more convincingly 
reasoned judgment than the chamber had delivered, because it could rely on R. v. 
Horncastle and Others. The Grand Chamber responded to the grounds on which the 
UK, drawing on R., challenged the chamber judgment.10 Although it nevertheless 
reaffirmed its earlier hearsay case law,11 it also showed more understanding of the 
relevant safeguards against an unfair trial and better clarified the criteria for the 
admission of hearsay evidence.12 This clarification made it possible to overrule the 
chamber in part.  
The dialogue proved to be valuable to both the judges in London and those in 
Strasbourg, not only due to the foregoing considerations, but also because it 
probably prevented conflict between them. If the Supreme Court had not seized the 
opportunity to engage in the dialogue that arose pursuant to the chamber judgment 
and if the European Court would not have listened to its counterpart, a clear 
discrepancy between their lines of reasoning would have remained, resulting in a 
slumbering conflict that becomes outspoken any time a comparable case is decided 
upon.  
                                                        
4  Lord Philips in ibid., para. 11. 
5  Ibid., para. 2. 
6  See also: section IX.1.9.5.  
7  Lord Philips in R. v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 107.  
8  Ibid., para. 107. 
9  Ibid., paras. 118-120.  
10  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 December 2011, paras. 129-147.  
11  Ibid., para. 143; Redmayne (2012), 869. 
12  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 December 2011, paras. 118-151.  
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The starting point of the dialogue, the domestic case R. v. Horncastle, travelled 
on to Strasbourg where it was renamed Horncastle and Others v. UK. In the 
judgment in this case, the European Court applied the Grand Chamber judgment Al-
Khawaja and Tahery. The Court therefore applied a judgment which was in a sense 
a response to the very case pending before it. Moreover, the Court assured the 
domestic judges that their refusal to follow the chamber was not in violation of the 
Convention.13 It thus sanctioned the domestic judge’s initiative to engage in 
dialogue and, according to the Court, concluded the judicial dialogue.14 
2  DIALOGUE  
The hearsay saga as just related is an unparalleled example of Convention dialogue. 
The notion of dialogue has, however, also been invoked at other occasions. In fact, 
it increasingly seems to be referred to when the relationship between the European 
judges and domestic judges is discussed.15 Dialogue has been welcomed and 
encouraged,16 as well as commended as ‘valuable’17 and ‘more necessary than 
ever’.18 A case in point is the latest addition to the Convention: Protocol 16.19 
Coined the ‘Protocol of dialogue’ by a President of the Court,20 it gives the Court 
the competence to issue an advisory opinion on questions posed by the highest 
domestic courts.21 This competence should ‘further enhance the interaction between 
the Court and the national authorities and thereby reinforce implementation of the 
Convention, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity’.22 This principle 
dictates that the responsibility for securing the rights in the Convention is shared 
between, first and foremost, the states parties and, next in order, the Court. Exactly 
because the responsibility must be shared unequally between two different entities 
operating on separate levels, enhanced interaction or dialogue is welcomed.23 The 
notion is also advanced because the Court has no means to force the states to fulfil 
their part of the joint responsibility; it cannot but rely on a dialogue to press them to 
do their part.24 The UK Supreme Court’s judgment in R. v. Horncastle and Others 
also illustrates why many encourage dialogue. The notion suggests that national 
                                                        
13  No. 4184/10, 16 December 2014, para. 139.  
14  ECtHR, ‘Press Release; Conclusion of Judicial Dialogue between ECHR and UK Courts on Use of 
Hearsay Evidence’, ECHR 376 (2014), 16 December 2014.  
15  See: section IV.4.1.2.  
16  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 12(c). 
17  Lord Philips in R. v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 11; See also: Bratza (2012b).  
18  Tulkens (2012); See also: Consultative Council of European Judges, ‘Opinion No. 9 on the Role of 
National Judges in Ensuring an Effective Application of International and European Law’, 10 
November 2006, para. 27; Glas (2015), 248.  
19  Protocol 15 had not yet entered into force at the time of writing.  
20  Spielmann (2014a).  
21  See also: section II.4.4. 
22  Preamble to Protocol 16 ECHR.  
23  See also: section IV.1.2.  
24  See also: section IV.1.1.  
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courts can encourage the Court to pay more attention to the diversity of domestic 
(legal) traditions or explain to it that it has not fully grasped the intricacies of a 
domestic legal system. If such issues are brought to the Court’s attention, the Court 
is given the opportunity to improve its case law and to make it more convincing, as 
the Grand Chamber did in the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery. This helps to avoid 
potential conflicts between the national and the supranational level over the 
appropriate way of dealing with controversial or sensitive rights fundamental 
questions. 
Long before the notion of dialogue became a buzzword for the Convention 
system, it was already employed by academics researching other (emerging) legal 
systems to describe interaction between, for example, domestic courts from 
different states. Others have relied on the notion to construct a normative 
framework to regulate exchanges between courts, such as, the Court of Justice and 
the courts in the EU member states.25 The origins of academic legal writing about 
dialogue can be traced back to publications about the relationship between national 
(supreme) courts and the legislature. Viewing that relationship through the lens of 
dialogue exposes that judicial review is oftentimes followed by legislative action. A 
judgment is therefore not a final verdict, but offers room for a legislative response, 
which makes judicial review of decisions adopted by democratically sanctioned 
parliaments less problematic than is often thought. Although originally devised for 
domestic constitutional systems, different authors have demonstrated convincingly 
that the notion of dialogue can also be usefully applied to interaction in other legal 
systems.26 Indeed, the notion has been promoted as a normative ideal for judicial 
interaction across borders because it can help justify the role of a court in the 
adjudication of fundamental rights questions. In particular, it has been submitted 
that adopting a ‘dialogic approach’ allows international courts to pay respect to 
diverse practices as regards the protection of these rights in the states parties to the 
treaty of which it is the guardian. Furthermore, it has been proposed that engaging 
in dialogue and using the language of dialogue can help prevent conflict between 
courts functioning in a pluralist system and to work efficiently by citing each 
other.27  
3  THIS RESEARCH  
The most general characterisation of this research would be that it, first, answers the 
question for which reasons dialogue should take place in the Convention system 
and, second, describes whether and to what extent dialogue indeed takes place for 
the reasons given. Already from this characterisation in two parts it can be derived 
that the research is normatively charged, since answering the question for which 
reasons dialogue should take place is a normative exercise. It is also normatively 
                                                        
25  See also: section III.1.  
26  See also and see for examples: Glas (2015), 249.  
27  Ibid., 254.  
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charged in the sense that, even though the second part of the research is largely 
descriptive, it is based on and informed by the answers given to the normative 
question.  
This characterisation surely raises many questions. First, one may want to know 
why the question as to the reasons for Convention dialogue is worth posing, 
pondering and answering at all, and why is it worth the effort to analyse and 
describe the interaction within the Convention system in terms of dialogue. Also, 
the questions themselves require some further introduction. Another question that 
may come up is how Convention dialogue actually can be researched in any useful 
way. Further, it is worth noting that dialogue is an umbrella term and, clearly, one 
single study cannot explore this notion in its full breath, not even if it is limited to 
only one legal system. Therefore the question as to demarcation of the study may 
also arise: which aspects of Convention dialogue are to be explored and which need 
not to be considered? These questions are addressed in turn.  
3.1  Relevance  
As was noted above, dialogue has become a buzzword in the Convention system. 
Yet whereas the buzz has intensified, exactly why dialogue can be of added value to 
the system and, more precisely, to ensuring a fruitful relationship between the 
Court, the states and others is not often shed light on.28 To illustrate, although the 
UK Supreme Court remarked in R. v. Horncastle and Others that it discussed 
hearsay evidence extensively so there could take place ‘what may prove to be a 
valuable dialogue’, it did not explain why such a dialogue could be considered to be 
valuable.29 Nor do the users of the word dialogue usually explain how exactly this 
apparently useful concept can be operationalised in a practical sense.30  
This research aims to go beyond merely referring to the notion of dialogue, by 
dissecting the common-sense realisation, which can be found in many references, 
that it can add value to the Convention system. Although this research is based on 
the basic premise that the concept of dialogue can be valuable and useful to the 
system, it is recognised that this premise needs further elaboration and clarification. 
This will be done by developing a concept of dialogue that can serve as a normative 
framework for interaction in the Convention system. The research also goes beyond 
most references because they usually relate to judicial dialogue, to dialogue 
between the Court and domestic judges.31 This research, although it focuses on the 
relationship between the Court and the states, also takes into account these other 
Council of Europe bodies and their part in the dialogue: the Committee of Ministers 
(Committee), the Parliamentary Assembly (Assembly) and the Commissioner for 
                                                        
28  See for an exception: Gerards (2014b); See also: Amos (2012), 557.  
29  Lord Philips in R. v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 11. 
30  See for an exception: Gerards (2012b).  
31  See: section IV. 4.1.2.  
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Human Rights (Commissioner). All these actors will be referred to as the 
‘interlocutors’ in the Convention dialogue.  
The buzz not only makes one wonder why this concept can be useful but also 
how dialogue can take place. The ‘hearsay saga’ surely is a good example, but it is 
also a rare example. The dialogue could only take place, because after the adoption 
of a chamber judgment, a case was brought before a domestic court that permitted it 
to criticise the chamber judgment, before the Grand Chamber revised the chamber’s 
judgment upon referral. Such a chain of events is not likely to occur often in this 
order and over a relatively short span of time. The question therefore arises if there 
are other ways in which a dialogue could usefully take place within the Convention 
system. This study aims to address that question by scrutinising 26 procedures and 
procedural steps, thereby providing insight into the many ways in which dialogue 
can take place. It not only assesses the potential contribution of these procedures to 
Convention dialogue, but it also analyses which contribution they have made in 
practice. Referral of a chamber case to the Grand Chamber is one of these 
procedures; other examples include third-party interventions, unilateral 
declarations, questions and recommendations of the Assembly to the Committee, 
interim resolutions of the Committee and the pilot-judgment procedure. 
Moreover, recommendations are made as to how the dialogic potential and 
functioning of the procedures can be improved. These recommendations are made 
based on a description and analysis in the light of dialogue of the procedures. In 
particular, it is recommended how the procedures’ potential to contribute to 
dialogue can be enhanced, by better adjusting their design towards stimulating 
dialogue. Further, recommendations are made as to how the dialogic functioning of 
the procedures can be improved when it turns out that they have dialogic potential 
but do not fulfil this potential in practice.  
Also when the layer of dialogue is peeled off, the research remains of relevance, 
for it describes a number of Convention-related procedures in detail.32 Many of 
these procedures have received only little academic attention, especially when 
compared to the attention paid to the substantive articles laid down in the 
Convention. Furthermore, relatively little is written about the Committee’s 
supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments and about the role which the 
Assembly and the Commissioner can play in ensuring that the Convention is 
implemented and that the Court’s judgments are executed. This research 
concentrates on exactly these relatively unpopular themes. It describes how the 
different procedures and procedural steps should function according to their 
regulatory documents, such as the Rules of Court, and analyses how they function 
in practice. This descriptive analysis is enriched by information collected by way of 
research interviews with persons who work with these procedures on a day-to-day 
basis.  
                                                        
32  See also: section I.4.  
 
 
 
 Introduction
  
 
7 
3.2  Research Questions33 
The normative question which this research aims to answer is whether and, if so, 
how the notion of dialogue can be of added value to the Convention system. In 
order to give an informed and useful answer to this question, it is required that two 
underlying issues are addressed.  
First, some understanding of the Convention system should be attained. This 
understanding can be gained by answering the question how the Convention system 
can be characterised in terms of its establishment, functioning, the developments it 
has gone through and the way in which it has been reformed since its establishment. 
In particular, it is important to understand how these matters have determined and 
influenced the relation and distribution of powers and responsibilities between the 
five interlocutors in the Convention dialogue (the states parties, the Court, the 
Committee, the Assembly and the Commissioner).  
Answering the normative question is, second, greatly facilitated when one can 
rely on what others have written about the added value of dialogue to other systems. 
As was noted above, various scholars have already demonstrated convincingly that 
the notion can be usefully applied to dialogue in different legal systems. Outlining 
their ideas facilitates their translation to and use for the Convention system. This 
research relies on what others have written about the notion of dialogue as a source 
of inspiration, to inform its own normative account of Convention dialogue.  
The second main question raised in this study relates to the way in which the 
Convention system can be described in terms of dialogue. More specifically, the 
question is whether a set of 26 procedures34 have the potential to contribute to 
Convention dialogue and whether they contribute to this purpose in practice. All of 
these procedures are in some way or the other connected to the Convention system 
and they function as the practical interface between dialogue and its added value, as 
proposed in this research. Clearly this second question is of a different nature than 
the first one, for the answer to it requires a primarily descriptive analysis of 
procedures rather than a normative account. Answering this overall question can be 
made easier by recognising that it in fact covers two related, yet different questions.  
The first question is whether and to what extent the procedures existing in the 
Convention system have dialogic potential. In other words, do they possess the 
features needed to stimulate the coming into existence of a dialogue between 
interlocutors in the Convention system and if so, to what degree. This question is 
theoretical in the sense that it inquires whether the procedures could contribute to 
dialogue and not whether they indeed do so.  
The second question is a variant of the first and in fact is its more practical or 
empirical counterpart. It is the question whether the procedures that, in theory could 
contribute to dialogue, actually appear to make this contribution in practice.  
                                                        
33  See also: section IV.5.2.  
34  See: section IV.5.3.  
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3.3  Method35 
As was already noted, the normative question of how the notion of dialogue can be 
applied usefully to the Convention system is, in very general terms, answered by 
relying on a characterisation of the Convention system and of how the notion has 
been applied to other legal systems. The characterisation of the Convention system 
made in this study is based on a wide array of sources, including the travaux 
préparatoires of the Convention, legal documents, case law and academic literature. 
The characterisation of dialogue as used by others logically relies almost 
exclusively on a literature review of a selection of relevant academic literature on 
three legal systems. The inventory of these characterisations in combination makes 
it possible to translate the notion of dialogue, as used by others, to the Convention 
system and clarifies to which problems a ‘Convention concept of dialogue’ should 
provide an answer. 
To formulate an answer to the second question, i.e. whether the various 
Convention-related procedures contribute to Convention dialogue, this study 
develops and relies on ‘indicators for dialogue’. The indicators make the assessment 
of the ‘dialogicness’ of a procedure reasonably specific and precise. The choice of 
the indicators is informed by the normative framework of dialogue that is 
constructed in the first part of this research.36 As was explained, the second 
question can be divided into two separate questions.  
The first sub-question is whether the procedures have dialogic potential. To 
answer this question, a description is needed of how these procedures are supposed 
to function ‘on paper’. This description is made based on documents, such as, the 
Convention, the Rules of Court, the Rules of the Committee for the Supervision of 
the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements, and the 
Assembly Rules of Procedures.37 Subsequently, the potential for dialogue of the 
different procedures and procedural steps is assessed based on the indicators for 
dialogue.  
The answer to the second sub-question, i.e. whether the procedures with dialogic 
potential also contribute to dialogue in practice, also requires more than just 
applying the indicators. First, an analysis must be made of how the procedures 
function in practice. To construe an account of the practical functioning of the 
Convention procedures, various sources of information are used, amongst which, 
HUDOC, annual reports of the Committee, recommendations of the Assembly and 
press releases of the Commissioner. Moreover, to enable an adequate understanding 
of the actual functioning of a procedure, this desktop research has been 
complemented with 34 research interviews with judges of the Court, members of 
staff of the Registry, agents representing the states before the Court and persons 
                                                        
35  The websites relied upon were all last visited on 20 August 2015.  
36  See also: section IV.5.5.  
37  See also: section IV.5.6.1.  
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working in the field of execution.38 Prior to describing the functioning of each 
procedure, it is outlined in more detailed how the information relied upon was 
collected.  
3.4 Delineation – A Working Definition of ‘Convention Dialogue’  
It is particularly important to clearly delineate the boundaries of the research, 
because the definition of dialogue on which it eventually relies is not self-
explanatory, but rather detailed and technical. The best way to explain the 
delineation of this study therefore is to introduce here already the elements making 
up the definition of Convention dialogue. This definition has been specifically 
devised for the purposes of this research, based on the findings in the first part. It is 
spelled out in more detail in chapter IV.39  
The first element of this definition concerns the content of the dialogue. It is the 
most open element of the definition, as it describes the content of dialogue as an 
exchange of facts and/or viewpoints on any given topic. The second element is 
more limiting because it pinpoints that dialogue takes place between two or more 
institutional interlocutors. These are the states parties to the Convention, the Court, 
the Committee, the Assembly and the Commissioner. This means that the role 
played by individual applicants and their representatives is left out of consideration, 
even though they play an important role in the Convention system. This choice was 
made because the dialogue as described in this study in terms of its added value is 
primarily one that takes place between institutions. Third, the dialogue must be 
conducted through one of the 26 procedures or procedural steps identified in the 
study. The focus of the study is consequently clearly procedural, to the exclusion of 
informal dialogue.40 Lastly, it is submitted that dialogue is defined by its outcome. 
An exchange between interlocutors only counts as ‘dialogic’ if it contributes to 
cooperation between them or to reducing tension in the Convention system.41 The 
first part of this research leads to this definition and explains why these outcomes 
are desirable; the second focuses on whether dialogue, as defined by these elements, 
indeed takes place.  
Clearly, the delineation as just outlined does not apply to the first part of the 
study, i.e. to the characterisation of the Convention system or to the more general 
characterisation of the notion of dialogue. Instead, the characterisation of the 
Convention system in the first part of the book is determined by the angles from 
which it is approached, which means that not all aspects of the Convention system 
are addressed, but only its establishment, functioning, developments and reform. 
These angles provide a useful framework for characterising different aspects of the 
Convention system, while they also permit a more specific and thematic focus, 
                                                        
38  See also: section IV.5.6.2. 
39  See: section IV.5.4.  
40  See for examples of informal dialogue: IV.4.1.2. 
41  See also: section IV.4.3.  
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namely the relation and distribution of powers and responsibilities between the five 
interlocutors of interest. This theme is of particular relevance to the notion of 
dialogue and therefore to this study. Similarly, the notion of dialogue is not 
characterised comprehensively, but in a way that is conducive to studying its 
applicability in the Convention setting. The discussion concentrates on how the 
notion has been applied to three legal settings by a selection of authors. These three 
settings are the national constitutional, the EU and the transjudicial settings.42 The 
national constitutional setting was selected because it is the origin of the discourse 
on dialogue; the other two settings were chosen because they have features which 
are comparable to those of the Convention system. The selection of the authors was 
based on the aim to include some who use the notion of dialogue as a descriptive 
tool and others who approach the notion in a normative manner.  
4  OUTLINE  
This study proceeds in three parts. Each part is divided into separate chapters and 
the three parts taken together encompass chapters II-XII. The last chapter, which 
draws conclusions and makes recommendations, chapter XIII, falls outside these 
parts, as does this chapter.  
Part 1 is composed of chapters II, III and IV. The first two chapters prepare the 
groundwork for the last. Chapter II characterises the Convention system, chapter III 
explores already existing ideas about the notion of dialogue and chapter IV gives a 
normative account of the added value of applying the notion to the Convention 
system. The last chapter of part 1 also defines Convention dialogue for the purposes 
of this study and describes the indicators of dialogue.  
Part 2 concerns the dialogic potential of the Convention-related procedures. 
These procedures are divided into separate categories: those belonging to the (pre-
)merits phase (chapter V), those belonging to the execution phase (chapter VI) and 
the pilot-judgment procedure (chapter VII; ‘PJP’). The (pre-)merits phase 
commences when an application alleging a violation of the Convention is registered 
at the Court and ends with the adoption by the Court of a decision or a judgment. 
When the merits phase ends in a judgment,43 the execution phase starts and ought to 
result in the enforcement of a judgment. The PJP is discussed in a separate chapter 
because it is a unique and uncommonly comprehensive procedure. As was noted 
above, the relevance of this research lies in part in its description in detail of a 
number of Convention-related procedures. Peeling off the layer of dialogue to 
permit easy access to these descriptions is facilitated by the way in which the first 
three chapters of part 2 (and part 3) are structured. First, a description of the 
procedures is given and, then, the procedures are scrutinised in the light of the 
notion of dialogue. The last chapter of part 2, chapter VIII concludes part 2 and 
                                                        
42  Transjudicial communication is ‘communication among courts – whether national or supranational 
– across borders’, see: Slaugther (1994), 99. 
43  Or in a friendly settlement.  
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answers the question whether the procedures have dialogic potential by integrating 
the findings made in the preceding three chapters in the light of the indicators for 
dialogue and by giving an overview of the level of dialogic potential per procedure.  
Part 3 (chapters IX-XII) follows a similar structure as part 2. This time, the 
dialogicness in practice of the procedures is commented on. 
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CHAPTER II 
A CHARACTERISATION OF THE CONVENTION 
SYSTEM 
 
 
 
This chapter is, together with the next, a necessary predecessor of chapter IV, which 
inter alia will describe the added value of dialogue for the Convention system. 
Clearly, to come to such a description, it is first required that the characteristics of 
the Convention system itself are introduced. The characterisation in this chapter is 
made from four angles: the system’s establishment, its functioning, the 
developments it has gone through and past and current reform to the system. To 
ensure the relevance of this chapter to the central theme of this study – Convention 
dialogue, the chapter focuses mainly on how the system’s establishment, 
functioning, development and reform have determined and influenced the relation 
and the distribution of power and responsibilities between the interlocutors taking 
part in that dialogue.  
1  THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM  
1.1 Unity and Human Rights  
The establishment of the Convention system can be understood in the light of the 
development of two ideals that preceded the First and Second World War and that 
came to bloom directly thereafter: European unity and human rights. The ideal of 
European unity through either voluntary or forced means can be traced back as far 
as Charlemagne, Napoleon and Kant;1 that of human rights as far back as the 
American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man.2 Moreover, the ideals of cooperation, peace and security played a role during 
the Interbellum when the states parties to the League of Nations agreed to the 
Covenant of the League ‘in order to promote international co-operation and to 
secure international peace and security’.3 The ideals of unity and human rights 
transcended Europe and appealed universally after the end of the Second World 
War. In June 1945, the UN was established. Its Charter clearly echoes the two 
ideals. The UN is to be a ‘centre for harmonizing the actions of all nations’, aiming 
                                                        
1  Weil (1963), 21.  
2  Jacobs et al. (2014), 3.  
3  Preamble League of Nations Covenant.  
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to take collective measures to attain the common ends of maintaining international 
peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations and to achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems.4 The UN Charter also 
refers to human rights at different occasions.5 Most importantly, one of the UN’s 
purposes is to ‘achieve international co-operation […] in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms’.6 Three years 
later, in December 1948, the UN General Assembly proclaimed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration). That document sets forth 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and is as a declaration not 
legally binding.  
In Europe, parallel developments took place in order promote unity and respect 
for human rights. These developments would ‘supplement’ the global 
developments.7 Ten western European states8 established the Council of Europe in 
May 1949, aiming to ‘to achieve a greater unity between its members for the 
purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their 
common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress’.9 Human 
rights have been a defining principle for this organisation ever since the conclusion 
of its Statute. Only states that are ‘deemed to be able and willing to’10 ‘accept the 
principles of the rule of law and of […] human rights and fundamental freedoms’11 
may become a member.12 Moreover, any member state that has ‘seriously violated’ 
human rights and fundamental freedoms may cease to be a member.13  
Of all the ‘ambitious proposals for European unity […] launched in the first 
wave of enthusiasm in 1949 […] only one survived to the stage of practical 
realisation’: the conclusion of the Convention.14 The ideals of European unity and 
human rights played an inseparable role in the minds of the drafters in mainly two 
ways. First, human rights protection through the enforcement mechanism laid down 
in the Convention was seen as a method to pursue the Council of Europe’s aim of 
‘the achievement of greater unity between its members’.15 Only if the member 
states would protect human rights, democracy could be guaranteed and this ‘was a 
sine qua non for European unification’.16 Second, unity between the founding 
                                                        
4  Art. 1 UN Charter.  
5  Preamble and Arts. 1(3), 13(1)(b), 55(c), 62(2), 68, 76(c) UN Charter.  
6  Art. 1(3) UN Charter.  
7  Robertson (1975), 50 (Lannung speaking at the 1st Session of the Consultative Assembly held at 
Strasbourg from 10 August to 8 September 1949). 
8  Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and 
UK; Greece and Turkey joined in August 1949.  
9  Art. 1(a) Council of Europe Statute.  
10  Art. 4 Council of Europe Statute.  
11  Art. 3 Council of Europe Statute. 
12  Art. 4 Council of Europe Statute. 
13  Art. 8 Council of Europe Statute. 
14  Robertson (1975), xxi. 
15  Preamble ECHR.  
16  Weil (1963), 22.  
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‘likeminded’17 states was the foundation on which European cooperation rested. 
Unity allowed Europe to build on and go beyond the Universal Declaration. In the 
words of the drafters: 
 
[...] there are special possibilities for supplementing and strengthening some of the 
rather vague provisions [in the Universal Declaration] having in view a Charter 
which is to apply on European soil alone. [...] in this limited, more uniform territory 
of Europe – based as it is on the same culture, and where political traditions follow 
the same main lines – there will often be much better conditions for reaching more 
easily positive results and working more practically and concretely [...].18 
 
These ‘better conditions’ led to the conclusion of the Convention, which, as 
opposed to the Universal Declaration, includes comparatively precisely defined 
rights, is legally binding and establishes an enforcement mechanism: the Court, 
which together with the Committee supervises the implementation of the 
Convention rights.  
1.2  Drafting the Convention  
With the recent peace after the end of the Second World War and the newly 
perceived threat to peace posed by communism, a unique momentum, based on past 
and future threats to peace, was created for the drafters of the Convention to come 
closer to the realisation of their ideals of unity and human rights.19 As one drafter 
stated: ‘the question [i.e. the protection of human rights] is particularly burning in 
the Europe of our time’.20 The drafters envisaged the Convention as an instrument 
that would be ‘an early warning system to sound the alarm in case Europe’s 
fledgling democracies began to backslide toward totalitarianism’21 and that would 
also strengthen ‘the resistance [...] against insidious attempts to undermine our 
democratic way of life from within or without’, that is, protecting states from 
communism.22 The Convention, which was designed for democratic states that 
adhere to the rule of law, was not an ‘aspirational programme’, but reflected the 
rights that were already being protected.23 The founding states therefore expected 
they would only occasionally be found in violation of the Convention.24  
                                                        
17  Preamble ECHR.  
18  Robertson (1975), 50 (Lannung speaking at the 1st Session of the Consultative Assembly held at 
Strasbourg from 10 August to 8 September 1949).  
19  Harris et al. (2014), 3.  
20  Robertson (1975), 52 (Lannung speaking at the 1st Session of the Consultative Assembly held at 
Strasbourg from 10 August to 8 September 1949). 
21  Helfer (2008), 129.  
22  Robertson (1975), 30 (Lord Layton speaking at the 1st Session of the Consultative Assembly held at 
Strasbourg from 10 August to 8 September 1949); Madsen (2007), 140; Bates (2010), 5, 7.  
23  Costa (2009a), 2.  
24  Bates (2010), 167.  
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The earliest version of the Convention was written by the European Movement, 
a post-war non-governmental movement for European unity that had also initiated 
the establishment of the Council of Europe. The Movement submitted its version to 
the Committee in July 1949. After some initial disinclination on the side of the 
Committee, the Council of Europe started a drafting process that was a combined 
effort of the Committee and the Assembly.25 This process finished on 4 November 
1950 when thirteen states signed the Convention.26 
The drafting process was, however, not wholly finished, because the Committee 
could not reach agreement on the inclusion of the right to protection of property, the 
right to education and the right to free elections in the Convention in November 
1950. Instead of delaying the conclusion of the document, the Committee decided 
to leave the issue to a committee of experts for further study.27 In March 1952, 
agreement was reached in the form of Protocol 1, protecting the above-mentioned 
rights.28 In a way, the drafting process has never wholly ended, as the states have 
continued to add Protocols to the Convention.  
2  THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM  
In order to gain an understanding of the functioning of the Convention system, the 
current object and purpose of that system is first outline. Thereafter, the main 
players in the system are introduced. These players will be referred to as 
‘interlocutors’, as this study is on dialogue. Because, as was stated in the 
introduction, this chapter is predominantly interested in the distribution of power 
and responsibilities between these interlocutors, the functioning of the system is 
also characterised by inquiring into how the tasks assigned to the interlocutors are 
divided and into the relations between the interlocutors. The relation Court-states is 
discussed separately and in most detail, because the Court and the states are the 
most important interlocutors. Their importance stems from the responsibilities 
which the Convention assigns to them. Further, by describing their relation from the 
perspective of two guiding principles, the subsidiarity and effectiveness principle, 
the way the Convention system functions generally is clarified. 
2.1  The Object and Purpose  
In order to understand the Convention system, it is important to understand its 
object and purpose. The current object and purpose can be derived from the 
Convention’s Preamble and the Court’s case law. Preambles are, according to the 
                                                        
25  The Assembly was then called the Consultative Assembly.  
26  Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, the Saar Government, Turkey and the UK; On 28 November 1950 
Greece and Sweden signed, see: Weil (1963), 35.  
27  Weil (1963), 34.  
28  Arts. 1, 2, 3 Protocol 1 ECHR. 
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Court, ‘generally very useful for the determination of the “object” and “purpose”‘ 
of an instrument and the Court interprets the Convention in the light of its object 
and purpose in its case law.29 The Convention system has mainly developed – 
beyond the expectations and perhaps the wishes of the drafters – as a system for the 
protection of individual human rights. In fact, protecting these rights is the system’s 
driving force and the Convention even seems to have achieved the status of a 
European Bill of Rights.30 The Preamble to the Convention provides that human 
rights should be maintained, further realised, collectively enforced, and commonly 
understood and observed. The Court in its case law marks the Convention as ‘a 
treaty for the effective protection of individual human rights’,31 a statement that is 
highly relevant to the interpretation of the Convention in light of its object and 
purpose.32 The importance attached to the protection of individual human rights has 
grown over the years; in the early years of the system, the Convention ‘was much 
more about protecting the democratic identity of member states [...], and about 
promoting international cooperation between them, than it was about providing 
individuals with redress for human rights violations’.33 The Convention was also 
‘designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’.34 
The High Contracting Parties designed the Convention with the purpose of 
establishing ‘a common public order of the free democracies of Europe’.35 This is, 
in the words of the Court, ‘apparent’ from the Preamble, because it: 
 
establishes a very clear connection between the Convention and democracy by 
stating that the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are best ensured on the one hand by an effective political democracy and 
on the other by a common understanding and observance of human rights [...]. The 
Preamble goes on to affirm that European countries have a common heritage of 
political tradition, ideals, freedom and the rule of law.36 
 
                                                        
29  Golder v. UK (Plenary), No. 4451/70, 21 February 1975, para. 34; This is in conformity with Art. 
31(2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
30  Bates (2010), 5.  
31  Saadi v. UK (GC), No. 13229/03, 29 January 2008, para. 62.  
32  Ibid., para. 62; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia (GC), No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, para. 275.  
33  Greer (2008), 682; See for an alternative view on the Court and Commission’s first years, namely 
that ‘they took great care to gain acceptance by the member states of the Council of Europe towards 
a stage of careful supervision of fundamental rights’: Schermers (1999), 823.  
34  United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 133/1996/752/951, 30 January 
1998, para. 45.  
35  Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey (Commission), No. 15299/89 et al., para. 
20.  
36  United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 133/1996/752/951, 30 January 
1998, para. 45. 
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The ‘very clear link’37 between the Convention and democracy is also apparent 
from Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11, which stipulate that the rights protected by them may 
only be interfered with when this is ‘necessary in a democratic society’.38 
2.2  Interlocutors  
2.2.1  States Parties  
The 47 states parties to the Convention, all also member states to the Council of 
Europe, are decidedly the most important actors in the Convention system. Article 1 
assigns them responsibility for securing to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention. The role of the states parties under 
this Article, and the way their role relates to that of the Court, is discussed in more 
detail in section II.2.3.2. The responsibility of the states extends however beyond 
Article 1: according to the Court, ‘the Convention comprises more than mere 
reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates, over and above, a 
network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations, which, in the 
words of the Preamble, benefit from “collective enforcement”‘.39 From this 
perspective, the states should not only enforce the Convention domestically, but 
should also be concerned with their fellow states’ implementation of the 
Convention. The Committee, as described below, is probably the most appropriate 
forum to collectively enforce the Convention by holding other states to account. 
Furthermore, the states should take ‘into account the Court’s developing case law, 
also with a view to considering the conclusions to be drawn from a judgment 
finding a violation of the Convention by another State, where the same problem of 
principle exists within their own legal system’.40 
2.2.2 The Court  
The Court was established by the Convention ‘[t]o ensure the observance of the 
engagements undertaken’ by the parties to the Convention.41 As the guardian of the 
Convention, the Court’s function depends to a large extent on the object and 
purpose of the Convention. The Court itself notes that ‘its function is in principle to 
rule on the compatibility with the Convention of [...] existing [national] measures’42 
and its jurisdiction extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and 
                                                        
37  Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 41340/98 et al., 13 February 2003, 
para. 99.  
38  United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 133/1996/752/951, 30 January 
1998, para. 45. 
39  Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para. 239.  
40  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Action Plan para. 
4(c).  
41  Art. 19 ECHR.  
42  Hirst v. UK (no. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005, para. 83.  
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application of the Convention.43 The Court decides whether it has jurisdiction44 and 
only the Court is empowered to ‘give the final ruling’ on whether a national 
measure is compatible with the Convention.45 Within its jurisdiction, the Court may 
receive inter-state cases and individual applications, and it has the power to give 
advisory opinions at the Committee’s request.46 In inter-state cases, the Court can 
establish a breach of the Convention in abstracto,47 but in individual cases, it ‘must 
assess the contested limitation in the light of the particular circumstances of the 
case’.48 The Court is composed of 47 judges, each nominated by one state party and 
elected by the Assembly,49 but not representing the nominating state. The 
Convention provides that the judges ‘shall be of a high moral character and must 
either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or 
be jurisconsults of recognised competence’.50 
2.2.3  The Committee  
The Committee is the voice of the representatives of governments in the Council of 
Europe51 and assumes legislative and executive functions.52 In line with these 
functions, it is empowered to conclude conventions,53 suspend the rights of 
representation of a state and to ask states to withdraw from the organisation.54 It 
also decides ‘with binding effect’ all matters relating to the internal organisation.55  
More importantly for the purposes of this study, the Convention makes the 
Committee responsible for supervising the execution of the terms of friendly 
settlements and the Court’s judgments in Article 46(2). The division of 
responsibilities between the Committee and the Court under the Convention is 
therefore divided along procedural lines: first, the Court pronounces a judgment 
and, then, the Committee supervises the execution of a judgment.56 Both 
institutions are therefore responsible for supervising or reviewing the conduct of the 
states parties, but while the Court supervises their conduct generally, the Committee 
supervises their conduct only in relation to execution. The Court acknowledges that: 
 
                                                        
43  Art. 32(1) ECHR.  
44  Art. 32(2) ECHR.  
45  Handyside v. UK (Plenary), No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49.  
46  Arts. 33, 34, 47 ECHR.  
47  Art. 33 ECHR (‘any alleged breach’); Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, 
paras. 239-240.  
48  Cordova v. Italy (no 2.), No. 45649/99, 30 January 2003, para. 58.  
49  Arts. 20, 22 ECHR.  
50  Art. 21(1) ECHR. 
51  Preamble Council of Europe Statute.  
52  Palmer (2010), 93.  
53  Art. 15(a) Council of Europe Statute.  
54  Art. 8 Council of Europe Statute.  
55  Art. 16 Council of Europe Statute.  
56  Arts. 19, 46(2) ECHR.  
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it has in principle no jurisdiction to review the [...] measures [...] adopted by the 
respondent State to secure the rights of the applicants which the Court found to be 
violated […]. This, it will be recalled, is a matter for the [Committee]’.57 
 
The task division is therefore rather clear-cut, because both are responsible for a 
different part of the procedure through which a Convention case travels. The 
Committee may further refer judgments that are hindered by a problem of 
interpretation to the Court and refer to the Court the question whether a party has 
failed to fulfil its obligation to execute a judgment.58  
The Committee is composed of the 47 ministers of foreign affairs of the states 
parties.59 The ministers, however, only meet twice a year; the day-to-day running of 
the organ is carried out by the ministers’ deputies, who are career diplomats and the 
states’ permanent representatives in Strasbourg.60 The deputies meet four times a 
year under Article 46(2) and decide whether a state has appropriately executed a 
judgment by adopting a final resolution.61 Chapter X, on the functioning of 
execution in practice, introduces and describes two assisting bodies to the 
Committee: its Secretariat and the Department for the Execution of Judgments of 
the Court. They are discussed in that chapter rather than here, because these bodies 
are not mentioned in the Convention, but are nevertheless of great practical 
relevance to execution.  
2.2.4  The Assembly 
The Assembly is the ‘deliberative organ’ of the Council of Europe representing 
national parliaments.62 It ‘may discuss and make recommendations upon any matter 
within the aim and scope’ of the Council of Europe.63 The Assembly should not be 
confused with a legislative organ, because the legislative powers in the Council of 
Europe are reserved to the Committee.64 The sole responsibility which the 
Convention assigns to the Assembly is to elect the Court’s judges.65 However, as 
will be demonstrated,66 the Assembly has, on paper at least, some opportunities for 
to become involved in the adjudicative process before the Court and in the 
execution phase. Further, as section X.2.7 will explain, the Assembly has taken a 
special interest in execution matters since the start of the 2000s. The 318 
representatives and 318 substitutes of which the Assembly exists are national 
                                                        
57  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 91.  
58  Art. 46(3-4) ECHR.  
59  Art. 14 Council of Europe Statute.  
60  Harris et al. (2014), 181. 
61  Rule 17 of the Committee; See also: sections X.2.3. and VI.1.3.  
62  Art. 22 Council of Europe Statute.  
63  Art. 23(a) Council of Europe Statute.  
64  Art. 15 Council of Europe Statute.  
65  Art. 22 ECHR.  
66  See: sections V.2.1 and VI.1.7.  
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parliamentarians who are elected or appointed by their national parliament to go to 
Strasbourg.67 The Assembly therefore has the ‘dual nature of an inter-state 
Assembly and an Assembly representative of national parliaments’.68 Further, 
according to the Assembly, its members have legitimacy of national members of 
parliament, because they are elected by national parliaments, and legitimacy in the 
Council of Europe, because the Assembly examines the credentials of potential 
members and may refuse them.69  
2.2.5  The Commissioner  
The Commissioner, the youngest interlocutor, was established in 1999 as a ‘non-
judicial institution to promote education in, awareness of and respect for human 
rights, as embedded in the human rights instruments of the Council of Europe’.70 
The Commissioner must inquire into structural defects ‘in the law and practice’ of 
the Council of Europe states;71 (s)he should not ‘take up individual complaints’.72 
Further, the Commissioner is required to ‘respect the competence of, and perform 
functions other than those fulfilled by, the supervisory bodies set up under the 
[Convention]’.73 Although the Commissioner must function ‘independently and 
impartially’,74 the office was instituted to assist the Committee and the Assembly as 
it must respond to their requests, forward its annual report to them and ‘take into 
account’ their views concerning his/her activities.75 The Commissioner is also 
instructed to make use of and cooperate with national human rights structures when 
dealing with the public and to facilitate the activities of national ombudsmen and 
similar institutions.76 The Commissioner is further authorised to ‘directly contact’ 
governments.77 On their part, the states must ‘facilitate the independent and 
effective performance by the Commissioner’ of his functions.78 The Commissioner 
has come to focus on three activities: engaging in dialogue with governments and 
conducting country visits, issuing thematic recommendations and awareness 
raising, and promoting the development of national human rights institutions.79 
Under the Convention, the Commissioner is competent to submit written comments 
                                                        
67  Arts. 25-26 Council of Europe Statute.  
68  Schieder (2006), para. 47.  
69  Idem. 
70  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, CM(99)50, 7 May 1999, 
Art. 1(1).  
71  Ibid., Art. 3(e).  
72  Ibid., Art. 1(2).  
73  Idem.  
74  Ibid., Art. 2.  
75  Ibid., Arts. 3(g-h), 4.  
76  Ibid., Art. 3(c-d).  
77  Ibid., Art. 7.  
78  Ibid., Art. 6(1).  
79  Gardetto (2007), para. 18.  
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or to take part in hearings.80 Like the Court’s judges, the Commissioner is elected 
by the Assembly from a list of three candidates drawn up by the Committee.81 
 
2.3  The Principle of Subsidiarity  
Article 1 provides that ‘The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone 
within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention’. The 
states parties therefore have primary responsibility for implementing the 
Convention.82 The ‘primarity principle’ captures this type of responsibility and is 
‘concerned with the obligations incumbent on domestic authorities in the 
implementation of the ECHR’.83 Placing primary responsibility with the states 
logically means that subsidiary responsibility is placed with the international 
enforcement system established by the Convention, which is captured by the 
subsidiarity principle.84 Although therefore both the Court and the Committee play 
a subsidiary role, this section focuses on the Court, because the subsidiarity 
principle plays a role of great importance in its case law. The principle of 
subsidiarity is concerned with the Court’s review of ‘the Contracting Parties’ 
observance of their obligations under the ECHR’.85 The Court refers systematically 
to the subsidiarity principle; it does not rely on the primarity principle in the sense 
that it expressly mentions it. For this reason, this study refers to the subsidiarity 
principle rather than the primarity principle when meaning to refer to both 
principles, as they are two sides of the same coin; by mentioning one principle, the 
other principle is also referred to implicitly.  
This section explores the subsidiarity principle in more depth and in particular, 
its existence in other systems, the insight which the principle gives into the roles of 
the Court and the states parties and the manifestations of the principle in 
proceedings before the Court.  
2.3.1  Background  
The subsidiarity principle is considered to constitute a foundational principle of 
international human rights law86 and is regarded as a central principle of EU law. 
These other systems, as well as the Convention system, give similar pragmatic and 
normative ground reasons for relying on the principle, although the precise way in 
                                                        
80  Art. 36(3) ECHR.  
81  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, CM(99)50, 7 May 1999, 
Art. 9(1).  
82  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011, para. 287. 
83  Christoffersen (2009), 360.  
84  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011, para. 287.  
85  Christoffersen (2009), 360. 
86  Carter (2009), 319.  
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which the principle functions may differ in each system. In its ‘simplest form, [...] 
subsidiarity holds that international [...] standards are best implemented at the 
lowest level of government that can effectuate those standards’.87 The subsidiarity 
principle has exactly this meaning also in the EU. The principle, as laid down in the 
Treaty on European Union, expresses the wish ‘to ensure that decisions are taken as 
closely as possible to the citizens of the Union’,88 probably because the drafters 
assumed that the member states are generally better placed to take action than the 
EU. The Strasbourg Court also employs the ‘better placed argument’. It explains 
that ‘national authorities [are] in principle better placed than an international court 
to evaluate local needs and conditions,’89 due to their ‘direct and continuous contact 
with the vital forces of their countries’.90 In international human rights law, the 
principle acknowledges that international organisations depend on the member 
states’ voluntary compliance and enforcement of the rights they aim to protect.91 
Moreover, applying the principle to international organisations is a ‘practical 
necessity,’ because these organisations simply do not have sufficient resources to be 
the first channel of communication.92  
2.3.2  Role of the Court and the States Parties  
Thinking in terms of primarity and subsidiarity clarifies the manner in which the 
national and international components of the Convention system are supposed to 
work and should share responsibilities according to the Convention and its drafters.  
The most important prerequisite for the functioning of the Convention system in 
line with the principle of subsidiarity is the existence of an effective national system 
for the protection of the Convention rights. An effective national system 
encompasses roughly two components. The states parties must, first, secure and 
implement the Convention in their own legal system. They are by virtue of Article 1 
obliged to secure to everyone in their jurisdiction directly the substance of the rights 
and freedoms set forth in the document.93 The effect of implementation matters, not 
the means of implementation, because the Convention does not lay down the 
manner in which the states must ensure the effective implementation of its 
provisions.94 States are therefore not obliged to incorporate the Convention into 
domestic law,95 but are only obliged to secure the rights ‘in some form or 
                                                        
87  Idem.  
88  Preamble Protocol 2 TEU; Art. 5 Protocol 2 TEU provides: ‘Under the principle of subsidiarity [...] 
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the Member States’. 
89  Hatton and Others v. UK (GC), No. 36022/97, 8 July 2003, para. 97.  
90  Handyside v. UK (Plenary), No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 48.  
91  Carter (2009), 319. 
92  Helfer (2008), 128.  
93  Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para. 239.  
94  Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, No. 5614/72, 6 February 1967, para. 50.  
95  Observer and Guardian v. UK (Plenary), No. 13585/88, 26 November 1991, para. 76.  
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another’.96 The intention to secure nevertheless ‘finds a particularly faithful 
reflection in those instances where the Convention has been incorporated into 
domestic law’97 and nowadays all states have incorporated the Convention into their 
domestic legal orders.98 When a violation takes place in spite of a state’s efforts to 
abide by the above obligation, it is ‘fundamental to the machinery of protection 
established by the Convention that the national systems themselves provide redress 
for breaches of the provisions’.99 Both Articles 13 and 35(1) contain the obligation 
to provide an effective remedy to enforce the Convention rights100 and articulate the 
subsidiary character of the Convention.101 Article 13 requires that that ‘where an 
individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation of the [Convention 
rights], he should have a remedy before a national authority in order both to have 
his claim decided and, if appropriate, to obtain redress’.102 The exhaustion of 
domestic remedies rule in Article 35(1) ‘is based on the assumption, reflected in 
Article 13 [...], that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged 
breach in the domestic system’.103 When, in contradiction with the above, states fail 
to fulfil their primary obligations to implement the Convention and, as part of the 
implementation process, to provide for an effective remedy for Convention 
breaches, Convention complaints might go more or less automatically to the 
Strasbourg Court, which then would become nothing more than a ‘court of fourth 
instance’. As a consequence, the international system would be deprived of its 
subsidiary character.  
The Court’s role in line with the subsidiarity principle is at its core supervisory: 
it reviews whether the measures chosen by the states parties in matters governed by 
the Convention are in conformity with Convention requirements, as interpreted in 
the light of its case law.104 Choices made in the states therefore go ‘hand in hand 
with a European supervision’, which concerns ‘both the aim of the measure 
challenged and its “necessity”; it covers not only the basic legislation but also the 
decision applying it, even one given by an independent court’.105 The Court 
therefore exerts a power of review over the states parties, to the extent that the 
decision made on the domestic level come within the Convention’s ambit. 
However, in line with the subsidiarity principle, certain domestic choices fall 
outside the Court’s scope of review. It is, for example, not for the Court to establish 
the way and means of meeting Article 8 obligations; the ‘Court’s supervisory 
function [...] is limited to reviewing whether or not the particular solution adopted 
                                                        
96  James and Others v. UK (Plenary), No. 8793/79, 21 February 1986, para. 84. 
97  Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para. 239.  
98  Stone Sweet (2012), 1864.  
99  Z. and Others v. UK (GC), No. 29392/95, 10 May 2001, para. 103.  
100  James and Others v. UK (Plenary), No. 8793/79, 21 February 1986, para. 84. 
101  Kudła v. Poland (GC), No. 30210/96, 26 October 2000, para. 152. 
102  Silver and Others v. UK, No. 5947/72 et al., 25 March 1983, para. 113.  
103  Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 21893/93, 16 September 1996, para. 65.  
104  Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 191.  
105  Handyside v. UK (Plenary), No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49.  
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can be regarded as striking a fair balance’.106 The Court’s adherence to the 
principles therefore limits its power of review over national authorities, as the 
manifestations of the principle below illustrate.  
2.3.3  Manifestations  
In the admissibility stage, the subsidiarity principle manifests itself clearly in the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule.107 This rule dispenses the states parties from 
answering to the Court before they have had the opportunity to remedy a violation 
domestically. The rule is ‘an important aspect’ of the subsidiarity principle and is 
based on the ‘assumption’ of the availability of an effective remedy ‘in respect of 
the alleged breach in the domestic system’.108 The Court considers this rule with 
reference to the subsidiarity principle and therefore stresses the freedom of states to 
put matters right at home first. When it would also consider the rule through the 
primarity principle, it would furthermore need to stress the obligation on the states 
to in fact provide effective remedies domestically in line with Article 13.  
Two manifestations of the principle in the merits phase can be found in two 
doctrines for the interpretation of the Convention employed by the Court. In line 
with the first instance doctrine and Article 32(1), the Court does not ‘deal with 
errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as 
they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention’.109 
Matters primarily for national authorities are, for example, regulating rules on the 
admissibility of evidence110 and interpreting and applying domestic law.111 By way 
of the first instance doctrine, the Court plays its subsidiary role and respects the 
primary responsibility of the states. The margin of appreciation doctrine gives the 
states parties some discretion when assessing the ‘necessity’ of interference with a 
Convention right.112 The wider the margin, the more the role of the Court can be 
characterised as subsidiary. This doctrine and the subsidiarity principle are 
unsurprisingly based on similar rationales, such as the ‘better placed argument’113 
and respect for diversity.114 In Hirst v. UK (no. 2), for example, the Court held that 
the states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in the area of organising electoral 
systems, because ‘[t]here are numerous ways of organising and running electoral 
systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural 
                                                        
106  Hatton and Others v. UK (GC), No. 36022/97, 8 July 2003, para. 123. 
107  Art. 35(1) ECHR.  
108  Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 21893/93, 16 September 1996, para. 65.  
109  García Ruiz v. Spain (GC), No. 30544/96, 21 January 1999, para. 28.  
110  Idem.  
111  K.-H. W. v. Germany (GC), No. 37201/97, 22 March 2001, para. 44.  
112  Hatton and Others v. UK (GC), No. 36022/97, 8 July 2003, para. 101.  
113  Idem; Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 ECHR, para. 9. 
114  Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, para. 61.  
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diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State 
to mould into their own democratic vision’.115  
In the execution phase, the subsidiarity principle manifests itself in the 
essentially declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments.116 When it comes to putting 
an end to a violation, the Court has repeatedly stated that ‘it is primarily for the 
State concerned to choose the means to be used in its domestic legal order in order 
to discharge its legal obligation under Article 46’.117 In this way, the power of 
review of the Court over the states parties is attenuated, because the states are given 
the discretion to choose their own way of remedying a violation. The discretion is 
clearly linked to the subsidiarity principle. The Court explains that ‘[the] discretion 
as to the manner of execution of a judgment reflects the freedom of choice attached 
to the primary obligation of the Contracting States under the Convention to secure 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed’.118  
2.4  The Principle of Effectiveness  
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is ‘of crucial importance’119 and required by 
the object and purpose of the Convention120 that the document ‘is interpreted and 
applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical 
and illusory’.121 It is the Court’s function ‘to ensure that a State’s obligation to 
protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged’.122 When 
ensuring this, the Court looks ‘behind appearances and investigates the realities of 
the situation complained of’.123 The effectiveness principle is thus concerned with 
the importance of the practical and effective interpretation and application of the 
Convention in line with its object and purpose.124 The effectiveness principle can be 
derived from this type of reasoning and from safeguards built in Convention 
provisions that are discussed below as manifestations of the principle. Further, the 
word ‘effective’ literally features in different Convention articles.125 Article 34, for 
example, guarantees the ‘effective exercise of the right of application’ and is, 
according to the Court, ‘one of the fundamental guarantees of the effectiveness of 
the Convention system’.126 When considering the system in terms of effectiveness, 
it becomes clear how the Court uses the effectiveness principle as a safety net in 
                                                        
115  Hirst v. UK (no. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005, para. 61.  
116  Assanidze v. Georgia (GC), No. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, para. 202.  
117  Idem.  
118  Idem.  
119  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, para. 104.  
120  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99 et al., 4 February 2005, para. 101.  
121  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, para. 104. 
122  Gäfgen v. Germany (GC), No. 22978/05, 1 June 2010, para. 123.  
123  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, para. 151.  
124  Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 311-312; Jackson (2006), 774-776; Forowicz (2010), 12-13.  
125  Preamble and Arts. 13, 34, 52 ECHR; Preamble Protocol 12 ECHR.  
126  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99 et al., 4 February 2005, para. 100.  
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situations where strict reliance on the on the subsidiarity principle may render the 
protection of the Convention rights practically ineffective, that is, when the national 
system does not fulfil the aforementioned prerequisite of effective domestic human 
rights protection. The effectiveness principle therefore ensures that, in case of an 
ineffective domestic system, at least the Strasbourg component of the system can 
afford protection to the victim of a violation. 
To elaborate on the effectiveness principle, this section sketches how the 
principle is used in other legal systems, explains what the principle can tell us about 
the role of the Court and the states parties and gives examples of manifestations of 
the principle.  
2.4.1  Background  
The effectiveness principle is, like the subsidiarity principle, also used in other legal 
systems. Public international law, as a ‘realistic legal system’, is ‘largely based on 
the principle of effectiveness, that is to say, it provides that only those claims and 
situations which are effective can produce legal consequences [and] permeates the 
whole body of rules making up international law’.127 The International Court of 
Justice holds that the principle ‘has an important role in the law of treaties and in 
the jurisprudence of the Court’.128 States emerging from secession, for example, can 
only claim international status when they indeed exercise territorial sovereignty and 
have a permanent population.129 The principle is also a general principle of EU law 
that can be found in the case law of the CJEU and that has been reaffirmed by 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights that enshrines the principle of 
effective judicial protection.130 The CJEU requires that national remedies for 
breaches of EU rights should be effective and this requirement has ‘modified 
considerably the basic notion of national procedural autonomy’.131 National courts, 
when deciding on the compatibility of a national rule with an EU law right, have to 
balance the effectiveness principle against the aim and function of a national rule.132 
To illustrate, the CJEU ruled under Article 47 of the Charter that the principle of 
effective judicial protection may necessitate assistance of a lawyer.133  
                                                        
127  Cassese (2005), 12-13.  
128  Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) (Merits) [1998] ICJ Rep 454, para. 52.  
129  Cassese (2005), 13.  
130  Joined Cases C-402/05 and C-415/05 Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of 
the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351, para. 335.  
131  Craig and de Búrca (2011), 224. 
132  Ibid., 231.  
133  Case C-279/09 DEB v. Germany [2010] ECR I-0000, para. 59.  
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2.4.2  Role of the Court and the States Parties 
When the Court allows its adjudication to be influenced by effectiveness 
considerations, it generally subjects the respondent state to stricter scrutiny and, in 
clearer terms, describes the required remedy compared to when it would only draw 
on subsidiarity considerations. In this way, the Court steps up responsibility and, 
thereby, may extend its power of review or go beyond its supervisory function. As a 
result, the subsidiarity nature of the protection offered by the Court diminishes, 
often prompted by a failure on part of a state to fulfil its primary responsibility. 
Effectiveness considerations also influence the way in which the national 
authorities must secure the Convention’s rights, namely in a way that renders the 
protection afforded by these rights effective. Moreover, with reference to the 
effectiveness principle, the Court may request domestic authorities to abide by 
obligations that are broader in scope than can be derived directly from the 
Convention or its own case law, as is illustrated by manifestations of the principle.  
National authorities must ensure that the interpretation of the Convention as 
informed by effectiveness consideration is applied in practice. They must at all 
times ensure that the Convention rights and remedies for violations of these rights 
are effective in practice as well as in law. The scope of the obligation under Article 
13, for example, varies depending on the nature of the applicant’s complaint under 
the Convention, but due to effectiveness considerations, the state must at all times 
ensure that the exercise of the right is not unjustifiably hindered by acts or 
omissions by its own authorities.134  
2.4.3  Manifestations  
The effectiveness principle manifests itself in various ways. When outlining these 
manifestations, it is clarified how the principle interrelates with the principle of 
subsidiarity, and how the principles are sometimes complementary, but may also be 
in tension with each other. The discussion is again broken down into the 
admissibility, merits and execution stage. This is clearly not an exhaustive 
enumeration of manifestations of the principle, but helps to deepen the insight into 
the functioning of the principle. 
The exhaustion of domestic remedies rule was introduced as manifestation of 
the subsidiarity principle in the admissibility stage. This rule can also be considered 
as a manifestation of the effectiveness principle, because it assumes that the 
national authorities have in place effective domestic remedies. Other effectiveness 
manifestations that crystallise in the admissibility stage are the various exceptions 
made by the Court, usually under exceptional circumstances, to the admissibility 
rules. The Court makes these exceptions because the ‘rules of admissibility must be 
applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism’ and 
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because the Court has regard to ‘the object and purpose of the Convention as an 
instrument for the protection of individual human beings [which requires that] its 
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and 
effective’.135 An example of such an exception is that the Court may admit 
applications of applicants who have not exhausted domestic remedies in conformity 
with Article 35(1).136 This enables the Court to extend the effective protection of 
Convention rights to those who would otherwise be required to conform to this 
article in a domestic system without effective remedies. The Court refers in this 
context explicitly to effectiveness when explaining that ‘[i]t is incumbent on the 
government claiming non-exhaustion to satisfy the Court that the remedy was an 
effective one’137 and when stating that applicants are not obliged to exhaust 
remedies that are ‘inadequate or ineffective’,138 such as a remedy that was only 
available in a state other than the respondent state.139 Another example of an 
exception to the domestic remedies rule can be found in the Convention. Normally, 
the Court has to declare applications inadmissible if the applicant has not suffered 
any ‘significant disadvantage’ as a result of an (alleged) violation of the 
Convention. The Court is allowed, however, to disapply the ‘no significant 
disadvantage’ ground to ensure that no case, ‘which has not been duly considered 
by a domestic tribunal’, is rejected on this ground.140 The ‘safeguard clause’ 
ensures, in line with the effectiveness principle, ‘that every case receives a judicial 
examination, either at the national or at the European level, so as to avoid a denial 
of justice’.141  
Manifestations of the effectiveness principle can also be found in the merits 
stage. One example of such a manifestation is the margin of appreciation doctrine. 
In addition to seeing that doctrine as a manifestation of the subsidiarity principle, it 
can also be a manifestation of the effectiveness principle when the Court, by 
leaving a state a narrow margin of appreciation, closely and critically scrutinise the 
alleged violation and in this way exerts more power of review over the state. In the 
context of Article 13, the Court stated for example that ‘although the Contracting 
States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform to their 
Convention obligations under this provision’ the remedy required by Article 13 
must nevertheless ‘be “effective” in practice as well as in law’.142 The margin of 
appreciation is therefore a doctrine that, depending on the manner in which it is 
applied, allows the Court to either put the subsidiarity or the effectiveness principle 
                                                        
135  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99 et al., 4 February 2005, para. 101. 
136  Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia, No. 57947/00 et al., 24 February 2005, paras. 145, 149, 
151.  
137  Akdivar and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 21893/93, 16 September 1996, para. 68.  
138  Ibid., para. 67.  
139  Cudak v. Lithuania (GC), No. 15869/02, 23 March 2010, paras. 34-37.  
140  Art. 35(3)(b) ECHR; This safeguard clause will be deleted after the entry into force of Protocol 15, 
see: section I.4.4.  
141  Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 73.  
142  Z. and Others v. UK (GC), No. 29392/95, 10 May 2001, 108.  
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in practice. The interpretation of the Convention ‘in the light of present-day 
conditions’143 also gives the Court flexibility to provide protection in keeping with 
the effectiveness principle. This method allows the Court to keep the Convention up 
to date with social and technological developments that the drafters could not have 
foreseen, even if this means departing from precedents laid down in previous 
cases.144 The rationale for this is that ‘the Convention is first and foremost a system 
for the protection of human rights’ which must be interpreted so as to make them 
practical and effective.145 According to the Court, ‘[a] failure [...] to maintain a 
dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering [the Convention] a bar to 
reform or improvement’.146 The categories of private life protected by Article 8 
have, for example, come to include sexual life147 and the possibility to take up 
private sector employment148 and acts that were previously classified as ‘inhuman 
and degrading treatment’ under Article 3 have become ‘torture’.149 This method of 
interpretation can also lead to finding new positive obligations. The Court for 
example found that a positive obligation is inherent to effective respect for family 
life, protected by Article 8, which required the state to avoid discrimination against 
an unmarried mother and her child, even though these positive obligations are not 
directly apparent from the Article.150 Not only the substantive rights protected by 
the Convention have been prone to dynamic interpretation, the provisions that 
govern the operation of the Convention’s enforcement machinery are also 
interpreted in this way.151  
In the execution phase too manifestations of the effectiveness principle can be 
found in, for example, the indication by the Court under Article 46 of individual 
and general measures (Article 46-indications). Other manifestations are the Court’s 
adjudication of follow-up cases and its involvement in the pilot-judgment 
procedure. Because these manifestations are discussed in some detail in other parts 
of this study,152 they are not discussed any further here.  
                                                        
143  Marckx v. Belgium (Plenary), No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, para. 41.  
144  Costa (2009c), 3; Wildhaber (2011), 213.  
145  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, para. 104.  
146  Idem.  
147  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands, No. 8978/80, 26 March 1985, para. 22.  
148  Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, No. 55480/00 et al., para. 47; See for more examples and a 
more elaborate description of the living instrument doctrine: Mowbray (2005).  
149  Selmouni v. France (GC), No. 25803/94, 28 July 1999, para. 101. 
150  Marckx v. Belgium (Plenary), No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979, paras. 31-32.  
151  Loizidou v. Turkey, No. 15318/89 (Preliminary Objections), 23 March 1995, para. 71.  
152  See for individual follow-up cases: sections VI.1.11 and X.2.10; For general follow-up cases: 
sections VI.1.12 and XI.2.11; For the Court’s role in the PJP: sections VII.2.1.1 and XI.2.1.1; And 
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3  THE CONVENTION SYSTEM IN DEVELOPMENT  
After the establishment of the Convention system in the 1950s, described in section 
II.1, the Convention remained a ‘sleeping beauty’153 for the first 20 to 30 years of 
its existence: it had little impact on domestic law, the Court delivered few 
judgments and the Convention’s optional clauses were not broadly accepted. The 
Convention was therefore ‘largely ignored by just about everybody, including 
victims [...], lawyers, jurists, politicians and social scientists’.154 By the end of the 
sixties, ‘things were starting to change at Strasbourg,’ it became for example clear 
that the Convention could be more than an alarm bell against totalitarianism and 
that it could develop into a European Bill of Rights.155 The years 1973-1974 were 
‘the turning point in the life of the Convention’.156 By this time, most states had 
accepted the optional clauses and in the subsequent years, the Court delivered 
various landmark judgments establishing general principles for the interpretation 
and application of the Convention.157 The states parties moreover started to amend 
their domestic law in response to the Court’s judgments.158 In the eighties, the 
Convention awakened as a European Bill of Rights. With the qualitative and 
quantitative expansion of the Court’s case law, these developments have made the 
system increasingly complex and sometimes caused major problems. When these 
problems, which are discussed in this section, surfaced, the first calls for reform 
were made, which are discussed in more detail in section II.4.159  
The developments outlined in this section have made the system more and more 
complex and have brought the system in a state of turmoil. They have forced 
interlocutors functioning in the system to leave familiar paths, travel new paths and 
sometimes make a detour in order to ensure the effective protection of the 
Convention rights in an increasingly complex, multilayered and pluralist legal 
order. The developments caused the need for reform to be ever more urgent.160 
With a section describing developments with often troublesome or highly negative 
consequences, this study risks focussing too strongly on the negative aspects of the 
Convention system and thereby losing sight of its achievements, which deserve 
some positive exposure. After all, the Court is ‘still perceived as an effective 
                                                        
153  Frowein (1984), 8.  
154  Greer (2008), 682.  
155  Bates (2010), 14 (original emphasis).  
156  Ibid., 16 (original emphasis). 
157  Ibid., 15, 16; See, e.g.: Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union v. Sweden, No. 5614/72, 6 February 1967; 
Handyside v. UK (Plenary), No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976; Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 
18 January 1978.  
158  Bates (2010), 17.  
159  Ibid., 16, 18-19; See also: Kuijer (2013), 101-112. 
160  In an earlier version of this chapter, one development was the upcoming accession of the EU to the 
Convention. However, in the light of the highly critical opinion of the Court of Justice on the Draft 
Accession Agreement, which makes accession nearly impossible or at least highly difficult, this 
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institution for the protection of human rights’ and it is widely agreed ‘that the 
[Convention] is one of the major developments in European legal history’.161 To 
undo the risk and to achieve a balanced account, section III not only outlines 
various rather problematic developments, but also recounts some of the system’s 
achievements.  
3.1  The Achievements of the Convention System  
The existence of the Convention and the accompanying enforcement mechanism is 
an achievement in itself.162 The European Court is the first international human 
rights court to render legally binding judgments, predating its Inter-American and 
African counterparts and going beyond the non-binding consideration of some UN 
treaty monitoring bodies. The system has furthermore, by making the right to 
individual petition obligatory, given over 800 million individuals direct and 
unconditional access to a European remedy when they find no national solace.163 
This is a unique achievement.164 As a former President of the Court stated: ‘if you 
want to launch an effective human rights protection procedure, a system of 
individual applications leading to binding judgments of an independent 
international court looks pretty good’.165  
The Convention system not only ‘looks pretty good’ on paper, but also is rather 
effective and influential in practice in a variety of ways and has been called the 
‘single most important rights-protecting court in the world’.166 The system is highly 
effective in the sense that the Court’s judgments enjoy high compliance. The 
judgments have therefore been labelled ‘as effective as those of any domestic 
court’.167 Moreover, the jurisprudence of the Court has positively influenced the 
laws of the states parties and the Convention has been incorporated into the 
domestic laws of virtually all parties.168 The Convention is also reflected in the 
constitutions of the post-communist Eastern European states and the accession of 
the new member states has advanced stability in the whole region by strengthening 
democracy.169 Beyond its own jurisdiction, the Court’s successful clarification of 
                                                        
161  O’Boyle (2008), 1.  
162  Ryssdal (1996), 18-19; Wildhaber (2011), 205.  
163  Ryssdal (1996), 19; Evaluation Group (2001), para. 15; Group of Wise Persons (2006), para. 23; 
Wildhaber (2011), 207-208; Harris et al. (2014), 35-36.  
164  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 11; In the Inter-American system, individuals 
submit their complaints to the Inter-American Commission. The respondent state or the 
Commission may refer the complaints to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, provided the 
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Human and Peoples’ Rights can receive complaints against states that have accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction.  
165  Wildhaber (2011), 208; See also: O’Boyle (2011), 1868.  
166  Stone Sweet (2012), 1860.  
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168  Ryssdal (1996), 21; O’Boyle (2008), 3; Harris et al. (2014), 34-35.  
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the content of common human rights law provisions has led to great influence on 
the development of international law, international human rights law and the 
jurisprudence of UN bodies, other regional courts and domestic supreme courts.170 
The Convention system has thus functioned as an example and source of inspiration 
for other systems, both regional and international.171  
3.2  An Expanded Catalogue of Rights and an Increased Scope of 
Protection  
The first development of interest is the expansion of the catalogue of Convention 
rights. Most visibly, this expansion can be traced by listing the Protocols that added 
substantive rights to the Convention, a development that was initiated by the states 
parties. As explained in section II.1.2, Protocol 1 added various optional rights to 
the Convention in 1952 already. Over the following decades, the states concluded 
optional Protocols 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13 and thereby expanded the initial catalogue of 
rights – in respect of the states that ratified the protocols – with inter alia the right to 
freedom of movement,172 the abolition of the death penalty173 and a general 
prohibition of discrimination.174 On the one hand, this expansion has led to a higher 
level of protection of human rights and to access to the Court for individual 
applicants on a larger number of human rights issues. Nonetheless, the development 
also has exacerbated the turmoil, because a larger catalogue of rights means that 
potentially more complaints can be brought before the Court, adding to its already 
overwhelming workload.175 By way of illustration, eleven percent of all the cases in 
which the Court found a violation from 1959-2010 concerned the right to protection 
of property, a right established by Protocol 1.176 Further, the expansion increases 
the area’s in which the Court has a say and thus its power of review over the states.  
For another part, the Court has initiated the gradual increase in the scope of 
protection afforded by the Convention in its case law. An important vehicle for 
increasing the scope of protection is its dynamic method of interpretation of the 
Convention as a living instrument in the light of present day conditions, previously 
discussed as a manifestation of the effectiveness principle in the merits phase. 
Another important reason for the expansion of the scope is the Court’s method of 
reasoning by analogy and on a case-by-case basis. When the Court recognises that a 
Convention right is at stake in a case with a certain set of facts, it will in another 
case with a comparable set of facts usually also recognise that a Convention right is 
                                                        
170  Ibid., 2-3; Harris et al. (2014), 34. 
171  Ryssdal (1996), 22; Carozza (2009); Lawson (2010), 162-173.  
172  Art. 2 Protocol 4 ECHR.  
173  Protocol 6 ECHR and Protocol 13 ECHR.  
174  Protocol 12 ECHR. 
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at stake, even though this may require it to slightly expand the scope of the right. 
This method of reasoning, twinned with the Court’s desire to maintain a consistent 
body of jurisprudence, inevitably leads to a slippery slope type expansion of the 
scope of rights. Applicants will always bring applications that tempt the Court to 
expand the scope of rights, because it is in their interest that the scope of protection 
afforded by the Court in an individual case is as broad as possible. This analogical 
method of reasoning is, regardless of problematic side-effects relating to the 
workload, also problematic in itself, because the precedent on which the analogy is 
based may be imperfect and because it may lead to judgments that the Court would 
have decided differently if only it had not reached a point of no return because of 
the precedents it created in previous judgments.177 
Like the expansion of the catalogue of rights, the availability of broader 
protection exacerbates the turmoil by opening up the possibility for more 
complaints. This development has a second side-effect exacerbating another aspect 
of the turmoil: it has led to legitimacy questions, which will be discussed in more 
detail below, because this development is, unlike the increased catalogue of rights, 
initiated by the Court and largely uncontrolled by the states. Moreover, it may 
require states to protect aspects of rights that they did not intend to protect when 
they ratified the Convention.  
3.3  The Confirmation of the Right to Individual Petition 
We may now take the right of individual petition as a given, but this right has not 
always been the hallmark of the Convention system.178 The right to individual 
petition, now a ‘key component’ of the Convention system according to the 
Court,179 was regarded in the early fifties as ‘a dream unlikely to ever be 
realized’.180 Furthermore, up to the 1990s, individuals had an ‘inferior’181 status in 
the system because the right to individual petition remained optional and not widely 
opted in to and because individuals did to not have standing before the Court.182 In 
the pre-1990 period, some states acceded to the Convention without accepting the 
right. Ratifying the Convention therefore did not automatically mean that an 
                                                        
177  Gerards (2012a), 180-181. 
178  O’Boyle (2008), 5; See for more information: Sardaro (2005), 47-50.  
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individual could bring a Convention case and that the Court could in this way 
scrutinize the actions of the states parties. Turkey, for example, was a founding 
state that ratified the Convention in 1954, but only opted into the right of individual 
petition in 1987. By the 1990s, however, all states had accepted the right.183 
Protocol 11 made the acceptance of the right mandatory and thereby ‘fully 
institutionalized’184 the right ‘as the motor of the enforcement machinery under the 
Convention’.185 
The expansion to over 800 million Europeans of this single procedural right 
warrants discussing the confirmation of the right separately for two reasons. First, 
because the success of the Convention system is ‘undoubtedly linked to the 
immeasurable value over the years’ of this right186 and because the right has played 
a ‘fundamental role’ in the evolution of the system.187 Individual applications have 
become the Court’s ‘daily bread’.188 When judgments in inter-state case would have 
been the only means for the Court to develop its case law, its achievements would 
have probably been bleak, as only about 20 inter-state applications have been 
brought before the Court.189 Second, the very existence of the right to individual 
petition has been a significant factor in increasing the Court’s caseload and 
backlog.190  
3.4 Enlargement: From 13191 to 47 States Parties  
An increase in the number of states parties took place gradually during the three 
decades following the conclusion of the Convention and peaked in the 1990s after 
the collapse of communism. Before the first new states parties from Eastern Europe 
ratified the Convention in 1992,192 the group of states parties had already increased 
from 13 founding states to 23 in 1990.193 The ex-colonies Cyprus and Malta ratified 
the Convention for example in the 1960s, Portugal and Spain ratified in the 1970s 
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after ending years of dictatorship and Finland was the last Nordic state to ratify the 
Convention in 1990. From 1992 to 2004, 22 Eastern European states194 ratified the 
Convention and with Andorra’s and Monaco’s ratification,195 the total number 
reached the current 47. 
The most obvious effect of expansion is a vast increase in the number of 
potential applicants: from 451 million by the end of 1989 to over 800 million in 
2010. This has undoubtedly increased the workload on the enforcement machinery, 
as the next section discusses.196 In addition to the increased workload, enlargement 
led to a change in the subject matter of cases brought before the Court: the Council 
of Europe moved from being ‘an established club of democracies’ to a ‘training 
centre’197 for democracy. This led the Court to assume a new function, namely that 
of ‘adjudicator of transition’.198  
3.5 The Increased Workload 
The figures illustrating the increased workload are startling. In 1955, the 
Commission received 138 applications. In 1991, this number had increased to 1,648 
and, in the same year, 93 cases were referred to the Court.199 Even more drastic 
developments materialised in the new millennium. In 2010 for example, 63,100 
applications were allocated to a judicial formation, leading to a total number of 
139,650 pending applications,200 which is certainly drastic compared to a total of 
53,400 applications allocated to a judicial formation from 1958 to 1999.201 The 
increased workload on the Court automatically led to an increased workload on the 
Committee. The number of pending cases before the Committee increased from 709 
in 1996 to 5,523 in 2006 and 10,904 in 2014.202 Together with the increasing 
workload, the output of the Court has increased, even to the extent that the number 
of pending of applications before the Court, which stood at 161,000 in 2011, had 
been brought down to 69,300 by the end of August 2015.203 The new single judge 
procedure made this development possible, because this formation enables the 
Court to efficiently dispose of large numbers of clearly unmeritorious applications.  
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A problem that remains, however, is the high number of pending repetitive 
cases, over 34,000 at the beginning of 2015, which cannot be disposed of by single 
judges.204 Furthermore, there are close to 26,750 chamber and Grand Chamber 
cases pending,205 cases which cannot be easily disposed of based on well-
established case law (as can be done with repetitive cases). The ‘heaviest part of the 
case-load’ therefore currently ‘consists of cases which cannot be declared 
inadmissible without further examination, require a more in-depth analysis and may 
lead to a finding of a violation of the Convention’.206  
The workload results from a relatively small number of states. To illustrate, over 
60 percent of all pending cases allocated to a judicial formation at the end of 2014 
resulted from Ukraine, Italy, Russia and Turkey.207 Further, the number of 
applications resulting from a state compared to its population varies widely.208 For 
example, in 2009, 57 percent of all pending applications were directed against only 
four states (Russia, Turkey, Romania and Ukraine), whist their population only 
comprised 35 percent of the total Council of Europe population.209 If only the 
number of applications would be proportionate to the population in these four 
states, the number of applications would have been a lot less.210 The overwhelming 
majority of applications moreover consists of unmeritorious applications. Only 
about four percent of the applications result in a judgment normally.211 
The developments that were discussed above explain the increased workload: 
the expanded catalogue of rights and the larger scope of protection afforded by 
existing rights have expanded the number and type of violations that can be 
potentially complained about; the enlargement and the confirmation of the right to 
individual petition have increased the number of potential applicants. However, 
even though the enlargement with states from the East is an important cause for the 
increased workload,212 other factors also play a role.213 For example, two ‘old’ 
member states, Italy and Turkey, accounted for respectively 14.4 and 13.6 percent 
of all pending applications in 2014.214 Two other factors are that individuals, 
lawyers and civil society have become more aware of the Convention system and 
that the sensitivity to ‘modern’ human rights has increased.215  
The consequences of these startling figures are certainly the most negative for 
the potential applicants. In 2012, it took the Court on average 37 months to first 
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communicate a prima facie admissible case to the respondent government.216 The 
applicant moreover usually has to wait a few years before the Court makes its 
decision and he also has to wait a long time before a case is executed. To illustrate, 
the average duration of the execution in leading cases closed in 2014 was 4.1 years 
(and 3.5 years in 2013).217 This erodes the effectiveness and credibility of the 
system and ‘threatens to kill of individual petition de facto’.218 When this happens, 
‘individual petition will become a kind of catoblepas, the animal which, according 
to ancient fable, used to feed on its own flesh!’.219 The Court has, in response to 
concerns about the length of proceedings, added Rule 41 of Court allowing it to 
give priority to certain applications. The most urgent and serious cases will 
therefore be dealt with within a reasonable amount of time, but the less urgent cases 
will be pending even longer.  
3.6 The Changed Subject Matter of the Court’s Judgments 
As related in section II.1, the drafters saw the Convention mainly as an ‘early 
warning system’ against totalitarianism and a means to strengthen resistance against 
communism. They assumed that the Court would only infrequently find a violation 
of the Convention. Over the first 40 years of its life, the system however assumed a 
‘radically’ different function.220 The applicants, in ‘sometimes very ordinary 
situations’,221 complained to the Court about at times ‘highly technical issues’222 
and about ‘relatively minor and discrete conflicts of interests prevalent in any 
complex society’.223 The system consequently mainly functioned for the ‘fine-
tuning [of] sophisticated national democratic engines that were, on the whole, 
working well’224 and the Court ‘almost as a constitutional court on fundamental 
rights’.225 During these years, the Court had a ‘staple diet of “judicial procedure” 
cases concerning the arrest and detention guarantees and the right to a fair 
administration of justice (or due process rights) in civil and criminal matters’226 and 
was more active than expected.227 Even though these developments differ from the 
drafters’ expectations, they are not ‘unnatural’,228 because the additional functions 
can be derived from the text of the Convention and could therefore be foreseen.229 
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The ‘logic’ of the right to individual petition, for example, required ‘that the 
Convention system develop into one of quasi-constitutional protection’.230 It was 
further natural that the system would develop to offer two types of protection: 
‘firstly against bad-faith abuse of governmental power and, secondly against good-
faith limitations on liberty which nevertheless go beyond what is “necessary in a 
democratic society” to use the terminology of Articles 8 to 11’.231 During its first 40 
years, the Convention system predominantly offered the second type of 
protection.232 
Since the start of the 1990s, the system has been seized by applications of a 
different subject matter and in the 2010s it was exercising the above-described 
functions less frequently.233 In this new era, the Court has to deal with three 
categories of violations that used to be relatively rare: grave and often widespread 
violations, violations relating to transitions from communism to democracy and 
repetitive violations.234 These categories overlap and some violations may fit into 
each category.235 The question arises how ‘natural’ these developments are and how 
the system has dealt with them.  
3.6.1 Grave and Widespread Violations 
Grave and widespread violations require the Convention system to afford the first 
type of protection described above, namely protection against the ‘bad-faith abuse 
of governmental power’.236 These violations result from, for example, ‘random 
killings and torture, disappearances of persons, mass rapes, but also prolonged 
illegal detention, thoroughly unfair or arbitrary proceedings, or systematic 
elimination of effective political opposition’.237 The system was undoubtedly 
established with this kind of violations in mind,238 considering the drafting history 
of the Convention as outline above. Applications alleging these violations were 
however virtually never brought before the Court during the first four decades, 
because the western democracies that had accepted the jurisdiction of the old Court 
and the right to individual petition did generally not commit these violations.239 For 
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these states, ‘[t]he scenario of a widespread pattern of grave human rights violations 
[...] constituted only a spectre, albeit frightening, that was never to materialise 
again’.240  
However, after Turkey had accepted the right to individual petition and the 
Court’s jurisdiction in 1987 and 1990 respectively, this pattern of violations did 
materialise again, leading to cases against Turkey about the banning of political 
parties, torture of detainees and the destruction of villages by state agents 
perpetrated against the Kurds in south-eastern Turkey.241 With the accession of new 
states in the 1990s, the Court was inevitably increasingly confronted with grave 
violations, because these states had, for example, problems of widespread 
discrimination against ethnic minorities or were engaged in conflict.242 The 
situation in the Russian republic of Chechnya is a case in point.243 Since the mid-
1990s, the Court has regularly found grave and widespread violations perpetrated 
by or with the acquiescence of state agents, finding torture in ‘a disturbing number 
of cases’ and violations of Article 2 relating to enforced disappearances and the 
excessive use of force that were no longer procedural, but substantial.244  
The system may have been established against the background of grave and 
widespread violations, but it is a different matter whether it is equipped to 
effectively handle such violations. For various problems arising in applications 
alleging this type of violations it can be concluded that the system is not. One 
problem is that domestic remedies available for such violations are usually 
ineffective in practice. This can lead the Court to absolve the applicant from the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies and requires itself to act as a court of 
first instance, which it is clearly not meant to be.245 Another problem is that the 
Court is confronted with cases where the facts are in dispute, forcing it to take on 
‘the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact’.246 The Court’s solution to the problem 
of a lack of domestic remedies and disputed facts, for which the states parties are 
responsible, led to a ‘significant redefinition of its role’: ‘[t]he Court ceases to be a 
secondary guarantor of human rights and instead finds itself in a more crucial – an 
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exposed – front-line position’.247 The Court thus loses its subsidiary function in part 
and the system can count on well-functioning states that act in good faith less than 
previously.248 This conclusion is linked to a third problem: in case of widespread 
and grave violations, the responsible government is often uncooperative. When 
such a government is found in violation, it often ‘resent[s] the Court’s judgments 
and will try to qualify them as political rather than legal’249 and thereby politicises 
the execution process, making it more complex for the Committee to supervise.250 
A lack of cooperation and political will is a common feature of widespread and 
grave violations, because these violations are not committed in a vacuum or because 
of negligence, but such a pattern of violations ‘rather [...] requires the sanction of 
the State at some level’.251 Yet another problem used to be that Court was largely 
unable to address the root of widespread and grave violations.252 However, with the 
introduction of the pilot-judgment procedure this problem can now be tackled at 
least in some cases.253  
The problems just enumerated illustrate that the Convention system was not 
equipped to deal efficiently with grave and widespread violations. Nevertheless, the 
Court has found ways to handle such violations with the effectiveness principle in 
mind, by, for example, allowing exceptions to the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
rule or issuing pilot judgments. The Court uses these ways, even if they mean it 
assumes responsibilities it did not have originally and even if they require it to 
disregard infrequently and partially the principle of subsidiarity. 
3.6.2 Transitional Violations 
Whilst the democratic engines of the group of pre-1990 western states only needed 
‘fine-tuning’, the democratic engines of the newly acceded states from the east still 
had to be assembled when they acceded. It was ‘no secret’ that the new member 
states could not meet the Convention’s standards upon accession.254 Nonetheless, 
the enlargement towards the east has not yet had a large impact on the jurisprudence 
of the Court and the judgments against these states can surprisingly ‘largely be seen 
as ‘fine-tuning’ exercises’, mostly relating to rather basic procedural problems 
under Articles 5 and 6 and the length of proceedings under Article 6.255 The nature 
of the complaints brought before the Court against the new member states does 
therefore not differ widely from the complaints brought in the pre-accession age. 
The background, on the other hand, to the complaints against the new states is 
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different; exactly because the democratic engines in these states still have to be 
assembled, their problems are both deeper and broader. The lack of new patterns is 
moreover due to the fact that the new states only joined recently. In the medium and 
long term, the Court will likely have to decide on more and more cases revealing 
systemic and systematic problems that are a heritage of communism.256 The current 
jurisprudence on the new member states gives a hint of the type of issues the Court 
will increasingly be confronted with: the loss of property under Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, prison conditions, discrimination against the Roma and extra-territorial 
jurisdiction.257  
When cases concerning these issues are increasingly brought before the Court, it 
will assume an additional role, that of ‘adjudicator of transition’.258 This role is, 
considering the drafting history, certainly a natural role and does not pose any 
problems in terms of legitimacy. In fact, it may positively contribute to the 
significance of the Court and gives the Convention ‘new relevance’.259 This 
development, as most developments, does however add to the Court’s workload and 
may also be problematic because transition cases usually relate to widespread 
problems that cannot be easily solved in an individual case, as recounted above.  
3.6.3 Repetitive Violations  
The problem of the high number of repetitive violations was already discussed in 
section II.3.5, when discussing the increased workload. This development means 
that the Court’s major activity in quantitative terms has become deciding ‘clone’ or 
‘repetitive’ cases,260 concerning ‘cookie cutter’261 complaints. These obviously 
well-founded complaints are brought by applicants whose rights are violated 
because of structural or systemic problems. Their complaints should have been 
dealt with on the national level in line with the subsidiarity principle, but were not, 
because the responsible state failed to solve the structural or systemic problem 
causing these complaints and to provide for remedial measures. These cases are 
‘one of the biggest problems facing the Convention system’, both because of the 
sheer number of repetitive applications and because the Court may not be equipped 
to effectively deal with the structural causes at the root of repetitive violations.262  
The most notorious examples of problems giving raise to high numbers of 
repetitive violations are: the length of judicial proceedings, non-enforcement of 
domestic judicial decisions, ill-treatment by law-enforcement officials and a lack of 
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effective investigations thereof and unlawful detention and excessive length of 
detention on remand.263 As these examples illustrate, grave human rights violations, 
which were discussed as a separate category of violations above, have sometimes 
become repetitive.264 On the whole less serious, but most common are Article 6 
violations. From 1959-2014, the Court found 9,865 violations on that count, on a 
total of 14,877 judgments in which it found at least one violation.265 
The high number of repetitive violations ‘shows that national systems are not 
well-adapted and that, quite often, judgments are not properly executed by 
States’.266 From this perspective too, states not always properly fulfil their primary 
responsibility. As a consequence, the Court risks assuming additional 
responsibilities, playing the role of a fourth-instance court, a court of first instance 
or ‘a mere compensation board’, roles it should not play and which are ‘unnatural’ 
in the light of the object and purpose of the Convention and the subsidiarity 
principle.267 
3.7 Implementation and Execution Problems 
The terms ‘implementation’ and ‘execution’ are used here to describe two types of 
enforcement measures which a state can take: those taken to give effect to the 
Convention generally, that is to implement the Convention, and those taken in 
consequence of a specific judgment, that is to execute a judgment.268 Some 
measures, and in particular general measures, meant to execute a judgment may 
also further the implementation of the Convention. The distinction between the two 
terms is therefore not precise, but useful nonetheless, because the obligation to 
execute is on the whole more easily discharged than the obligation to implement. 
This distinction explains the apparent paradox that the execution record is generally 
considered satisfactory,269 while the Court is flooded with repetitive cases: 
individual judgments are usually executed, but because the implementation record 
is not improved in response to an individual judgment, structural problems continue 
to exist, causing repetitive violations.  
The states parties have, on the whole, not yet succeeded in effectively 
implementing the Convention on the national level, which they are required to do 
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by virtue of Article 1. This was acknowledged by the European Ministerial 
Conference on Human Rights that assembled in Rome on the occasion of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Convention. The Conference stressed ‘the need to improve even 
further the implementation of the Convention by the member states’.270 These 
concerns were echoed in the Interlaken Declaration, which recalled ‘that it is first 
and foremost the responsibility of the States Parties to guarantee the application and 
implementation of the Convention’271 and reiterated in the Izmir Declaration.272 
The Action Plan of the Brussels Declaration even dedicated an entire part to the 
‘Implementation of the Convention at national level’.273 Most of the developments 
outlined above confirm the conclusion that national implementation of the 
Convention has not yet been sufficiently successful and demonstrate that 
implementation problems challenge the effective working of the Convention 
system. These developments include the high number of repetitive cases, instances 
where the Court has to act as a court of first instance, cases rooted in grave and 
widespread violations and, more generally, the high workload. Not Strasbourg has 
‘failed’274 to respond to for example repetitive cases, but the member states have 
failed to fulfil their primary obligation to implement the Convention, which is 
essential to the proper functioning of the Convention system.275 Improved 
implementation therefore logically ‘has a central position to [...] guaranteeing the 
long-term effectiveness of the ECHR system’.276  
As section VI.1, which includes a general introduction to the execution phase, 
will explain in more detail, Article 46 imposes on the respondent state the 
obligation to pay the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article 41 and 
to take general and/or individual measures to end and remedy a violation and to 
prevent new violations. The execution record is recognised to be quite 
satisfactory.277 In particular paying just satisfaction has ‘very rarely raised serious 
issues’278 and only twice has a state refused outright to make the payment.279 
Delays in making the payment have nevertheless occurred.280 In 2014, 26 percent of 
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the payments were made outside the deadlines and the number of cases awaiting 
necessary payment information ‘is reaching worrying proportions’: the information 
was missing in 1141 cases of the 2235 cases, in two-third of the cases already for 
more than six months after the expiry of the deadline.281 Also more generally, the 
problem is delayed and partial execution, rather than complete non-execution.282 
The time taken to execute a judgment has almost trebled since the late 1990s.283 
The problem of delays will probably intensify because of the increased workload on 
the Court and the Committee, the increased complexity and sensitivity of the cases 
and the increased portion of pending leading cases.284 Further, instances of 
execution problems have increased since the accession of the new states parties.285 
A positive development as regards execution is, however, that the number of 
pending cases before the Committee is decreasing and that there is a ‘considerable’ 
increase in the number of judgments executed.286 Nevertheless, in September 2015, 
the Assembly stated that it ‘remains deeply concerned about the high number of 
non-implemented judgments pending before the [Committee], which remains stable 
at nearly 11,000 cases’.287 
Each execution problem, in particular those relating to a lack of political will, 
potentially poses a threat to the system, because ‘proper’ execution is the 
‘cornerstone and the most fundamental evidence of the effectiveness’ of the 
Convention system and because such a problem erodes the authority and credibility 
of the system.288 When execution problems occur, they probably mostly relate to 
general measures as these measures arguably ‘present the greatest challenge for the 
[ECHR] system’.289 The non-execution of general measures is usually due to the 
‘scale of the reform required and the cumbersome nature of national legislative 
procedures’.290 Currently, ‘the number of important systemic/structural problems, in 
respect of which the domestic remedial response has been slow given the sheer size 
of the problem or the underlying economic or political sensitivities is’ of 
‘considerable concern’.291 Some cases ‘reveal important “pockets of resistance”, 
sometimes linked to an entrenched social prejudice (for example concerning Roma 
or certain minority groups) or particular political considerations’.292  
                                                        
281  Committee (2015), 10.  
282  Open Society Justice Initiative (2011), 52; See also: Venice Commission, ‘Opinion 209/2002 on 
the Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, CDL-AD(2002)34, 18 December 2002, para. 
19; Harris et al. (2014), 198; Lambert Abdelgawad (2014), 158. 
283  Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 65. 
284  Evaluation Group (2001), para. 33; Committee (2015), 29.  
285  Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 64; See also: Bates (2010), 493.  
286  Committee (2015), 9.  
287  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of [ECtHR]’, Res(2015)2075, 30 September 2015, 
para. 4.  
288  Lambert Abdelgawad (2002), 5-6; See also: Group of Wise Persons (2006), para. 25.  
289  Baluarte and de Vos (2011), 96; See also: Harris et al. (2014), 188-191.  
290  Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 66; Committee (2015), 11.  
291  Committee (2015), 7.  
292  Ibid., 11; See also: Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 66. 
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Due to the declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments,293 states normally can 
choose the means by which they execute a judgment, which is a manifestation of 
the subsidiarity principle in the execution phase. In addition, however, the Court 
sometimes makes Article 46-indications, whereby it indicates which execution 
measures the respondent state should take, as a manifestation of the effectiveness 
principle in the execution phase.294 The Court currently suggests these measures 
with greater frequency, which is probably a response to the changed subject matter 
of applications. Making an Article 46-indication, as well as rendering a pilot 
judgment, enables the Court to more effectively deal with problems such as 
widespread violations, repetitive cases and instances of non-execution. The Court’s 
changing practice in response to these problems is, however, also potentially 
problematic, because the states parties may feel that the Court oversteps its 
authority and encroaches upon the principles of subsidiarity by assuming 
responsibilities that the states thinks are exclusively theirs and that should only be 
supervised by the Committee. It may thus jeopardise its legitimacy and blur the task 
division between itself and the Committee, adding a new dimension to the turmoil.  
3.8 Legitimacy Questions  
The question of the legitimacy of the Court is, according to a President of the Court, 
sensitive because the ‘[s]tates tend to accuse us of activism when we find against 
them, while applicants reproach us for showing restraint if we do not find a 
violation’.295 Moreover, legitimacy is conferred on the Court by the same states that 
the Court finds against.296 Currently, the Court’s legitimacy is questioned with 
increasing frequency, intensity and, at times, hostility, based on the various 
statements made by politicians and judges, discussions that took place in national 
parliaments and academic and newspaper articles that were written during the past 
few years. The legitimacy is usually questioned without clearly defining what the 
concept encompasses. The answer to the question whether the criticism has reached 
a point at which it warrants separate discussion is as important as the above 
observation, as a discussion risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, confirming 
that there indeed is a legitimacy problem when the criticism has not yet reached a 
critical point. It is submitted that the critical point has been reached and that a 
discussion is therefore justified, because there have been various examples of fierce 
criticism by rather influential actors in different states, who may be able to translate 
their criticism into policy changes, and because the criticism is of such intensity 
that, when not addressed, probably intensifies further.297 This study speaks of 
                                                        
293  See: section II.2.3.3.  
294  See: section II.2.3.3. 
295  Spielmann (2015a), 3.  
296  Idem. 
297  See generally: Bratza (2011), 505-507; Costa (2011a), 174, 176; O’Boyle (2011), 1862-1865; 
Gerards (2012a), 173-175. 
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‘legitimacy questions’ or the ‘legitimacy debate’ and not of a ‘legitimacy crisis’, 
because the Convention system still enjoys a high level of legitimacy in general, as 
is evidenced by the overall good execution record.298 The legitimacy debate 
moreover takes place in a limited number of states. Most criticism has come from 
government representatives,299 parliamentarians,300 national judges,301 
academics,302 and the media303 in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Russia and 
Switzerland. The legitimacy questions usually do not concern the legitimacy of the 
Convention system as such, but more narrowly the legitimacy of the Court or a 
judgment. According to the critics, the Court jeopardises its legitimacy because it 
reads in new rights or concepts by applying the living instrument doctrine broadly. 
They are further of the opinion that the Court does not take the margin of 
appreciation doctrine far enough and therefore encroaches upon the authority of the 
states parties generally and upon democratically elected national parliaments in 
particular. According to them, the Court disrespects the responsibility of the states 
parties by assuming additional tasks. The criticism usually centres on one case or on 
a limited group of cases,304 but may also concern a whole area of Convention law 
relating to, for example, asylum and immigration305 or social security regulation.306 
                                                        
298  See also: Çalı et al. (2011), 35.  
299  See, e.g.: Berends (2011), 80-81; Clarke (2011), 104-105; Cameron (2012).  
300  See, e.g.: Hooper, ‘Human rights Ruling against Classroom Crucifixes Angers Italy’, The 
Guardian, 3 November 2009 (<www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/03/italy-classroom-cruci-
fixes-human-rights>) (about Italian parliamentarians); Blok and Dijkhoff, ‘Leg het Europees Hof 
aan banden’, de Volkskrant, 7 April 2011, 28 (Dutch parliamentarians); Siegenthaler, 
‘International vs National Law: a Manufactured Controversy?’, 28 July 2014 (<www.swissinfo.ch/ 
eng/multimedia/international-vs-national-law--a-manufactured-controversy-/40491656>) (about 
Swiss parliamentarians); Conservatives, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK; The Conservatives’ 
Proposals for Changing Britan’s Human Rights Laws’, 3 October 2014, (<www.conservatives.com 
/~/media/files/downloadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf>) (UK parliamentarians).  
301  See, e.g.: Bossuyt (2007); Hoffmann (2009); Bossuyt (2010); Zorkin (2010); Dyson (2011); 
Bossuyt (2012). 
302  See generally: the German Law Journal volume 12 number 10 (2011) (a special issue dedicated to 
‘Legitimacy and the Future of the [ECtHR]’).  
303  See, e.g.: Baudet, ‘Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens Vormt een Ernstige Inbreuk op de 
Democratie’, NRC Handelsblad, 13 November 2010; Wyina, ‘Losgezongen; Europees Hof voor 
Rechten van de Mens Zorgt met Perverse Prikkels voor Europese Tweedeling’, Elsevier, 19 
January 2011, 9; ‘Killers and Rapists go to [ECtHR] to Win Full State Benefits’, Daily Mail, 20 
February 2011; Laura Caroe, ‘Radical Cleric Abu Qatada Can’t be Sent Home Says Euro Court’, 
The Sun, 17 January 2012.  
304  See, e.g.: Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (GC), No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004 and the 
‘follow-up case’ Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011; 
Hirst v. UK (no. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005 and Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 
et al., 23 November 2010 (on the right to vote for prisoners); Lautsi v. Italy, No. 30814/06, 3 
November 2009, which received a lot of criticism and was decided differently by the Grand 
Chamber in Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
(GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011.  
305  See, e.g.: Bossuyt (2010); HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, 
Follow-up Plan para. A(3); Bossuyt (2012).  
306  See, e.g.: Bossuyt (2007).  
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To counter their concerns, the critics propose that the Court exercise more self-
restraint, focusing on ‘more serious human rights cases’ or ‘truly significant issues’; 
develop the margin of appreciation doctrine further; use a more originalist method 
of interpretation and pay respect to the decisions made by national parliaments and 
courts.307  
The legitimacy debate has reached a point at which the Court’s legitimacy is 
discussed in different parliaments, at which some more or less concrete policy 
proposals have been tabled and at which the Committee has also aired some 
concerns. In Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK motions of parliament, some 
more successful than others, have been drawn up to call upon the government to 
take action in response to legitimacy questions.308 In the UK, the Conservatives 
have proposed to replace the Human Rights Act, which requires British courts to 
base their judgments on the Convention and Strasbourg jurisprudence, with a 
British Bill of Rights. The Conservatives want to ‘make fundamental changes to the 
way human rights laws work in the United Kingdom, to restore common sense and 
put Britain first’, which includes reducing the European Court to ‘an advisory body 
only’.309 Should the Council of Europe disagree, ‘the UK would be left with no 
alternative but to withdraw from the [Convention]’, that is, when the UK’s own 
human rights instrument, the British Bill of Rights, comes into effect.310 The 
president of Switzerland’s largest party, the People’s Party, echoes these ideas. 
‘People’s initiatives are no longer implemented’ according to him and ‘[t]he 
democratic system is increasingly undermined’.311 His party has called for a 
people’s initiative supporting the supremacy of popular votes over international 
law, including the Convention, and prefers withdrawing from the Convention over 
                                                        
307  See, e.g.: Hoffman (2009); UK Ministry of Justice, ‘Press Release; Clarke: European Court Should 
Allow for Genuine Differences of National Approach’, 26 April 2011.  
308  Two Dutch parliamentarians, Çörüz and Omtzigt, requested in a motion (not voted upon) the 
government inter alia to press for a wider margin of appreciation in the reform process of the Court 
at the Council of Europe, see: Kamerstukken II, 2010/11, 32500, No. 29, ‘Motie van de Leden 
Çörüz en Omtzigt’; The UK House of Commons adopted a motion confirming that the decision 
about a general restriction on the right of prisoners to vote ‘should be a matter for democratically-
elected lawmakers’ in response to Hirst v. UK, see: BBC, ‘Jack Straw and David Davis Secure 
Prison Vote Debate’, 18 January 2011 (<www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-12214988>); Three 
Belgian parliamentarians, Schoofs, Colen and Logghe, requested the government in a motion (not 
adopted) to inter alia request the Council of Europe that the Court will no longer act as a 
‘gouvernement des juges’, see: Proposition de Résolution, 12 December 2011, Doc. 53, 1949/001. 
309  Conservatives, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK; The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing 
Britain’s Human Rights Laws’, 3 October 2014, (www.conservatives.com/~/media/files/down-
loadable%20Files/human_rights.pdf), 5.  
310  Ibid., 8.  
311  Siegenthaler, ‘International vs National Law: a Manufactured Controversy?’, 28 July 2014 
(<www.swissinfo.ch/eng/multimedia/international-vs-national-law--a-manufactured-controversy-
/40491656>).  
 
 
 
 A Characterisation of the Convention System 
 
 
51 
giving up its call.312 In the Netherlands, it was proposed that the dialogue between 
the member states and the Committee should be improved by strengthening the role 
of the Committee. The Ministry of Safety and Justice wrote to parliament that better 
checks and balances would be in place when the role of the Committee is 
strengthened. The Ministry furthermore explained that it will promote the 
subsidiarity principle, aims to further develop the regulation of interim measures 
and emphasised that the Court should respect the facts found by national courts.313 
With a change of government, these proposals have now moved to the background 
however. In Russia, a proposal has been tabled to allow the Russian Constitutional 
Court to override certain Strasbourg judgments.314 Moreover, the Russian 
Constitutional Court has confirmed, on the request of a group of parliamentarians, 
that when a conflict between the Russian Constitution and the Convention appears 
‘by virtue of the supremacy of the Basic Law, Russia will be forced to abstain from 
the literal implementation of the decision of the Strasbourg Court’.315 As a last 
example, the Council of Europe’s own Committee ‘invited’ in careful but critical 
language the Court to avoid intervening in cases related to asylum and immigration 
‘except in the most exceptional circumstances’316 and to confirm ‘in its case law 
that it is not a fourth-instance court, thus avoiding the re-examination of issues of 
fact and law decided by national courts’.317 
The legitimacy debate has forced the Court into an uneasy position. When it 
decides on a controversial issue, its judgment risks being interpreted as either a 
concession to the criticism or a refusal to be open to any criticism whatsoever.318 
The Court moreover does not have a platform to defend itself or to give an 
additional explanation of a controversial judgment should staunch criticism arise.319 
                                                        
312  Humanrights.ch, ‘Swiss People’s Party Initiative: Misleading Bill Weakens Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in Switzerland’, 25 October 2014 (<www.humanrights.ch/en/switzerland/ 
internal-affairs/law/swiss-peoples-party-misleading-bill-fundamental-rights>).  
313  Brief van de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie, ‘Mensenrechten in het Buitenlands Beleid’, 3 
October 2011, Kamerstukken II 2011/12, No. 32, 3, 4, 7. 
314  Sevortain, ‘Moscow Attempts to Elbow Strasbourg Aside’, openDemocracy, 5 September 2011 
(<www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/anna-sevortian/moscow-attempts-to-elbow-strasbourg-
aside>); Gerards (2012a), 174. 
315  Smirnova, ‘Russian Constitutional Court Affirms Russian Constitution’s Supremacy over ECtHR 
Decisions’, UK Constitutional Law Blog, 17 July 2015, (<ukconstitutionallaw.org/2015/07/17/ 
maria-smirnova-russian-constitutional-court-affirms-russian-constitutions-supremacy-over-ecthr-
decisions>).  
316  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. A(3).  
317  Ibid., Follow-up Plan para. F(2)(c). 
318  See, e.g.: Spielmann (2015a), 3.  
319  The Court’s Presidents have however written in defence of the Court during their presidency, see, 
e.g.: Costa (2011a); Bratza (2011), 505-507; Bratza, ‘Nicolas Bratza: Britain should be defending 
European justice, not attacking it’, The Independent, 24 January 2012, (<www. 
independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/nicolas-bratza-britain-should-be-defending-european-
justice-not-attacking-it-6293689.html#>); Rozenberg, ‘Bratza Bemused by UK’s Disdain for 
Strasbourg’, The Guardian, 31 January 2012, (<www.theguardian.com/law/2012/jan/31/joshua-
rozenberg-interviews-nicolas-bratza>).  
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Additionally, general legitimacy questions that are posed in reaction to a specific 
judgment, which a respondent government does not wish to execute for a lack of 
political will, may work to distract from the fact that a government has not 
effectively implemented the Convention. There is thus a fine line between 
legitimacy questions that are posed for political gain and those that are posed 
because a state is genuinely concerned that the Court oversteps its authority and 
thereby risks losing its legitimacy. Finally, if the legitimacy debate would 
eventually turn into a legitimacy crisis, this would have a negative effect on other 
developments that were already identified above. It would make it for example 
more difficult to persuade states to implement the Convention and to execute the 
Court’s judgments, which would in turn lead to an even higher pressure on the 
system. An answer must therefore be formulated to legitimacy questions that stem 
from genuine concerns about the Court’s legitimacy and are not merely posed for 
popular purposes.  
3.9 The Essence of the Developments  
From the developments described in this section, it is clear that the Convention 
system has to face many challenges, in spite of the great achievements which it has 
also reached. These challenges are all of a different nature, ranging from practical 
problems, such as the workload, execution and implementation problems, to 
questions which are being posted regarding the Court’s legitimacy. From the 
description, it is also clear that that these developments have changed the state of 
the Convention system significantly: more rights give broader protection, individual 
petition has become the cornerstone of the system, the system has expanded vastly 
geographically and the content of the cases which are processed has changed. The 
developments do not stand on their own, but are intertwined and can reinforce and 
explain each other. In addition to and in response to these developments, more 
formal changes have been made to the system. These changes are described in the 
next section.  
4  THE CONVENTION SYSTEM UNDER REFORM   
The Convention system has been in a ‘reformatory turmoil’320 since the beginning 
of the eighties,321 with reform of the Convention as a ‘quasi-permanent and 
relatively slow process’, making the system increasingly complex.322 The never 
ending story of reform is, like the developments described in section II.3, another 
aspect of the turmoil of the system, but it is discussed separately as the reforms aim 
to solve problematic developments and because reform, as a protracted process, 
requires a separate and more elaborate discussion.  
                                                        
320  Hennette-Vauchez (2011), 145.  
321  Explanatory Report to Protocol 11 ECHR, para. 19.  
322  Costa (2007b), 4.  
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This section commences with a section outlining the reform that Protocols 11 
and 14 have brought. The next section reflects on the level at which the reform 
debate takes place, that is, whether it is limited to discussing the functioning of the 
system or whether it also concerns reforms that would change the role and purpose 
of the system. After this interlude, the section examines the current reform debate 
and the newest protocols.  
4.1 Protocol 11 
Protocol 11 (1998) introduced changes which were the result of discussions that had 
started in the 1980s, prompted by the geographical enlargement of the Council of 
Europe and the increasing workload on the Commission and the old Court.323 The 
discussion centred on how the length of proceedings could be reduced and how the 
judicial character of the proceedings could be strengthened. The answer to these 
questions, Protocol 11, ‘radically’ reformed the Convention system by establishing 
a new single full-time Court and abolishing the old part-time Court, the 
Commission, the quasi-judicial powers of the Committee and the clauses making 
individual petition and the Court’s jurisdiction optional. The Protocol therefore 
clarified the task division between the Court and the Committee: the Court became 
solely responsible for the (pre-)merits phase and the Committee for the execution 
phase. These reforms were meant to improve the system’s efficiency by increasing 
the Court’s accessibility and by simplifying and shortening the procedures, thus 
better equipping the Court to deal with the increased workload.324  
These reforms extended the Court’s tasks significantly. While the old Court 
ruled on cases that were brought before it by the Commission or a state, Protocol 11 
imposed on the new Court the Commission’s responsibilities, including the filtering 
of all applications, establishing the facts, ruling on admissibility and taking part in 
                                                        
323  The Commission was created to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the states 
parties (Art. 19 ECHR 1950). States could refer to the Commission an alleged breach of the 
provision of the Convention by another party. The Commission could also receive petitions from 
persons, NGOs and groups of individuals claiming to be a victim of a violation committed by a 
state that had accepted the right to individual petition (Art. 25 ECHR 1950). The task of the 
Commission was, first, to examine the petition and, where necessary, to conduct an investigation 
and, second, to secure a friendly settlement (Art. 28 ECHR 1950). When a friendly settlement was 
not reached, the Commission drew up a report on the facts and stated its opinion ‘as to whether the 
facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned’. This report was transmitted to the Committee 
and the states concerned (Art. 31 ECHR 1950). The ‘question’ could then go to the Committee or 
to the Court. The latter became involved when either a concerned state or the Commission decided 
to refer a question to it, provided the state had accepted either the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Court (Art. 46 ECHR 1950) or with its consent (Arts. 44, 46, 48 ECHR 1950) and within a period 
of three months from the transmission of the report to the Committee (Art. 32(1) ECHR 1950).  
324  Preamble Protocol 11 ECHR; Explanatory Report to Protocol 11 ECHR, paras. 3-5, 19-25; Other 
reforms relate to the terms of office of the judges, third-party interventions (previously only to be 
found in the Rules of Court) and the possibility to appeal to the Grand Chamber. See for a more 
elaborate description: Bates (2010), 460-467. 
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friendly settlement negotiations.325 Since the responsibilities of the Court were 
extended and since the workload continued to grow, it comes as no surprise that the 
reforms introduced by Protocol 11 were insufficient.326 The reform debate soon 
continued and the ‘reform of the reform’ started.327 
4.2 Protocol 14 
The Council of Europe Ministerial Conference on Human Rights gave the ‘starting 
signal’ for a new path of reform in Rome in November 2000, two years after the 
entry into force of Protocol 11. The path led to the adoption of Protocol 14 in May 
2004.328 The Preambles of Protocol 11 and 14 are strikingly similar, they refer both 
to the ‘urgent need’ ‘to maintain and improve the efficiency’ of the Convention 
system in the light of the increasing workload. Compared to Protocol 11, which 
radically restructured the control machinery, Protocol 14 makes modest 
amendments.329 The most important amendments relate to the filtering of clearly 
unmeritorious applications and the processing of repetitive cases.330 Single-judge 
formations, assisted by judge rapporteurs, are now competent to declare 
inadmissible clearly unmeritorious applications, while this was previously done by 
committees of three judges;331 the committees of three judges are now competent to 
declare admissible and decide on repetitive applications that are the subject of well-
established case law, while this was previously done by a seven-judge chamber.332 
The new admissibility criterion empowers the Court to declare inadmissible 
applications where the applicant has not suffered a ‘significant disadvantage’.333 
These reform measures, because they decrease the time the Court spends on clearly 
unmeritorious applications and meritorious repetitive cases, were designed to 
enable the Court to concentrate on ‘those cases that raise important human rights 
issues’ and that ‘require in-depth examination,’.334  
                                                        
325  Evaluation Group (2001), para. 14.  
326  Bates (2010), 470, 496.  
327  Ibid., 495.  
328  Keller et al. (2011), 1029; Protocol 14 entered into force with a delay of over six years, of which 
four years were caused by Russia’s delayed ratification. Russia ratified Protocol 11 in 2010, while 
all other states had ratified the Protocol before the end of October 2006 (Poland was the before last 
state to ratify Protocol 14 on 12 October 2006) (information available on: <www.conventions. 
coe.int>). 
329  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, paras. 18, 35.  
330  Other changes relate to empowering the Committee to bring infringement proceedings and file a 
requets for interpretation, the supervision by the Committee of friendly settlements, the judges’ 
terms of office and the EU’s accession; See for more information: Lemmens and Vandenhole 
(2005).  
331  Art. 27 ECHR.  
332  Art. 28 ECHR.  
333  Art. 35(3)(b) ECHR.  
334  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, paras. 35, 37.  
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Protocol 14 furthermore extended the powers of the Committee by giving it the 
power to start infringement proceedings and to refer a judgment for interpretation to 
the Court. These additional powers were conferred to the Committee in the context 
of the execution process, which ‘generally functions satisfactorily’, but nevertheless 
‘needs to be improved to maintain the system’s effectiveness’.335 The measures 
were designed to ‘improve and accelerate the execution process’, which would have 
an impact on the influx of cases and result in fewer repetitive applications.336 The 
power to ask the Court to interpret a judgment was designed to facilitate the 
Committee’s supervisory exercise and the power to bring infringement proceedings 
was introduced because it was considered ‘essential to strengthen the means given’ 
to the Committee, which would help ensure the vitality of the ‘rapid and full 
execution of the Court’s judgments’.337 Protocol 14 further gives the Commissioner 
the right to submit third-party interventions of his/her own motion.338 
Even prior to the entry into force of Protocol 14, it was evident that the 
document alone could not ensure the long-term effectiveness of the system,339 
because ‘it will not itself reduce the volume of cases coming to Strasbourg; it will 
not turn off the tap; it will not even slow down the flow’.340 Protocol 14 was 
therefore not written to bring the reform story to an ending, but written as an 
intermediate chapter necessary to continue the story; it allows the system to 
‘survive’ pending more structural reforms for the long term.341 The process of the 
‘reform of the reform of the reform’ began.342 Protocol 14 has, however, together 
with the introduction of new working methods by the Court, been instrumental in 
processing efficiently the number of clearly inadmissible cases, even to the extent 
that the backlog of that kind of cases is probably absorbed by the end of 2015.343 
4.3 Questioning the Object and Purpose of the Convention System 
The reform debate and actual reform of a system like the Convention system can 
take place at two levels. At the first and least revolutionary level, reform measures 
are discussed and possibly implemented that change the functioning of a system. 
These measures may be sweeping in the sense that the functioning is profoundly 
                                                        
335  Ibid., para. 17.  
336  Ibid., paras. 14, 16.  
337  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, paras. 96, 98; See for more information about these 
procedures: sections VI.1.5-6 and X.2.5-6.  
338  See for more information: sections V.1.6, IX.1.6.7 and IX.1.7.4.  
339  Woolf (2005), 3; Group of Wise Persons (2006), para. 32; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 
ECHR, para. 14; Bates (2010), 504; HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 
April 2011, Declaration para. 8.  
340  Wildhaber cited in: Keller et al. (2011), 1030. 
341  Keller et al. (2011), 1031; See also: O’Boyle (2008), 5; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, 
para. 14.  
342  Caflisch (2006), 415.  
343  ECtHR (2015a), 5.  
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changed, but are not revolutionary because they leave unchallenged the overarching 
object and purpose of a system and its general principles. The measures that are 
discussed and implemented at the second and deeper level of reform do change or 
challenge the object and purpose of a system and its general principles, which are 
therefore more fundamental and revolutionary. Since the function of the Court, as 
the guardian of the Convention, is closely connected to the Convention’s object and 
purpose, any changes at the second level of reform potentially change the Court’s 
function fundamentally and possibly that of other interlocutors as well.  
The reform debate preceding the adoption of Protocol 11 took place at the first 
level, because it ‘remained substantially focused at […] how to secure the better 
functioning of the institutions, in a context where there did not as yet appear to be a 
need to pose deeper questions about what purposes those institutions were intended 
to serve’.344 Enlargement was, for example, only discussed as a development that 
would increase the workload, not as a development that would change the subject 
matter of the cases brought before the Court, requiring the Court to assume new 
functions.345 Since the debate took place at the first level, Protocol 11 did not 
change the role and purpose of the system, but rather reinforced the judicial 
character of the system and the right to individual petition, principles on which the 
system previously also rested.  
Prior to the adoption of Protocol 14, two former Presidents of the Court, Ryssdal 
and Wildhaber, and a former Registrar, Mahoney, brought the reform debate to the 
second level. They discussed the role and purpose of the Convention system and 
concluded that its primary aim is to ‘[raise] the general standard of protection of 
human rights […] both in the country concerned and in the Convention community 
of States as a whole’.346 The Court should thus primarily aim to deliver 
constitutional justice, as opposed to individual justice.347 Individual justice is of 
secondary importance and regarded as a means to detect defects in the contracting 
states, which enables the Court to contribute to achieving constitutional justice.348 
Constitutional justice may not only be preferable over individual justice for 
theoretical reasons, but also for practical reasons, because it requires the Court to 
deliver comparatively fewer judgments.349 This may be a compelling argument 
considering that Strasbourg already found it hard to deal with the workload in the 
late 1980s when the Council of Europe was not yet enlarged, when the 
implementation and execution record was better than it is today and prior to 
Turkey’s acceptance of the right to individual petition.350 A system of constitutional 
                                                        
344  Harmsen (2001), 122 (emphasis original).  
345  Ibid., 126.  
346  Ibid., 104.  
347  See for more information about the Court as a constitutional court: Jackson (2006), 777-781.  
348  Mahoney (2002), 104; See also: Wildhaber (2002); Greer (2006), 169-175; Bates (2010), 498-500.  
349  Mahoney (2002), 110; Greer (2006), 169-170; Wildhaber cited in: Bates (2010), 498.  
350  Bates (2010), 393, 420, 430; It should, however, also be noted that the system in the late 1980s had 
a part-time Court and the Commission, while it has had a full-time Court since the entry into force 
of Protocol 11 ECHR, which can probably handle more applications than the old system.  
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justice, in the words of Wildhaber, by decreasing the workload, paradoxically 
prevents that the right to individual petition becomes ‘largely illusory’.351  
Proposals made by the Evaluation Group, established to follow up on the 
Ministerial Conference in Rome, gave thought to how a system of constitutional 
justice could be formed. The Evaluation Group proposed that the Court should be 
allowed to decline to examine ‘in detail applications which raise no substantial 
issue under the Convention’,352 thus giving the Court sufficient time to decide on 
‘constitutional judgments’.353 Applications not meriting a constitutional judgment 
could then be treated as part of the execution process of constitutional judgments 
and be forwarded to the Committee directly.354 The Committee alone would thus be 
given the task of dealing with non-constitutional cases, while the Court would be 
solely responsible for choosing and adjudicating constitutional cases.  
As Mahoney predicted,355 the Evaluation Group’s proposals met with criticism 
from NGOs, academics and judges.356 The CDDH, responsible for drafting Protocol 
14, concluded that the proposals ‘would give too wide a discretion to the Court 
enabling it to pick and choose,’ causing ‘an important restriction on the right of 
individual application, for which it found it impossible […] to compensate 
somehow’.357 The CDDH argued that both individual and constitutional justice are 
‘legitimate functions’ of system and that these functions should be reconciled by 
inserting a new admissibility criterion into the Convention that would empower the 
Court to declare inadmissible applications that satisfy all of these criteria:  
1.  the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage;  
2.  the case does not raise a serious question affecting the interpretation or 
application of the Convention or the protocols thereto; and  
3.  the case does not raise any serious issue of general importance.358  
 
As described above, only the first criterion made it to Protocol 14. This new 
admissibility criterion is such a faint echo of the debate that Wildhaber, Mahoney 
and Ryssdal initiated that is a measure on the first level of reform, leaving the role 
and purpose of the Convention system again broadly unchanged. 
The Group of Wise Persons, appointed to consider the long-term effectiveness 
of the Convention system in 2005, refused to pursue the option of giving priority to 
                                                        
351  Wildhaber (2004b).   
352  Evaluation Group (2001), para. 93.  
353  Defined as ‘fully reasoned and authoritative judgments in cases which raise substantial or new and 
complex issues of human rights law, are of particular significance for the State concerned or 
involve allegations of serious human rights violations and which warrant a full process of 
considered adjudication’, in: Evaluation Group (2001), para. 98. 
354  Mahoney (2002), 112; See also: Luzius Wildhaber cited in: Bates (2010), 498.  
355  Mahoney (2002), 112–113.  
356  Amnesty International et al., ‘Joint Response to Proposals to Ensure the Future Effectiveness of the 
[ECtHR]’, 28 March 2003, paras. 8-9; Thomassen (2003); Leach (2006a).  
357  CDDH (2003), para. 14.  
358  Ibid., paras. 11, 15 and proposal B.4. 
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constitutional justice over individual justice. It considered that giving the Court the 
power to ‘pick and choose cases’ would ‘call [...] into question and thus undermine 
the philosophy underlying the Convention’ and ‘entail a risk of politicising the 
system’.359 The CDDH mentioned the possibility again in a report in 2012. It is of 
the opinion that the term ‘constitutional’ may not be appropriate and needs further 
clarification and that it anyhow ‘points towards something whose functioning 
would be radically different from that of the current Court’.360 As the CDDH did 
not elaborate on the possibility it is unlikely that a system of constitutional justice 
will be introduced in the foreseeable future.  
4.4 Protocols 15 and 16 and Beyond  
After the publication of the report of the Evaluation Group (2001) and the report of 
the Group of Wise Persons (2006), the reform debate continued most visibly in the 
form of declarations adopted at ministerial conferences in Interlaken (2010), Izmir 
(2011), Brighton (2012) and Brussels (2014). The declarations have also reaffirmed 
the right of individual petition, which reinforces the above conclusion that it is 
unlikely that a model of constitutional justice will be implemented in the near 
future.361 The Brighton Declaration may have opened the door to second level 
reform however, admitting that ‘it may be necessary to evaluate the fundamental 
role and nature of the Court’ in order to secure the ‘future effectiveness of the 
Convention system’.362 In this light probably, the Committee was invited to 
‘consider the future of the Convention system’ and to carry out a ‘comprehensive 
analysis of potential options for the future role and function of the Court, including 
analysis of how the Convention system in essentially its current form could be 
preserved, and consideration of more profound changes to how applications are 
resolved by the [...] system’.363 In response thereto, the CDDH has established a 
drafting group on the reform of the Court to report on this matter,364 which also 
looks into the alternative model of a ‘constitutional’ court.365 The door to second 
level reform is however only ajar, as the Brighton Declaration added that the right 
of individual application ‘remains a cornerstone of the Convention system’. The 
declarations additionally emphasised the importance of the subsidiarity principle,366 
                                                        
359  Group of Wise Persons (2006), para. 42.  
360  CDDH (2012b), para. 34.  
361  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Declaration para. 1 
and Action Plan para. A(1); HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, 
Follow-up para. A(1); HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 
2015, Declaration para. 1.  
362  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 31.  
363  Ibid., para. 35(c),(e).  
364  CDDH (2014), para. 1; The report is scheduled for December 2015. 
365  Ibid., para. 7.   
366  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Declaration para. 2, 
6; HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Declaration paras. 5-6.  
 
 
 
 A Characterisation of the Convention System 
 
 
59 
inviting the Court to avoid re-examining issues of fact and law established by 
national courts, to apply the admissibility criteria consistently and rigorously and to 
give full effect to the new admissibility criteria introduced by Protocol 14.367 The 
Izmir Declaration also critically recalls that ‘the Court is not an immigration 
Appeals Tribunal or Court of fourth instance’ and emphasised ‘that the treatment of 
requests for interim measures must take place in full conformity with the principle 
of subsidiarity’.368 The states thus sent a signal to the Court that it may be 
overstepping its responsibility, specifically in immigration cases and with regard to 
the imposition of (large numbers of) interim measures in such cases. This signal fits 
in the legitimacy debate discussed in section II.3.8. Further, the Brighton 
Declaration, unlike its predecessors, included a heading titled ‘Interaction between 
the Court and national authorities’, in which is reiterated the importance of the 
subsidiarity principle and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation to the task 
division between the Court and the states.369 In the Brussels Declaration, the 
Committee is invited to evaluate the extent to which the implementation of the 
Interlaken Action Plan has improved the Convention system’s effectiveness and, on 
the basis of that evaluation, to decide ‘before the end of 2019, on whether more far-
reaching changes are necessary’.370 Again, therefore, the door to second level 
reform has not been completely closed.  
The documents, as may be inherent to such political documents, are mostly a 
series of statements inviting the Court, the Committee and the states to act in a 
certain way and of statements welcoming and considering the desirability of certain 
actions and developments relating to inter alia implementation of the Convention, 
repetitive applications and the supervision of execution of judgments. Hardly any 
concrete reform measures are included and when they are mentioned, they are 
limited to the first level of reform discussed above; they do not provide an answer 
to pressing questions posed by a former President of the Court to the states parties, 
asking them ‘what sort of Court [...] do they want for the future?’ and how the right 
of individual application can ‘be preserved while ensuring that it remains effective 
[...]?’. 371 The declarations nevertheless set in motion a process that would 
eventually lead to several concrete reform measures described in Protocols 15 and 
16, both adopted in 2013.372 
                                                        
367  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Action Plan para. 
E(9); HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. 
F(2).  
368  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. A(3).  
369  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, paras. 10-11; The 
Conference invited the Committee to amend the Convention to include the principle and the 
doctrine in the Preamble, see: para. 12(b).  
370  HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
para. 6.  
371  Costa (2009b), 3.  
372  At the time of writing, the Protocols had not yet entered into force.  
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Protocol 15 makes different amendments to the Convention, three of which are 
highlighted here.373 The first change concerns the preamble to the Convention, to 
which a new recital will be added containing a reference to the principle of 
subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation.374 The recital is 
‘intended to enhance the transparency and accessibility of these characteristics of 
the Convention system’.375 Further, upon the entry into force of the Protocol, the 
parties may no longer object to relinquishment by a chamber of its jurisdiction to 
the Grand Chamber, which is currently possible.376 This amendment aims to 
contribute to the consistency of the Court’s case law and to accelerate the 
proceedings before the Court in cases which raise a serious question affecting the 
interpretation of the Convention or a potential departure from existing case law.377 
The document also amends the admissibility criterion regarding a significant 
disadvantage introduced by Protocol 14, deleting the safeguard ‘provided that no 
case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a 
domestic tribunal’.378 This measure should ‘give greater effect to the maxim de 
minimis non curat praetor’.379 Protocol 15 enters into force once all state parties 
have ratified it.380 
Optional Protocol 16, coined the ‘Protocol of dialogue’ by a President of the 
Court,381 empowers the highest domestic courts to seek an advisory opinion of the 
Court on ‘questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application’ of the 
Convention rights in the context of a domestic case.382 This mechanism is supposed 
to ‘further enhance the interaction between the Court and national authorities and 
thereby reinforce implementation of the Convention, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity’.383 A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber decides 
whether to accept the request, and if it decides so, the Grand Chamber delivers the 
advisory opinion.384 This opinion is not binding;385 because the requests for an 
advisory opinion ‘take place in the context of the judicial dialogue between the 
Court and domestic courts’, the requesting court ‘decides on the effects of the 
                                                        
373  The changes which are not discussed here concern the criteria for office and the terms of office and 
dismissal and the time limit for filing an application.  
374  Art. 1 Protocol 15 ECHR.  
375  Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 ECHR, para. 7.  
376  Art. 3 Protocol 15 ECHR.  
377  Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 ECHR, paras. 16-17.  
378  Art. 5 Protocol 15 ECHR.  
379  Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 ECHR, para. 23.  
380  Art. 7 Protocol 15 ECHR.  
381  Spielmann (2014a), 2.  
382  Art. 1(1-2) Protocol 16 ECHR.  
383  Preamble Protocol 16 ECHR; See for a critical review of the Protocol: Gerards (2014a).  
384  Art. 2 Protocol 16 ECHR. 
385  Art. 5 Protocol 16 ECHR.  
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advisory opinion’.386 The required number of ratifications for the document’s entry 
into force is ten.387  
4.5 The Essence of the Reform  
This section described past reform, explained how reform can take place on two 
levels and shed light on the current reform debate and measures. The reform debate 
has not and will probably not in the near future fundamentally change the outlook 
of the Convention system, turning the Court into a court which mainly provides for 
constitutional justice, in spite of voices in the reform debate rallying in favour of 
this. It is further notable that that the relation Court-states, as governed by the 
subsidiarity principle, has become an important point of debate, of which the 
adoption of Protocol 16 is the ultimate proof.  
5 A CHARACTERISATION OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM  
As was stated in the introduction, this chapter is mainly interested in seeing how the 
establishment, functioning, developments and reform of the Convention system 
have determined and influenced the distribution of power and responsibilities 
between the five interlocutors of interest: the states parties, the Court, the 
Committee, the Assembly and the Commissioner. The final section aims to 
characterise the Convention system in this light by discussing the functioning of the 
interlocutors and the relations between them from the perspective of the 
developments and reform which the system has travelled through. The Assembly 
and the Commissioner are not discussed here, because apart from a short 
introduction to these interlocutors in section II.2.2, they were not discussed in this 
chapter. Additionally, the section lists five characteristics that can be extracted from 
the preceding sections.  
5.1 The Functioning of the Interlocutors  
5.1.1 States Parties  
The subsidiarity principle prescribes that the states are first and foremost 
responsible for protecting the Convention rights. Ideally therefore, protection of the 
rights begins and ends in the states, because they have an effective protection 
system, including effective domestic remedies to remedy the exceptional violation. 
The states bear their primary responsibility collectively: they should, again ideally, 
move their fellow states towards improved implementation. The developments in 
section II.3 however revealed that the Convention system does not function under 
                                                        
386  Explanatory Report to Protocol 16 ECHR, para. 25.  
387  Art. 8(1) Protocol 16 ECHR.  
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ideal circumstances. This does not mean that the subsidiarity principle loses its 
value or meaning. On the contrary, in the course of the reform debate discussed in 
section II.4 the importance of the principle has been stressed over and again and the 
principle will even be recited in the preamble to the Convention upon the entry into 
force of Protocol 15. It rather means that the states have not implemented the 
Convention adequately, not even to the extent that the system’s effective 
functioning is guaranteed. Furthermore, the developments clarified that states are in 
practice largely unwilling to collectively enforce the Convention. More concretely, 
the developments illustrated that some states act in bad faith, committing grave 
violations on a wide scale, or that some fail, for whatever reason, to address 
systemic and systematic issues that give raise to high numbers of repetitive 
violations.  
5.1.2 The Court  
The Court, in line with the subsidiarity principle, supervises the conduct of the 
states that falls within the ambit of the Convention and, as part of its supervisory 
exercise, gives its verdict on the compatibility of their conduct with the Convention. 
It only does so after the respondent state has been given the possibility to discharge 
its primary responsibility. Respect for the states’ primary responsibility is normally 
guaranteed by manifestations of the subsidiarity principle that include the 
exhaustion of domestic remedies rule in the admissibility phase and the first 
instance and margin of appreciation doctrine in the merits phase.  
The developments have shown that the Court is simultaneously confronted with 
roughly two categories of cases: first, cases stemming from the ‘fine tuning’ of 
systems that have in place the fundamentals for effective Convention 
implementation and, second, cases stemming from more fundamental problems in 
systems where the Convention, or part thereof, has not been implemented 
effectively. The latter category of cases concerns grave and widespread violations, 
repetitive violations and the violations pertaining to the transition to democracy. 
The Court’s added value is that it provides some form of relief to the applicant, 
something he could apparently not find in the respondent state when a violation is 
found. This is probably particularly important to applicants bringing cases that 
make the Court one of first instance, because these applicants are denied all 
Convention protection. The Court’s added value is also that a judgment finding a 
violation may be a signal for the respondent state that an implementation problem 
exists, thus assisting the state with improving its implementation record. This added 
value is however generally, outside the context of the pilot-judgment procedure, 
limited due to the individual nature of the judgments. It is further suggested that this 
added value is particularly important to the second category of cases where even the 
fundamentals of Convention implementation may be insufficient.  
The Court’s supervisory task, coupled with its power to pronounce legally 
binding judgments, gives it some power over the states parties. The relation Court-
states is therefore – at least from a formal, legal perspective – hierarchical. 
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However, the Court does not have a great amount of power over the states, as 
ensured by the above-mentioned manifestations of the subsidiarity principle. The 
limited power of the Court over the states thus stems from the rule that the Court 
only assumes jurisdiction after the national courts were given the chance to remedy 
a violation. Furthermore, when the Court does establish jurisdiction in the end, it 
does not review the national court’s interpretation of domestic law and its 
establishment of the facts, and the Court often gives the national authorities some 
leeway as to the choices they make. Should it find a violation, the Court normally 
only declares that a violation was committed and therefore does not necessarily 
indicate how the violation should be remedied, with the exception of just 
satisfaction, and what broader consequences should be drawn from its judgment; 
this is for the state to decide. In each phases of Convention proceedings the states 
therefore maintain a certain degree of decision-making power. 
When the Court respects the principle of subsidiarity, it helps the Court to 
ensure respecting the direct democratic legitimacy of national authorities and their 
knowledge of the domestic situation. As was explained when outlining the broader 
context to the subsidiarity principle, domestic authorities are generally thought to be 
best equipped to effectuate international standards; the legitimacy of in particular 
the Court was discussed when discussing the development of the Convention 
system. It is desirable that the Court respects the legitimacy and knowledge of the 
states, because the Court has comparatively less democratic legitimacy as a court, 
and has comparatively less knowledge of a domestic situation, as an international 
court. National authorities are superior in both areas, which makes them, in 
principle, better decision-makers. The manifestations of the subsidiarity principle 
are practical tools in the hands of the Court to show respect for the decisions made 
by national authorities. Therefore, when the Court moves away from respecting that 
principle, it risks disrespecting the legitimacy and knowledge of national 
authorities, which may unavoidably causes the national authorities to question the 
Court’s legitimacy. As the legitimacy debate illustrated, in some states the 
legitimacy of the Court may no longer be as strong as it probably used to be. One 
cause for this decline is that the Court has at least sometimes (allegedly) 
disregarded the subsidiarity principle by either expanding its supervisory 
responsibility or by assuming additional responsibilities. These changes in the 
Court’s role are a response to the developments described in this chapter and a 
result of the importance which the Court attaches to ensuring that the Convention 
continues to provide effective protection to individuals.  
Over the years, the Court’s supervisory task has expanded in different ways and 
directions. Its task has first expanded in a neutral manner, in the sense that the 
changes do not directly compromise respect for the subsidiarity principle, because 
the expansion was initiated by the states, rather than on the Court’s initiative. The 
enlargement and the confirmation of the right to individual petition have expanded 
the Court’s responsibility quantitatively; the expansion of the catalogue of 
Convention rights has increased its responsibility qualitatively. The Protocol 11 
reforms also have expanded the Court’s supervisory task by assigning it 
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responsibilities that were previously assigned to the Commission and the 
Committee. Protocol 14 reforms did not change the Court’s task significantly, 
although they were designed to allow it to focus on important cases. Second, the 
Court has assumed responsibility for supervising ‘parts’ of rights that it did not 
supervise previously, because it has expanded the scope of protection provided by 
existing Convention rights. Since this was initiated by the Court itself, without the 
explicit approval of the state parties, this expansion may potentially cause tension 
between the Court and the states, as evidenced by the legitimacy debate. Third, the 
Court has assumed responsibilities that should ideally be discharged by the states. 
The Court has come to sometimes function as a court of fourth instance that deals 
with errors of fact and national law. It also increasingly deals with repetitive 
violations that point to a fundamental national problem and a failure of the states to 
fulfil their primary responsibility. It further sometimes assumes the function of a 
court of first instance, establishing the facts because this was not done by national 
authorities or offering a first avenue of relieve, because no effective national 
remedies exist. The Court has also become increasingly active in the area of 
execution, thus taking on the Committee’s task at least in part, and in indicating 
remedial measures under Article 46, a choice formally reserved to the states. The 
Court’s activity in the area of execution has been a reaction to implementation and 
execution problems. The development of pilot-judgments and the Court’s 
willingness to adjudicate follow-up cases illustrate this development.  
The stepping up and the assumption of new responsibilities is oftentimes 
understandable from the perspective of the importance which the Court attaches to 
the effectiveness principle: when states do not discharge their responsibilities, the 
Court is confronted with choosing between respecting the subsidiarity principle or 
providing effective protection. As an institution established to protect human rights, 
it tends to choose the latter option. However understandable this choice is from the 
perspective of effectiveness, the tension that results from this choice continues to 
exist, because national authorities remain in principle the primary decision makers 
due to their superior knowledge and direct democratic legitimacy. Further, by 
stepping up and assuming new responsibilities, the Court exerts potentially more 
power over the states parties, because it often decreases room for the subsidiarity 
principle to manifest itself, which increases the power of the Court over the states. 
This deteriorates the tension resulting from prioritising the effectiveness principle 
and creates tension in itself, because states naturally want to retain power 
themselves.  
As for the Court’s relation with the Committee, the responsibilities are usually 
clearly divided between them along procedural lines. Exceptionally however, the 
division becomes less clear-cut, because the Court assumes the Committee’s 
responsibility under the Convention: supervising the execution process. This may 
happen when the Court makes an Article 46-indication, adjudicates follow-up cases 
or issues pilot judgments, phenomena which were introduced above as 
manifestations of the effectiveness principle in the execution phase. This may lead 
to tension between the two organs when the Committee considers it problematic 
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that the Court has also come to play a role in the execution process, which the 
Convention reserves to the Committee and the states. The Court again steps up its 
responsibility for effectiveness considerations.  
5.1.3 The Committee  
Under the Convention, the Committee is solely responsible for supervising the 
execution of the Court’s judgments since the adoption of Protocol 11. Its role in the 
Convention system is therefore more limited than that of the Court, because, even 
though it supervises the conduct of states like the Court does, the supervision only 
concerns execution of a judgment issued by the Court. Like the Court, the 
Committee is in a hierarchically higher and more powerful position than the states: 
only the Committee can decide that the execution process is formally finished by 
adopting a final resolution.  
5.2 The Characteristics of the Convention System  
5.2.1 Internal and External Tension 
The system is characterised two categories of tension, encompassing tension that is 
internal to the system and external tension that has been caused by various 
developments discussed in section II.3.  
Internal tension derives from the international and countermajoritarian 
supervision of a single European Court that can, in a binding fashion and in the last 
resort, impose uniform norms over a diverse pool of national authorities that are 
normally more knowledgeable of the national situation, that have more direct 
democratic legitimacy, in the sense that they are elected, and that wish to see their 
diversity is respected. Uniformity and diversity; international supervision and 
domestic superior knowledge; judicial supervision and more direct democratic 
national decision-making are therefore in tension with each other.388  
External tension stems from developments that have confronted the Court with a 
choice between predominantly respecting either the subsidiarity principle or the 
effectiveness principle, a trade-off which it does not need to make when the 
national system implementing the Convention is sufficiently efficient.389 When 
confronted with the choice, the Court’s choice for effective protection of the 
individual applicant has led it to assume wider and additional responsibilities, 
sometimes at the expense of other interlocutors, and, thereby, has exerted more 
power over in particular the states. Not only does the Court’s confrontation with 
this choice create tension, but also do the consequences of the choice make that the 
tension internal to the system is magnified and potentially enlarged.  
                                                        
388  See also: sections IV.2 and IV.2.1.  
389  See also: section IV.3.  
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5.2.2 Sharing Responsibilities  
Responsibilities are shared among different interlocutors: the states bear primary 
responsibility for implementing the Convention and the Court has subsidiary 
responsibility for ensuring that the states observe their responsibility.390 Further, the 
states are responsible for executing judgments, while the Committee is responsible 
for supervising the execution process. In addition to that, the Court sometimes 
presents its views on execution. Within the Committee, the states should 
collectively enforce the Convention rights; this is a shared responsibility too. The 
division of responsibilities is therefore rather clear-cut. However, this chapter also 
showed that in particular the Court may assume responsibilities that are normally 
carried out by other interlocutors in reaction to the states’ failure to implement the 
Convention. The system of shared responsibilities can therefore only function when 
each interlocutor fulfils is responsibility fully and effectively.  
5.2.3 Interconnectedness between National and European level  
The Convention system can also be characterised in terms of the interconnectedness 
between the national and the European level: the Committee and the Assembly are 
composed of persons who simultaneously play a role at both levels. The sharing of 
responsibility between interlocutors at both levels adds to the system’s 
interconnectedness. Neither the domestic and the European level, nor the different 
interlocutors can therefore be studied in isolation from each other.  
5.2.4 Diversity  
The system is diverse, existing out of 47 different states that demand from the Court 
that it respect their diversity. The diversity is illustrated by the diverse body of 
judgments: some fine-tune long-established democracies and others point to 
essential defects in states in transition to democracy; some result from repetitive 
violations and others from an isolated problem; some concern grave and widespread 
violations perpetrated by uncooperative state authorities and other reveal a minor 
violation resulting from a decision made by an independent court that undertook a 
complex balancing exercise. The Court sees diversity as a norm that it should 
respect, as evidenced by the margin of appreciation doctrine: in general it holds that 
more diversity implies a wider margin of appreciation.  
                                                        
390  See also: section IV.1.2; HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 
2010, Declaration paras. 2, 6; Bratza (2012a), 4; HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton 
Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 3. 
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5.2.5 Lack of Final Power  
The system is finally characterised by a lack of final power of the Committee and 
the Court over the states parties, even though they review the states’ conduct from a 
vertically hierarchical position. The manifestations of the subsidiarity principle 
show that the Court does not consider it desirable to exert a great extent of power 
over the states. Moreover, and even when it partially disregards the principle, it 
cannot directly force the states to execute a judgment: it simply has no means to 
attain this. Further, the Committee neither has the means to exert power: in the end, 
it is the state that must execute a judgment and implement the Convention. 
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CHAPTER III 
A CHARACTERISATION OF DIALOGUE 
 
 
 
The origins of academic legal writing about dialogue can be traced back to 
publications about dialogue between the (supreme) courts and the legislature in 
national constitutional systems. Although therefore originally devised for the 
national legal system, various authors have demonstrated convincingly that the 
notion can also be usefully applied to judicial dialogue in the EU and to 
transjudicial communication, that is ‘communication among courts – whether 
national or supranational – across borders’.1 Their contributions form a valuable 
source for explaining why and how dialogue can be of added value to the 
Convention system, which is done in chapter IV.  
This chapter aims to give a characterisation of how the notion of dialogue has 
been employed in academic legal writing.2 It is emphasised that this is a 
characterisation and by no means an exhaustive inventory. It serves to contextualise 
the dialogue discourse and to give some insights into the possible uses of the notion. 
To this end, section III.1 starts off with an analysis of why and how dialogue has 
come to be used by authors writing about national constitutional systems in order to 
sketch the background to this notion. Additionally, that section explains how 
various authors have applied the same notion to the EU and other forms of 
transjudicial communication. In order to place the use of the notion in perspective, 
the background against which it has been developed in each setting is briefly 
sketched. To structure the discussions, a distinction is inter alia made between 
authors who use the notion as a descriptive tool and those who use it normatively. 
Structuring the chapter in this manner serves to emphasise that the notion of 
dialogue is applied in different ways and that, depending on one’s choice, different 
questions arise. The descriptive use of the notion leads to the question how the 
phenomenon can be observed empirically and, when observed, why it takes place. 
Its normative use prompts the question why dialogue should take place, pointing to 
the need for dialogue to not be an end in itself, but to have a higher goal, such as 
promoting judicial learning, preventing conflict or legitimising the role of the 
judiciary.3 Once it has been established why dialogue can be of added value, the 
question arises how dialogue can be attained. Section III.2 lists means for dialogue, 
                                                        
1  The term ‘transjudical communication’ as well as the definition were devised in: Slaugther (1994), 
99.  
2  See also: Glas (2015).  
3  Chapter VI explaines that this study uses dialogue as a normative tool. 
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from different angles, examples of which are drawn from the national 
constitutional, the EU and transjudicial communication.  
1 DIALOGUE AS A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE TOOL  
1.1 In National Constitutional Settings  
This section first sketches the background against which the notion of dialogue has 
been developed and then introduces the notion itself. The notion as employed in 
national constitutional settings is explored further by distinguishing how it can be 
used as a descriptive and a normative tool.4 Thereafter, the positive implications in 
terms of collaboration and reciprocity are introduced. Further, the notions of 
dialogue and deference are compared and contrasted as they are used by different 
authors, because these notions are often used in connection with each other. 
Because this section mostly focuses on dialogue between the judiciary and the 
legislature, the section also addresses how dialogue can be regarded from a broader 
perspective.  
1.1.1 Background  
The emergence of dialogue theory as ‘one of the principal contenders in the quest 
for a satisfactory theory of judicial authority in constitutional decision-making’5 
should be placed against the background of the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’, or, 
the perceived undemocratic nature of judicial review.6 Solving the difficulty 
requires reconciling the notion of representative democracy, which is founded on 
majority rule and decision-making based on the representative will of the people, 
with judicial review, which allows electorally unaccountable judges to overrule the 
majority’s will. The difficulty is particularly intricate in the context of constitutional 
and fundamental rights adjudication, because rights are usually broadly defined and 
multi-interpretable, leading to the question why a judge, and not a democratically 
elected parliament, should have the last say about their interpretation.7  
Mostly developed by authors writing about the Canadian constitutional system, 
the notion of dialogue explains how judicial review may be reconciled with 
representative democracy and therefore potentially solves the countermajoritarian 
difficulty.8 At its core, the notion proposes that the undemocratic nature of judicial 
review is attenuated when judges engage in a dialogue about the interpretation of 
constitutional or fundamental rights with democratic actors, such as parliament or 
the society at large. Dialogue thus both describes the interaction between the 
                                                        
4  See also: Meuwese and Snel (2013), 136-137.  
5  Bateup (2006), 1118.  
6  See: Thayer (1893); Bickel (1962); Friedman (1998).  
7  Bateup (2006), 1114-1115.  
8  Ibid., 1118.  
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judiciary and other actors and serves to legitimise the role of the judiciary in rights 
adjudication.9  
Since the core idea behind dialogue can be refined in different ways and applied 
to different national settings, no uniform dialogue theory exists: dialogue theory 
can, for example, be either predominantly descriptive or normative, or a 
combination thereof, and it can merely describe interaction between the legislature 
and the judiciary or more broadly between the judiciary and society at large.  
1.1.2 Dialogue as a Descriptive Tool  
Hogg and Bushell use the notion of dialogue to describe the practice of 
constitutional adjudication by the Canadian Supreme Court under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, which empowers courts to review acts of parliament and at 
the same time gives parliament the power to modify or disregard a judgment. In line 
with this account, they call the relationship between the judiciary and the legislature 
‘dialogical’ when the latter can reverse, modify or avoid a decision of the former, 
and the other way round. Dialogue thus takes place when a judgment of the 
Supreme Court, striking down legislation for incompatibility with the Charter, is 
followed by legislative action.10 Following an empirical survey where the authors 
employed this definition of dialogue, they found that 80 percent of the 65 surveyed 
cases were followed by legislative action.11 They concluded that judicial review is 
‘the beginning of a dialogue’ and that the critique of the Charter based on 
democratic legitimacy concerns can therefore ‘[not] be sustained’.12 Hogg and 
Bushell’s theory therefore empirically shows how the democratic legitimacy 
concern aired by the countermajoritarian difficulty is greatly reduced when the 
legislature can influence the judiciary’s decisions. The authors demonstrated ‘not 
that judicial review was good’ and therefore ‘how the legislatures [...] should 
behave’, but rather that judicial review ‘was weaker than generally supposed’ and 
therefore ‘how the legislatures did behave.13 Further, Hogg and Bushell emphasise 
that, even when it is accepted, as they do, that the judiciary and not the legislature 
has the final authority to interpret the Charter, it is still possible for dialogue to 
develop, because an authoritative and final interpretation of a right does not take 
away the possibility for the legislature to choose from ‘a range of legislative 
responses’.14 
                                                        
9  See: Ibid., 1110.  
10  Hogg and Bushell (1997), 79, 82; See for a ‘conventional description of constitutional dialogue’: 
Tushnet (2012), 3-4.  
11  See for other empirical research into ‘Charter dialogue’: Macfarlane (2012), 51 (who concludes 
‘that the system of judicial review in Canada is, in practice, fundamentally one of judicial 
supremacy’). 
12  Hogg and Bushell (1997), 97-105; They made a less strong conclusion in a subsequent article, see: 
Hogg et al. (2007).  
13  Hogg et al. (2007), 26, 29.  
14  Ibid., 31, 53.  
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1.1.3 Dialogue as a Normative Tool  
Roach has proposed to give normative content to Hogg and Bushell’s account by 
justifying the role of the judiciary in the Charter dialogue. He answers in this way to 
criticism of descriptive accounts generally advanced by for example Bateup, who 
writes that even though they ‘provide [...] persuasive evidence that concern about 
the countermajoritarian difficulty is overstated [...] these accounts themselves [...] 
frequently fail to offer an attractive normative vision of what judicial review should 
accomplish in modern society’.15 Bateup criticises normative accounts also because 
‘they are not sufficiently grounded in how judicial review operates in the real 
world’.16 Roach seems to answer this criticism as well, because he takes Hogg and 
Bushell’s empirical observations as a starting point for his normative account. The 
judiciary’s role, Roach argues, is not legitimate for the sole reason that the 
legislature has a procedural possibility to resist the judiciary’s judgment.17 Rather, 
the judiciary’s role is legitimate, because it plays an unparalleled anti-majoritarian 
role that can, due to the ‘unique attributes of courts’, only be played by courts. 
These unique attributes include ‘guaranteed participation of aggrieved parties’, 
independence of the judiciary from the executive, legal reasoning and a fair process 
of adjudication. Moreover, the judiciary is open to claims of injustice by vulnerable 
minorities. These claims may not always be considered by the other branches, 
unless the legal branch takes them on and thereby forces the other branches to 
respond.18  
Dixon has developed an alternative normative concept for the Canadian system. 
She subscribes to the notion of dialogue, but is of the opinion that Hogg and 
Bushell’s account insufficiently distinguishes Canadian weak-form judicial review 
from strong-form judicial review.19 Strong-form judicial review, as can be found in 
the US,20 gives the judiciary the final say in the interpretation of the constitution, 
thus creating the countermajoritarian difficulty.21 At the other extreme, complete 
parliamentary sovereignty solves the countermajoritarian difficulty by giving 
parliament the last say, but does not in any significant manner protect the rights of 
minorities against the will of the majority, which the current study calls the 
                                                        
15  Bateup (2006), 1112; This has been a major criticism of Hogg and Bushell’s account, see also: 
Tremblay (2005), 627; Roach (2008), 52-53.  
16  Bateup (2006), 1121.  
17  Roach (2008), 67-68.  
18  Ibid., 69-75.  
19  The terms ‘weak-form’ and ‘strong-form’ judicial review were introduced by: Tushnet (2003a), 
813-814; See also: Tushnet (2003b).  
20  The US constitutional system is the best known example of a system with strong-form judicial 
review. The US Supreme Court has overturned congressional and state legislation and other 
governmental action ever since it justified the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison (see: 
O’Brien (2008), 31-35). While this means that the Supreme Court has indeed been able to protect 
minorities (see, e.g.: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka), it also means that the 
countermajoritarian difficulty has been discussed fiercely in the US (see, e.g.: Bickel (1962)).  
21  Tushnet (2003a), 814.  
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majoritarian dilemma. This system no longer exists in its pure form as it used to in 
the Commonwealth,22 as some sort of weak-form judicial review over parliament 
has been introduced, usually in the form a mechanisms to facilitate dialogue 
between the branches in a bill of rights.23 Weak-form review is a ‘new middle 
ground’,24 giving the judiciary the power to review parliament in its judgments, but 
not the power to impose its will on parliament by giving parliament the power to 
decide whether and how it responds to a judgment. The review is weakened because 
it is not final. Due to this feature, the review helps bypass the countermajoritarian 
difficulty and can also stimulate inter-branch dialogue.25 The Canadian system can 
be characterised as weak, because the Supreme Court can review acts of parliament, 
while parliament can modify or disregard a judgment.26 In Dixon’s view, the 
‘weakness’ should be more outspoken and obvious; Hogg and Bushell’s account 
does not sufficiently require the Canadian Supreme Court to show any deference to 
the legislature.27 To make judicial review truly weak, Dixon proposes to require the 
Supreme Court to defer to the legislature in ‘second look cases’, i.e. cases that bring 
an issue before the court that it had previously already decided on and that 
subsequently have been dealt with for a second time by the legislature. The Court’s 
deference should be conditional on the fulfilment of certain minimum criteria and 
requires the Court to reason narrowly in the second look case, so as to make its 
reasoning compatible with precedents. Dialogue takes place when the courts ‘defer 
to legislative sequels that evidence interpretive disagreement with the courts’ in 
second look cases.28  
Dixon also undertakes to justify the role of the judiciary. Unlike Roach, she does 
not emphasise the unique anti-majoritarian role of the judiciary, but justifies its role 
with reference to its capacity to undo ‘blockages’ in the legislative process,29 which 
are caused by roughly two gaps in the legislative process: ‘blind spots’ and ‘burdens 
                                                        
22  Where it was ‘pointless to rationalise [the British constitution] in an enacted constitution which 
could forbid nothing, not could it provide a list of basic freedoms which governments would be 
unable to infringe’ (Felix Frankfurter cited in: O’Brien (2008), 68); The Canadian system prior to 
the enactment of the Charter, when the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960 was still in force, used to 
be another example of a system without judicial review, see: Hogg et al. (2007), 29; See also: 
Hiebert (2006), 7-8.  
23  Tushnet (2003a), 815: Explaining that ‘[e]very constitution-maker in the past generation has 
adopted some form of constrained parliamentarism, and at present Australia and New Zealand 
provide the only significant examples of nations committed to something even approaching’ a 
model of parliamentary sovereignty and adding in a footnote that even the examples of Australia 
and New Zealand must be ‘qualified’; See also: Hiebert (2004), 1964-1966; Hiebert (2006), 8; 
Jackson (2007), 93.  
24  Hiebert (2006), 9.  
25  Tushnet (2003a), 813-814; Tushnet (2003b), 2785-2786; Bateup (2007), 1-2; Dixon (2007), 392.  
26  See also: Hogg et al. (2007), 29 (describing the Charter of 1982 as a ‘halfway house between the 
strong form of judicial review typified by the [US] and the statutory bill of rights typified by the 
Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960’).  
27  Dixon (2009), 239-240, 248.  
28  Ibid., 240, 242.  
29  Ibid., 258.  
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of inertia’. Blind spots occur when, for example, the legislature does not realise that 
a law may be applied to limit a right because of time constraints or because it does 
not realise that a law will limit the rights of a specific group because its expertise is 
limited. Burdens of inertia make that blind spots remain unremedied and are caused 
by, for example, bureaucracy or prioritisation policies.30 As a consequence of 
legislative blockages, even those rights that the majority wishes to see protected and 
that do not necessarily have significant budgetary implications risk remaining 
unprotected.31 This is where the judiciary can play a justifiable role; it can use 
dialogic and coercive means to counter legislative blockages, ensuring that the 
blockages do not impede the enjoyment of rights.32 The judiciary, for example, 
assess the practical implications of a law because it adjudicates individual cases, 
undoes blind spots when it has remedial powers and eliminates blockages when 
authority and publicity is given to its judgments.33 The judiciary should, in 
summary, adjudicate rights cases when ‘there are arguable failures of foresight, 
perspective, accommodation or responsiveness’ in the legislative process, on the 
condition that it introduces ‘new ideas, perspectives, or even equilibriums in the 
political process, all with a view to encourage the legislature and the broader 
constitutional culture to reconsider its allegiance to the previous status quo’.34 In 
this way, the judiciary enters into a dialogue with the legislature about the meaning 
of the Charter rights when the legislature fails to deliberate about their meaning of 
its own motion.  
Certain circumstances call according to Dixon for a more flexible approach to 
judicial review than is possible under the above account. These circumstances are 
cases concerning the positive dimension of socioeconomic rights.35 Key to 
understanding how more flexibility can be attained is her distinction between 
‘strong rights’ and ‘strong remedies’. When a court adopts strong rights and weak 
remedies (a ‘strong-weak’ approach), it broadly and concretely defines the right at 
issue, but does not instruct the other branches how to remedy the violation of a 
right. In the alternative, when a court adopts weak rights and strong remedies (a 
‘weak-strong’ approach), it does not interpret the right at issue broadly or in a 
detailed manner, but does state which remedies the other branches should take and 
might set a deadline for them.36 In general, in Dixon’s view, judicial review is 
sufficiently weakened by showing deference to the legislature in second look cases 
to allow the judiciary to adopt both strong rights and strong remedies. However, the 
judiciary should sometimes take a weaker and more flexible approach by choosing 
                                                        
30  Dixon (2007), 402-403; Dixon (2009), 257-260.  
31  Dixon (2007), 403.  
32  Ibid., 405.  
33  Idem; Dixon (2009), 260-261.  
34  Dixon (2007), 407.  
35  The reason for which further weakening is necessary is not elaborated on here and is connected to 
the comparatively high likelihood that reverse legislative inertia, i.e. inertia of the legislature after a 
judgment has been issued, occurs when this type of rights is adjudicated, see: Ibid., 410.  
36  Ibid., 392, 411.  
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between a strong-weak or a weak-strong approach.37 This choice not only weakens 
judicial review but also opens more room for dialogue because the legislature will 
be either allowed to fill in the content of the right at issue or to choose how to 
remedy a violation, while it would have comparatively less freedom of choice when 
the judiciary adopts strong rights and remedies. The preferred choice depends on 
the constitutional setting. For example, when a powerful human rights commission 
exists that can help remedy a violation, a strong-weak approach may be called for.38  
In short, Roach and Dixon have given Hogg and Bushell’s predominantly 
descriptive dialogue theory normative body by justifying the role of the judiciary in 
the adjudication of Charter rights. While Roach does this without adapting Hogg 
and Bushell’s theory, Dixon considers it necessary to weaken the judicial review 
which the theory describes, so the theory can not only be justified on normative 
grounds, but also be presented as a genuine alternative to strong-form judicial 
review.  
1.1.4 Implications of Dialogue  
When parliament is supreme or when the judiciary has the power of strong-form 
judicial review, this almost automatically makes their relation adversarial, which 
almost unavoidably precludes cooperation between them. When, on the contrary, 
possibilities for dialogue are opened up because a weak-form of judicial review is 
created, arguably the relation between the branches can be seen as one of 
cooperation in the joint effort of protecting rights.39 The branches’ engagement in a 
‘collaborative enterprise’ does not mean they lose their branch-specific 
responsibilities and while they become interdependent, they remain independent.40 
Their relation further becomes one of reciprocity: the legislature is empowered to 
enact legislation and the judiciary to react to that by reviewing the compatibility of 
the legislation with rights.41 Several bills of rights, by introducing a weak-form of 
judicial review, institutionalise a ‘dialectical’ or ‘creative’ tension between the 
branches, which makes they engage in dialogue of their own motion and from their 
own perspective about rights issues in order to achieve their joint objective of 
protecting these rights. This tension thus positively ensures that different 
perspectives are taken into consideration.42 The UK Human Rights Act, for 
example, has a ‘dialectical tension at its core’, because it ‘presents itself as 
establishing a new, justiciable language of human rights’ and at the same time 
                                                        
37  Ibid., 393.  
38  Ibid., 413.  
39  Joseph (2004), 323.  
40  Ibid., 334.  
41  Ibid., 343; Jackson (2007), 92.  
42  Hunt (1999), 89-90; Hiebert (2004), 1977.  
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‘declares itself to be still in thrall to the fundamental constitutional principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty’.43  
1.1.5 Dialogue and Deference  
While Dixon brings in the notion of deference as part of a new dialogue theory, 
scholars in the UK tend to consider ‘dialogue’ and ‘deference’ as alternative 
options, forcing them to choose one of the two as the preferred theory for 
adjudicating cases under the Human Rights Act. That law, which transposes the 
European Convention into national law, commissions courts and tribunals to carry 
out judicial review and to make declarations of incompatibility when they find that 
a law cannot be read ‘in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’.44 
When a court makes such a declaration, the responsible minister is empowered, but 
not required, to amend the law at issue to remove the incompatibility.45  
The UK courts use the doctrine of deference as a tool to assess the extent to 
which they may review decisions made by public authorities.46 As a rule, courts 
defer to the executive and legislature and thus apply a low standard of review when 
a decision is made by an expert body or when a decision relates to socio-economic 
policy.47 Deference may be justified with reference to the undemocratic nature of 
judicial review and may be pragmatically justified based on the judiciary’s lack of 
expertise in socioeconomic questions.48 The traditional doctrine of deference, as 
applied to Human Rights Act cases, has come under attack, however, by scholars 
who bring forward the concept of dialogue as the preferred alternative for 
fundamental rights adjudication. 
Edwards argues that the doctrine of deference is incompatible with and even 
erodes the ‘culture of justification’ brought by the Human Rights Act. In this 
culture, the legislature’s views have ceased to be decisive and the judiciary 
scrutinises the decisions made by executive and legislature in light of the 
Convention.49 Ultimately, deference may mean that the courts disregard Convention 
rights, which in Edwards’ view runs contrary to the ‘central purpose’ of the Human 
Rights Act, which is to bring rights home.50 Clayton states in similar vein that the 
Human Rights Act authorises an ‘intensive standard’ of judicial review and that the 
concept of deference does not fit this form of review, because it ‘reflects a formalist 
conception of the separation of powers and substitutes a generalised rule for a 
judgment which should more closely attend to the facts of a particular case and the 
                                                        
43  Gearty (2002), 249.  
44  Section 3(1); See for more information about the Human Rights Act: Gearty (2002).  
45  Section 10(2); Tushnet (2003a), 821. See for more information about declarations of 
incompatibility: section III.2.2.5.  
46  Young (2009), 554-555.  
47  Edwards (2002), 860.  
48  Ibid., 859.  
49  Ibid., 866, 882.  
50  Ibid., 882. 
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nature and scope of the right in question’.51 After these observations, both authors 
turn to dialogue to conceptualise adjudication under the Human Rights Act and 
propose that, when considering adjudication under the Human Rights Act in the 
light of this concept, the call for deference to the legislature loses force; the concept 
is an alternative way to show respect, or at least listen, to the legislature and thus to 
maintain the good relationship between the judiciary and the legislature.52 In spite 
of the intensive standard of review called for, this type of review remains weak, 
because, as stated above, a court’s declaration of incompatibility does not bind the 
legislature.  
1.1.6 Dialogue in a Broader Perspective  
The foregoing discussion focussed predominantly on dialogue between the judiciary 
and the legislature, which is a logical consequence of dialogue theory’s concern 
with the countermajoritarian difficulty. Dialogue can, however, also be seen in a 
broader perspective in the national constitutional setting in two ways.  
Dialogue can, first, be seen in other combinations and between other branches 
than just between the judiciary and the legislature. To illustrate, bills of rights, such 
as the UK Human Rights Act and the Canadian Charter, that introduce weak-form 
judicial review are equally concerned with promoting ‘political rights review’ by 
the other branches and the interaction between the executive and the legislature.53 
Thus, rather than solely relying on judicial review, these documents also rely on 
non-judicial review by the other branches and have therefore moved away from a 
‘judicial-centric’ approach to resolving rights issues.54 This movement underlines 
the role which the executive and the legislature should play in order to bring a 
human rights culture that permeates all branches. The UK Secretary of State for 
Constitutional Affairs for example stated that ‘[w]e didn’t bring in the Human 
Rights Act to get a litigation culture. We brought it in to get a human rights 
culture’.55 Likewise, the Canadian Charter introduced the idea of ‘creating a rights 
culture in governing that did not depend, exclusively, on judicial review’, which 
would ‘strengthened parliament’s capacity to hold government (and wayward 
bureaucrats) accountable.56 
Additionally, theorists in the US have developed a broader notion of society-
wide dialogue, based on social science insights about the constraints posed on the 
Supreme Court by the threat of political sanctions and about the influence of public 
opinion on that Court.57 Friedman writes for example about a nation-wide dialogue 
                                                        
51  Clayton (2004), 33, 36.  
52  Ibid., 47; Edwards (2002), 867.  
53  Hiebert (2009), 9.  
54  Jackson (2007), 91-92.  
55  Falconer of Thoroton (2004).  
56  Hiebert (2006), 12; See also: Jackson (2007), 94.  
57  Bateup (2007), 19-20, 23; See also: Meuwese and Snel (2013), 131-132.  
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and describes courts as ‘participants in American political life’.58 According to him, 
‘most normative legal scholarship regarding the role of judicial review [by the US 
Supreme Court] rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation’.59 It is in 
particular problematic to rest too heavily upon the concept of the 
countermajoritarian difficulty because the concept ‘overstates the role of the courts 
and thus understates society’s responsibility’.60 Friedman aims, against this 
background, to ‘redescribe the landscape of American constitutionalism [...] so that 
later normative work can proceed against the backdrop of a far more accurate 
understanding of’ that landscape.61 He theorises that the process of judicial review 
does not involve setting the government against an electorally unaccountable 
court.62 Quite the contrary, each branch of government is involved in the process 
and all segments of society engage in a constitutional interpretative dialogue.63 
Courts are therefore part of this dialogue rather than an outsider to it and facilitate 
the dialogue in various ways.64 They ‘synthesize society’s view on constitutional 
meaning’, ‘focus debate’, ‘may act as a catalyst’, ‘shape the debate over 
constitutional meaning’, ‘give voice and body to the dialogue’, ‘can prod other 
institutions to speak’ and ‘moderate and tend the debate’.65 Even though Friedman 
uses a comparatively broad notion of dialogue, he still comes to a similar 
conclusion as Hogg and Bushell when stating that the countermajoritarian difficulty 
is weakened because ‘the judicial word is not the last word’.66 
1.2 In the EU 
This section outlines how dialogue has been used in the EU legal system, a system 
characterised by pluralism. In the background sketch to this system, that 
characteristic is commented on. The first part of the account that follows clarifies 
how the notion of dialogue can be employed to describe one part of the pluralist EU 
system, namely the ongoing dialogue between the Court of Justice and the national 
courts in the states parties.67 The second part illustrates how, by applying a 
normative concept of dialogue to the EU legal setting, a solution can be found for 
the challenges posed by pluralism.  
                                                        
58  Friedman (1993), 581; See for a description of how a broad process of dialogue can take place: 
Friedman (1993), 655-657; See for a discussion of how the popular constitutionalism involves a 
dialogue between the courts and the people: Tushnet (2006).  
59  Friedman (1993), 580.  
60  Ibid., 682 (emphasis original).  
61  Ibid., 580. 
62  Idem. 
63  Ibid., 580-581. 
64  Ibid., 581, 668.  
65  Ibid., 669-670 (emphasis original).  
66  Ibid., 644.  
67  Gerards (2011), 80.  
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1.2.1 Background  
The EU legal system is often described as ‘pluralist’, due to the existence of EU 
constitutional claims alongside national constitutional claims and the arguably non-
hierarchical nature of the relation between the EU and domestic law.68 The system 
is composed of interdependent legal systems, rather than of independent states or a 
single authority.69 This means, for example, that although the Court of Justice 
considers the rules created by the EU institutions to be supreme over national law, 
this is not accepted by all states parties.70 In practice therefore, the EU institutions 
attempt to assert power over the national institutions and the national institutions try 
to resist this attempt. Pluralism is used here as a metaphor to describe this complex 
situation and to describe the multiple sources of authority that exist alongside each 
other in the EU.71  
Together with the observation that the EU is a pluralist system, the problem 
arises that there is no apparent means to determine who has the ultimate authority to 
pronounce which norms prevail and how EU norms should be interpreted.72 As 
stated above, EU institutions try to assert power over national institutions, which 
national institutions will resist, something inevitable and rightful. In particular in 
the area of fundamental rights, which are valued differently among the member 
states, it is problematic to simply appoint the Court of Justice as the final arbiter. 
This solution would not only lead to democracy concerns, because a supranational 
institution would overturn the interpretation given to a right by democratic national 
actors, but would also disregard the pluralist nature of the system.73 Dialogue, as is 
explained below, may provide a more appropriate solution.  
1.2.2 Dialogue as a Descriptive Tool  
As Hogg and Bushell do in the national setting, the notion of dialogue has been 
used descriptively in the EU. Dialogue may be used as a metaphor for the 
interaction between the Court of Justice and domestic courts.74 Slaughter, for 
example, describes a European ‘community of courts’ where courts in a non-
hierarchical relationship engage in dialogue.75 In this dialogue, according to 
Slaughter, the participants are aware of their dialogue partners and willing to take 
                                                        
68  Walker describes the relationship between EU and domestic law as non-hierarchical, because both 
legal systems make constitutional claims, see: Walker (2002), 337; See also: Torres Pérez (2009), 
123.  
69  Walker (2002), 337; Torres Pérez (2009), 66-67, 106.  
70  Gerards (2011), 80.  
71  Walker (2002), 337.  
72  Gerards (2011), 81.  
73  Torres Pérez (2009), 101.  
74  Ibid., 106; Gerards (2011), 83.  
75  Slaughter (2000), 1108.  
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into consideration each other’s viewpoints.76 When the relation between the EU 
Court and domestic courts is indeed characterised by interaction, Gerards suggests 
that, rather than using ‘dialogue’ to describe this interaction, the interaction could 
be more adequately described in terms of Ahdieh’s dialectical review.77 Gerards 
prefers this term, because the EU pluralist legal system is characterised by a 
dynamic distribution of power that also characterises dialectical review.78 If 
Gerards’ account would be limited to this remark, her account would be solely 
descriptive. However, with the contention that accepting the existence of dialectical 
review in the EU may prevent conflict between the Court of Justice and domestic 
courts, Gerards’ account becomes normative and is therefore further discussed 
below.79 
1.2.3 Dialogue as a Normative Tool  
Three authors have used dialogue or dialectical review as a norm to guide the Court 
of Justice’s adjudication of fundamental rights cases. The first author, Cartabia, 
takes as a starting point the risk that the Court of Justice too actively uses the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights to standardise and centralise the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU. When this risk materialises, the Court would 
undermine the plurality of European constitutional traditions, an ‘original feature’ 
of the EU.80 The risk can be countered by enhanced dialogue between the EU court 
and the national courts, because dialogue allows the former to consider the various 
constitutional traditions, thereby protecting the diversity that unites the EU.81 
Requirements for this dialogue which Cartabia formulates are discussed in section 
III.2. Another author, Torres Pérez, commences with the observation that the Court 
of Justice cannot rely on coercive powers to ensure state compliance with its 
fundamental rights judgments. Instead, it must rely on the legitimacy, defined as 
‘the justification of authority’,82 of its judgments and on domestic courts to ensure 
compliance.83 Dialogue functions as an ideal that justifies the Court of Justice’s 
claim to authority over fundamental rights cases,84 in the context of a pluralist 
system where, in spite of the multiple sources of national and international 
authority, agreement should be reached on fundamental rights norms.85 In the 
dialogic process, the Court of Justice should not search for universal truths, but 
                                                        
76  Slaugther (1994), 112-113.  
77  See: section III.1.3.4.  
78  Gerards (2011), 84; See also: Ahdieh (2004), 2033.  
79  Gerards (2011), 84.  
80  Cartabia (2007), 2, 4, 23.  
81  Ibid., 23.  
82  Torres Pérez (2009), 97-98.  
83  Ibid., 101; See also: Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 285.  
84  Torres Pérez (2009), 97, 103-104.  
85  Ibid., 110.  
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should rather integrate the meaning given to rights by different states.86 Dialogue is 
envisaged as a process, where broad agreement on the interpretation of a 
fundamental right is reached gradually and in a fragmented manner.87 The ideal of 
dialogue is a source of legitimacy because it leads to better-reasoned interpretative 
outcomes that respect national constitutional values, leaving room for diversity. 
Besides that, dialogue improves participation and thereby reaching a shared 
outcome and it helps building a common European identity based on fundamental 
rights.88 Gerards’ view on dialectical review, as explained above, becomes 
normative with the contention that the acceptance of the existence of this type of 
review prevents the occurrence of conflict.89 Conflict can be prevented because 
dialectical review ‘presupposes the existence and use of judicial instruments that 
can be used to bolster the cooperation and voluntary acceptance of interpretations 
and findings by both national and European courts’.90 Such instruments include the 
preliminary reference procedure, the use of comparative methods of interpretation 
and the instrument of deference or marginal review.91 Gerards argues that the Court 
of Justice should use the latter instrument ‘in a much more clear and refined 
manner’ so as to prevent conflict by paying ‘due respect to national constitutional 
traditions and national legislative policy choices’ and taking into account ‘the 
intricacies related to judicial review of norms drafted by co-equal European 
institutions, or by national elected bodies’.92  
1.3  In Transjudicial Communication  
1.3.1  Background  
As can be recalled from the introduction to this chapter, transjudicial is 
‘communication among courts – whether national or supranational – across 
borders’.93 This section therefore concerns judicial dialogue solely, which can take 
place between courts in a horizontal or vertical relation. Although horizontal and 
vertical dialogue will be distinguished, they are not discussed separately. 
Horizontal relations exist between courts that act on the same level, for example 
between international courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court or between domestic courts 
in different states engaged in transnational litigation. These relations are 
characterised by features such as a high degree of informality, a lack of hierarchy 
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and multiple sources of law.94 In this context, jurisdictional and interpretative issues 
may arise that, due to the features that characterise horizontal relations, cannot be 
solved by a hierarchically superior court or with reference to a single legal 
document. The below account explains how notions of, on the one hand, deference 
and, on the other hand, comity and dialogue can function as norms to regulate the 
relation between these courts by providing an answer to jurisdictional and 
interpretative questions. The account additionally gives an example of how the 
notion of dialogue can be applied to describe the relation between international 
courts.  
A vertical relation exists when an international court reviews a national court. 
The relation between the Strasbourg Court and the domestic courts in the states 
parties functions as an example, but is not discussed any further here, because 
chapter IV is entirely dedicated to dialogue in the Convention system. Verticality 
implies some form of hierarchy and because this and other features differ from the 
features that characterise horizontal relations, it is unlikely that the notion of 
dialogue can be applied in a similar manner to this type of international relations as 
it can be applied to vertical international relations. An alternative to the notion of 
dialogue that has been adapted to vertical relations and that aims to regulate these 
relations is therefore introduced.  
1.3.2  Dialogue as a Descriptive Tool   
Romano, writing about the jurisprudential dialogue between international courts in 
a horizontal relation, starts his account with the empirical observation that dialogue 
between international courts in fact takes place.95 In the description that follows, 
Romano endeavours to decipher the ‘grammar’ of the observed dialogue, using four 
hypotheses. One hypothesis is, for example, that international courts aim to 
reinforce each other’s jurisprudence by citing each other or by implicitly supporting 
each other’s interpretation through ‘nodding and winking at each other’.96 Another 
hypothesis is that dialogue is informal and can be best explained in terms of 
acculturation, rather than in terms of persuasion. Both informality and acculturation 
suit the features of the emerging international legal system, as can be derived from 
the interaction between international courts, because their opposites, namely 
formality and persuasion, would require courts to openly admit that they were 
persuaded by and follow another court, devaluating their autonomy and creating a 
sense of hierarchy.97  
After having deciphered the grammar of dialogue, Romano poses the question 
why judicial dialogue takes place at all, to which his answer is that it takes place 
because it helps prevent interpretative and jurisdictional conflict. Conflict would 
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negatively impact on the legitimacy and welfare of international law generally.98 
Moreover, from a more self-interested point of view, courts engage in dialogue, 
because ‘reinventing the wheel’ would be inefficient time-wise and because 
engaging in dialogue may increase their power and authority.99 Slaughter has asked 
the same question and answered it by describing five functions of dialogue, of 
which the first three that apply to the relation between international courts are 
discussed here. The first function is labelled ‘cross-fertilization’, which is the ‘the 
simple dissemination of ideas’ from one system to another.100 Cross-fertilization 
functions as a source of inspiration and helps legal systems to develop based on the 
achievements of other systems. Second, building on other jurisdictions may help 
enhance ‘the persuasiveness, authority, or legitimacy’ of one’s own decisions. It 
may for example be advantageous to merely show that other systems reason 
similarly.101 Dialogue’s third function is the collective deliberation of common 
problems.102 This process has been at work, for example, between the German 
Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice. The former has reserved to right to 
establish minimum human rights standards for EU law, to which the latter has 
responded by incorporating the constitutional traditions of the member states when 
developing EU human rights law. Thus, ‘joint sharing of jurisdiction, and hence 
deliberation, over the interpretation of both national constitutions and [EU] law’ 
took place.103 This process ‘eased jurisdictional conflicts’.104 
To return to Romano’s account, after clarifying why dialogue takes place, his 
third step is to question the legitimacy of dialogue, by reason that international 
courts participate in dialogue of their own motion, without the sanctioning of the 
states that established them.105 States can hardly do anything about that, besides 
refusing to abide by a judgment, due to the informality of dialogue and the 
importance of acculturation.106 Instead, states may be able to ‘structure and steer’ 
dialogue by,107 for example, giving courts the resources to publish their decisions 
widely to allow them to engage in dialogue and by formalising the relationship 
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between courts.108 By questioning the legitimacy of dialogue, Romano’s account 
becomes normative in the third step.  
1.3.3 Dialogue as a Normative Tool  
Judicial globalisation has attracted scholarly attention trying to characterise and 
categorise this process.109 As part of the broader process of globalisation, judicial 
globalisation is the sharing of ideas and the intensification of influence between 
legal systems. One part of the process is the horizontal interaction that takes place 
between national courts involved in transnational litigation, described by Slaughter. 
Transnational cases, which increasingly occur in a globalising world, bring with 
them the possibility that domestic courts in different states can establish jurisdiction 
over the same issue. One way to determine which court has jurisdiction would be 
for courts to show negative comity, i.e. to defer to foreign courts out of respect for 
foreign governments or law.110 Alternatively, the issue of overlapping jurisdiction 
could be solved based on ‘judicial comity’, or respect for courts as courts, also 
called positive comity.111 Judicial or positive comity is a regulative norm that 
Slaughter prefers over the alternative of passive deference and that enables courts in 
a horizontal relation to divide jurisdiction.112 Judicial comity therefore is a means to 
channel potential jurisdictional conflict. Moreover, it may lead to dialogue, because 
courts exercising judicial comity do not passively defer to another court, but 
actively and critically examine whether their counterparts live up to, for example, 
the standards of international justice.113 
When part of judicial globalisation can indeed be characterised in terms of 
judicial comity, the next and more revolutionary step in the process of globalisation 
is the emergence of an international legal system in which judges interact so 
actively that they form a ‘global community of courts’.114 Different scholars, when 
examining the global interaction between mostly but not solely courts in a 
horizontal relation, have found evidence that such an international legal system is 
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emerging.115 Unlike national legal systems that are organised and evolve in a 
structured manner, the emerging international legal system does not know a 
hierarchically superior court that can give a final verdict on the interpretation of 
laws, nor has a single document that dictates the law.116 Judicial globalisation 
fostering the emergence of an international legal system therefore is a ‘diverse and 
messy process of judicial interaction across, above and below borders, exchanging 
ideas and cooperating in cases’.117 Martinez, when writing about a wide range of 
both horizontal and vertical international relations, proposes that the notion of 
dialogue can be a principle on which to ‘rest’ the emerging international legal 
system, because it fits the non-hierarchical and informal nature of the system. This 
means for example that, should an issue such as overlapping jurisdiction between 
two courts arise, dialogue facilitates preventing jurisdictional conflict, while in the 
absence of comity and dialogue, conflict would occur. Martinez, in a similar 
manner as Slaughter, therefore uses dialogue as a regulative norm for the 
international system.118 Dialogue can be contrasted in this manner with passive 
reception in a similar way as negative comity can be contrasted with positive 
comity: courts do not meekly receive and apply each other’s jurisprudence, but 
exert mutual influence and build on each other’s ideas.119  
1.3.4 Dialogue and Dialectical Review  
The notion of dialogue sits easily with horizontal relations between courts, because 
these relations are characterised by a high degree of voluntariness, comity and the 
absence of hierarchy and power.120 However, as already hinted at above, the notion 
may be less appropriate for vertical and more formal relations between international 
and domestic courts. The uneasiness derives from the power that international 
courts exercise over national courts when reviewing them.121 Their relationship can 
therefore not be characterised as fully dialogic. Neither can their relationship be 
described in terms of strict review, characterised by the binding authority of one 
court to overturn a decision of a lower court and thus by hierarchy,122 because an 
international court, even though it may be hierarchically superior on paper, does not 
have the practical means to impose its will on national courts in practice.123 
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International review of national courts is therefore a hybrid form of interaction that 
can be positioned between horizontal dialogue and hierarchical review.124  
Ahdieh introduces the concept of dialectical review to capture this hybrid form 
of interaction. The characteristics of dialectical review combine a hierarchical and 
dialogic dimension. Dialectical review is first characterised by a ‘dynamic 
distribution of power’, which means that the courts can force each other to listen, 
but not to act.125 Neither hierarchy nor comity therefore dominates.126 Further, in a 
dialectical relation diverse perspectives exist, while simultaneously some 
commonality exists as the basis for interaction. A combination is thus again 
required.127 The final characteristic, ‘adjudicatory continuity’, concerns the 
‘presence of repeat players to participate in a process of legal innovation’, which 
requires a combination of ‘convincing dialogue’ and the ‘threat of review’.128 
Dialectical interaction with these characteristics leads to legal learning, innovation, 
advances judicial coordination, jurisprudential harmonisation and norm 
internationalisation.129 
1.4 Comments  
This section summarises the normative answers that different conceptions of 
dialogue have formulated to the difficulties sketched in the background paragraph 
regarding national constitutional settings, the EU and transjudicial communication. 
Thereafter, different remarks draw together the way in which dialogue can be 
described and applied generally by listing features of the notion that reappear across 
this section. Chapter IV, which will devise a normative conception of dialogue for 
the Convention system, is inspired by this summary and these remarks. The section 
ends with a discussion of concepts related to that of dialogue. 
In the national constitutional setting, judicial review creates the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. Dialogue can be seen as an answer to that difficulty. 
Unlike the answer of complete parliamentary sovereignty, dialogue does not cause 
another difficulty, namely likely disregard for the protection of minority rights, 
which was referred to as the majoritarian dilemma. Rather, because dialogue 
introduces weak-form review in the words of Dixon, it offers a solution because it 
can be positioned between the two opposites and therefore answers at least in part 
both the countermajoritarian difficulty and the majoritarian dilemma. Dialogue 
takes place when the legislature can modify or ignore a judgment or, more broadly, 
when society can influence a judgment. This potentially weakens the strength of 
judicial review and makes a judgment the starting point of dialogue instead of a 
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final verdict. The weakening of judicial review plays an important role, because it 
allows dialogue to flourish. Systems of parliamentary sovereignty for example can 
be weakened by introducing some form of judicial review, as the Human Rights Act 
introduced to the UK constitutional system. Besides that, systems that already know 
weak-form review can be weakened further when the judiciary defers to the 
legislature in second look cases and, which is more far going, when the judiciary 
chooses between either strong rights or strong remedies, as proposed by Dixon. 
Importantly, the discussion that takes place in the UK clarifies that intensive 
judicial review of legislative action should not be equated with strong-form judicial 
review, on the condition that the result of intense review does not bind the 
legislature.  
In the EU, the Court of Justice’s adjudication of fundamental rights brings with 
it the risk that the court disregards the pluralist nature of the EU legal system and 
disrespects the variety of viewpoints on fundamental rights held by domestic 
democratic actors. When this risk materialises, it creates an impulse for conflict 
between the EU and its member states. In this setting therefore, not only democratic 
legitimacy concerns arise as they do in the national constitutional setting, but also 
pluralism and diversity should be respected, complicating judicial review further. 
Dialogue can in this setting also function as a regulative norm. It allows the 
Luxembourg Court to adjudicate fundamental rights, while ensuring that it takes 
into account pluralism and diversity, thereby minimising the risk of conflict. 
Dialogical review has this potential because it enables the member states to 
communicate their perspective to the EU Court, because it legitimises the role of 
that Court and because it helps ensure that the Court does not standardise 
fundamental rights too intensively. Dialogue takes place, according to Torres Pérez, 
when, after a broad and fragmented process of interaction, the Court of Justice 
integrates the views of the states in its judgments and, according to Cartabia, when 
that Court formulates truly common values that are grounded in diversity.  
In the context of transjudicial communication, and in particular in the context of 
informal and non-hierarchical horizontal relations between courts, the question 
arises how jurisprudential and interpretative conflicts should be solved when they 
cannot be solved by a supreme court or by consulting a single source of law. 
Dialogue, a notion that sits easily with the characteristics of horizontal relations, has 
been proposed as a norm to regulate these relations and to prevent conflict in this 
way. The notion of dialogue again is a solution that can be positioned in between 
two more extreme solutions, namely enforcing international law hierarchically or 
solely referring to national sovereignty. Dialogue develops when courts refer to 
each other’s interpretation, or when they less visibly ‘nod and wink’ at each other, 
and when jurisprudential issues are solved on the basis of judicial comity. When 
looking at vertical international relations, typified by a hybrid system of interaction 
that combines features of dialogue and strict appellate review, it appears that the 
notion of dialectical review best regulates this type of relations. This notion also 
promotes harmony and ultimately aims to achieve legal innovation and learning.  
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When taking a broader view on dialogue as described in and applied to the 
different settings, it becomes clear that the notion potentially usefully describes or is 
a regulative norm for relations between actors that want their power to be respected 
by their counterpart and that, in the absence of dialogue or an alternative mode of 
interaction, risk being in conflict over power, or related issues such as 
interpretation. Dialogue as described in this chapter therefore is about dividing 
power and channelling interaction between powers that are in some kind of relation. 
The relevant actors or powers differ even within the same setting: in the national 
constitutional system dialogue can take place between the judiciary and the 
legislature, but also between other branches or even with the society at large. 
Further, dialogue as a norm is a balanced alternative to more extreme regulative 
norms that prevent conflict by either appointing one power as hierarchically 
superior or by giving sovereignty to the various powers, which prevents them from 
reaching agreement. Due to the nature of dialogue, which ensures that different 
voices are heard, and because it has conflict channelling, or even conflict 
preventive, potential, it may work to legitimise the assertion of power or a form of 
review of one actor over the other. For dialogue to take place, it is important that 
the power of review is weakened, at least to the extent that the different actors can 
only force each other to listen but not to undertake specific action. Key to effective 
dialogue is also that all actors actively use the voice they are given in a dialogical 
relation. Further, it is proposed that the notion of dialogue is particularly useful to 
the field of rights adjudication, since all actors in this field will want to have the 
power to interpret these rights, because rights are considered highly important and 
formulated vaguely, which opens room for diverging interpretation. Dialogical 
relations are usually characterised by informality and a lack of hierarchy between 
the different actors, making it difficult to agree on the division of power and 
common norms, which dialogue may help to reach agreement on. When these 
characteristics cannot be applied to a relation, it may be more helpful to use a 
variation on the notion of dialogue, such as dialectical review.  
Finally, dialogue can be related to other concepts. It can first be related to 
deference, also called negative comity, in two manners. Deference can be seen as a 
means to stimulate dialogue, and in particular to enhance the voice of the legislature 
in national constitutional dialogue, by weakening the review that is carried out by 
one actor over the other. In a different manner, deference can be presented as a 
passive alternative to dialogue that leaves little room from for interaction, while 
dialogue opens room for review and active engagement. Dialogue has been 
presented in this manner in the UK and in the context of transnational litigation. 
Furthermore, the notion of positive or judicial comity is closely related to dialogue; 
this form of comity implies and stimulates dialogue. Because neither dialogue nor 
connected concepts have the same, mutually agreed upon meaning or function, it is 
important to clarify what is understood by such a concept when relying upon it in a 
specific legal setting.  
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2 DIALOGUE PREREQUISITES, FACILITATORS AND INSTRUMENTS    
This section aims to give insight into the means by which dialogue can be attained 
in a practical sense and draws on examples from national constitutional systems, the 
EU and transjudicial communication. The objective is not to give a comprehensive 
overview of all means for dialogue in the different settings and thereby present a 
formula for effective dialogue. This is virtually impossible because the coming into 
existence of dialogue always depends on the specific characteristics of a given 
context, a point this section may also serve to illustrate. Rather, the aim is to clarify 
how dialogue can be either stimulated or hampered by exploring different 
examples. This section may also serve to constitute the basis for the following 
chapter that concerns dialogue in the Convention system. Moreover, the more 
practical approach taken in this part may help to provide further insight into the 
notion of dialogue as introduced and presented in the first section.  
2.1 Prerequisites 
In order to achieve dialogue, certain prerequisites must be fulfilled and, in addition 
to that, dialogue can be facilitated and certain instruments may help stimulate 
dialogue. The difference between prerequisites, facilitators and instruments is not 
always clear-cut. On the whole however, the prerequisites relate to institutional 
structures and features and the way in which institutions perceive each other, and 
how these factors may create the right environment for dialogue to develop. 
Dialogue facilitators and instruments are unusable if certain prerequisites have not 
been met, because the ‘mere existence’ of dialogical instruments does not create 
dialogue.130 Dialogue facilitators are, unlike prerequisites, not a sine qua non of 
dialogue, but rather greatly enhance the likelihood and quality of its occurrence; 
they advance the coming into existence of dialogue. Moreover, due to their 
fundamental nature, prerequisites may be generalisable, unlike facilitators and 
instruments, whose functioning depends more on the specifics of a constitutional or 
international context. Facilitators are less tangible than dialogue instruments. The 
latter are specifically created to enhance dialogue and therefore directly contribute 
thereto, or at least to co-operation between the branches or courts, while the former 
concerns already existing factors that can be used for a dialogic purpose among 
other purposes. Instruments are thus the most practical tools in the hands of an 
interlocutor to make its voice heard. 
2.1.1 Willingness  
In order for a dialogue to develop, the interlocutors should be willing to engage in 
dialogue. They should feel responsible for engaging in dialogue and to live up to 
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that responsibility.131 Moreover, they should embrace certain notions as an 
expression of their willingness to engage in dialogue. It has been argued that a 
prerequisite for a dialogue about national constitutional values is that the 
interlocutors are willing to subscribe to a political and constitutional culture that 
functions in accordance with the rule of law.132 If the legislator would, for example, 
not accept the power of judicial review, it can simply and squarely refuse to abide 
by a judgment, without entering into a dialogue to explain why it disagrees. 
Comparably, when a dialogue is one between courts, be they in a horizontal or a 
vertical relation, they should recognise each other as similar institutions, all 
‘engaged in the application and interpretation of the law’.133 If they would not 
accept each other as such, their willingness to engage in dialogue would inevitably 
diminish. The courts should also be prepared to see each other as autonomous 
judicial actors, free from the control of others and empowered to independently 
establish what interests they wish to protect.134 As autonomous judicial actors, they 
can engage in an ‘independent dialogue’ and establish ‘autonomous relationships’. 
Some lower domestic courts in the EU are for example engaged in dialogue with 
the Court of Justice autonomously and independently from higher national courts 
and the executive.135 
The willingness to engage in dialogue should be shared by all interlocutors and 
not just by some or one. When, for example, only a few domestic courts in the EU 
engage in dialogue with the Court of Justice, only the constitutional traditions of a 
few states are brought to the Luxembourg Court’s attention, meaning it may impose 
the values of a minority of states with active courts on a majority with inactive 
courts. In the words of Cartabia, a ‘multilogue’ is therefore required to establish 
common European values.136 In the words of Dor, who writes about dialogue 
between the US Supreme Court, society at large and its representatives as well as 
decision-makers should be involved, ‘[f]or it takes two to tango, it takes at least two 
to dance to the tune of a valuable dialogue for the benefit of them all’.137 If one 
interlocutor declines to take part in a dialogue, this leads to a ‘restricted dialogue, 
which is less capable of adequately counteracting counter-majoritarianism’.138 
2.1.2 Different Viewpoints  
Further, for a dialogue to develop, different viewpoints must exist. When total 
agreement would exist on legal questions, dialogue may be precluded. Different 
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viewpoints are, for example, supplied by the institutional context in which courts 
operate and the varied sources of law upon which they rely as well as their different 
hierarchical position. When on the contrary, a precise answer to a certain legal 
question is clear and mutually agreed upon, in particular when this answer is 
formulated by a hierarchically superior court in a vertical relation, dialogue may be 
precluded.139 The Luxembourg Court, for example, established to ensure respect for 
EU law in the furtherance of the common market project, approaches fundamental 
rights comparably pragmatically, while domestic constitutional courts approach 
these rights in a more principled fashion.140 In the national legal system, different 
viewpoints between the courts, as judicial institutions, and parliament, as a 
representative institution, are forged by the different nature of these branches. 
2.1.3 Common Ground of Understanding  
The different viewpoints should be accompanied by a common ground of 
understanding.141 These commonalities are the basis on which differences can be 
transcended and a dialogue can develop. In the national constitutional setting, this 
common ground can exist in, for example, the adoption by each branch of a rights 
culture that nourishes their interest in and expertise of rights’ questions.142 In the 
absence of such a culture, political branches may either accept judgments in this 
area as final or disagree with the judiciary for reasons unrelated to the substance of 
rights or disagree and nevertheless accept a judgment. Either possibility greatly 
hampers the development of a substantial dialogue about rights. When dialogue is 
considered desirable from a normative perspective because it attenuates concerns 
related to the countermajoritarian difficulty, these possibilities may be problematic. 
In the EU and in transjudicial communication, a common ground can be that the 
courts play by similar rules, the rule of law rather than the rules of politics, and use 
similar methods of legal reasoning, such as clarity and consistency.143 Common 
ground can also be found in the realisation that they are engaged in a ‘common 
enterprise’ that confronts them with common legal problems and that demands 
mutual respect.144 In the EU specifically this enterprise can be promoting the rule of 
law, protecting fundamental rights and furthering European integration. These 
commonalities are coupled with and strengthened by the use of common legal 
language and methods in the EU.145 Besides that, the European states share to some 
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extent common histories and values: all are a party to the Convention and most 
have constitutional courts with the power of judicial review and a parliamentary 
democracy. In a more practical sense, commonalities are forged in the EU by the 
appointment of national judges to the Court of Justice.146  
2.1.4 Time  
The availability of sufficient time to engage in dialogue at various occasions is 
another prerequisite. This is necessary because the interlocutors can normally not 
all speak at the same time, or else their voice will be lost, and because the positive 
outcomes of dialogue, such as the prevention of conflict, cannot be achieved 
overnight.147 Dialogue develops over time, for example, when courts are involved 
in the same case, when there is a continuous pattern of cases and when there are 
‘repeat players’.148  
2.2 Facilitators  
Once the above prerequisites are fulfilled, there is a good foundation for dialogue to 
develop. In order to indeed set dialogue in motion, however, more may be required. 
The discussion of dialogue facilitators in this section illustrates this point by 
elaborating on how a dynamic distribution of power, the doctrine of deference, 
comparative methods of interpretation, a procedural approach and leaving remedial 
discretion can help the coming into existence of dialogue.  
2.2.1 Dynamic Distribution of Power  
In a vertical relation between an international and a domestic court, linked up by a 
treaty, a dynamic distribution of power can be a facilitator of dialogue.149 Such a 
distribution of power exists when both courts can exercise some power over each 
other but are also constrained by one another. This means that neither court can 
impose its will on its counterpart, as is common in pluralist legal systems.150 
Because neither court has complete supremacy over the other, they are dependent 
on each other. International courts rely in particular on national courts for the 
execution of their judgments. This opens room for dialogue, because it presses 
international courts to acknowledge that domestic courts must have some room for 
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their own interpretation and because it stimulates the international court to listen to 
the viewpoints of domestic courts, or else, risk non-execution.151  
2.2.2 Deference 
Deference has already been mentioned in the previous section when discussing 
dialogue as a normative tool in the national constitutional setting and in 
transjudicial communication and when analysing the relation of this notion with that 
of dialogue. The notion of deference can also be regarded as a facilitator for 
dialogue. As can be recalled from section III.1.1, Dixon has noted that the Canadian 
system of judicial review, where some dialogue takes place, distinguishes itself 
insufficiently from systems where the judiciary has the final say about the 
interpretation of the constitution.152 To restrain the voice of the Supreme Court 
more, it should defer to the legislature in cases bringing an issue before it that it had 
previously already decided on and that subsequently have been dealt with for a 
second time by the legislature.153 Dialogue is then facilitated when the Supreme 
Court defers ‘to legislative sequels that evidence interpretive disagreement’ in such 
cases.154  
Gerards has also qualified the doctrine of deference as employed by the Court of 
Justice as a facilitator of dialogue.155 By exercising deference, that Court shows that 
it respects and pays attention to national proceedings and national constitutional 
values and traditions, which increases the likelihood that the national authorities 
consider its judgments legitimate and comply with them. Deference thus prevents 
conflict by showing that the other was listened to. Deference further invites national 
courts to make their own decision by guaranteeing that the Court of Justice only 
intervenes when their decisions is ‘manifestly unreasonable or inappropriate’.156 In 
this way, deference enhances dialogue because it stimulates national courts to prove 
to Luxembourg that a national decision cannot be qualified as such. It also allows 
the EU Court to return an issue to the national level undecided because a decision 
falls within national discretion, thus inviting the national authorities to make their 
own decision.157 The Court of Justice should also show deference from a normative 
democratic legitimacy perspective, because the decisions made by national 
authorities have more democratic legitimacy than decisions made by EU 
institutions. This argument alludes to the countermajoritarian difficulty. The 
European court as an international institution should furthermore, from a practical 
perspective, defer to national authorities, because these authorities are usually better 
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placed to assess what works nationally, due to their superior expertise of the 
domestic level.158 Importantly, showing deference is not always ‘desirable’.159 The 
use of the doctrine is based on the assumption that national procedures that instigate 
decision-making are of a certain quality in the sense that they are, for example, 
transparent and permit participation where relevant; when these procedures are 
flawed deference is undesirable. It is particularly important that national procedures 
concerning important interests, including fundamental rights, live up to the 
assumption.160 When these interests play a role, courts must act as ‘‘gate-keepers’, 
checking with reasonable care whether the demands of legitimacy, participation and 
accountability have been met’.161 
2.2.3 Comparative Methods of Interpretation  
Another facilitator of dialogue, which can also be derived from the EU legal 
system, is the Court of Justice’s use of comparative methods of interpretation. This 
approach stimulates that Court to base the content and development of its 
jurisprudence on domestic constitutional traditions. It thus shows that these 
traditions are taken into account and respected. This stimulates domestic courts to 
enter into a dialogue to explain the particularities of their national traditions.162 
Using comparative methods of interpretation moreover enhances the persuasive 
force of a judgment by demonstrating the judgments’ ‘reasonableness and 
acceptability’.163 
2.2.4 Procedural Approach 
Some authors propose that, when the judiciary takes a procedural approach to 
adjudication, it facilitates dialogue more than when it follows the alternative 
approach of adjudicating on the content of a right. Following this approach, the 
judiciary inquires into the domestic constitutional decision-making process which 
led to the establishment of the content of a right. A procedural approach potentially 
facilitates dialogue, because it leaves the legislature free to make its own decision, 
provided that the procedure based on which the decision was made conforms to 
certain minimum standards. The legislature may thus even be able to resurrect its 
decision after a negative judgment, by implementing procedural improvements and 
in this way respond to a judgment.164 A content-based approach, on the other hand, 
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implies that the judiciary tells the legislature which outcome it should reach, which 
leaves less room for dialogue. Presumably, the procedural approach is further 
comparatively objective and therefore less politically sensitive than the alternative 
approach, which may lower the threshold for the political branches to accept the 
judiciary as an interlocutor. This approach may not only facilitate dialogue more 
than a substantive approach, but may also be opted for from a practical and 
democratic perspective, because the legislature is generally better placed than the 
judiciary to decide about the content of a right and enjoys more democratic 
legitimacy to make such decisions.165 The US Supreme Court employs several 
instruments in the form of procedural rules to give practical effect to taking a 
procedural approach. These rules are discussed in the next section as instruments 
for dialogue.166  
2.2.5 Remedial Discretion  
Lastly, dialogue can be facilitated by how the judiciary in a constitutional setting, 
depending on its competences and creativity, can establish which remedial action 
should be pursued. Generally, the more the course of remedial action is left open, 
the better a judgment facilitates dialogue, because remedial discretion gives the 
other branches the opportunity to formulate their own response to a judgment.167 
The following discussion shows how certain techniques used by and powers of 
courts can affect the measure of remedial discretion that a judgment leaves. Some 
of these techniques and powers work to facilitate dialogue; other rather hamper it.  
Some courts employ in their judgments a technique to prevent themselves from 
finding a potential incompatibility of a law with the constitution or an international 
legal obligation, such as those laid down in the Convention. The judges themselves 
therefore remedy a potential incompatibility. One way of going about this is to 
make a factual presumption of compatibility, which requires a court to ‘assume 
facts necessary to satisfy constitutional tests developed by courts’.168 A court may 
for example presume that a law is reasonable and therefore the law automatically 
passes the reasonable test. This is what the US Supreme Court did when stating that 
‘[i]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the 
challenged legislation], there is a presumption of the existence of that state of 
facts’.169 The judiciary thus makes assumptions about factual legislative intentions 
necessary for a law to pass constitutional tests, such as, the reasonableness test. A 
factual presumption of compatibility may help show respect to the legislature and 
promote democracy.170 Additionally, judges may interpret a law in such a way that 
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it repairs an incompatibility. In Germany, the technique of verfassungskonforme 
Auslegung compels courts to interpret thus.171 Comparably, the Human Rights Act 
requires UK courts in ‘[s]o far as it is possible’ to read legislation ‘in a way which 
is compatible with the Convention rights’.172 To fulfil this requirement, the courts 
may use the technique of reading down a law in a modified or narrowed way so as 
to make it compatible with the Convention.173 This technique, on the one hand, 
stimulates deference to the legislature because it prevents ‘the judiciary from 
shooting on sight every suspect law’.174 On the other hand, it risks imposing a 
certain interpretation on the legislature without its consent, making the technique 
less deferential.175 In the Netherlands, courts also may presume that the legislature 
intends a law to be in line with international legal obligations and interpret laws, 
where possible, in line with these obligations. Besides reading down, Dutch courts 
use the technique of reading in, to increase the scope of an under-inclusive law to 
give effect to the presumption. The Dutch Supreme Court sometimes reads in 
‘highly detailed rules that have very little to do with either the text of the statute in 
question or its legislative history’.176 Reading-in can be compared with lawmaking 
and can therefore be considered as activist.177 Neither the technique of making 
factual presumptions of compatibility nor of verfassungskonforme Auslegung 
facilitates dialogue, although they may be a sign of deference to the legislature. 
These techniques rather hamper dialogue because a ‘remedy’ is designed by way of 
interpretation, thus pre-empting the need for a legislative response.178 
Some supreme courts have the power to strike down an incompatible law, which 
leaves room for the legislature to decide about the remedy, making the power 
potentially dialogic. The South African Constitutional Court for example has the 
power to invalidate laws of parliament with binding force.179 The dialogic nature of 
a strike-out judgment depends on the form of the judgment and the powers of the 
legislature, as the following examples show. The UK Supreme Court cannot strike 
down a law, but can make a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ under the Human 
Rights Act. These declarations do not bind the legislature and therefore potentially 
facilitate dialogue more than the binding invalidations of law by the South African 
Supreme Court.180 In the UK, not only the course of remedial action is left to the 
legislature, but also the decision whether to accept a finding of incompatibility at 
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all, giving the legislature even more room to respond to a judgment at its own 
discretion.181 Further, in Canada, the legislature has the possibility to re-enact a law 
that the judiciary struck down in the form of the power of ‘legislative override’, 
allowing parliament to ‘expressly declare in an Act of Parliament [...] that the Act 
or provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a Charter right’.182 In this way, 
the power of judicial review is weakened and room for dialogue broadened and the 
legislature can disagree with the judiciary in a formal and institutionalised 
manner.183 
A court with the power to strike down acts in a binding fashion may make its 
judgment more of a dialogue facilitator by affording the legislature the opportunity 
to find a solution prior to using its power. The Dutch Supreme Court for example 
sometimes only finds that a law is incompatible with the Convention and then 
postpones further intervention. The legislature is thus given control over a law in 
the light of the judiciary’s opinion, while the judiciary maintains the possibility to 
intervene in the future in the face of legislative inertia.184 Likewise, the Canadian 
Supreme Court can issue ‘suspended declarations of invalidity’, which are a 
dialogic tool to return an unconstitutional law to the legislature and allow it to 
prevent the court from using the blunter instrument of a declaration of invalidity.185 
When the legislature fails to amend the law during the suspension, the declaration 
of invalidity enters into force.186 Postponing striking down a law as is done in the 
Netherlands and Canada is dialogic, because the legislature may be more inclined to 
respond to a postponement, which is an invitation for remedial action, than to a 
binding declaration of incompatibility, which in a more forceful manner imposes on 
the legislature a finding of incompatibility and the need to find a remedy.187 
Courts may, on the contrary, go beyond finding an incompatibility and stipulate 
to the legislature which remedial action it should take and even supervise the 
implementation of the remedy.188 The Indian Supreme Court has done this in the 
field of child labour and prison conditions; the South African Constitutional Court 
has felt the duty to ensure that a remedy is found and implemented in the field of 
housing.189 Further, the Canadian Supreme Court decided that a judge is allowed to 
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order and supervise the building of minority language schools.190 Stipulating 
remedial action like these three courts sometimes do hampers dialogue because it 
gives the other branches little discretion to formulate their own response to a 
judgment.  
Instead of imposing a particular course of remedial action, a court may order the 
other branches to engage with the applicants or relevant interests groups about the 
most appropriate remedy and supervise the engagement process. The South African 
Constitutional Court has ordered authorities to engage with informal occupiers 
about housing issues and endorsed the agreement that was the result of the 
engagement between the parties in its final judgment.191 In this way, the court in a 
rather forceful way clarifies that remedial action is required, but not which action 
and creates the opportunity to give its approval to the action. An engagement order 
is therefore more dialogic than merely imposing and supervising a remedy. The 
Canadian Supreme Court has also ordered what it calls ‘supervisory engagement 
orders’ to induce the parties to consider the consequences of a judgment and to 
deliberate about the most appropriate remedy. It has, for example, ordered the 
legislature to engage with Aboriginal people, explaining that the principle of 
democracy is ‘one of the important factors guiding the exercise of a court’s 
remedial discretion’ and that the court ‘encourages remedies that allow the 
democratic process of […] dialogue to occur’. Remedies should therefore 
encourage ‘the inclusion in that dialogue of groups particularly affected by 
legislation’ and the inclusion by the government of the interests and views of 
minorities.192 Judgments can therefore encourage two types of dialogue: inter-
branch dialogue, and thereby respect for the democratic legitimacy of the 
legislature, and a broader societal dialogue when a judgment takes the form of an 
engagement order. Engagement orders encourage the inclusion of inter alia the view 
of minorities and thereby respect for other democratic values in addition to respect 
for the legislature’s democratic legitimacy.  
As the discussion of the above examples has showed, the remedial discretion 
which a court leaves and can leave differs widely. In addition to widening remedial 
discretion and thereby opening up room for dialogue, there are also different 
techniques for and powers of supreme courts which leave little discretion and 
therefore do not function as a facilitator for dialogue but rather as an antidote to 
dialogue. 
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2.3 Instruments  
This section describes practical means in the hands of an interlocutor to start a 
dialogue. Two categories of instruments are dealt with: so-called pro-dialogic rules 
and requests for a ruling.  
2.3.1 Pro-dialogic Rules  
Martinez has identified several ‘pro-dialogic’ rules for courts involved in 
transjudicial communication. These rules help stimulate judicial dialogue, with the 
ultimate aim of solving issues between them that, when unaddressed, may lead to 
tension or conflict. These issues include dealing with precedent as well as with 
overlapping jurisdiction and enforcing each other’s judgments. The rules are an 
alternative means of solving tension to centralising power and act as a ‘sort of 
doctrinal toolkit of default rules for courts in transnational cases’.193 Three 
situations in which different rules can be applied are distinguished by Martinez.  
First, courts in a vertical relation can abide by the rule that they consider the 
precedents set in each other’s jurisprudence when interpreting international law. 
National courts considering international judgments may take into account the 
context in which a judgment was pronounced and they may decide not to depart 
from a judgment without good reason. Similarly, international courts considering 
national judgments may pay attention to the national legal culture influencing the 
judgment. Another rule to which national courts can abide is that they enforce 
judgments rendered by international courts to which their state is a party, unless a 
judgment violates domestic law or is contrary to the expressed opinion of another 
branch.194  
Second, regarding international courts in a horizontal relation, they can, as a 
rule, pay attention to each other’s jurisprudence. When they need to ignore a 
precedent to solve a case, a pro-dialogic rule is that they provide reasons for doing 
so. The issue of overlapping jurisdiction could be solved by applying the pro-
dialogic rule that, when the establishment of jurisdiction by more than one court 
may cause diverging jurisprudence, jurisdiction is reserved for the court that first 
received a case. International courts could further contribute to the recognition and 
enforcement of each other’s judgments by attaching preclusive effect to these 
judgments, meaning that they will not accept applications from litigants who have 
already received a fair judgment from another court.195  
Third, national courts across borders, when interpreting international law, could 
as a pro-dialogic rule consider and follow the precedents set by other national courts 
and only decline to do so for good reason. National courts could further, when 
confronted with overlapping jurisdiction, establish jurisdiction based on what 
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Martinez calls a ‘multifactor test’ that takes into consideration factors such as 
‘international comity, national sovereignty, judicial efficiency, and fairness to the 
parties’.196 The enforcement of a judgment by a court in another state and 
cooperation between courts can moreover be regulated by formulating ‘reciprocity 
requirements’, which stipulate that a court enforces the judgment of another court, 
provided this also happens vice versa.197  
In the domestic constitutional context, Coenen has identified several rules which 
the US Supreme Court uses to operationalise the procedural approach, which may 
also be called pro-dialogic rules. These rules help establish whether a decision 
incompatible with the constitution was taken with due regard to procedural 
prescriptions.198 The ‘clarity rule’, for example, requires Congress to formulate its 
intention very clearly when limiting a constitutional right. When the Supreme Court 
applies this rule, it leaves aside the content of the limitation and instead scrutinises 
how carefully Congress has considered the reasons for limiting a right, leaving 
room for Congress to makes its own decision.199 Another way to stimulate careful 
decision-making is to require the legislature to use a particular form of legislative 
policy-making that facilitates intelligibility, the likelihood of public scrutiny and, 
more broadly, accountability.200 The Supreme Court may furthermore demand 
concrete evidence from the legislature about the carefulness of its decision-making 
in the form of studies that show it opted for the least restrictive option and duly 
considered the Constitution.201 In yet another manner, the Court may impose on the 
legislature the rule that it designs policy in a way that thoughtfully treats the 
specificities of a certain policy area. When legislating in the area of the death 
penalty for example, the legislature must show that it designed ‘a thoughtfully 
structured treatment of how and when the death penalty would be imposed’.202 
Thoughtful treatment of the policy area may help the Supreme Court to uphold the 
constitutionality of a law that it would otherwise strike down.203 Another procedural 
rule requires that a law or policy was created for a permissible purpose. One 
permissible purpose rule for example stipulates that that acts advancing religion 
violate the Establishment Clause,204 unless the policymaker acted with ‘a secular 
legislative purpose’.205 These rules are procedural according to Coenen, because 
they do not prevent the legislature from reaching a certain outcome, provided the 
outcome’s purpose is permissible. When a law is incompatible with the Constitution 
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for breaching this procedural rule, the law is returned to the legislature for 
reconsideration, enabling it to resurrect the constitutionality of the law by 
formulating a permissible purpose.206 In this way, the rule is an instrument for 
dialogue about permissible purposes of legislation. The Supreme Court finally 
sometimes requires from the legislature that a decision affecting the Constitution is 
made by a proper decision-maker that, due to its characteristics, facilitates the 
protection of substantive constitutional values, such as federalism.207 It for example 
demands that Congress as opposed to the state legislatures makes policy in sensitive 
areas, such as the naturalization of legal aliens.208 By employing this instrument, the 
Supreme Court makes deference to a decision-maker dependant on its strengths and 
weaknesses.209 The instrument further enables the Supreme Court to return a 
decision to a different authority than the one previously in charge and therefore to 
engage in dialogue with multiple authorities.210  
 
2.3.2 Requests for a Ruling  
 
Some US state constitutions empower state courts to give advisory opinions on the 
request of other branches.211 These advisory opinions give non-binding guidance 
and are usually received by the other branches as persuasive authority.212 They 
bring to the attention of the other branches particularly pressing issues relating to 
for example the separation of powers.213 The opinions are an instrument for 
dialogue between the branches, because they allow the non-legal branches to flag an 
issue and the legal branch to return issues for a solution to the other branches, after 
expressing its opinion on the issue. The other branches ‘tend to take seriously the 
judiciary’s expressed view’, responding to it with legislative amendments and 
constitutional proposals.214 The US Supreme Court does not give advisory 
opinions,215 but the argument has been made that it should assume an advisory 
function. Katay, for example, proposes that the Supreme Court should become more 
proactive and ‘recommend courses of action to provide advice, clarify constitutional 
issues, or shine light on particular matters’, which he summarises as 
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‘advicegiving’.216 Advice giving creates ‘the conditions for productive 
conversation’ between the branches and helps them to work in harmony.217 It is a 
dialogic instrument, because it enables the Supreme Court to explain the other 
branches how they can avoid incompatibilities with the Constitution, while enabling 
the other branches to find a political solution for the incompatibilities.218 This mode 
of judicial action further promotes respect for the separation of powers doctrine, 
because the judiciary does not coercively impose its view on the other branches, but 
rather tries to persuade them to act in a certain way.219 Relying on persuasion rather 
than on coercion can be regarded as dialogic. 
In the EU, a comparable instrument for dialogue can be found in the preliminary 
reference procedure that enables and sometimes obliges domestic courts to pose 
questions to the Luxembourg Court about the validity and interpretation of acts of 
EU organs.220 The question should be accompanied by an explanation of the facts 
and relevant law, the legal context of the question and the reason for referring.221 
After the ruling, the Court of Justice requests from national courts, on a voluntary 
basis, a report about the domestic judgment that gave effect to its ruling.222 This 
procedure has been described as the ultimate instrument for dialogue for various 
reasons. Generally, the procedure enables both the Luxembourg Court and domestic 
courts to inform each other of their viewpoints, experiences, traditions and values 
and to respond to what the other advances.223 More specifically, the procedure 
promotes sharing responsibility between the courts and thereby gives them various 
opportunities to air their opinion. The national courts are responsible for setting the 
first step224 and have various exclusive responsibilities, such as fact-finding and 
deciding on national law. When formulating a question, the national court may 
suggest one or multiple answers and warn the Court of Justice about a potential 
clash of EU law with a constitutional right. After the EU Court discharges its 
responsibility by issuing a sometimes rather general ruling, the domestic court is 
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responsible for giving effect to the ruling in the national legal order and in the 
concrete case before it.225 Further, the Court of Justice has the flexibility to refuse 
answering a question, make statements not directly related to the question, 
reformulate questions, or to vary the degree of specificity of a ruling. These 
flexibilities are instrumental to dialogue, because they send a signal to the 
requesting court. Declining to answer a question, for example, clarifies that the 
question is one of national rather than EU law.226 The procedure furthermore allows 
dialogue to develop over time by giving national courts the possibility to refer 
follow-up or rephrased questions about the same issue. This possibility also enables 
a domestic court to inform the Court of Justice of why it disagrees with a previous 
ruling.227 When protesting, the national courts may ‘ventilate the legal and factual 
context in which the issues arise and refine their queries and, ultimately, may 
induce a more favourable reply from Luxembourg’.228 Additionally, domestic 
courts, the EU member states, the Commission and the Council all have access to 
this procedure to give their opinion in one way or the other.229 Due to its dialogic 
nature, the procedure is the ‘simplest way to keep pluralism alive’230 and a means to 
enhance the Court of Justice’s legitimacy.231  
2.4  Comments  
The reliance of this part on examples from different systems makes it hard to draw 
general conclusions, because each example functions in a particular context. This 
conclusion is therefore for a large part a summary.  
The first section has enumerated five prerequisites for dialogue. The 
interlocutors should first of all be willing to engage in dialogue, which may include 
embracing certain notions as an expression of their willingness. This willingness 
should be shared by all relevant interlocutors so a multilogue can develop. The 
interlocutor should furthermore have different viewpoints, which can be supplied by 
the different context in which they operate and different sources of law upon which 
they rely. These different viewpoints should be coupled with a common ground of 
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understanding so the differences can be transcended and a dialogue can take place. 
Lastly, a dialogue requires time.  
Five facilitators were outlined in the second section. A facilitator for dialogue 
between courts in a vertical relation is a dynamic distribution of power, meaning 
that neither court can impose its will on the other, which creates dependency 
between them. Relying upon a doctrine of deference can also function as a 
facilitator for dialogue in different ways and for various reasons, as was illustrated 
with reference to the Canadian constitutional setting and the EU. Regarding the EU 
as well, the Court of Justice’s use of comparative method of interpretation was also 
included as a facilitator of dialogue. Further, when courts take a procedural 
approach to adjudicating rights’ questions, they stimulate dialogue by leaving room 
to the decision-maker to make its own decisions. This doctrine was advocated by 
Dixon for the Canadian constitutional setting and identified by Gerards in the EU. 
Another way to facilitate dialogue is by leaving a certain degree of remedial 
discretion to remedy an incompatibility. Dialogue is hampered rather than 
facilitated if courts make a factual presumption of compatibility or use the method 
of verfassungskonforme Auslegung. It is better facilitated if a court strikes down a 
law, or, which is even more beneficial from the perspective of dialogue, makes a 
non-binding declaration of incompatibility or a suspended declaration of 
incompatibility. Neither is dialogue really advanced when a court stipulates which 
remedial measures are to be taken and possibly supervises the implementation of 
these measures; from the perspective of dialogue it would be better to not stipulate 
this or to, alternatively, impose an engagement order.  
The first instrument of dialogue that was advanced in the last section was pro-
dialogic rules. These rules were identified by Martinez for transjudicial 
communication between courts and are, in that setting, means to solve problems 
relating to precedent, overlapping jurisdiction and enforcing judgments of courts in 
other jurisdictions. Coenen has identified pro-dialogic rules relied upon by the US 
Supreme Court, which are means to operationalised the procedural approach. 
Requests for a ruling are the other instrument introduced in this chapter, of which 
two examples were given. Such requests can be made by some state courts in the 
US on the request of the other branches. The requests lead to a non-binding opinion. 
A comparable instrument can be found in the EU, in the form of the preliminary 
reference procedure, which leads to binding rulings by the Court of justice on the 
request of courts in the states parties.  
More generally, when examining means of dialogue, it becomes clear that 
dialogue can take place at different stages of judicial proceedings. Delayed 
declarations of incompatibility for example allow of dialogue during a judgment 
and the power of legislative override for after a judgment. The preliminary 
reference procedure, as a complete judicial procedure, allows for dialogue 
throughout the procedure. Further, some means can only be used by one 
interlocutor and others by different interlocutors: the power of legislative override 
can only be used by the legislature while the preliminary reference can be used by 
various interlocutors.  
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Further, some recurring themes in the discussion of dialogue prerequisites, 
facilitators and instruments can be detected. Dialogue, first of all, requires from the 
interlocutors openness to outside influence and arguments, and respect for each 
other based on their institutional features, the persuasiveness of their arguments and 
rigidity of their methods. This necessitates persuasive decision-making, which 
includes legal decisions, based on reasoned and identifiable arguments rather than 
on institutional authority and strictly legally binding and final decisions. Such 
decision-making allows the other interlocutors to form their own reasoned opinion 
about an issue and equally necessitates that they, should they disagree, give reasons 
for declining to follow the decision made by their interlocutor. It is equally 
important that the interlocutors clarify to each other where a problem derives from 
and then leave the solution open for a problem, rather than either not clearly 
identifying the problem or solving the problem themselves. In this way, the 
responsibility for solving common problems is shared. In the process of decision-
making, the interlocutors should further acknowledge each other by demonstrating 
they have listened to each other, by paying respect to each other’s values and by 
taking into consideration each other’s arguments. In this way, the interlocutors take 
each other seriously for reasons related to content rather than to hierarchy. More 
practically, the interlocutors should all have access to procedures that allow them to 
express their opinion and, where relevant, disagreement. The dialogic nature of 
decision-making may be enhanced when the interlocutors can formulate a response 
swiftly and dialogue may be facilitated when the decisions relate to technical rather 
than politically sensitive issues. The interlocutors finally should also feel that they 
are cooperating to achieve an aim they all want to see achieved and should have a 
shared overall responsibility, but distinct sub-responsibilities, for achieving this 
aim.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CONVENTION SYSTEM AND DIALOGUE 
 
 
 
Chapter II characterised the Convention system in terms of its establishment and 
functioning and the developments and reform it went through; chapter III 
characterised the notion of dialogue by illustrating how it has been employed in 
different settings as a descriptive and normative tool and by enumerating 
prerequisites, facilitators and instruments for dialogue. This chapter combines and 
is based on the foregoing two chapters, thus bringing together the Convention 
system and the notion of dialogue.  
As can be derived from chapter III, the notion of dialogue can be used either in a 
descriptive or a normative sense. This chapter is geared towards the normative 
question whether, and if so, why the notion may be usefully applied to the 
Convention system and what the added value of its application would be. The aim is 
therefore to give insight into the normative worth, rather than the descriptive value, 
of dialogue. As is proposed, the normative worth of dialogue can be based on the 
need to manage two categories of tension that characterise the Convention system 
and that have been discussed in chapter II: internal and external tension. More 
positively, another basis for the use of dialogue in the Convention system can be 
found in the necessity of cooperation between the different interlocutors in order to 
bolster the effective functioning of the system.  
Section IV.1 elaborates on the importance of cooperation, which will be based 
on two characteristics of the Convention system established in the conclusion to 
chapter II: the lack of final power and the sharing of responsibilities. Section IV.2 
deals with internal tension and IV.3 with external tension. Further, section IV.4 
turns to the notion of dialogue as a means to improve cooperation and to handle the 
problematic aspects of internal and external tension in a way that they do not 
jeopardise, but stimulate the effective functioning of the Convention system. The 
last section, IV.5, looks forward and explains how this study proceeds in parts 2 and 
3. It formulates the research questions and describes the indicators which facilitate 
answering these questions.  
1  THE NECESSITY OF COOPERATION  
Cooperation between the interlocutors on the national and the Council of Europe 
level is indispensable or at least instrumental to the effective functioning of the 
Convention system: the better the cooperation, the more effectively the system 
functions. The necessity of cooperation to the effective functioning of the system 
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has been stressed on numerous occasions by various scholars.1 It can be explained 
with reference to two characteristics of the Convention system, namely the lack of 
final power of one interlocutor over the other and the sharing of responsibilities.2 
Additionally, in the light of the external tension on the system3 and, related to that, 
the increasing complexity and sensitivity of cases brought before the Court, 
cooperation is now more important than ever.4 This also holds for sharing 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention, considering that, in reaction to 
the developments described in chapter II, the Court has at times assumed 
responsibilities that should be discharged by the states.5 Cooperation should in 
essence be based on ‘the understanding that all—domestic and supranational—
jurisdictions have a common mission: to protect and to develop human rights’.6 The 
two characteristics and their relation to cooperation are described in the following 
two sections.  
1.1  Lack of Coercive Means to Compel Convention Implementation 
The conclusion to chapter II described the Convention system as one characterised 
by a lack of final power of the Court and the Committee over the states parties. 
Rather than relying on coercion, the interlocutors must therefore inevitably rely on 
cooperation.7 Cooperation can, for example be prompted by the persuasive force of 
one’s arguments,8 one’s institutional authority or the good relationship with the 
interlocutor that is to be persuaded.9  
1.2  Sharing Responsibilities  
Chapter II characterised the Convention system as one in which responsibilities 
should be shared among different interlocutors, something which is only possible 
                                                        
1  Barkhuysen and Van Emmerik (1999), 833-834; Garlicki (2008), 511, 516, 521; Helfer (2008), 
158; Gerards (2009), 409; Paraskeva (2011), 422 (this author bases his contention that ‘the system 
of protection of human rights under the ECHR can only operate effectively on the basis of smooth 
and constructive co-operation and interaction between the Strasbourg and domestic institutions’ on 
observations by professor Evrigenis, former President of the Court Ryssdall and Drzemczewski); 
Paulus (2014), 56; Laffranque (2014), 69.  
2  See for more information about these characteristics: sections IV.1.1 and IV.1.2; These two 
characteristics do not explain exhaustively the importance of cooperation; other characteristics may 
also play a role. Garlicki for example also bases the importance of cooperation in part on a general 
characteristic of European human rights protection, namely the ‘phenomenon of parallel 
constitutional protection in Europe’, see: Garlicki (2008), 511.  
3  Sections II.5.2.1 and IV.3  
4  Section II.3.6.  
5  Section II.5.2.1 
6  Garlicki (2008), 522.  
7  See also: idem.  
8  See also: section II.2.4 (explaining that dialogue requires from the interlocutors inter alia respect 
for each other based on the persuasiveness of their arguments); and Garlicki (2009), 394-395. 
9  See also: Garlicki (2008), 514-515.  
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when each interlocutors fulfils its own responsibility fully and effectively. As a 
President of the Court stated: ‘[t]he protection of human rights is too important and 
too complex a business to be monopolised by one institution or body; it requires a 
collective effort as the authors of the Convention recognised’.10 Further, the states 
parties, as they expressed themselves in the Interlaken Declaration, stressed that the 
principle of subsidiarity ‘implies a shared responsibility between the States Parties 
and the Court’.11 
Considering the various ways in which the responsibility for the full 
implementation of the Convention and related aims are shared, the importance of 
cooperation comes as no surprise: cooperation may for example help ensure that the 
responsibilities are divided in accordance with the Convention and that tasks are not 
performed twice or not at all. Cooperation is furthermore important because the 
proper fulfilment of the states parties’ primary responsibility determines to a large 
extent whether the other interlocutors, and in particular the Court and the 
Committee, can effectively fulfil their responsibilities.12 It is therefore in the 
interest of the Court and the Committee to cooperate with the states parties to help 
improve, where necessary, the fulfilment of their primary responsibility. 
Furthermore, the Assembly and the Commissioner can contribute to Convention 
implementation only when they do so in cooperation with the other interlocutors, 
considering that they have no, or hardly any, formal role in the system.  
2  INTERNAL TENSION  
2.1  Sources  
The conclusion to chapter II labelled internal tension as a characteristic of the 
Convention system. This tension derives from the very fact of the Court’s 
supervision, exercised in binding judgments, and more precisely exists out of 
tension between uniformity and diversity; international supervision and domestic 
superior knowledge; ‘undemocratic’ supervision and more direct democratic 
national decision-making. These competing forces are the three sources of internal 
tension which are discussed and labelled in this chapter based on the 
characterisation of the Convention system in chapter II and with reference to 
examples which can be found in chapter III.  
Both the first and second sources of internal tension derive from the 
international review carried out by the Court of domestic decisions in the sphere of 
the Convention. The tension arises simply because this review takes place, even 
though domestic authorities are in principle best placed to make such decisions.13 
                                                        
10  Bratza (2012a), 2; See also: ECtHR (2014), 5 (foreword by the President).  
11  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Declaration para. 3; 
See also: HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 3.  
12  See also: section II.3.7.  
13  See also: section II.2.3.  
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2.1.1  Countermajoritarian Difficulty  
The first reason why national authorities are best placed reveals the first source of 
internal tension: the Court lacks the democratic legitimacy that the national 
authorities, in particular national parliaments, are endowed with. The European 
Court experiences the same difficulty as national judiciaries that are empowered to 
review, and sometimes even to overrule, statutory legislation, in spite of the 
democratic legitimacy of such legislation and the judiciary’s lack of such 
legitimacy. Authors writing about national constitutional settings describe this 
difficulty with the term ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’, as was noted in chapter II, 
and this study uses the same term. In the words of the Court: ‘The national 
authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are [...] in principle better placed 
than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions’.14  
2.1.2  Knowledge Gap Difficulty  
The second reason why national authorities are best placed to make Convention-
related decisions is that they are most knowledgeable of the particularities of the 
national situation in which such decisions are to be implemented. The Court and the 
other interlocutors as well are, on the contrary, less familiar with the domestic 
situation, but may nevertheless review national decisions at some point. This may, 
for example, lead the Court to ‘develop its jurisprudence in a manner which 
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the domestic law position’.15 To illustrate, 
research on perceptions of the authority of the Court among 30 apex court judges in 
the UK, Germany, Ireland, Turkey and Bulgaria found that the second and third 
most important reason to not follow the Court was that it had misunderstood the 
relevant domestic factual situation or domestic law.16 This source of tension is 
referred to as the ‘knowledge gap difficulty’. 
While the countermajoritarian difficulty is experienced by the Court and 
domestic courts in a comparable manner, the Court experiences the knowledge gap 
difficulty differently from its national counterparts. This is not to say that domestic 
courts do not experience a comparable difficulty; UK courts for example justify 
their use of the doctrine of deference with reference to their lack of knowledge of 
socioeconomic questions.17 The difficulty for the Court is however of a different 
dimension because it is broader than for national courts, because the Court not only 
                                                        
14  Hatton and Others v. UK (GC), No. 36022/97, 8 July 2003, para. 97; The importance of respecting 
national democratic legitimacy can also be derived from the Convention’s object and purpose, 
which is inter alia to promote the ideals and values of a democratic society, as emphasised by the 
Court in its case-law, see: section II.2.1.  
15  Arden (2010), 9-10. 
16  Başak (2011), 6.  
17  In addition to with reference to the undemocratic nature of judicial review; See for more 
information about the use by UK courts of the doctrine of deference: section III.1.1.5. 
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lacks knowledge in comparison to the national legislature and executive, like 
domestic courts do,18 but also in comparison to a third branch, namely the national 
judiciary in 47 states parties.  
2.1.3  Unifying Diversity Difficulty  
The third source of tension lays in the diversity of laws, policies and practice in the 
47 states parties to the Convention, combined with the potential of a Strasbourg 
judgment to impose uniform standards.19 In the conclusion to chapter II, diversity 
was already identified as a characteristic of the Convention system and as a norm 
which warrants respect according to the Court. The study terms this source of 
tension the ‘unifying diversity difficulty’. A similar difficulty can be found in for 
example the EU, where the Court of Justice’s adjudication of fundamental rights 
cases has a potentially unifying force, which is considered to be problematic in the 
pluralist EU legal system.20  
2.2  The Risk of Conflict and Decreased Effectiveness 
Internal tension stems, in sum, from three sources of tension that are grounded in 
the superior national democratic legitimacy and knowledge and the diversity of the 
states parties, combined with a unifying potential of the Court’s judgments. The 
sources of tension can be translated into three difficulties: the countermajoritarian, 
the knowledge gap and the unifying diversity difficulty. National authorities are, 
due to the three difficulties, in principle more competent and knowledgeable and 
therefore best placed to make decisions in the sphere of the Convention. This makes 
them the primary actors in the Convention system and the Court, as well as the 
other Council of Europe interlocutors, of secondary importance.  
When the Court reviews national decision-making, it risks causing the escalation 
of either source of tension, because it may make a decision that, in the opinion of 
the states parties, is unbalanced because it disrespects or takes insufficiently into 
account their direct democratic legitimacy, knowledge or diversity. The escalation 
of tension can lead to a conflict between the Court, or perhaps the Convention 
system at large, and the states parties and, in turn, likely causes the national 
authorities to feel less inclined to implement the Convention generally, or, more 
specifically, decline to execute the Court’s judgments, causing non-compliance. 
This possibility is the feasible outcome of an escalation of tension, because neither 
the Court nor the other Council of Europe institutions possess the means to coerce 
the states to implement the Convention or to undertake specific steps towards 
implementation. On the contrary, they need to persuade the states of the need to 
implement and execute and the persuasiveness of their arguments, decisions and 
                                                        
18  Edwards (2002), 876.  
19  See also: section II.5.2.4 (describing diversity as a characteristic of the Convention system).  
20  See for more information about this difficulty in the EU setting: section III.1.2.1.  
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recommendations diminishes when tension escalates.21 As various stakeholders 
have discussed the legitimacy of some judgments fiercely over the past few years, 
the possibility of an escalation of tension and conflict is real and never far away.22 
Section IV.2.6 elaborates on this point. Such an escalation would be particularly 
problematic, considering that the system has already gone through various 
problematic developments since the start of the nineties, bringing it into a state of 
turmoil, as described in chapter II.  
The type of conflict that results from internal tension should not necessarily be 
perceived as rhetorical mud-slinging between institutions that staunchly defend 
their own viewpoints. Conflict does not need to be so outspoken and hence visible; 
it is often more one of conflicting viewpoints than one of outright conflict between 
institutions that are in active disagreement. A conflict can for example take the form 
of evading a judgment, which comes closer to passive disagreement, or take the 
form of friction between institutions that does not cause their relationship to be one 
of rivalry and combat. As Krisch concluded after examining various instances of 
‘friction’ between national courts and Strasbourg: ‘despite [the] divergence on 
fundamentals, the interplay between the different levels of law has been remarkably 
harmonious and stable’.23 Furthermore, when perceiving the Convention system as 
a pluralist system, where national courts regard their own constitutional norms 
superior to the norms deriving from the Convention,24 the national courts may not 
perceive disagreement with Strasbourg as a conflict, but rather as the confirmation 
of the pluralist nature of the system.  
In a concrete case, all types of ‘conflict’ – in the shape of open conflict, friction 
or ‘merely’ evasion – tend to lead to non-compliance for a longer or shorter period, 
but usually not permanently. The examples of eruptions of tension discussed in 
section IV.2.6 illustrate this point and the different forms which conflict can take. 
From this perspective, evasion is at least as problematic as open conflict, because it 
has the same consequence, described below: decreased effectiveness, which may 
eventually jeopardise the protection of the Convention rights. Evasion could even 
be more problematic than open conflict in the sense that it may escape the attention 
of the Council of Europe interlocutors, making it harder to address national 
concerns and the deadlock caused by a controversial judgment.  
When the states parties feel less inclined to implement the Convention, for 
example because they refuse to execute a judgment, the effective and smooth 
functioning of the entire Convention system is significantly hampered, considering 
that the states are the primary actors in the system, based on whose diligent 
involvement the system has been designed and without which it cannot function 
effectively. It is therefore of great importance to the effective functioning of the 
Convention system that the tension does not lead to a conflict causing the national 
                                                        
21  Jackson (2006), 792.  
22  See for more information about the legitimacy debate: section II.3.8. 
23  Krisch (2008), 215.  
24  Ibid., 196.  
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authorities to neglect or abandon their crucial role in the system. It is also important 
that conflict is prevented considering that the system requires the sharing of 
responsibilities; conflict would complicate the functioning of a system with such a 
requirement. Moreover and as emphasised in section IV.1.2, the sharing of 
responsibilities implies that, rather than conflict, evasion and the like, the 
Convention system requires cooperation between the interlocutors.  
The consequences of conflict as just qualified would ultimately jeopardise the 
effective implementation of the Convention and thereby the achievement of the 
Convention’s object and purpose, which is to provide for the protection of 
individual human rights and, in addition to that, maintaining and promoting 
democracy in the Council of Europe states.25 Considering the numerous 
achievements of the Convention system,26 maintaining the system’s effectiveness 
definitely is an effort worth making.  
2.3  The Preventability of Conflict  
The above section described how internal tension, when it leads to unbalanced-
decision making, risks leading to conflict. This section emphasises that the tension 
caused by the three difficulties is inherent to the Convention system and adds to this 
observation that conflict is not the unavoidable outcome of the tension. Conflict can 
be prevented. This addition is introduced here and further substantiated from a 
dialogic perspective in section IV.4.3.  
In fact, there is no way out of the countermajoritarian difficulty; an important 
characteristic of the functioning of the Convention system is the, from a 
majoritarian perspective, countermajoritarian European review of national decisions 
that have been approved by authorities representing majorities. The decisions 
subject to European scrutiny are therefore normally more directly democratically 
legitimate than the decisions taken in the course of the Convention complaints 
procedure. The tension at the source of this difficulty should be handled by ensuring 
that the national authorities can find sufficiently persuasive reasons to accept that 
the democratic legitimacy of their decisions is compromised to some degree. In 
practice, the line between what national authorities consider (un)acceptable from a 
democratic viewpoint will be hard to draw accurately, but it can nevertheless be 
imagined that the tension caused by the countermajoritarian difficulty can be 
diverted from conflict. To the observation that the nature of the system provides no 
practical way out of the countermajoritarian difficulty, it can be added that there 
should be no way out of the difficulty: the Convention system was established 
exactly to sometimes rebuff the will of democratic majorities when they for 
                                                        
25  See for more information about the object and purpose of the Convention: section II.2.1; Even 
when in the future the main object and purpose would be to provide constitutional rather than 
individual justice as advanced by some (see: section II.4.3), it would be still indispensable to the 
effective functioning of the system that internal tension does not cause conflict.  
26  See: section II.3.1.  
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example intend to violate minority rights. The will of the majority must therefore 
take shape within and be guided by the rights proclaimed in the Convention.  
As for the knowledge gap difficulty, a comparable observation holds: the 
Council of Europe interlocutors virtually always have less knowledge of the 
domestic situation than the national authorities. Moreover, it is virtually impossible, 
if only for practical reasons related to capacity, to completely fill the knowledge 
gap and thus to escape this difficulty. However, when the Court allows its decisions 
to be influenced by the superior knowledge of the domestic authorities, it seems 
plausible that this tension does not need to lead to conflict. The Court could for 
example decide to leave a certain issue undecided and thus to defer to the national 
authorities due to their superior knowledge or it can explicitly refer to national 
knowledge in its judgment and thus show it has taken it into consideration.  
The unifying diversity difficulty is the unavoidable consequence of signing up to 
an international document such as the European Convention and the establishment 
of a supranational Court with the task to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements 
undertaken by’ the parties to the Convention and with jurisdiction that extends to 
‘all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention’.27 The 
states therefore must and often will accept the unifying force up to a certain level. 
The crux of the matter is, as in the case of the countermajoritarian difficulty, when 
the states’ acceptance turns into reluctance, that is, when they feel they are not 
offered sufficient room to make their own decisions within the boundaries set by the 
unified Convention standards, as elaborated upon in the Court’s case law. Two 
competing forces – uniform standards and national diversity – need to be balanced 
in order to prevent conflict. Regardless of how exactly these forces are balanced, it 
is thus conceivable that they can be balanced.  
For now the observation that conflict as a result of the three sources of internal 
tension is preventable suffices; the contours of how this can be achieved are 
discussed in section IV.3 on the added value of the notion of dialogue to the 
Convention system.  
2.4  Internal Tension as a Positive Good  
In abstract terms, the word ‘tension’ has a negative connotation and the preceding 
sections reinforced this connotation by connecting it to the word ‘conflict’. 
However, tension may also in a positive manner be an engine for change and it may 
stimulate creativity. The UK Human Rights Act, by way of illustration, has a 
dialectical tension at its core that positively ensures that the different branches 
communicate their perspective to each other about the compatibility of legislation 
with the Convention.28 For the Convention system as well, it is proposed that 
internal tension may be a positive good, rather than solely a potential source of 
                                                        
27  Arts. 19, 32(1) ECHR.  
28  The UK Human Rights Act and this ‘dialectical tension’ were discussed in more detail in: section 
III1.1.4. 
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conflict caused by unbalanced decision-making, because it can have the outcome of 
more balanced and therefore improved decision-making by the Court if channelled 
in the right direction. This is a reassuring observation considering that this category 
of tension is internal to the system and can hence not be eliminated, not even in 
theory. The forces should therefore be allowed to coexist rather than be eradicated.  
Internal tension leads to more balanced decision-making when it contributes to 
ensuring that the Council of Europe interlocutors respect the democratic legitimacy 
of national authorities, take into account national superior knowledge and allow the 
continued existence of diversity in the states parties.29 When this occurs, the 
decisions of the Council of Europe interlocutors are more balanced in the sense that 
they are more responsive to democratic legitimacy concerns and take into 
consideration more information and perspectives. This may lead to more respect for 
and protection of democracy, national diversity and constitutional values and make 
the decisions also more balanced in this way. As such, a decision may not only be 
more balanced, but its legitimacy and quality may also increase. Better balanced 
decisions will generally be more persuasive and, as also noted above, the 
persuasiveness of decisions is key to the effective and smooth functioning of the 
Convention system, because the Council of Europe interlocutors have no final 
power over the national authorities to coerce them to implement the Convention. It 
can finally be argued that the positive effect of internal tension may facilitate 
cooperation, because a respected state may feel more inclined to cooperate than 
when it would feel disrespected.  
Section IV.2.2 explained how internal tension may decrease the effective 
functioning of the Convention system when it leads to conflict. This section 
clarified that internal tension may also contribute to the effective functioning of the 
Convention system, when it leads to better balanced decision-making which may in 
turn facilitate cooperation. As in the case of preventing conflict, the ‘how’ question 
is reserved here and returned to in section IV.3.  
2.5  The Potential of the Convention System to Channel Internal Tension 
away from Conflict 
Regarding both the countermajoritarian and the knowledge gap difficulty, the 
principles of primarity and subsidiarity, which assign primary responsibility for 
securing the Convention rights to the states,30 assure first of all that the states can 
make their own decisions based on the opinion of national majorities and their 
superior knowledge, prior to any European involvement. The exhaustion of 
domestic remedies rule, a manifestation of the subsidiarity principle, gives content 
to the practical application of this assurance in the admissibility phase of 
Convention proceedings. Furthermore, once a case has reached the merits phase, 
                                                        
29  See also: Torres Pérez (2009), 113-114 (who writes about dialogue in the EU setting and ‘better-
reasoned outcomes’). 
30  See: section II.2.3.  
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other manifestations of that principle, namely the margin of appreciation doctrine 
and the first instance doctrine, are tools in the hand of the Court to pay respect to 
domestic decisions. The margin of appreciation doctrine gives the states room to 
make their own decisions;31 the first instance doctrine stipulates that the Court does 
not deal with each alleged error of fact or law committed by a national court. 
Finally, the declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments serves to ensure that the 
states parties do not only enjoy a certain degree of freedom of choice prior to a 
judgment, but also during the execution phase, after a violation has been found. The 
Court justifies its use of these manifestations of the subsidiarity principle,32 and in 
particular of the margin of appreciation doctrine, explicitly with reference to the 
superior democratic legitimacy and knowledge of the domestic situation held by the 
national authorities.  
It can further be argued that the system, and the Court in particular, is already 
geared towards preventing the unifying diversity difficulty from causing tension. 
The subsidiarity principle and its manifestations allow the states to make their own 
decisions in the sphere of the Convention prior, during and after European review to 
a certain extent, enabling them to make decisions in a way that suits the specific 
features of their national legal systems. Further, the subsidiarity principle, by 
limiting the role of the Court, for example because its judgments are declaratory, 
decreases the possibilities for it to impose uniform standards. In addition to that 
principle, the Court’s reliance on European consensus when interpreting the 
Convention demonstrates that it considers respect for national diversity a value 
worth protecting.33 When no consensus exists in the states parties, the Court usually 
upholds the lowest common denominator as the standard for Convention protection 
or affords the states a wide margin of appreciation, which allows them to maintain 
diverse practice.34 The Court further generally declines to change its interpretation 
of the Convention in the light of present-day conditions when no consensus exists in 
the states parties.35 This stance also promotes respect for diversity.  
It can be concluded that the basic philosophy behind the functioning of the 
Convention system and the principles developed by the Court in line with that 
philosophy are already geared towards channelling the three sources of internal 
tension in a way that conflict may be prevented and transformed into the positive 
good of balanced decision-making. Whether this materialises in practice is a 
separate and complex question that cannot be answered here.36 Moreover and more 
importantly, regardless of the principles and doctrines that may help mitigate 
tension, the possibility of conflict as a result of the tension, due to its internal 
                                                        
31  Gerards (2011), 104-115.  
32  Section II.2.3.3. 
33  Consensus interpretation was not yet discussed in this study and will not be discussed in any detail. 
34  Harris et al. (2014), 11.  
35  See for more information: ibid., 9-10.  
36  This research rather inquires into the potential of Convention-related procedures to channel the 
tension in the right direction, see: IV.5.2.  
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nature, always exists.37 The next section illustrates the ever-present possibility of 
conflict by exploring eruptions of tension on several occasions.  
2.6  The Ever-present Possibility of Conflict  
Conflict as a consequence of internal tension is an ever-present possibility. The 
knowledge gap difficulty explains this to a large extent. Due to the comparably 
limited knowledge held by the Strasbourg institutions of national legal systems, 
traditions and sensitivities, they may find it hard to predict which judgments will be 
perceived unbalanced and cause an outcry by the domestic authorities over an 
alleged lack of respect for national democratic legitimacy, knowledge and diversity. 
Therefore, ‘[a]ny case in which the ECtHR finds that a violation of the convention 
has taken place carries a certain potential for conflict’.38 It is particularly hard to 
predict which judgments will be perceived as problematic considering the sheer 
number of states parties and their great diversity in various respects,39 reflected in 
for example the differences between common and civil law legal systems,40 
between the new states parties from Central and East Europe and the other and 
usually ‘older’ states parties41 and between national approaches to sensitive moral 
or ethical questions, such as the use of IVF treatment42 or the nature and status of 
the embryo or foetus.43 To illustrate, as was noted by a domestic Judge: “The 
difference is of course that the Court in Strasbourg is interpreting the Convention 
for 47 countries and each individual supreme court is interpreting the law just for 
their own country and that involves a built-in inevitable tension that will always be 
there’.44 Another domestic Judge noted that ‘there is always a risk, now that [the] 
jurisprudence [of the supranational courts] is becoming ever-more pervasive, of 
European law introducing concepts which do not set easily with our own domestic 
law’.45 
The concerns expressed by the states in the legitimacy debate generally illustrate 
the inflammable nature of internal tension.46 This section gives some more concrete 
examples from seven states of the how tension can materialise in relation to specific 
judgments and in the manner sketched in section IV.2.2: not always open and 
                                                        
37  See also: Garlicki (2008), 512; Gerards (2011), 104. 
38  Garlicki (2008), 516; See also: Gerards (2009), 409-410; Garlicki (2009), 396-397.  
39  See: section II.5.2.4. 
40  See, e.g.: Lord Philips in R v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 107: ‘The 
jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court in relation to article 6(3)(d) has developed largely in cases 
relating to civil law rather than common law jurisdictions and this is particularly true of the sole or 
decisive rule. [...] as I have shown [pre-existing] case law appears to have developed without full 
consideration of the safeguards against an unfair trial that exist under the common law procedure.’  
41  See, e.g.: Sadurski (2009), 435-445. 
42  Evans v. UK (GC), No. 6339/05, 10 April 2007, paras. 79-81.  
43  See: Vo v. France (GC), No. 53924/00, 8 July 2004, para. 84.  
44  Çalı (2011), 7.  
45  Arden (2010), 4.  
46  See for more information about the legitimacy debate: section II.3.8.  
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outspoken, and not always causing feelings of animosity between institutions, but 
oftentimes less visible, taking the form of evasion or silent non-compliance.  
The example of conflict that springs to mind immediately is the right to vote for 
prisoners’ saga that gave rise to widespread criticism in the UK and that might 
actually resemble the image of conflict as rhetorical mud-slinging.47 As a result of 
the conflict, the UK government failed to execute the pilot judgment Greens and 
M.T. v. UK48 in time because it did not devise legislative proposals to amend the 
impugned legislation within the six month deadline.49 Another series of cases that 
received only slightly less attention concerned the use of hearsay evidence in UK 
courts, which the Court scrutinised under Article 6. The chamber judgment50 on this 
issue provoked Lord Philips, writing for a unanimous UK Supreme Court, to state 
that:  
 
There will [...] be rare occasions where this court has concerns as to whether a 
decision of the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular 
aspects of our domestic process. In such circumstances it is open to this court to 
decline to follow Strasbourg decisions, giving reasons for adopting this course.51 
 
He thus clearly signalled that compliance with Strasbourg judgments is conditional 
rather than automatic, which may lead to future non-compliance by the Supreme 
Court.  
An older example that illustrates the consequences of an evasive, or at least very 
slow, reaction to a European judgment is the initial inertia of the Belgian authorities 
in the face of the Marckx judgment, concerning the rights of a child born out of 
wedlock and her mother.52 It took the Belgian legislature eight years to amend the 
act that was at the source of the violation and some national courts did not comply 
with the judgment in their case law either. More than a decennium later, Strasbourg 
therefore found a similar violation in the Vermeire judgment, critically noting that:  
 
The freedom of choice allowed to a State as to the means of fulfilling its obligation 
under Article 53 [now Article 46] cannot allow it to suspend the application of the 
Convention while waiting for such a reform to be completed, to the extent of 
compelling the Court to reject in 1991, with respect to a succession which took effect 
                                                        
47  See elaborately: Bates (2014). 
48  No. 60041 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 6 operative provisions.  
49  See also: XI.1.5.1.  
50  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, No. 26766/05 et al., 20 January 2009; This case was referred to the 
Grand Chamber, resulting in a judgment of 15 December 2011 that took the criticism aired by the 
UK Supreme Court partially into account. See also: chapter I.  
51  Lord Philips in R v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 11; Former President of the 
Court Nicolas Bratza considered this approach ‘important’, see: Bratza (2011), 512.  
52  (Plenary), No. 6833/74, 13 June 1979.  
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on 22 July 1980, complaints identical to those which it upheld on 13 June 1979 [in 
the Marckx judgment].53  
 
The evasion of the Marckx judgment meant that the Article 8 rights of some people, 
as in the case of Vermeire, continued to be violated for years even though the 
Marckx judgment clearly pointed to a problem. For the Court, it meant extra work 
that was not required for to clarify Convention standards, but for pointing out to 
Belgium that it should have reacted faster.  
The Chechen cases, in which the Court found grave violations by the Russian 
security forces, illustrate a more serious and protracted conflict of ‘decades-long 
animosity between Moscow and Strasbourg’.54 In reaction to these cases, Russia 
has been said to have adopted a policy of ‘à la carte compliance’, a policy of paying 
compensation but failing to fully execute the judgments because it does not 
undertake effective investigations or holds perpetrators to account.55 Such evasion 
‘[diminishes] the significance of the judgments’ for the applicants. In the case of an 
enforced disappearance for example, a favourable judgment does not mean the 
applicant is brought closer to knowing of the whereabouts of a disappeared relative. 
Moreover, partial execution does not contribute to preventing future, similar 
violations.56 
In Germany, some national courts resisted Strasbourg’s finding of a violation of 
Article 5 as a result of the retroactive extension of preventive detention.57 These 
courts refused to release prisoners who had been detained retroactively, in spite and 
in defiance of European jurisprudence and German law as well.58 About a year and 
a half after the first Strasbourg judgment on the issue, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court solved the conflict by holding that ‘all provisions on the 
retrospective prolongation of preventive detention and on the retrospective order of 
such detention were incompatible with the Basic Law’.59 That court is however not 
always in a position to offer a solution in the event of a conflict with Strasbourg, as 
it has acknowledged that the legislature may ‘exceptionally, [...] not comply with 
the law of international agreements [such as the Convention], provided this is the 
only way in which a violation of fundamental principles of the constitution can be 
                                                        
53  Vermeire v. Belgium, No. 12849/87, 9 November 1991, para. 26.  
54  Hillebrecht (2012), 289 
55  Ibid.; See also: Human Rights Watch (2007); Human Rights Watch (2009).  
56  Human Rights Watch (2009), 2.  
57  M. v. Germany, No. 19359/04, 17 December 2009 established that the retroactive extension of 
preventive detention, as regulated by German law, violated Art. 5(1)(a); The Court’s case law was 
later extended to include indefinite preventive detention following completion of one’s prison term 
in: Haid v. Germany, No. 6587/04, 13 January 2011; The Court confirmed the course it had taken 
in M. in, amongst other cases: Mautes v. Germany, No. 20008/07, 13 January 2011; See also: 
section: X.2.11.  
58  Merkel (2011), 975-976; Peters (2012), 764.  
59  In this judgment, the Court did not find a violation of Art. 5(1): Schmitz v. Germany, No. 30493/04, 
9 June 2011; See for more information: Michaelsen (2012).  
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averted’.60 Further, it has given German courts the duty to ‘observe and apply the 
Convention within the limits of the methodologically justifiable interpretation’.61 
Regardless of how one qualifies this duty,62 it ‘keeps the door open for a respectful 
dissent’,63 which may lead to conflict between the German courts and the European 
Court, however exceptional and sophisticated this conflict would be.  
French courts rebelled against the 1993 Poitrimol64 judgment of the European 
Court. The latter had concluded that the French criminal law rule, that an applicant 
loses his right of appeal when he fails to appear in person, violates Article 6. The 
French courts’ initial reaction was evasive because they simply ignored this 
judgment and related judgments and thus did not create an open conflict. They 
subsequently ‘openly defied it by insisting on their own interpretation’ of the article 
in a more conflict-provoking manner.65 Only in 2001 did the Court of Cassation 
bring this conflict to an end. The reaction to the Poitrimol judgment was not an 
isolated incident, but part of ‘years of resistance’ by French courts against 
Strasbourg.66 
In Romania too, a judgment concerning Article 6 led to rebellion by the 
judiciary. The European Court had found that the power of the public prosecutor to 
direct the preventive detention of a criminal suspect for a maximum of 30 days 
violated the Convention. The Romanian Constitutional Court refused to abide by 
the judgment for some years by not ruling in conformity with the European 
judgment, even though it had various opportunities to do so. In the end, the 
legislature amended the legislation and in this way solved the conflict.67 
Finally, the Spanish Constitutional Court has reacted evasively to the Lopez 
Ostra judgment of the European Court. In this judgment, the Court scrutinized a 
pollution problem under Article 8 and found a violation. The Constitutional Court 
only considered the possibility of a broader interpretation of the constitutional right 
to privacy seven years after the Lopez Ostra judgment. This remained a possibility; 
the Constitutional Court did not hold that it should always literally translate 
European judgments. The non-literal translation in this area meant that the national 
court upheld a higher threshold for finding a violation than the Strasbourg Court. 
This is part of a broader development that has weakened the connection between the 
European Convention and the Spanish Constitution, giving the Constitutional Court 
                                                        
60  Order of the Second Senate of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, para. 35.  
61  Ibid., para. 32; They should however also take judgments of the Court ‘into account’ (ibid., para. 
46).  
62  This may be qualified either as ‘a posture of open revolt’ or as a ‘cooperation relationship’ and a 
caution against a hierarchical approach that would ‘set aside sophisticated precedents under 
national law altogether’, see: Hoffmeister (2006), 729.  
63  Idem.  
64  No. 14032/88, 23 November 1993.  
65  Krisch (2008), 193.  
66  Idem.  
67  Sadurski (2009), 405, 443-444.  
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‘significant discretion’ in deciding whether and how it conforms to European 
jurisprudence.68  
These examples illustrate how conflict and non-compliance may develop as a 
result of internal tension and how this possibility is ever-present. Conflict may arise 
because of executive, legislative or judicial defiance or less pronounced evasion and 
may last for several years, but is usually solved in the end. Further, in the case of 
the UK, Germany and Spain, the supreme or constitutional courts clearly signalled 
to Strasbourg that they would not automatically comply with its judgments, which 
emphasizes that conflict, also as a matter of doctrine, may always develop, in 
particular considering that the European Court has repeatedly stated that ‘it is for 
the [European] Court to give the final ruling’ on whether a national measure is 
compatible with the Convention.69 The examples also illustrate the point made in 
section IV.2.2 that conflict in the context of this study does not need to be open, 
active and clearly hostile. Regardless of the exact cause, consequence or form of 
conflict, the result for the applicant, be it a mother whose daughter was born out of 
wedlock or a mother whose son has disappeared, is that it significantly hampers 
exercising her Convention rights.  
2.7 The Characteristics of Internal Tension  
As can be concluded from the previous sections, the three sources of internal 
tension risk leading to conflict, but not unavoidably, provided that the democratic 
legitimacy, superior knowledge of the domestic situation and diversity in the states 
parties are not compromised to the extent that conflict indeed materialises. The 
word conflict as used in this study does not need to refer to an outspoken and 
visible conflict between two Convention interlocutors, but may equally refer to a 
less pronounced and visible conflict between the viewpoints of different 
interlocutors as well as to the evasion of judgments rather than express collision. In 
addition to that, tension may have the positive effect of stimulating more balanced 
decision-making. Internal tension in the Convention system thus risks causing 
conflict, but may also positively contribute to improved and more balanced 
European decision-making. Finally, although the basic philosophy behind the 
functioning of the Convention system and the principles developed by the Court in 
line with that philosophy are already geared towards channelling tension away from 
conflict towards more balanced decision-making, conflict as a result of that tension 
remains an ever-present possibility.  
                                                        
68  Krisch (2008), 190-191.  
69  Handyside v. UK (Plenary), No. 5493/72, 7 December 1976, para. 49.  
 
 
 
 Chapter IV 
 
 
122 
3  EXTERNAL TENSION  
3.1  Sources  
External tension stems from various complex and problematic developments that 
have influenced the Convention system since the nineties and that are caused by the 
failure of the states to generally adequately fulfil their primary responsibility for the 
implementation of the Convention.70 These developments have caused the system 
to be in a state of turmoil as discussed in chapter II. The implementation problems 
referred to concern the manifestly inadequate implementation of the Convention 
and the violations committed as a consequences of such inadequate implementation. 
These implementation problems of a very serious and grave nature can be 
contrasted with less serious violations of the Convention that are caused by an 
occasional defect in the national system rather than more structural defects. When 
the Court is confronted with the consequences of the implementation problem, it 
must often choose between giving priority to respect for the subsidiarity principle or 
the effectiveness principle.71 The Court often chooses to prioritise respect for the 
effectiveness principle over respect for the other principle, meaning it assumes 
wider and additional responsibilities,72 at the expense of the states parties, thus 
exerting more power over them.  
External tension is, in sum, the tension between the subsidiarity principle and 
the effectiveness principle in cases where the states have failed to adequately 
implement the Convention. In such cases, the principles are in tension, because the 
Court cannot respect both principles equally at the same time. Further, the system 
can in such cases hardly function as it is supposed to function, namely by relying on 
the sharing of responsibilities and in a spirit of cooperation as described in section 
IV.1. Importantly, this tension does not arise in cases where the state has 
implemented the Convention adequately in a way that pre-empts the need for the 
Court to assume responsibilities that the states should have assumed in accordance 
with the subsidiarity principle. This type of tension is external, because it is not 
caused by inalienable features of the system, as is the case for internal tension, but 
rather by developments originating from outside the Convention system.  
3.1.1 Need for Long-term Change  
The problems at the source of the above outlined implementation troubles are 
usually highly complex, rooted in structures and systems affecting large numbers of 
persons. These problems cannot be solved in the short term, by a single adverse 
                                                        
70  See for more information about these developments: section II.3.  
71  See also: sections II.2.3 and II.24.  
72  It can also be argued that the Court has assumed wider responsibilities because it has at its own 
initiative increased the scope of protection afforded by existing rights. This development, described 
in section II.3.2, is however not related to external tension and is therefore not discussed here.  
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judgment of the Court or by the one-time involvement of the Committee in the 
execution process. Instead, they require changes that can only be implemented in 
the long term.  
Examples of some widespread, repetitive and sometimes also grave violations 
illustrate their complexity. In Italy, the great number of cases revealing a violation 
of Article 6 because of the length of judicial proceedings require, according to the 
Committee, amongst other things, ‘the deep structural modernisation of the judicial 
system’, a measure that ‘cannot be expected to produce major effects before a 
reasonable time has elapsed’.73 For the execution of 154 cases against Russia 
concerning actions of the security forces in Chechnya, the Committee requires ‘the 
adoption of comprehensive measures’ aimed at amongst other things improving the 
legal and regulatory framework governing anti-terrorist activities of the security 
forces, developing domestic remedies and enhancing awareness-raising and training 
of the security forces.74 The Court found furthermore in Orchowski v. Poland that 
the problem of overcrowding in detention facilities was ‘a widespread problem 
arising out of the malfunctioning of the administration of the prison system 
insufficiently controlled by Polish legislation, which has affected, and may still 
affect in the future, an as yet unidentified, but potentially considerable number of 
persons [...]’.75 Poland therefore needed to undertake ‘consistent and long-term 
efforts’ in order to achieve Convention compliance and the Court added that solving 
the problem ‘may necessitate the mobilisation of significant financial resources’ 
and the development of ‘an efficient system of complaints to the authorities 
supervising detention facilities’.76 
3.1.2  Limited Usefulness of Increasing Coercion and Power 
In addition to requiring long-term change, the implementation problems can, due to 
their nature, not be solved by simply increasing the power of the Convention 
interlocutors over the states parties to direct them to carry out specific reform 
measures. Section IV.1.1 explained that the Convention interlocutors currently lack 
coercive power over the states parties. Such an increase is not only contrary to the 
status quo, but is also virtually impossible in the future. The first reason for this is 
that the Council of Europe institutions usually lack knowledge of how the complex 
dysfunction in the national legal system at issue can be solved, which may make it 
already hard for the national authorities to draw up an effective and comprehensive 
reform plan.77 Furthermore, only states can bring about the required reform in the 
                                                        
73 Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2000)135, 25 October 2000.  
74  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 154 cases v. Russia ‘, ResDH(2011)292, 2 December 2011.  
75  Orchowski v. Poland, No. 17885/04, 22 October 2009, para. 147.  
76  Ibid., paras. 152-154.  
77  Balitskiy v. Ukraine, No. 12793/03, 3 November 2011, para. 53; See also: section IV. 2.1.2 on the 
knowledge gap difficulty.  
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end, because the implementation problems concern their legal systems; it is 
therefore indispensable that broad support exists in the state concerned for the need 
to reform and the required reform measures. Reform measures should therefore be 
discussed and agreed upon, rather than imposed. Broad support and action by all 
branches is often required exactly because the problems are complex and derive 
from structures, which means they cannot be solved single-handedly by for example 
passing new legislation in parliament. To illustrate, in the case of action by the 
Russian security forces in Chechnya, relevant execution measures mentioned by the 
Committee include the adoption of federal laws by the legislature, the introduction 
of a general framework for domestic investigations by the executive and the 
domestic judiciary’s practice demonstrating positive developments in the 
application of the remedies available to victims.78 Yet another reason why 
increasing coercive power is of limited usefulness is that some implementation 
problems continue to persist because certain states have not yet been able to 
effectively implement the Convention due to the complexity of the deficiencies they 
are confronted with, not necessarily because they are reluctant to pursue reform. 
Coercion in these cases would clearly not contribute to improved implementation; 
what these states rather need is expertise and possibly funds as well provided by 
cooperative partners. Additionally, coercion and the increase of power of the 
Council of Europe interlocutors would risk leading to the escalation of the internal 
tension caused by the countermajoritarian difficulty and the unifying diversity 
difficulty and could therefore be detrimental to the effective functioning of the 
Convention system in the end. For reason of these two difficulties, it is realistically 
speaking moreover unlikely that the states would agree to Convention reforms that 
would increase the power of the other interlocutors over themselves.  
3.2 Decreased Effectiveness 
As explained, the failure of the states parties to live up to their primary 
responsibility is the source of external tension. Since the functioning of the 
Convention system was designed based on the assumption that states would respect 
this principle, external tension automatically decreases the effectiveness of the 
Convention system. The states’ failure both causes a large influx of new 
applications and leads the Court to assume additional responsibilities, thus 
increasing the workload on the system to the extent that its effectiveness is 
jeopardised, creating a long waiting-time for applicants.79 The workload on the 
Committee has also increased. The developments relating to the implementation 
problem have furthermore caused applicants to bring cases of a new subject matter 
of which it is questionable whether the Court and the system generally are equipped 
to deal with effectively.80 It is questionable whether they can deal effectively with 
                                                        
78  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 154 cases v. Russia ‘, ResDH(2011)292, 2 December 2011. 
79  See also: section II.3.  
80  See for more information: section II.3.6. 
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applications revealing structural problems and applications brought in response to 
grave and repetitive violations, because neither the Court nor the Committee are 
equipped to coerce states to execute a judgment adequately or completely or to 
order the state to take general measures. Furthermore, the assumption of additional 
responsibilities at the expense of the states parties may lead the states to question 
the persuasiveness of the review and supervision by the system and, in turn, the 
need to implement the Convention or, more narrowly, the Court’s judgments, which 
would exacerbate external tension. As explained previously, persuasiveness is of 
great importance in the absence of means to force the states to implement the 
Convention. Eventually, challenges to the effective functioning of the system put in 
peril the protection and promotion of the Convention rights. External tension may 
thus ultimately have the same consequence as internal tension. The difference is 
however that internal tension does not need lead to this consequence because 
conflict as a result of this tension can be prevented, while external tension 
irreversibly leads to this consequence. It is therefore not necessary to wonder 
whether external tension may be a positive good. On the contrary, it is beyond 
question that, ideally, this category of tension should be eliminated completely.  
3.3 The Eliminability of External Tension  
External tension should not only be eliminated, but this can also be achieved 
because, as just noted, the tension is not inherent to the functioning or design of the 
system, but caused by various external developments. When the states would 
adequately implement the Convention, it would not or hardly ever surface. 
Improved implementation is therefore in essence the solution to eliminating 
external tension. Since neither the system nor the states parties are infallible, rather 
than aiming to discard external tension completely, it would be more realistic to aim 
for decreasing this category of tension at least to the extent that it causes no major 
difficulties to the smooth and effective functioning of the Convention system. The 
final aim of complete removal of this type of tension would then become a point of 
guidance on the horizon. Again, the question of by what more practical means 
external tension can be eliminated is not answered here, but in section IV.4.  
3.4  External Tension Reinforcing Internal Tension  
Although external and internal tension are different in nature, they are connected in 
the sense that they both relate in essence to the subsidiarity principle: external 
tension because the national authorities do not respect the principle in this case; 
internal tension because the Court risks disrespecting the principle by not paying 
sufficient respect to the primary responsibly of the states parties and its own 
subsidiarity position in this case. The two types of tension are also connected, 
because instances of external tension may reinforce the difficulties created by the 
three sources of internal tension. When the Court assumes additional functions and 
more power over the states parties to ensure the effective protection of Convention 
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rights, this may make it harder to respect the democratic legitimacy, superior 
knowledge and diversity in the states parties, increasing the possibility that internal 
tension, reinforced by external tension, causes conflict. For example, when the 
Court indicates to the respondent state which execution measures it must take, the 
room for the state to execute the judgment in a manner that suits the particular 
characteristics of its legal system and that conforms to the will of the democratic 
majority decreases.  
3.5 The Characteristics of External Tension 
As clarified above, external tension is the tension which arises when the Court is 
confronted with the choice between paying respect to the subsidiarity principle and 
the effectiveness principle, a choice with which the Court is faced in case of serious 
implementation problems. The implementation problems that cause the tension 
between the two principles cannot be solved overnight, but rather require long-term 
change. Moreover, they cannot simply be solved by increasing power over the 
states parties. Nevertheless, the ultimate consequence of the tension is decreased 
effectiveness of the Convention system and the tension can reinforce the difficulties 
created by internal tension. Unlike internal tension, external tension can be 
eliminated in theory and should be eliminated in practice at least to the extent that 
that it does not cause major problems for the effective functioning of the 
Convention system. External tension is eliminated when the Court is no longer 
confronted with the choice between respecting the subsidiarity or the effectiveness 
principle, but can respect both principles. This happens when national authorities 
pay sufficient respect to the first principle, by living up to their responsibilities 
under the Convention, at least to the extent that it does not require the Court to step 
up its responsibly to ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights. The 
elimination of external tension should be brought about by improving the 
implementation record in certain states and certain parts of some domestic systems 
where manifest inadequate implementation gives raise to violations of widespread, 
grave and/or repetitive nature and to execution problems of in particular the general 
measures.81  
Due to the nature of external tension, the question does not need to be answered 
whether the system is already sufficiently equipped to deal with this category of 
tension.82 Its very existence confirms this, as well as the existence of problematic 
                                                        
81  See for more information: section II.3.7. 
82  An exception may be the PJP, since it was created exactly in response to the inability of the system 
to deal effectively with violations of a changed subject matter. The procedure is, however, a 
resource- and time-consuming procedure that is only applied exceptionally. As remarked by the 
Director General of the Directorate General of Human Rights and the Rule of Law of the Council 
of Europe: ‘In theory [PJP’s] could help to solve the problem posed by [repetitive] cases. That 
being said, the Court is cautious in using this procedure: 2011 has seen only five final pilot 
judgments. The fact that no [PJP] has been initiated with respect to the problem of excessive length 
of judicial proceedings in Italy is a good illustration of the Court’s careful approach when 
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developments related to the tension, which are execution problems of in particular 
general measures and the grave, widespread and repetitive nature of some 
violations. The continued debate on proposals for reform that would contribute to 
improved implementation also confirms this.83 This section can therefore move 
directly on to the next, which inquires into the added value of the notion of dialogue 
to the Convention system.  
4 THE ADDED VALUE OF DIALOGUE IN THE CONVENTION SYSTEM  
The previous sections emphasised the importance of cooperation, ensuring that 
internal tension travels the right course and that external tension is eliminated. The 
importance of these points is clear when considering the alternative: decreased 
effectiveness of the Convention system, which results eventually in jeopardising the 
protection of the Convention rights. Moreover, national democratic legitimacy, 
knowledge and diversity are respected when internal tension is controlled rightly 
and fewer particularly serious violations are committed when external tension is 
brought closer to its elimination.  
Although internal and external tension were examined in some detail in sections 
IV.2 and IV.3, the question has not yet been addressed how either sort of tension 
should be handled. Neither did section IV.1 clarify how cooperation can be 
stimulated. The current section continues where the previous three sections ended: 
it aims to formulate answers and to further clarify issues in a normative account that 
is grounded in the notion of dialogue. The account proposes that dialogue, as a 
normative ideal and when applied and adapted appropriately to the Convention 
system, is instrumental to ensuring that internal tension leads to improved decision-
making rather than to conflict, that external tension is eliminated and that, more 
generally, cooperation is facilitated.  
This section presents the normative account in two steps.84 First, it explores the 
current use of the notion of dialogue in other systems in connexion with the 
difficulties existing in the Convention system and how the notion has already been 
used for the Convention system. The second section discusses what the added value 
of the notion of dialogue can be to the Convention system in light of the twofold 
tension and the importance of cooperation. Additionally, prerequisites for 
Convention dialogue are outlined.  
                                                        
identifying situations fit for such a procedure’, in: Committee (2012), 10-11. This quote illustrates 
that the procedure alone cannot be a sufficient answer to eliminating the tension. This procedure is 
further discussed in: chapters VII and XI.  
83  See for more information: section II.4.  
84  The structure of this section is informed by: Torres Pérez (2009), chapter 5.  
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4.1 The Notion of Dialogue  
4.1.1 As Used for Other Systems  
As section III.1 illustrated, several authors have already applied the notion of 
dialogue convincingly and in various ways to different legal systems. These authors 
described how the notion can be a means to prevent the three difficulties described 
in section IV.2.1 from causing internal tension. Three illustrations of how this can 
be attained in other legal systems are recalled here, this time with explicit reference 
to the three difficulties. After this exercise, the section enumerates some more 
general features of dialogue as can be derived from section III.1. The illustrations 
and enumeration only relate to internal tension, because the notion of dialogue, as 
far as the author is aware, not been used by authors writing about other systems as a 
means to contribute to eliminating comparable sorts of external tension. This is not 
surprising considering that the implementation difficulties that cause external 
tension are particular to the way in which the Convention system functions now, 
which may mean that comparable sorts of external tension simply do not exist 
outside the Convention system’s context. This study can therefore not rely on what 
others have already written about the added value of dialogue for eliminating 
external tension in other systems.  
Notions of dialogue applied to the national constitutional setting can, in one 
form or the other, help reconcile the countermajoritarian difficulty with the 
majoritarian dilemma, the need to protect the rights of minorities against the will of 
the majority. In the Canadian constitutional setting for example, Hogg and Bushell 
showed how judicial review is the beginning of a dialogue between the judiciary 
and the legislature, an observation that according to them shows that the 
countermajoritarian difficulty is considerably less problematic than when the 
legislature cannot respond to the judiciary’s judgment.  
In the UK, courts use the knowledge gap difficulty, and in particular their lack 
of knowledge of socioeconomic questions, as a pragmatic justification for deferring 
to decisions made by public authorities. On the one hand, this approach can be 
considered dialogic because it gives the non-judicial branches an important voice in 
domestic decision-making in the field of socioeconomic policy. In this way, the 
judiciary prevents tension between the courts and the other branches of government 
as a result of the knowledge gap difficulty, because it gives the others leeway to 
make their own decisions. On the other hand, some scholars doubt the dialogic 
nature of deference, because the judiciary reduces its own voice significantly, thus 
preventing a genuine dialogue from taking place.85  
The Court of Justice experiences the unifying diversity difficulty in a similar 
manner as the Strasbourg Court. The Luxembourg Court’s adjudication of 
fundamental rights brings with it the risk that it disregards the pluralist nature of the 
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EU legal system and disrespects the variety of national approaches to fundamental 
rights. When this indeed happens, a conflict likely arises between that Court and the 
national courts and possibly also with the states at large. Different authors have 
proposed that dialogue as a regulative norm helps ensure that the Court of Justice’s 
adjudication of fundamental rights’ cases does not lead it to disrespect diversity and 
pluralism to the extent that conflict materialises.86 This risk is minimised because a 
dialogue means that domestic courts can communicate their perspective to 
Luxembourg, which in turn allows Luxembourg to take this into account and to 
give the domestic courts a certain margin within which they can decide how to 
implement its rulings in a way that corresponds with the particularities of their own 
legal systems.  
As for the more general features of dialogue that can be found in different 
systems, when it is applied as a norm to regulate interaction between different 
institutions, it helps ensure that they respect each other’s powers and competences, 
preventing the development of conflict by encouraging dividing power and 
channelling interaction in a dialogic, non-conflictual manner. Notions of dialogue 
usually rely on the weakening of power of review of one actor over the other and on 
ensuring that the perspectives held by the actors are considered by all. As a weak-
form of judicial review is often an important feature of dialogue, the notion is 
usually applied to systems characterised by not strictly hierarchical relations. The 
notion may not only work to prevent conflict and channel interaction, but also to 
legitimise the assertion of some degree of power of one actor over the other, 
because it requires continued respect for the powers and competences of the actor 
subject to the power. A normative conception of dialogue is often regarded as an 
alternative to norms that either give one actor a great amount of power over the 
other or that stipulate that all actors should be sovereign in their choices.  
4.1.2 As Used for the Convention System 
Different authors writing about the Convention system have used the term 
‘dialogue’.87 They do so virtually always in a positive sense, writing about a 
‘valuable’,88 ‘necessary’89 and ‘lively’90 dialogue.91 Further, from these writings it 
can be derived that dialogue is considered to be of importance; ‘to foster dialogue 
                                                        
86  See for more information: section III.1.2.3. 
87  See for an overview of the different types of dialogue the Strasbourg judges can engage in: Villiger 
(2011).  
88  Lord Philips in R v. Horncastle and Others [2009] UKSC 14, para. 11.  
89  Tulkens (2012); See also: Consultative Council of European Judges, ‘Opinion No. 9 on the Role of 
National Judges in Ensuring an Effective Application of International and European Law’, 10 
November 2006, para. 27.  
90  Hale (2012), 78.  
91  See also: Polakiewicz (2001), 47; HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels 
Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan para. A(1)(b); Spielmann (2015b); See for the exception, 
about the possible negative outcomes of dialogue: Amos (2012), 574, 576, 580.  
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with supreme courts is at the forefront of my concerns’, a President of the Court 
noted for example.92 The same President coined Protocol 16 the ‘Protocol of 
dialogue’,93 after which the notion seems to have gained even more importance and 
is referred to more frequently.94  
When connected to external tension, dialogue can first be seen as a way to give 
substance to considering Convention implementation as a shared responsibility 
between the European and the domestic level. A Judge of the Court for example 
stated that, in the opinion of the Court, a judge-to-judge dialogue is ‘more necessary 
than ever in 2012’, adding that ‘[g]iven the challenges facing fundamental rights in 
the current economic, social and political climate, it is essential that the protection 
of human rights in Europe is a necessity and a joint responsibility’.95 In the 
Brighton Declaration, the states parties encouraged in a comparable vein ‘open 
dialogues between the Court and States Parties as a means of developing an 
enhanced understanding of their respective roles in carrying out their shared 
responsibility for applying the Convention’.96 Judge Lübbe-Wolff of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court is furthermore convinced that ‘the long-term viability 
and strength of the Convention system depend on a division of labour based on 
dialogue [...]’ and she ‘would like to draw attention to the way dialogue between the 
courts in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions and the principle of 
subsidiarity are connected’.97 The Court, the states and the German Judge seem to 
suggest that dialogue can contribute to the effective sharing of responsibilities. 
Additionally, the Committee decided to establish a Liaison Committee with the 
Court in order to maintain a dialogue on the future of human rights protection in 
Europe and on questions affecting the Court, which may be a response to instances 
of external tension.98 The Committee further noted that it wishes to start meetings 
between itself, the Assembly and the Commissioner to promote stronger interaction, 
or a dialogue, between these three institutions in the context of execution.99  
Effectively sharing responsibilities may eventually lead to improved 
implementation. Dialogue is however also connected to improved implementation 
in a more direct sense. Another Judge of the Court suggested, for example, that in a 
general sense an ‘important aspect of effective Convention implementation is [...] 
the necessary dialogue between Strasbourg and its national counterparts’.100 The 
                                                        
92  Spielmann (2015a), 2. 
93  Spielmann (2014a), 1.  
94  See, e.g.: Gragl (2013), 237; Spielmann (2014e), 3.  
95  Tulkens (2012).  
96  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 12(c); See also: 
Costa (2012), 4.  
97  Lübbe-Wolff (2012).  
98  Committee, ‘Decision on Liaison Committee with the [ECtHR]’, CM/Del/Dec(2000)705/4.3, GT-
EB(2000)2, Resolution (97)9, 11 April 2000.  
99  Committee, ‘Declaration of on Sustained Action to Ensure the Effectiveness of the Implementation 
of the [ECHR] at National and European levels’, 19 May 2006, para. X(c).  
100  Bratza (2012a), 4.  
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Director General of the Council of Europe’s Directorate General of Human Rights 
and the Rule of Law connects dialogue to improved implementation more 
concretely. He sees as ‘one of the primary reasons’ for the decrease in the number 
of repetitive cases before the Committee for the first time in years the ‘increased 
interaction between the Court, the [Committee] and national authorities in the 
context of the pilot-judgment procedure’.101 Finally, the Commissioner suggests 
that a dialogue with national courts among other ‘positive chain effects’ may reduce 
the workload on the system,102 something which likely is brought about by 
remedying the violations that cause external tension. Further, it has been proposed 
that the notion of dialogue ‘may help us understand the importance of procedures 
and mechanisms that inform the states’ (in particular national courts’) 
implementation of the Convention’.103  
The term is also connected to internal tension. Dialogue is for example in a 
rather general sense seen as a method to prevent internal tension from causing 
conflict. A Strasbourg Judge, writing extrajudicially, welcomes dialogue to the 
Convention system because he sees it as a method to ‘ensure greater harmony 
between the decision-making of the Strasbourg Court and that of national courts 
and to avoid what appears to have been from time to time a feeling of mistrust by 
one court of the other’.104 Comparably, ‘constitutional conversations’ in the 
Convention system have been advanced as a ‘strategy’ to prevent disagreements 
and as a ‘valid alternative for hierarchical conflict resolution’.105 Also, it has been 
noted that critical domestic courts, of which examples can be found in section 
IV.2.6, do not desire that the Court’s competences are restricted, but rather call for a 
dialogue with the Court.106 More precisely, dialogue is advanced as a means to 
manage the unifying diversity difficulty: European and domestic judges as well as 
others agree that dialogue can be a means to pay respect to national diversity, or, in 
case the Court already has disrespected diversity in the eyes of a state party, to point 
this out to the Court.107 As a president of the Court stated: ‘Even if [the Court] is 
not bound to accept the view of the national courts in their interpretation of 
Convention rights, it is of untold benefit [...] that we should have those views’.108 
He added that ‘it is right and healthy that national courts should [...] feel free to 
criticise Strasbourg judgments where those judgments [...] misunderstood national 
law or practices’.109 Further, others see dialogue as a means to help ensure that the 
                                                        
101  Committee (2012), 10.  
102  Hammarberg (2012).  
103  Gerards (2014b), 72. 
104  Bratza (2011), 510; See also: Gerards (2014b), 33-34.  
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countermajoritarian difficulty does not lead to conflict. The Dutch government sees 
improving the dialogue between the Court and the states parties as a method to 
decrease the distance between the Court and the political-social reality in the states 
and connects the notion to securing the Court’s democratic legitimacy.110 
According to Amos, however, ‘no amount of dialogue’ between courts at least can 
‘enhance the democratic legitimacy of their judgments’;111 engaging in dialogue 
rather ensures that the Court does not disrespect the democratic legitimacy of 
national interlocutors. What a judicial dialogue can however achieve according to 
Amos in terms of legitimacy, is to increase the chance that the Strasbourg 
judgments reflect ‘the value of those affected’ and thus to increase the legitimacy of 
the judgments in the eyes of the ‘general public and their representatives in 
governments and legislatures’.112 It may even be possible that a judgment going 
against a domestic judgment is considered legitimate because Strasbourg listened to 
national concerns prior to issuing its judgment. Such legitimising force of dialogue 
is important since Strasbourg cannot force national authorities to comply by its 
judgments.113 
Dialogue in the Convention system is often pictured as an informal dialogue, 
which does not take place through any of the procedures outlined below, but 
through academic writing or at seminars for example.114 The ‘dialogue between 
judges’ seminars are a case in point. The Court organises these seminars annually to 
mark the opening of the judicial year and to ‘provide a forum for discussion 
between judges from the Court and from various other courts’.115 The government 
agents also have a meeting with the Court every second year, meetings which have 
intensified since the Interlaken Declaration of 2010.116 In a quite different manner, 
the appointment of ad hoc judges to the Court may also stimulate informal dialogue. 
These judges are assigned to a case when the judge elected in respect of a 
respondent state cannot sit on a case for whatever reason. The Court’s president 
chooses the ad hoc judge from a list submitted in advance by the respondent 
state.117 Informal dialogue is furthermore at work in the reform process, where 
‘many things that were discussed in the various working groups were picked up by 
the Court without any formal decisions by the [Committee] or amendment to the 
Convention’.118 The reform negotiations are therefore ‘a very useful purpose of 
                                                        
110  Brief van de Minister van Veiligheid en Justitie, ‘Mensenrechten in het Buitenlands Beleid’, 3 
October 2011, Kamerstukken II 2011/12, No. 32, 7.  
111  Amos (2012), 575.  
112  Idem. 
113  Idem.  
114  See, e.g. and for more information: Kerr (2009), Villiger (2011), 202; Bratza (2012), Laffranque 
(2014), Paulus (2014), Spielman (2014d), Spielmann (2015b).  
115  ECtHR, ‘Events at the Court’, (<www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=court/events&c=#n 
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facilitating a continuous dialogue between State representatives, the Court and civil 
society and other stakeholders such as the [Assembly]’.119 The launch by the Court 
of a network for the exchange of case law information in October 2015 can be 
mentioned as a final example. This comparably formal mechanism is ‘designed to 
promote the exchange of information between the Court and the national superior 
courts’.120 
As was also noted in Chapter I, these examples of the use of the term ‘dialogue’ 
in the Convention context are limited in different respects. First of all, the term is 
often used without any further analysis as to what exactly its added value 
encompasses and how precisely it contributes to the positive outcomes attributed to 
it.121 Convention dialogue is, moreover, often pictured as a judicial dialogue. 
Indeed, a President of the Court has stated that the main interlocutors of the Court 
are ‘of course, the senior courts of European States’.122 Even more narrowly, 
dialogue is often referred to as one between the Strasbourg Court and UK courts 
under the Human Rights Act. As an exception to only considering dialogue as an 
exchange between judges, the Brighton Conference not only encourages a dialogue 
between the European Court and the highest national courts, but also between the 
Court and the Committee and between the Court and the government agents and 
legal experts of the states parties.123 The Dutch government furthermore mentioned 
that the Committee as well as the Assembly play a role in the dialogue it 
envisages.124 The notion is furthermore mostly used in a normative sense. A 
President of the Court, however also used the notion as a descriptive tool, when 
stating that ‘dialogue is in fact the word which best characterises relations between’ 
the European Court and national constitutional courts.125 The above summary 
shows that various actors consider dialogue a useful concept, but it remains largely 
unclear how exactly it should work and what exactly its added value could be. This 
section aims to shed light on the answer to the ‘what’-question.  
4.1.3 Appropriateness of the Notion  
Some observations can be made about the appropriateness of the term ‘dialogue’. 
Due to one’s familiarity with the term and one’s knowledge of the how the term is 
used in other contexts, the question arises whether the above outlined norm for 
interaction between the Council of Europe and the national interlocutors can be best 
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captured by this term or whether it would be more appropriate to use another.126 
One the one hand, ‘dialogue’ may not be very appropriate because it may call to 
mind for example the picture of two actors in a play, constantly talking and 
responding to each other, while in the Convention system dialogue may exist out of 
only one or two exchanges and a limited response, within the confines a single 
Convention case. On the other hand, the appropriateness of a term depends largely 
on how it is defined in a specific context. The ‘concept of dialogue’127 as defined by 
Hogg and Bushell is for example a far cry from a regular dictionary definition of the 
word ‘dialogue’, but is nevertheless sufficiently clear to understand the function of 
dialogue in their study.128 This illustrates how even a word that at ‘first blush [...] 
may not seem particularly apt to describe’129 the relationship between the Canadian 
Supreme Court and the legislative bodies, may become apt once defined 
appropriately. With reference to the Convention system, it will be hard to find a 
word which definition does justice to the above outlined normative concept of 
dialogue, which is applied to such a complex system as the Convention system. 
This study therefore, rather than trying to find an alternative term, relies on the 
familiar term ‘dialogue’. A definition of that word for the purposes of this study is 
given in section IV.5.5.  
4.2  The Added Value  
4.2.1 Preliminary Observations  
This study’s turn to the notion of dialogue as a normative ideal and solution for the 
problems which the Convention system currently experiences is informed by four 
observations.  
First comes the observation of how others have applied the notion to different 
systems that experience the difficulties at the source of internal tension in a 
comparable way as the Convention system. This was observed in the previous 
section and in more detail in chapter III. Dialogue can, in sum, function as a norm 
for interaction between actors in a not strictly hierarchical relationship, helping to 
ensure that none of the three difficulties causes conflict. Besides that, dialogue may 
have legitimising potential.  
The turn to dialogue is also informed by the increased, but limited, use of the 
term in the context of the Convention system, as also observed in the above section. 
                                                        
126  See for a discussion of the term dialogue in the context of the Convention system: Amos (2012), 
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129  Hogg and Bushell (1997), 79.  
 
 
 
 The Convention System and Dialogue 
 
 
135 
Both the adjective ‘increased’ and ‘limited’ explain the appeal of the term: the first 
points to the apparent usefulness of the term and the second to the room there still is 
to examine the term in the context of the Convention system in more depth. This 
study aims to do exactly that: examining how dialogue can be made useful to the 
Convention system, thus dissecting the common-sense realisation that dialogue is 
useful, a realisation that has probably promoted its increased use.  
The third observation that explains this study’s turn to dialogue as a solution for 
dealing with the difficulties at the source of internal tension in particular is that the 
characteristics of the Convention system, summarised in the conclusion to chapter 
II and in part also described in section IV.1, correspond with the characteristics of 
the notion of dialogue as recounted in the previous section and in more detail in 
section III.1.4. The Convention system is characterised by a lack of final power of 
the European interlocutors over the national authorities, which ties in well with the 
weakening of the power of one actor over the other that is required for dialogue 
according to some. Furthermore, it is easily understood that the notion of dialogue 
can be usefully applied to a system that cannot rely on coercion, but that must rather 
rely on the persuasiveness of its arguments and decisions. Besides that, the 
Convention system is characterised by the shared responsibility for fulfilling its 
object and purpose among the national and Council of Europe interlocutors, which 
makes it appropriate to apply the notion of dialogue to that system, because some 
form of dialogue or communication is logically needed when responsibilities are 
shared. Finally, the last characteristic of the Convention system,130 namely that of 
the interconnectedness between the international and national part of the system is 
expected to be instrumental to the coming into existence of a dialogue between the 
interlocutors on the two levels. Considering the foregoing, the Convention system 
already has various characteristics that may help advance dialogue.  
The Convention is not only already geared towards dialogue because its 
characteristics correspond with the characteristics of the notion of dialogue, but also 
because the Convention system knows facilitators and instruments for dialogue 
which are reminiscent of facilitators and instruments of dialogue which can be 
found in the other settings discussed in section III.2. This is the fourth observation 
informing the study’s turn to dialogue. Section III.2.2 described five facilitators of 
dialogue, means that can enhance the likelihood and quality of dialogue’s 
occurrence.131 Comparable facilitators can be found in the Convention system. The 
first facilitator identified in chapter III was a dynamic distribution of power. The 
founding Convention principle of subsidiarity can function in a comparable manner 
as that facilitator as it denotes a distribution of power – or at least of responsibilities 
– between the European court and the domestic courts. The principle dictates that 
the state parties must pronounce themselves about a Convention matter before the 
Court can do so, after which the Court can rely on their insights, approve or 
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disapprove them and, eventually, formulate an answer in its judgment. Chapter III 
also identified the notion of deference as facilitator. The margin of appreciation 
doctrine can fulfil a comparable function. After all, a wide margin is accorded inter 
alia when states follow a ‘diversity of [...] practices’,132 in particular if a case ‘raises 
sensitive moral or ethical issues’.133 By leaving a wide margin, the Court gives the 
states a voice to which it will attach great importance and to which it formulates a 
deferential response.134 The third facilitator, the comparative methods of 
interpretation as used by the Court of Justice is reminiscent of the consensus 
method of interpretation adopted by the Strasbourg Court. A lack of consensus 
usually means that the Court upholds the lowest common denominator or affords a 
wide margin of appreciation.135 Regardless of the outcome, establishing whether 
consensus exists can be the result of a dialogue as it requires the Court to listen to 
the opinion of the states. Moreover, if no consensus exists, the Court does not 
substitute its own interpretation for that of the states, giving them a decisive 
voice.136 The fourth facilitator was taking a procedural approach to adjudicating a 
case. This approach can also be seen more and more in the case law of the 
Strasbourg court,137 leading it to relocate its focus from ‘the substantive reasons 
provided by the states in justification of an interference’ to ‘the quality and 
transparency of the national procedure and judicial remedies’.138 It can be 
envisaged that the Court relies on domestic decisions and therefore listens to the 
states, but also enters into a dialogue about the procedural standards applied by 
them. Lastly, granting remedial discretion may also function as a facilitator of 
dialogue in the Convention system. As explained in chapter III, the more the course 
of remedial action is open, the better a judgment facilitates dialogue. The Court’s 
judgments potentially facilitate dialogue in that manner because they are essentially 
declaratory and impose an obligation of result only.139  
Further, section III.2.3 mentioned two instruments for dialogue, the most 
tangible building blocks for dialogue: pro-dialogic rules and the EU preliminary 
reference procedure.140 Comparable instruments can be found in the Convention 
system, an observation underlining that the system is already geared towards 
dialogue. The exhaustion of domestic remedies rule can for example be 
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characterised as a pro-dialogic rule.141 The rule helps ensure that domestic courts 
have, in line with their primary responsibility, the possibility to remedy a 
Convention violation and to voice their view on a case prior to Strasbourg’s 
assessment of a case. The Strasbourg Court can, in turn, rely on and respond to their 
views when dealing with a case. Another example is the rule which the European 
Court sometimes formulates that it requires ‘strong reasons to substitute its own 
view’ for that of domestic courts, provided they have undertaken a sufficient and 
precise balancing exercise in conformity with its case law, balancing for example 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life.142 The 
rule restrains the Court from finding a violation and substituting its own view for 
that of domestic courts, provided the reasoning of a domestic court is of sufficient 
quality, even if it could have reached a different conclusion would it have 
undertaken the balancing exercise itself. The rule functions in a dialogic manner 
because the voice of domestic courts is given great importance and, at the same 
time, the European Court has room for a response, because it only respects their 
voice after having verified that they fulfil certain criteria. The second instrument, 
the EU preliminary reference procedure, has been compared with the procedure 
envisaged in Protocol 16 to the Convention which empowers, upon its entry into 
force, domestic courts to seek an advisory opinion of the Court on ‘questions of 
principle relating to the interpretation or application’ of the Convention rights in the 
context of a domestic case.143 Various features of the instrument, as well as the 
instrument as such, intend to ‘further enhance the interaction between the Court and 
national authorities’.144  
4.2.2 Observations on the Added Value  
In light of the previous discussions in this chapter, a conception of dialogue for the 
Convention system could in short provide an answer to the problems posed by both 
internal and external tension, meaning it could contribute to the effective 
functioning of the Convention system and eventually to improved protection of the 
Convention rights. As chapter II explained, the effectiveness of the system is 
closely related to the execution of the Court’s judgments, which is the best evidence 
of the system’s effectiveness, and more generally to the implementation of the 
Convention, which has a central position to guaranteeing the effectiveness.145 
Dialogue could direct the internal tension stemming from the 
countermajoritarian, knowledge gap and unifying diversity difficulties away from 
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II.2.4.3.  
142  See, e.g.: MGN Limited v. UK, No. 39401/04, 18 January 2011, para. 150; Von Hannover v. 
Germany (no. 2), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012, para. 107.  
143  Art. 1(1-2) Protocol 16 ECHR; See also: section II.4.4.  
144  Preamble Protocol 16 ECHR.  
145  See: section II.3.7. 
 
 
 
 Chapter IV 
 
 
138 
conflict and towards improved and increasingly balanced decision-making. When it 
comes to external tension, dialogue could improve manifestly bad implementation 
instances by at least rallying broad support in the states parties and allowing 
solutions to develop over time.146 In a more positive sense, dialogue could 
contribute to improving cooperation among all interlocutors by building on the 
sharing of responsibilities and non-coercive means to compel the state to execute 
and implement.  
This study proposes that dialogue can conform to the specifications just 
stipulated when it is seen as a norm that promotes a process of interaction in the 
Convention system between the states parties, the Court, the Committee, the 
Assembly and the Commissioner with a view to advancing respect for national 
democratic legitimacy, knowledge and diversity. This process of interaction should 
lead to enhancing the understanding of the domestic legal systems by the Council of 
Europe interlocutors and of the Convention system by the states. Dialogue is 
considered in this research as a norm that is a middle path between conflict and 
deference. Keller and Stone Sweet have already empirically observed this path as 
one some national courts have taken: ‘[o]ne might identify a mid-point, between 
conflict and deference, wherein courts seek to forge a cooperative relationship with 
the Strasbourg Court through dialogue and comity’.147 
As can be derived from section IV.3.2, the Convention system is not yet 
sufficiently equipped to eliminate external tension; its mere existence confirms this. 
Moreover, section IV.2.6 illustrated how the possibility of conflict as a result of 
internal tension is an ever-present possibility. As for cooperation, addressed in 
section IV.1, this will remain necessary and should therefore always be stimulated. 
It may further be the case that the ability of the Convention interlocutors to 
cooperate based on sharing responsibilities and persuasion rather than coercion is 
undermined by instances of internal and external tension. Additional equipment in 
the form of dialogue to stimulate cooperation, channel internal tension and 
eliminate external tension should therefore be welcomed.  
More generally, the Convention ‘does not provide a blueprint for an integrated 
system of human rights protection for Europe’.148 Dialogue may provide at least the 
outlines of such a blueprint. A blueprint is now even more necessary than before 
because more interlocutors than before are involved in more Convention-related 
issues. The Assembly and the Commissioner have for example taken an interest in 
the Convention and in execution issues in particular149 and the Court has also 
become more active in the field of execution, whilst this used to be the realm of the 
Committee alone.150 It is also proposed that dialogue is equipment of a different 
kind when compared to the equipment which the Convention system already has in 
                                                        
146  See also: Committee (2013a), 14. 
147  Keller and Stone Sweet (2008), 705.  
148  Idem. 
149  See also: Sundberg (2009), 468.  
150  Glas (2014), 10-13.  
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the form of the subsidiarity principle and its manifestations to help channel internal 
tension, which is another reason to welcome it. Dialogue is different, because it is 
not yet another doctrine or principle, like the manifestations of the subsidiarity 
principle, but a more overarching framework within which existing doctrines, 
principles and procedures that help direct the tension may be applied more 
effectively. For these reasons, dialogue can be seen as a blueprint for interaction in 
the Convention system.  
With regard to dialogue with domestic courts specifically, it is furthermore 
suggested that dialogue is of added value because ‘there are but few procedural 
mechanisms providing the means to solve conflicts between courts’151 and because 
there is an ‘absence of formal rules governing inter-judicial interaction in the 
regime’; the Convention does not ‘establish how the Court should interact with its 
national counterparts’.152 Dialogue could fill this gap by providing for a means to 
prevent and solve conflicts and by giving national courts an ideal mode of 
interaction with Strasbourg, namely dialogic interaction.  
Concerning external tension it can be added that, regardless of the added value 
of dialogue to eliminating external tension, the notion can indeed be nothing more 
than an addition or one part of the implementation puzzle that needs to be solved. 
Various practical problems exist, relating to for example budgetary and 
organisational shortages, that hamper adequate implementation and to which 
dialogue alone cannot offer a solution. It can however be envisaged that dialogue 
facilitates solving the puzzle at least.  
The added value of dialogue to the Convention system as just proposed should 
be qualified, because Convention dialogue will be mostly relevant to a small, albeit 
important, part of all applications sent to Strasbourg. It will be relevant to those 
applications which are eventually decided on their merits and which potentially 
cause internal or external tension. This number will be low considering that only 4 
percent of the total number of applications decided in 2014 resulted in a judgment; 
the other 96 percent were declared inadmissible or struck out in a decision.153 The 
number of applications to which dialogue is of relevance is therefore limited. 
Nevertheless, the added value of dialogue to the Convention system in qualitative 
terms should not be underestimated: exactly those applications which potentially 
cause tension can generally have a great impact on the relationship between the 
Court and the states and on the willingness of the latter to execute judgments of the 
former.  
4.3 The Possible Functioning of Dialogue  
Parts 2 and 3, encompassing chapters V-XII, explore how dialogue functions in the 
Convention system. In anticipation thereof, this section hypothesises how dialogue 
                                                        
151  Garlicki (2008), 512.  
152  Keller and Stone Sweet (2008), 705. 
153  ECtHR (2015d), 6: 89,740/93,403 x 100 = 96.08 percent.  
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may function and what its added value may be in a more practical sense than 
described previously. This description takes the form of commenting on how 
dialogue might be advantageous to cooperation and to the reduction of internal and 
external tension. The aim of this section is to present a dialogical approach to the 
Convention system and the way in which dialogue can contribute to these aims.  
4.3.1 Cooperation  
As section IV.1 explained, cooperation is necessary, first, because the functioning 
of the Convention system is based on the sharing of responsibilities. By way of a 
dialogue, it may be easier to share responsibilities effectively and to understand 
which responsibilities should be fulfilled by which interlocutor. In a dialogue, one 
interlocutor can for example ask the other to give him room to fulfil the tasks the 
Convention assigned to him or ask the other to fulfil his share of the shared 
responsibility. The necessity of cooperation also derives from the absence of 
coercive means in the system to compel conformity; the Council of Europe 
interlocutors should rather rely on persuasion. A dialogue, when seen as an 
exchange of arguments, naturally is a means to try to persuade the other, in 
particular when the interlocutor incorporates for example the knowledge of the 
institution that is to be persuaded in the dialogue. When the interlocutor further uses 
dialogue to show that it respects the other, this may also increase the persuasive 
force of its arguments.  
4.3.2 Internal Tension  
It can be imagined that dialogue contributes to directing internal tension away from 
conflict towards improved decision-making in different ways.  
The Court’s engagement with the Committee, composed of the members of the 
national executive, and the Assembly, composed of members of domestic 
parliaments, may decrease the chance that its review of the states parties causes too 
great an amount of internal tension. By for example communicating to the 
Committee in a judgment that it leaves certain issues for the state to decide under 
the Committee’s monitoring, the Court may decrease the likelihood that it imposes 
overly uniform standards. The states are then given more room to follow their own 
course.  
Further, a dialogue between the Court and the states parties may enable these 
actors to communicate to the Court their knowledge and concerns. Even the mere 
possibility of communicating this probably decreases the chance that internal 
tension causes conflict and it may enable the Court to improve its decisions in the 
light of the dialogue. Also the mere possibility of listening to the interlocutors that 
dialogue could offer may make they feel more respected, which decreases the 
chance internal tension causes conflict. When the listening leads in particular the 
Court to take national concerns and knowledge into consideration, this can also lead 
to improved decision-making.  
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Once the Court understands that a party is indeed more knowledgeable about a 
certain issue or that majoritarian or diversity concerns exist, it can lead the 
difficulties away from the ever-present possibility of conflict in different ways. 
Content-wise, the Court could pay respect by deciding not to review the national 
decision at stake. In this way, it pays the greatest amount of respect possible, and 
internal tension, let alone conflict as a result of this tension, will not arise. However, 
some degree of review and some compromises as to respect for national knowledge, 
diversity and democracy are the unavoidable consequence the functioning of the 
Convention system.154 It is proposed that if the Courts reviews, it can, when doing 
so in a dialogic manner, still decrease the chance that it causes conflict over internal 
tension. This can be achieved by, in spite of its review, leaving some room for a 
response of the respondent state its judgment, and thus weakening its review to 
some extent. The Court may also, in a dialogic manner, point out to the state that its 
review is indeed weak and that, therefore, respect for their superior competences 
and diversity is compromised or in exceptional cases minimised, but never 
annihilated. This may help states understand that respect for their competences and 
diversity is not wholly compromised, thus promoting their understanding of the 
Convention system and enhancing the feeling that they are being respected. The 
notion of dialogue is thus used in a descriptive sense within a normative framework 
and may contribute to legitimising the response of the European interlocutors to the 
national communication. Considering that the assertion of some power of review is 
often unavoidable, the power of review should not only be weakened but also be 
legitimised.  
4.3.3 External Tension  
With regard to external tension, since improved execution is key to eliminating this 
category of tension, it is most likely important that the Court cooperates with the 
Committee, the body responsible for supervising execution, on this issue and it can 
be imagined that a dialogue facilitates this. A Court-Assembly and Committee-
Assembly dialogue may also be advantageous because the Assembly has taken a 
special interest in execution issues, issues which cause external tension.155 Such a 
dialogue may better enable the Court and the Committee to grasp the structural and 
complex problems causing external tension. A similar observation could hold for 
the Commissioner.  
Additionally, it was previously stressed that broad national support for solutions 
to implementation problems is required and a dialogue between the Court, the 
Committee and the states parties could be instrumental to this. Such a dialogue may 
also help the Court and the Committee to understand which structural issues cause 
manifest implementation problems and the reasons for which implementation 
                                                        
154  See also: section IV.2.3.  
155  See: section X.2.7.  
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problems have not been solved yet, which may make it easier to cooperate with the 
states parties. This is particularly important considering the complex and structural 
nature of the problems at the source of this category of tension. This sort of 
understanding may make it easier to cooperate in finding a solution for the 
implementation problem at issue and may therefore ultimately contribute to solving 
the implementation problem. The possibility that dialogue may help show respect 
for national sensitivities is also relevant to external tension because complete lack 
of respect may cause external tension to exacerbate internal tension.156 Further, 
dialogue may be of added value here because it may help to legitimise the stepping 
up of responsibilities by the Court, which it sometimes does in the face of external 
tension, by requiring this happens in a dialogic manner.  
4.4 Prerequisites for Convention Dialogue157 
This section formulates six prerequisites for dialogue in the Convention system. 
These prerequisites serve to emphasise that the coming into existence of a dialogue 
depends on many more factors other than the procedures introduced in section 
IV.5.4. Various stumbling blocks to dialogue exist, which may differ per state and 
per case. Moreover, some stumbling blocks need to be overcome before a procedure 
can be of any use to stimulating dialogue. As explained in section III.2, 
prerequisites generally relate to institutional structures and features, to how 
institutions perceive each other and to how these factors may create an environment 
that fosters dialogue.  
The study does not aim to establish whether the prerequisites are fulfilled. For 
those prerequisites that relate to the features of a national legal system, this would 
require an extensive survey of different institutions in all 47 states parties and such 
a survey is beyond the reach of this study. However, it may be possible to establish 
to some extent whether the prerequisites are fulfilled that relate to the more general 
features of the Convention system.  
The choice of the prerequisites is motivated based on the prerequisites for 
dialogue formulated by other authors for other legal systems, an overview of which 
can be found in section III.2, and which are translated to the Convention system, 
and informed by the characteristics of the system as discussed in chapter II.  
Prior to outlining the six more specific prerequisites in pairs, a more general 
word of caution is given as to how Convention dialogue could function. When 
envisaging that dialogue, it is first of all important to not lose sight of the 
Convention system as one that aims to maintain and promote the protection of 
human rights.158 Dialogue should increase the effectiveness of the system because 
                                                        
156  See also: section IV.3.4.  
157  See also: Glas (2015), 265-267.  
158  This does not automatically circumscribe all room for dialogue: as emphasized in section III.1.1.2, 
in the context of the Canadian Charter, even when the judiciary has final authority to interpret 
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this is advantageous to protection the Convention rights. The ‘because’ is highly 
important; effectiveness is not important for its own sake. The foregoing means that 
dialogue should not result in compromising respect for the Convention rights. 
Otherwise, dialogue risks becoming a goal in itself, while it is introduced due to its 
added value to managing tension so as to prevent it from undermining the effective 
protection of the rights. Second, any dialogue should as much as possible conform 
to the rules laid down in the Convention, which include the primary responsibility 
of the states parties (Article 1), the binding force of the Court’s judgments (Article 
46(1)) and the task division between the Court and the Committee (Article 46(2)).  
4.4.1 Ability and Willingness159 
The ability to engage in dialogue is particularly relevant to the states parties and is a 
rather practical prerequisite that consists of roughly two components. The first 
component is the availability of time and resources needed to engage in dialogue. 
Many states, and in particular those faced with structural problems that lead to 
repetitive violations, may find it hard to find time and resources to engage in 
dialogue, especially in the short term, when dialogue may not yet yield any returns 
that may make taking part in dialogue eventually worthwhile.160 When engaging in 
dialogue would also come at extra costs for the Strasbourg institutions, this may be 
problematic for them considering the limited Council of Europe budget generally 
and the heavy caseload on the Court and the Committee in particular, which already 
forces these institutions to make very effective and selective use of their rather 
scarce resources.161 Second, ability requires from the national interlocutors that they 
are sufficiently aware and knowledgeable of the Convention system. When they for 
example lack knowledge of procedures by way of which they can engage in 
dialogue, this may make it hard for them to engage in dialogue. Knowledge and 
awareness may also be hampered by practical problems such as language barriers 
and by the complexity, scope and at times questioned clarity and consistency of 
European jurisprudence.162 The national authorities should at least be able to read 
                                                        
rights, dialogue can develop, because a final judicial interpretation of a right does not take away the 
possibility for the legislature to choose from various responses to a judgment.  
159  See also: Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 239; Lübbe-Wolff 
(2012).  
160  See, e.g., in a different context, a CDDH report in which the states parties often mention budgetary 
restraints as a reason for not yet having implemented the Action Plans in the Interlaken and Izmir 
Declarations, see: CDDH (2012c), paras. 63, 89, 95, 114, 125, 136. It can be assumed that when the 
states have difficulties implementing these Action Plans, taking part in dialogue may also be 
problematic for budgetary reasons.  
161  See for more information about ‘the overload of the Court’ and the ‘CoE’s budgetary predicament’: 
Bemelmans-Videc (2011), 7-11.  
162  To illustrate, in the above mentioned CDDH report, states mention as one of the priorities for the 
implementation of the Izmir and Interlaken Action Plans ‘awareness-raising on Convention 
standards’, which suggests that there may not yet be enough awareness. Further, language 
difficulties are repeatedly mentioned as a factor hampering the implementation of the Action Plans, 
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the Court’s judgments, which are the ‘food for dialogue’, either in the original 
language or in translation. This is, however, probably not always the case, 
considering that due to inter alia ignorance some national courts have ‘failed to 
negotiate much of a relationship at all’ with Strasbourg163 and considering that in 
‘several non-francophone/non-anglophone countries there is a problem with 
accessibility of the ECtHR case law’.164 
Ability needs to be complemented with the willingness to engage in dialogue. 
As was noted with reference to other systems in section III.2.1, willingness 
concerns both readiness to engage in dialogue and to accept certain connected 
notions. Willingness is particularly important when engaging in dialogue is 
associated with making costs. Willingness will be born of an institution’s own 
conviction that engaging in dialogue is important and worthwhile and of their 
commitment to live up to this conviction;165 this can hardly be imposed 
hierarchically. At least the European Court and some other interlocutors already 
seem to be willing to engage in some form of dialogue as their enthusiastic use of 
the term evidences.166 The willingness of the states parties is probably stimulated by 
the possibility which dialogue offers to communicate national knowledge and 
concerns to European decisions-makers. The states’ willingness may further depend 
on whether they are convinced of the importance of protecting human rights as 
embedded in the Convention protection system, considering that the ultimate goal 
of dialogue is improved Convention implementation. Regarding the protection of 
rights as important does not suffice, however; national authorities should see human 
rights as a European affair where European supervision plays a role of subsidiary 
importance. The willingness of a European institution to engage in dialogue with a 
national institution may rely on the national institution’s genuine endorsement of 
the Convention’s objects and purpose.167 A notion that the interlocutors must be 
willing to accept is the ‘authority and legitimacy’ of its counterpart and that ‘every 
other court may have good reasons to differ on how rights are to be interpreted and 
applied in the context of any specific dispute’.168 Further, as noted in relation to the 
other systems, they should accept a legal culture functioning in accordance with the 
rule of law and see each other as autonomous judicial actors, all engaged in, what 
will be in the Convention system, the application and interpretation of the 
Convention. 
                                                        
see: CDDH (2012c), paras. 11,16, 38, 88, 95, 136. See also: Keller and Stone Sweet (2008), 688-
689: ‘Among lawyers and lower court judges in many States, knowledge of the Court’s case law 
and access to translations of judgments involving applications from other States remains poor’. 
163  Keller and Stone Sweet (2008), 705.  
164  Garlicki (2009), 396-397.  
165  See also: section III.2.1.1.  
166  See: section IV.4.1.2. 
167  This prerequisite is therefore related to the prerequisite of accepting each other as independent and 
autonomous institutions, mentioned in: section III.2.1.1. 
168  Stone Sweet (2014).  
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4.4.2 Different Viewpoints and a Common Ground of Understanding169 
Different viewpoints on what protecting a Convention right requires in a concrete 
case are the engine for and the subject of dialogue, as was noted with respect to the 
EU and transjudicial communication. This prerequisite is exceptional in the sense 
that it can already be concluded that it is fulfilled with reference to some rather 
general and straightforward observations. Regardless of which two interlocutors are 
considered, their viewpoints are always potentially different because they will have 
a different function and may operate on a different level, meaning they look from a 
unique angle at a right. This will lead to different, but not necessarily competing, 
viewpoints. When taking the Court and the Committee for example, even though 
they function within the same organisation, their viewpoints potentially differ 
because the Court is a judicial institution responsible for ensuring the observance of 
the Convention engagements undertaken by the states,170 while the Committee 
assumes legislative and executive functions and is responsible for supervising 
execution under the Convention, amongst a range of other responsibilities.171 The 
difference is probably more pronounced when taking for example the European 
Court and the states parties because they function on different levels, which gives 
them different perspectives.  
Various reasons can be given why the Council of Europe interlocutors and in 
particular the Court have a different perspective and therefore likely different 
viewpoints on Convention matters from the states parties. First, the European 
perspective means that the European Court may defer to national decisions based on 
the margin of appreciation doctrine, take into consideration the perspective of more 
than one state by relying on the consensus method of interpretation, give legal terms 
an autonomous Convention meaning and consider the impact of a judgment on 
states other than the respondent state.172 All of these factors, which do not influence 
the states parties when taking decisions in the sphere of the Convention, influence 
Strasbourg’s approach to a rights’ question. Second, the closeness of the states 
parties to events that fall within the sphere of the Convention may influence the 
manner in which they scrutinise limitations placed on a right. The European Court, 
due to its distance from national events, experiences such influence less. Keller and 
Stone Sweet for example concluded, based on empirical research in sixteen states, 
that ‘[n]ational courts, being close to the events, proved unable to accord sufficient 
weight to fundamental rights when balanced against security imperatives’ in the 
                                                        
169  See also: Cover and Aleinikoff (1977), 1049-1050; Ahdieh (2004), 2095-2096; Torres Pérez 
(2009), 118-125.  
170  Art. 19 ECHR.  
171  See also: sections II.2.2.2 and II.2.2.3.  
172  See, e.g.: Pretty v. UK, No. 2346/02, 19 April 2002, para. 75; Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, No. 
25965/04, 7 January 2010, para. 197; See for more information about these doctrines and methods: 
Harris et al. (2014), 8-13. 
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context of Articles 5 and 6 and anti-terrorism measures.173 Lastly and with regard to 
domestic courts specifically, even though they refer increasingly to the Convention 
and European jurisprudence,174 they at the same time take ‘pain to stress that it is 
the national Constitution that ultimately regulates the relationship between the 
domestic legal order and the Convention system’.175 This means that the European 
Court and the national courts rely in part on different legal sources, which gives 
them different perspectives.176 The German Federal Constitutional Court for 
example primarily relies on the German Basic Law, while using ‘[t]he Convention 
and the case law of the [Court] as guides to interpretation in determining the content 
and scope of fundamental rights and constitutional principles of the Basic Law’.177 
According to that Court, the hierarchically higher position of the constitution is the 
‘normative basis’ for judicial dialogue.178 
For a dialogue to develop, the existence of different viewpoints should go paired 
with a common ground of understanding, a prerequisite also introduced in chapter 
III. It is proposed that the Convention, at least in theory, provides a common ground 
of understanding for the various interlocutors to base their dialogue on. More 
specifically, such a ground can exist in the realisation that all courts are engaged in 
the ‘common legal enterprise’ of securing and further realising the Convention 
rights.179 The trust in a common ground stimulated the founding states to go beyond 
what the UN had achieved after the end of the Second World War and unity 
between these states was the foundation on which European cooperation rested.180 
For the Council of Europe interlocutors, it can be assumed that the Convention also 
provides such a common ground of understanding. Pérez observes that ‘there is a 
common way of talking about fundamental rights prompted by the European 
Convention as interpreted by the ECtHR’.181 However, even though the Convention 
provides a common human rights language, it is questionable whether, in practical 
terms, all relevant institutions in all 47 states are sufficiently proficient in that 
language for a dialogue to develop and whether they appreciate the language 
enough to indeed start using it. The prerequisites are thus interconnected, since this 
issue returns to the prerequisite of being able and willing to engage in dialogue. The 
proficiency problem is particularly material to the ‘new’ states parties, since they 
started learning the rights language only in the nineties, while the institutions in the 
‘old’ states already had years of practice.182  
                                                        
173  Keller and Stone Sweet (2008), 698.  
174  Ibid., 677.  
175  Ibid., 688.  
176  See also: Ahdieh (2004), 2095.  
177  Order of the Second Senate of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, para. 32. 
178  O.H. v. Germany, No. 4646/08, 24 November 2011, para. 54.  
179  Preamble ECHR.  
180  See: section II.1.1. 
181  Torres Pérez (2009), 123.  
182  See also: section II. 3.4.  
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4.4.3 Time and Clarity  
Another prerequisite for dialogue is that it should be given time to develop, as was 
already noted in section III.2.1.183 When considering internal tension, it may a take 
a series of exchanges or cases for the Court to develop a good understanding of 
democratic sensitivities and national knowledge and it may equally take time to be 
respectful and to be perceived as such. Likewise, in the case of external tension, 
dialogue is not only just one part of the implementation puzzle that needs to be 
solved, but also part of a process of solving complex and entrenched problems that 
can only be solved in the medium or long run. Logically then, for dialogue to 
contribute to eliminating external tension, time is required. It is furthermore likely 
that dialogue can lead to improved cooperation, provided that sufficient time passes. 
Cooperation anyhow requires more than one step because it involves two actors or 
more and it is likely that the more often the two actors take steps to cooperate in a 
dialogic manner, the smoother and the more effective the cooperation becomes.  
The last prerequisite for dialogue in the Convention system is that dialogue 
should be based on sufficient and sufficiently clear information that is 
communicated in an understandable language.184 If the Court’s judgments for 
example are not sufficiently transparent, this hampers the ability of the states parties 
as well as the Committee to engage in a well-reasoned dialogue about the outcome 
of a judgment or to cooperate with the Court in a dialogic manner. Again, this 
shows how the prerequisites, this time of ability and clarity, are interconnected. 
Further, if a state party thinks the European Court has misunderstood a domestic 
legal concept or disrespected a constitutional tradition, but does not state this in 
clear terms or does not give persuasive and clear reasons for this, it will be hard and 
unappealing for the European Court to make its judgments more balanced in 
response to their criticism.  
5 RESEARCHING DIALOGUE IN THE CONVENTION SYSTEM  
Part 1 of this study has not merely been written to characterise the Convention 
system and the notion of dialogue, but mainly to describe what the added value of 
dialogue may be to dealing with tension and stimulating cooperation in the 
Convention system. The previous section gave such a description and with this, part 
1 is almost finished. This final section of part 1 looks forward to part 2, which 
inquires into the question whether dialogue as introduced in the previous section 
can indeed materialise in the Convention system. This section gives an outline of 
the approach to answering this question. Further, based on inter alia this approach, a 
working definition of dialogue is given for the purposes of this study in section 
IV.5.5.  
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5.1 Hypotheses  
The research question for the second part of this study is based on seven 
assumptions formulated and consolidated in the preceding three sections of this 
chapter which underlie the research question: 
1. Cooperation between the interlocutors in the Convention system is necessary for 
the effective functioning of the Convention system. This can be explained with 
reference to the system’s characteristics of shared responsibilities and a lack of 
coercive means to compel implementation of the Convention;  
2. Internal tension in the Convention system risks causing conflict, which is not 
necessarily active and highly visible, between the national and European 
interlocutors, which would, in turn, hamper the effective functioning of the 
Convention system and thereby the protection of the Convention rights. It is 
therefore desirable that this tension is channelled in a way that prevents this risk 
from materialising; 
3. Internal tension does not necessarily lead to conflict, but may, depending on 
how it is channelled, positively contribute to more balanced decision-making by 
the interlocutors and, in turn, to greater effectiveness of the functioning of the 
Convention system;  
4. Conflict as a result of internal tension is nevertheless an ever-present possibility; 
5. External tension unavoidably hampers the effective functioning of the 
Convention system and thereby the protection of the Convention rights. It 
therefore desirable that this tension is eliminated;  
6. External tension is currently not sufficiently eliminated so as to ensure that it 
does not compromise the effective functioning of the system; and  
7. The notion of dialogue can be of added value to the system because it helps 
enhance cooperation, channel the internal tension away from tension towards 
improved decision-making and contributes towards eliminating the external 
tension. Dialogue therefore contributes to the effective functioning of the 
Convention system, which leads to improved Convention implementation.  
 
When considering these assumptions in conjunction, it becomes clear that the study 
assumes that the implementation of the Convention to a large extent depends on the 
effective functioning of the system and that the latter can be enhanced by 
stimulating cooperation, ensuring that internal tension leads to more balanced 
decision-making rather than to conflict and contributing to the elimination of 
external tension. These three factors do not exhaustively determine the effectiveness 
of the functioning of the Convention system. Increasing the Council of Europe’s 
budget, for example, may also be a way to increase its effectiveness. However, the 
factors are nevertheless of key importance to the effective functioning of the 
system, they are interesting from a dialogic perspective and they are therefore of 
great interest to this study.  
Additionally, it becomes clear that the study is based on a normative concept of 
dialogue, as the word ‘added value’ indicates. This study is interested in whether 
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Convention related procedures, which are outlined section IV.5.4, allow dialogue to 
bloom and allow its added value to have practical effects. The added value of 
dialogue is, as assumption 7 clarifies, that it can contribute to improved Convention 
implementation. For this reason, the study will also make recommendations in 
chapter XIII for improving the dialogic potential or functioning of the procedures, 
should they not be a sufficient means for the norm of dialogue to grow to its full 
potential.  
5.2 The Research Questions of Part 2 and Part 3 
The first research question of this study, posed in chapter I, has now been 
answered:185 this chapter explained that and why the notion of dialogue can be of 
added value to the Convention system. At this point, it is useful to call into memory 
the second research question, because the remainder of this chapter outlines the 
approach taken in part 2 and part 3 to answering that question.  
As was announced in chapter I, part 2 and part 3 are a more practical and 
empirical inquiry into the question whether Convention-related procedures have the 
potential to contribute to Convention dialogue and whether they contribute to this 
purpose in practice. More specifically, the question overarching part 2 is whether 
the procedures have dialogic potential on paper to allow a dialogue between the 
interlocutors to develop as described in conformity with the hypotheses outlined 
above. The question of part 3 is largely similar to the question of part 2, but 
different to the extent that it deals with the functioning of the Convention-related 
procedures in practice. Part 3 answers the question whether the procedures with 
dialogic potential on paper allow dialogue between the interlocutors to develop in 
practice, again in conformity with the above hypotheses.  
5.3 Procedures of Interest  
5.3.1 Why Procedures?  
This study inquires into the dialogic potential and functioning in practice of 
Convention-related procedures rather than into the dialogic potential of principles 
and doctrines for different reasons and in spite of the likelihood that principles and 
doctrines, such as the margin of appreciation doctrine, can facilitate dialogue.186 
Principles and doctrines are disregarded first and foremost because they are tools in 
the hands of the Court (or of the Committee in the execution phase), usually 
developed by the Court itself and only applied when it deems this necessary or 
appropriate, rather than tools that can also be used by other interlocutors. 
Procedures are usually more accessible to other interlocutors, which makes them 
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from a dialogic perspective potentially more useful. In a procedure such as the 
friendly settlement procedure, for example, the state, the Court and the Committee 
are actively involved. By contrast, the margin of appreciation doctrine can only be 
applied by the Court in a judgment. Moreover, when states criticise the Court 
outside the remit of Convention-related procedures, the Court can hardly respond to 
such criticism. This is illustrated by some national concerns expressed in the course 
of the legitimacy debate, some of which have brought the Court in an uneasy 
position, inter alia because it not always has a platform to defend itself or to give 
additional explanations about a judgment because the concerns are expressed in the 
media.187 An additional reason for researching procedures is that they are more 
tangible than doctrines and principles, which makes it comparatively easy to inquire 
into to what extent they contribute to dialogue. Further, procedures have received 
comparably less attention in academic writing than the Court’s doctrines and 
principles, of which the dialogic potential may be rather evident and for which 
many improvement proposals have already been made.  
5.3.2 What are Procedures?  
To define a procedure in the context of this study, the ordinary dictionary definition 
of a procedure is of some help. Dictionaries refer to procedures as a ‘way of doing 
something’.188 In line with this definition, it is proposed that a procedure in this 
study is a ‘way of doing something’ or a procedural step that can be taken during 
the life of an application by one interlocutor to communicate in some way or the 
other with another interlocutor, prior to, in or after a judgment, and that forms either 
part of the individual complaints procedure before the Court or is connected to it. 
Defined as such, procedures can be contrasted with rules, doctrines and principles 
that are more static concepts in the sense that they are not a step in proceedings 
before the Court and/or do not allow of interaction between interlocutors. For this 
reason, the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule and reform proposals related to 
this rule are for example not examined in this study.  
Some of the ‘ways of doing something’ discussed in this study can be more 
appropriately described as a procedural step than as a procedure. These steps are 
incomprehensive and form part of a larger procedure, but are nevertheless of 
sufficient interest to the study to be assessed separately. An example of a procedural 
step is the adoption of an interim or final resolution by the Committee. This chapter 
uses the word procedure(s), but when using this word, also means to refer to 
procedural steps.  
Hypothesis 7 in section IV.5.1 provided that dialogue theory is of added value to 
the system because it can be advantageous to enhancing cooperation, channelling 
internal tension and bringing external tension closer to its end. The added value 
                                                        
187  See: section II.3.8.  
188  See, e.g.: ‘Cambridge Dictionaries Online’, ‘Oxford Dictionaries Online’.  
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however does not kick in without any intervention. This is where procedures come 
in; they can be the practical interface between dialogue and its three-pronged added 
value. Procedures, in other words, can be the medium through which the beneficial 
potential of dialogue to the implementation of the Convention can be given effect in 
the day-to-day functioning of the system.  
When casting one’s mind back to section III.2 and the distinction made between 
dialogue prerequisites, facilitators and instruments, the question arises in which 
category procedures fall. It is here suggested that a procedure can either be a 
facilitator or an instrument. A procedure is a facilitator when it helps the coming 
into existence of dialogue and an instrument when it directly contributes to 
dialogue. Importantly, procedures cannot be equated to either facilitators or 
instruments; procedures rather are a sub-category or a kind of facilitator or 
instrument. By way of illustration, the margin of appreciation doctrine, which is not 
a procedure, can function as a facilitator of Convention dialogue as was explained 
in section IV.4.2. 
5.3.3 Which Procedures?  
The most important answer to the question ‘which procedures?’ is that only 
procedures that are available at the level of the Council of Europe are examined. 
This means, conversely, that national procedures remain out of sight. The reason for 
disregarding national procedures is a practical one as it would require looking at an 
enormous pool of procedures in each of the 47 states parties. 
The discussion of the procedures is divided into the (pre-)merits and the 
execution phase. The (pre-)merits phase commences when a completed application 
alleging a violation of the Convention reaches the Court and is registered. This 
phase normally ends when the Court issues a judgment, unless a request for referral 
is made and granted. The execution phase is the next phase and ends formally when 
the Committee adopts a final resolution, but continues exceptionally when a follow-
up case is brought to the Court. The foregoing means that the division of the 
proceedings in two phases is not clear-cut, because certain procedures, such as 
follow-up cases, encompass both phases. The comprehensive nature of the pilot-
judgment procedure, which clearly encompasses both phases, means it cannot be 
discussed under the heading of either phase. It is therefore discussed separately. In 
line with the above definition, the 26 procedures presented in figure 1, which can be 
found below, are examined. 
As can be noted from the figure, the advisory opinion procedure laid down in 
Protocol 16 is not analysed.189 This procedure as a whole and its separate features 
intend to ‘further enhance the interaction between the Court and national 
authorities’.190 To illustrate, the panel deciding on a request for an opinion must 
                                                        
189  See for a summary of the procedure: section II.4.4.  
190  Preamble Protocol 16 ECHR.  
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reason a refusal in order to ‘reinforce dialogue’.191 Another way in which advisory 
opinions can enhance dialogue is by way of the rule that the requesting court 
‘decides on the effects of the [opinion] in the domestic proceedings’.192 This opens 
the possibility to for the domestic court to not follow the Court’s opinion entirely. If 
the domestic court clearly explains its reasons for not doing so and if the applicant 
subsequently brings the case to Strasbourg, the Court can respond to the reasons of 
the domestic court for declining to follow its guidance.193 Notwithstanding the 
procedure’s clear dialogic potential, it is not discussed any further because Protocol 
16 had not yet entered into force when finishing this study (in October 2015). In 
this situation, it is impossible to assess the dialogicness in practice of the procedure. 
Moreover, the Protocol’s entry into force still seemed to be quite far away.194 
Indeed, only five states had ratified the Protocol, while the Protocol only enters into 
force with ten ratifications195 and ‘quite a few countries’ are reluctant to ratify.196 
They are reluctant because they prefer that ‘their domestic courts [...] have the first 
say for the disposal of human rights cases’; only when ‘domestic attempts at 
judicial settlement have been exhausted’, they will ‘allow the European level to 
intervene’.197 
 
Figure 1: Procedures of interest  
 
(Pre-)Merits phase   
1.  Communication 2.  Interim measures  
3.  Friendly settlements   4. Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions 
5.  Unilateral declarations 6. Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions 
7.  Hearings 8.  Relinquishment  
9. Third-party interventions  10.  Investigations  
11.  Judgments  12.  Referral  
 
Execution phase 
  
13.  Article 46-indications198 14.  Article 41-awards  
15.  Action plans/reports 16. DH meetings 
17.  Bi- and multilateral meeting  18. Requests for interpretation 
19. Infringement proceedings 20. Assembly questions and 
recommendations  
                                                        
191  Art. 2(1) Protocol 16; Explanatory Report to Protocol 16 ECHR, para. 15. 
192  Ibid, para. 25. 
193  See also: Glas (2015), 273.  
194  In October 2015.  
195  Art. 8(1) Protocol 16 ECHR.  
196  Paulus (2014), 63.  
197  Idem.  
198  Article 46-indications are only discussed in chapter X on the dialogicness of procedures in the 
execution phase, because this procedural step has been developed in practice and is not described 
on paper.  
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21.  Commissioner country visits and 
reports 
22.  Decisions and interim resolutions 
23.  Final Resolutions  24. Individual follow-up cases 
25. General follow-up cases   
 
Both phases  
  
26.  Pilot-judgment procedure   
5.4 A Definition of Dialogue  
Now that it has been clarified inter alia what the added value of dialogue can be to 
the Convention system and through which procedures a dialogue may be achieved, 
it is possible to give a working definition of Convention dialogue. Defining 
dialogue clarifies what is meant by ‘dialogue’ when referring to this notion in this 
study.  
Dialogue, for the purposes of this study, is an exchange of facts and/or 
viewpoints on a given subject199 between at least two of the five Convention 
interlocutors through one of the 26 procedures set out in section IV.5.3 with the 
result of enhancing cooperation between the involved interlocutors, channelling 
internal tension away from conflict towards balanced decision-making and/or 
contributing towards the elimination of external tension.  
The definition can be broken down into four elements. The first concerns the 
content of the dialogue: it encompasses an exchange of facts and/or viewpoints on a 
given subject. The content of Convention dialogue is therefore largely left open and 
also extends to facts. The second element concerns the question between whom 
dialogue takes place. The dialogue to which this study refers, takes place between at 
least two of the five Convention interlocutors: states parties, Court, Committee, 
Assembly and Commissioner. When writing about dialogue with the state, the state 
is not broken down into separate interlocutors, such as the judiciary or the 
legislature. From the point of view of the Convention, the state is answerable to the 
Court.200 Third, the medium through which dialogue takes place is procedures and, 
more specifically, the 26 procedures listed in section IV.5.3. The study as well as 
the definition of dialogue used in the study therefore have a clearly procedural 
focus. This means that informal dialogue is excluded from the definition.201 The last 
element in the above definition of dialogue is the result which is achieved through a 
dialogue. Section IV.4.3 elaborates on these possible results.  
                                                        
199  Tzanakopoulos (2014), 2. 
200  All branches of government are, however, bound by a judgment of the Court, see: Ireland v. UK 
(Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, para. 239.  
201  See also: Tzanakopoulos (2014), 6-7; An informal dialogue does, however, take place, see: 
Committee (2013), para. B; ECtHR (2015a), 6; See for examples of informal dialogue: section 
IV.4.1.2.  
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Apart from the four elements of dialogue that can be distinguished in the 
definition, it is important to note that for an exchange to fall within the definition, it 
is not required that the interlocutors label the exchange in which they engage as a 
dialogue or experience the exchange as a dialogue per se. In other words, they do 
not need to acknowledge that they are engaged in a dialogue.202 
5.5 Indicators of Dialogue  
As explained above, this study examines the dialogicness of the above-listed 
procedures. The examination concerns the dialogic potential of the procedures on 
paper and the realisation of their dialogic potential in practice.  
The study clarified that dialogue is of added value to the Convention system 
because it can enhance cooperation, channel internal tension away from conflict and 
towards balanced decision-making and contribute to eliminating external tension. 
As was explained in the previous section, procedures are the practical interface 
between dialogue and its three-pronged added value. In this light, the dialogic 
potential of a procedure depends on whether it facilitates or allows for the 
materialisation of the added value of dialogue to the Convention system, measured 
in terms of its contribution to cooperation and controlling tension. The dialogic 
potential of a procedure is thus related to two elements: first, dialogue and, second, 
cooperation and the two types of tension.  
The dialogic potential of a procedure could thus be assessed by establishing 
whether and, if so, to what extent the procedure facilitates the added value of 
dialogue coming to bloom. Such an inquiry, even though tenable in essence, 
remains very general and imprecise, which would make it hard to somewhat 
objectively establish whether a procedure is dialogic and to compare the dialogic 
potential of different procedures or to combine the potential of different procedures 
to come to more general conclusions about the ‘dialogicness’ of the system. To 
bypass the problem of generality and imprecision, this study turns to indicators.  
The indicators, which are enumerated and described individually below, are 
derived from and based on the two elements just noted, to which the dialogic 
potential of a procedure is related, namely, first, dialogue and, second, cooperation 
and internal and external tension. The choice of the indicators is informed by 
chapters II and III and in particular by the current chapter.  
The description of each indicator refers to the above-mentioned elements and in 
this way clarifies where the indicator derives from. More specifically, the 
description of the indicator, first, answers two questions that concern the two 
elements just introduced; the answers to these questions clarify the usefulness of the 
indicator to the study. The first question is why the indicator can be indicative of 
dialogue. The second question is why the indicator can help establish whether a 
procedure contributes to enhancing cooperation, channelling internal tension or 
                                                        
202  See also: Meuwese and Snel (2013), 126. 
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eliminating external tension. After answering the questions, the description of the 
indicator introduces what exactly the indicator inquires. The description is followed 
by a list of questions per indicator which serves to facilitate applying the indicators 
in a concrete and somewhat standardised manner. The questions vary in detail, they 
may not be relevant to each procedure and they sometimes overlap. Therefore, not 
all questions need to be answered in respect of each procedure.  
By relying on these indicators, the study aims to establish the dialogic potential 
and functioning in practice of the procedures in a rather precise manner that lends 
itself to comparison and allows it to draw conclusions about the ‘dialogicness’ of 
the system as a whole. Furthermore, the indicators help determine where the 
procedures facilitate the coming into existence of a dialogue and where they prove 
to be a stumbling block to dialogue. Based on such observations, the study can 
make recommendations as to how and to what extent certain procedures could be 
used to facilitate dialogue and where procedural improvements can be made. More 
generally, the indicators serve to make more tangible what a dialogue in the 
Convention system should encompass.  
The indicators distinguish themselves from the prerequisites listed above,203 
because the former help to measure the practical dialogic nature of a procedure, 
while the latter more generally form the basis for the coming into existence of a 
dialogue. Without the fulfilment of the prerequisites, even procedures with a very 
high dialogic potential are of no practical use; for the coming into existence of a 
dialogue in practice, the fulfilment of the prerequisites is a necessity.  
5.5.1 Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
The preferred goal of procedural involvement from the perspective of dialogue is 
the involvement of all interlocutors, at least when taking an overall look at the 
procedures. Not all interlocutors need to be able to participate in each procedure, 
however; the procedures jointly should give them the opportunity to play a role that 
suits their position and that allows them to communicate their concerns and 
opinions and thus exert some influence on the decision-making process. Thus, from 
a dialogic perspective, the procedures analysed together should not only involve the 
European Court or the respondent state, but also the Committee, the Assembly and 
the Commissioner.  
Some elements in section IV.4.2 on the added value of dialogue theory to the 
Convention system already give a hint of why the involvement of as many 
interlocutors as possible would be advantageous to cooperation and to handling 
tension in the system. The extent to which a procedure or the procedures jointly 
permit involvement is indicative of dialogue, first of all and for the straightforward 
reason that the more voices that can be heard, the more likely it is that a substantial 
                                                        
203  See also: section III.2.  
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and lively dialogue takes place that incorporates different perspectives and that 
resorts the desired dialogic effects. More voices may also make it more likely that 
dialogue indeed develops. This section makes these elements more explicit in order 
to clarify why their involvement is a relevant indicator in the light of the three-
pronged added value of Convention dialogue.  
Cooperation is a necessity because responsibilities are shared and because the 
Council of Europe interlocutors cannot rely on coercion.204 For cooperation it is 
naturally important that at least those interlocutors that are necessary for the 
cooperative enterprise of Convention protection to succeed can become involved. 
When considering sharing responsibilities, it is important that various interlocutors 
participate in a procedure, because it can be assumed that the more interlocutors 
participate, the easier the sharing of responsibilities becomes as sharing is a joint 
exercise that depends on cooperation by all to a large extent. Further, because the 
interlocutors cannot rely on coercive means to compel Convention implementation, 
they must, as a direct result of that, rather rely on the involvement of as many 
interlocutors as possible to compel implementation.  
It is imperative that all relevant interlocutors participate in a dialogue when 
aiming to ensure that none of the three difficulties at the root of internal tension 
causes conflict. By way of illustration, for the countermajoritarian difficulty, the 
involvement of interlocutors other than the Court can be relevant. The unifying 
diversity difficulty further requires, where relevant, not only one, but various states 
to communicate their diverse perspectives, as it is difficult to respect diversity when 
only one or two states communicate their perspective. Besides that, the more 
perspectives are voiced in a dialogue, the more likely they are to be considered in 
the process of decision-making and the more likely the outcome of the dialogue will 
be balanced and to the satisfaction of all. This probably also enhances the likelihood 
that a judgment is executed rather than disputed because of internal tension.  
Not only issues of internal tension, but also external tension can cause problems 
to the execution of judgments and the smooth functioning of the Convention 
system. It can well be imagined that, due to the complexity of the problems at the 
root of external tension, the involvement of the Assembly and the Commissioner is 
particularly important, because they can bring in their specific knowledge and thus 
complement the work of the Court and the Committee in this area in particular.  
Considering the foregoing observations, indicator 1 should pose the question 
which interlocutors can become involved through which procedures so they can 
formulate an answer to decisions taken by other interlocutors and to problems 
encountered in Convention-related proceedings. The ‘answer’ may be an answer in 
the literal sense of the word, but may also be the steps an interlocutor takes in 
response to steps taken by another interlocutor. The respondent state can, for 
example, in ‘answer’ to a suggestion of the Court regarding execution measures, 
take steps to implement the suggested measures.  
                                                        
204  See: section IV.1.  
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If a procedural opportunity for involvement exists, the following questions are 
about what and with whom the interlocutor can communicate and what the 
procedure enables the interlocutor to do or achieve. To the extent that these 
questions concern the more specific question whether the interlocutor has room to 
respond to a decision made by another interlocutor, the answer is given under 
indicator 4 (room for a response). 
The above explanation of which factors have informed indicator 1 and of which 
questions indicator 1 prompts one to pose, can be translated into the following 
specific questions which can be used when examining a procedure in the light of 
indicator 1:  
- Which interlocutors can become involved through the procedure?  
- What does the procedure enable the interlocutor to do, achieve or communicate? 
5.5.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities  
The inclusion of indicator 2 is triggered by the observation that sharing 
responsibilities is clearly advantageous to enhancing cooperation. In fact, one of the 
two reasons explaining why cooperation is a necessity is because the system relies 
heavily on the sharing of responsibilities for its effective functioning.205 Sharing 
responsibilities by way of a dialogue potentially makes cooperation easier because 
it facilitates, for example, informing the other interlocutor which responsibilities 
have already been fulfilled and pointing out to the other that it still has to fulfil its 
responsibility.206 Sharing responsibilities in such a dialogic manner fosters 
cooperation.  
Concerning internal tension, when responsibilities are shared as envisaged by 
the Convention, that is, in line with the subsidiarity principle, this also means that 
the tension is directed away from conflict. Dialogue helps the sharing of 
responsibilities in this manner. 
States not living up to their responsibilities cause external tension. Therefore, 
when a procedure contributes to sharing responsibilities, it contributes towards 
eliminating external tension, especially when it simulates states to fulfil their 
primary responsibility in areas of Convention implementation where problems 
cause violations of a serious and/or repetitive nature. The sharing of responsibilities 
is important too when considering that increasing the power of the European 
interlocutors over the states is of little use to solving external tension, which 
requires broad national support.207 Furthermore, the continued sharing of 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention is important when recalling that 
external tension, which may materialise in, for example, the form of a changed 
                                                        
205  See: section IV.1.2.  
206  See also: HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 12(c).  
207  See: section IV.3.1.2.  
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subject matter of violations, risks sometimes blurring the otherwise clear-cut task 
division between the Court and the Committee.208 
Indicator 2 helps to examine, first, whether and to what extent the Convention 
procedures can be used to share responsibilities and encourage the sharing of 
responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention. The Convention envisages that the 
Court/Committee and the states share responsibilities in conformity with the 
subsidiarity principle. The manifestations of the principle, discussed in section 
II.2.3, clarify that the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention 
encompasses inter alia that:  
- the respondent state has the opportunity to remedy an alleged violation before 
the Court rules on an alleged violation (exhaustion of domestic remedies rule);  
- the respondent state, and not the Court, establishes the facts of a case (the first-
instance doctrine);  
- the states have discretion to determine how they implement the Convention 
(margin of appreciation doctrine); and  
- the respondent state can choose how to execute a judgment (declaratory nature 
of the Court’s judgments). 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the 
Convention means that the Court and the Committee respect their task division 
along procedural lines as laid down in the Convention. This means that, first, the 
Court pronounces a judgment and, then, the Committee supervises the execution of 
the judgment.209 Both are therefore responsible for supervising or reviewing the 
conduct of the states parties, but while the Court supervises their conduct more 
generally, the Committee supervises their conduct only in relation to the execution 
of a specific judgment.210 The task division is clear-cut, because both interlocutors 
are responsible for a different part of the life of an application. 
Indicator 2, second, helps analyse whether the procedures can be used to 
stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as such, that is, whether they stimulate the 
interlocutors to assist and complement each other in carrying out their 
responsibilities. It is important to determine whether the procedures provide the 
interlocutors the opportunity to assist and complement each other, because sections 
II.5.2 and IV.1.2 stressed the importance of sharing responsibilities generally and 
because section IV.3.1 stressed this in the context of external tension.  
More concretely, the foregoing two aspects which indicator 2 helps to examine 
and the observation that sharing responsibilities is advantageous to enhancing 
cooperation, lead to the following questions which may be answered when 
assessing a procedure in the light of indicator 2:  
- Can the procedure be used to share responsibilities? 
                                                        
208  See: section II.3.7.  
209  Arts. 19 and 46(2) ECHR.  
210  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 91; See also: 
Broniowski v. Poland (GC) (Dec.), No. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, para. 42.  
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- Does the procedure encourage the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the 
Convention? 
- Does the procedure enhance respect by the Court for the subsidiarity principle?  
- Does the procedure enhance respect by the Committee for the subsidiarity 
principle?  
- Does the procedure give the respondent state the possibility to remedy an 
alleged violation before the Court rules on the matter? 
- Does the procedure give the respondent state the possibility to communicate the 
facts of a case to the Court?  
- Does the procedure give the respondent state discretion to determine how it 
executes a judgment? In other words, does the procedure stimulate the 
Court/Committee to leave certain issues undecided? 
- Does the procedure leave discretion as to how the respondent state implements 
the Convention?  
- Does the procedure ensure and enhance respect by the Court and the Committee 
for their procedural task division?  
- Can the procedure be used to stimulate the sharing of responsibilities and to 
share responsibilities as such?  
- Does the procedure allow the Assembly/Commissioner to complement the 
states/Court/Committee?  
- Does the procedure allow the interlocutors to assist the states in fulfilling their 
primary responsibility?  
5.5.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding  
Indicator 3 has been added because whether or not a procedure helps foster mutual 
understanding is presumably indicative of dialogue, considering that a likely 
outcome of a constructive dialogue is improved mutual understanding.211 This 
outcome was also described in section IV.4.2 on the added value of Convention 
dialogue. The same section described more specifically that dialogue could possibly 
lead to, for example, making the Court realise that a national authority is better 
placed to make a certain decision, to an understanding by the Council of Europe 
interlocutors of structural problems that cause external tension and to national 
insights into weaknesses of European review.  
It can furthermore be easily imagined how enhanced mutual understanding can 
facilitate cooperation, because the better one understands another interlocutor and 
the more one feels one is being understood by the other, the easier it becomes to 
enter into a cooperative relationship where the success of cooperation depends in 
part on understanding. Mutual understanding is also beneficial to solving internal 
tension, because improved understanding by the European interlocutors of the states 
decreases the chance that their decisions cause any of the three difficulties to 
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escalate into conflict. On the contrary, it makes it more plausible that the difficulties 
lead to improved decision-making because the decisions will be informed by 
national knowledge and concerns. Regarding external tension, understanding by the 
European interlocutors of the magnitude of the problems at the national level 
causing external tension may be instrumental to finding a solution for these 
problems.  
Indicator 3 facilitates determining whether a procedure stimulates the coming 
into existence of mutual understanding.212 Such understanding comprises, for one 
part, understanding by the respondent state of the functioning of the Convention 
system, including the Court’s case law, and of the principles governing the system. 
For the other part, it comprises understanding by the interlocutors functioning on 
the level of the Council of Europe of the national systems, most relevantly 
implementation problems that relate to external tension and sensitive issues in view 
of the three difficulties. It is particularly important that the understanding of these 
interlocutors increases when they are the major decision-maker in a certain 
procedure, because this means the increase in understanding has a potentially 
beneficial effect on the quality of their decision-making. This makes it possible, for 
example, that internal tension has the positive result of increasingly balanced 
decision-making, as further elaborated on under indicator 6.  
In order to scrutinise the procedures in the following chapters from the 
perspective of indicator 3, these questions can be posed:  
- Does the procedure stimulate mutual understanding between the interlocutors? 
- More concretely, does the procedure stimulate understanding by the states of the 
Convention system? 
- More concretely, does the procedure stimulate understanding by the European 
interlocutors of the states, including major implementation problems causing 
external tension and sensitive issues concerning the three difficulties (i.e. the 
countermajoritarian, knowledge gap and unifying diversity difficulty)? 
5.5.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Balanced decision-making as the result of a procedure can reveal the dialogic 
potential of a procedure, because, as in the case of mutual understanding, dialogue 
likely encourages balanced-decision making. This is particularly true when all 
relevant interlocutors participate in a dialogue, because this allows the decision-
maker to decide based on the totality of views present in the Convention system.  
 A procedure that promotes balanced decision-making may facilitate cooperation 
because the interlocutors find it probably easier to cooperate when a decision is 
balanced and thereby shows respect for its own concerns and knowledge. For 
internal tension, the importance of balanced decision-making was already outlined 
in section IV.2: balanced decision-making is the preferred outcome of internal 
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tension, an alternative to the objectionable outcome of conflict. In the case of 
external tension, the Court may decide to step up its responsibilities for reasons 
related to the effectiveness principle and, by doing so, risks making its decisions 
less balanced. It remains nevertheless important to make balanced decisions 
considering that solving external tension requires broad support, which may be 
fostered by balanced decision-making that enhances the persuasiveness of a 
decision.213 
Indicator 4 serves to analyse whether the Convention-related procedures 
promote balanced decision-making by the European interlocutors. This indicator is 
particularly relevant to the Court and the Committee as they are the major decision-
makers, which means their decisions can cause conflict, something which dialogue 
leading to balanced decisions potentially prevents. Balanced-decision making 
concerns the taking into account of different perspectives, in particular national 
knowledge and democracy and diversity concerns. The showing of respect for the 
competences, views and concerns of the other interlocutors plays an important role 
in making a decision more balanced.214 Balanced decision-making is, in a way, the 
opposite to conflict, which is caused by decision-making that is unbalanced in the 
eyes of the national authorities.  
In the following chapters, these questions can be posed when discussing the 
dialogicness of a procedure from the perspective of indicator 4:  
- Does the procedure encourage balanced decision-making by, in particular, the 
Court and the Committee?  
- Does the procedure stimulate the Court and the Committee, when making a 
decision, to take into account national perspectives relating to national 
democracy concerns, national diversity and national knowledge?  
- If the procedure stimulates the taking into account of these perspectives, does it 
lead to improved decision-making in the sense that the decisions are 
increasingly balanced (i.e. the positive good of internal tension)?  
- Does the procedure enable the Court and the Committee to show respect for 
national competences, concerns and views in their decisions?  
- Does the procedure stimulate the Court and the Committee to show respect for 
national competences, concerns and views in their decisions?  
5.5.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving  
This indicator is connected to indicator 3, because reason-giving is presumably 
advantageous to creating mutual understanding, and to indicator 4, because 
balanced decisions require reason-giving. Further, it is also connected to the next 
indicator (room for a response), because it is easier to respond when the decision to 
which a response is formulated is well motivated and explained.  
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The relevance of reason-giving to assessing the dialogic potential of a procedure 
is clear: the reasons given by one interlocutor for a decision or criticism are the 
basis on which the other interlocutor can formulate a response. Without such 
reason-giving, a dialogue can hardly develop. When the Court would for example 
not reason its judgments, it makes it difficult for the respondent state to start a 
dialogue about a judgment, simply because the reasons for the decisions made in 
the judgment remain unknown. In comparable vein, when a state disagrees with a 
judgment and only shows this by for example not amending relevant legislation, 
without giving reasons, it largely precludes the Court from responding to the 
disagreement in an informed manner. 
Reason-giving is beneficial to cooperation, because cooperation is commanded 
for a great part by the persuasive force of the arguments of an interlocutor, 
considering that the Convention system lacks the means to compel implementation, 
and persuasiveness naturally relies on reason-giving.215 Further, it can be imagined 
that it is easier for an interlocutor to cooperate with another interlocutor when he 
knows the other will base its actions on reasons that are communicated to him. As 
Lauterpacht wrote:216 
 
Experience has shown that governments as a rule reconcile themselves to the fact that 
their case has not been successful – provided the defeat is accompanied by the 
conviction that their argument was considered in all its relevant aspects. On the other 
hand, however fully they may comply with an adverse decision, they do not find it 
easy to accept it as expressive or justice – or of law – if they feel that their argument 
was treated summarily, that it was misunderstood, or that dialectics have usurped the 
place of judicial reasoning. 
 
Additionally, a clearly reasoned judgment makes it probably easier for the 
respondent state to execute a judgment as its choice of execution measures is based 
on the judgment.217 As for internal tension, when the Court makes a decision that 
possibly creates such tension, conflict as a result of any of the difficulties at the root 
the tension may be prevented or minimised by motivating why a decision is made 
that goes against national direct democratic legitimacy, national superior knowledge 
and diversity across the Council of Europe. 
Reason-giving and explanations may also prevent the escalation of conflict over 
internal tension because it may clarify to the respondent state that, in spite of a 
rather precise judgment, it remains sufficiently weak to enable the authorities to 
choose themselves how to execute it. Moreover, a state may prevent the occurrence 
of internal tension by exhaustively explaining to the Court why a decision should be 
left to its discretion.218 Also, when internal tension nevertheless causes conflict, this 
                                                        
215  See: section IV.1.  
216  Cited in: Merrills (1993), 32.  
217  HLC on the Future of the ECHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 23.  
218  See also: section IV.2.3.  
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could be repaired by the Court by adapting its line of jurisprudence in a comparable 
judgment when the state explains to the Court why a certain judgment caused a 
critical amount of internal tension.  
Providing reasons and explanations is finally important to eliminating external 
tension. As has been recalled earlier, increasing power and coercion is of limited 
usefulness in this respect; external tension rather requires broad national support for 
reform measures,219 which may be rallied by the Council of Europe interlocutors 
when they explain the importance of Convention implementation, not only for the 
continued existence of the Convention system, but also for enhancing the protection 
of human rights at home. The states parties, for their part, should inform the other 
interlocutors of the causes of implementation problems, which may then facilitate 
finding a solution for these problems together. Further, it can be recalled that in 
reaction to external tension, the Court sometimes steps up its responsibilities to 
ensure the effective protection of the Convention rights. Since this reaction may 
reinforce internal tension,220 it is also important that the Court reasons its reaction 
persuasively.  
Indicator 5 is designed to help answer the question whether the procedures 
induce the interlocutors to give reasons for their decisions.221 Reason-giving is 
particularly important when an interlocutor makes a decision that is potentially 
unwelcome to the interlocutor that must follow up on the decision. In these 
circumstances, proper reason-giving can make a difference because it makes the 
decision, albeit unwelcome, understandable and possibly bearable. The procedures 
are then the means by which one interlocutor can communicate its reasons to the 
other.  
Reason-giving can be both internal and external. Internal reason-giving concerns 
the question whether reason-giving for decisions made within the confines of a 
procedure is stimulated. External reason-giving concerns the question whether 
reason-giving is stimulated for decisions made or steps set outside the confines of a 
procedure. In the latter case, the decision does not need to be made within the 
confines of the procedure under scrutiny. For example, when the Court explains, 
when it communicates a case, why it communicates the case, this is internal reason-
giving. When the Court would give the same explanation in its judgment, this 
would qualify as external reason-giving; it gives reasons for decisions made outside 
a judgment. 
The reasons need to be embedded in the Convention system, which can be 
achieved by linking them up to the Convention, the Court’s jurisprudence or 
important Convention principles, such as the principles of subsidiarity and 
effectiveness and manifestations thereof.222 This may also be achieved by referring 
                                                        
219  See: section IV.3.1.2.  
220  See also: section IV.3.4.  
221  An extensive body of scholarship in other contexts exists about the reason-giving requirement on 
which this study will not expand or rely, see, e.g.: Shapiro (1992); Schauer (1995); Cohen (2008).  
222  See: sections II.2.3 and II.2.4. 
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to the three difficulties at the source of internal tension.223 This point is connected 
to the importance of communicating in an understandable language, namely the 
judicial language of the Convention.224  
To facilitate answering the broad question whether a procedure stimulates 
reason-giving, the following more specific questions can be posed when examining 
a procedure:  
- To what extent does the procedure stimulate reason-giving? 
- Does the reason-giving concern a decision that will not be welcomed by the 
interlocutor to which the decision applies?  
- Does the procedure stimulate internal reason-giving?  
- Does the procedure stimulate external reason-giving?  
- To what extent does the procedure induce the interlocutors to give reasons that 
are embedded in the Convention system? More concretely, to what extent does 
the procedure induce the interlocutors to give reasons related to the Convention, 
the Court’s jurisprudence, important Convention principles (or manifestations 
thereof), or to any of the three difficulties causing internal tension?  
5.5.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response  
When room exists to respond to a decision made by another interlocutor, a 
procedure more or less automatically has dialogic potential. If, on the contrary, 
there is only room for input to a decision in the process of decision-making, but not 
for a response, one may wonder whether a dialogue takes place at all. Room for a 
response can therefore be said to be a natural part of a dialogue. Furthermore, a 
response is important to dialogue because this allows for its continued existence, 
which is in principle deemed desirable at all times, considering that dialogue is a 
norm for interaction in the Convention system in this study.  
Cooperation is easier when a series of arguments can be exchanged, in particular 
considering that the necessity to cooperate is based on the need to share 
responsibilities. The ever-present possibility that internal tension causes conflict 
decreases when room for a response is left. Thus, an escape valve for conflict is 
created. Additionally, considering the complexity of the problems at the root of 
external tension, none of the European interlocutors can conceive a plan to solve the 
problems; the states must always be able to play their part by responding in their 
way to a judgment that causes external tension.  
Indicator 6 facilitates analysing whether the procedures leave sufficient room for 
a response by one interlocutor to a decision made by another interlocutor or to an 
important procedural step set by another interlocutor.225 Not only decisions as such, 
                                                        
223  See: section IV.2.1.  
224  See: section IV.4.4 and specifically the ‘clarity prerequisite’.  
225  The importance of leaving room for a response was emphasised in the other settings too. Friedman 
and Hogg and Bushell, writing in the context of the national constitutional setting, for example 
agreed that the countermajoritarian difficulty is significantly less problematic when the judicial 
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but also procedural steps are examined, because the latter can imply a decision 
relating to the merits of a complaint. For example, communication implies that the 
Court decided that a case is not clearly inadmissible. Room for a response permits 
an interlocutor to, for example, air its concerns and communicate its opinion to the 
relevant decision-maker or interlocutor to which a decision applies. Room for a 
response may also allow the interlocutor giving the response to exert some 
influence of the decision-making relating to the merits or execution process.  
In a comparable manner as in the case of indicator 5 (reason-giving), there can 
be internal and external room for a response. Internal room for a response exists 
when there is room to respond to a decision made in the procedure itself; external 
room when it is possible to respond to decisions made or steps set outside the 
confines of the procedure under scrutiny. By way of illustration, when it is possible 
for the state to explain to the Court why it disagrees with the Court’s decision to 
apply an interim measure within the confines of that procedural step, it gives an 
internal response. When such a response can only be given by, for example, 
submitting observations during communication, and after the Court applied the 
interim measure the response qualifies as an external response.  
Indicator 6 is specifically relevant to the Court’s judgments, because they are 
authoritative and legally binding decisions. The Court creates room for a response 
to a judgment when it, for example, leaves certain issues undecided or when it only 
decides along broad lines, which makes it possible to respond to a judgment by 
filling in the details. Another interlocutor can also respond when a procedure gives 
it the possibility to adapt a decision with which it disagrees or when it can air its 
concerns over a decision. Importantly and as explained in section IV.4.4, dialogue 
should take place within the confines of the Convention’s object and purpose and 
rules. This means that a state can, for example, not simply ignore the binding terms 
of a judgment by way of a response, but should use Convention procedures to 
express its discontent.  
Room for a response only exists when the interlocutor formulating the response 
has some discretion; the response should not be automatic in the sense that it is 
already clear beforehand what the response will be. Such an automatic response is 
not dialogic. In this light, it is also relevant to establish whether an interlocutor can 
become involved of its own motion, because an obligatory response may imply that 
the interlocutor has no discretion as to its response.  
The specific questions that can be answered when examining a procedure with 
the help of indicator 6 are:  
- To what extent does the procedure leave room for a response by one interlocutor 
to a decision made by another interlocutor? 
- Has the interlocutor giving the response discretion to formulate its response?  
- To the decision of which interlocutor can the responding interlocutor respond?  
                                                        
word is not always the last word, see: section III.1.1.2. In the same setting, the dialogic potential of 
a certain judgment was assessed based on the extent to which the judgment leaves the non-judicial 
branches free to decide about the course of remedial action, see: section III.2.2.5. 
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- Does the procedure provide internal room for a response? 
- Does the procedure provide external room for a response?  
- More concretely, does the procedure encourage the decision-maker to leave 
certain issues undecided so room for a response is created? 
- More concretely, does the procedure give an interlocutor who disagrees with a 
decision the possibility to communicate the disagreement to the decision-maker? 
5.5.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
Dialogue is the alternative to conflict: when issues are solved in a dialogic manner, 
conflict is prevented and when conflict has already developed, dialogue can help to 
end or mitigate it.226 Dialogue thus has conflict preventing and solving potential. By 
establishing whether a procedure helps to achieve this, the dialogicness of a 
procedure can likely be established.  
The prevention and solution of conflict is of course instrumental to stimulating 
cooperation, as conflict is detrimental to cooperation. Cooperation is necessary in 
the Convention system due to the importance of sharing responsibilities and the 
lack of coercive means to compel Convention implementation. Conflict is also 
clearly detrimental to sharing responsibilities. In view of the lack of coercive 
means, handling conflict is also important, because a conflict cannot be coercively 
brought to an end and may therefore result in a deadlock. Moreover, one can 
wonder whether a coercively ended conflict is only ended formally or also 
genuinely.   
Conflict is the undesirable outcome of internal tension. It is therefore easily 
understood that handling conflict is relevant to this type of tension. This indicator is 
relevant to external tension as well, because external tension may reinforce the 
chance that that internal tension causes conflict,227 making it even less probable that 
the difficult problems at the root of external tension will be solved.  
Indicator 7 facilitates determining whether and how a procedure helps prevent 
conflict in the Convention system. Conflict can always materialise, but does not 
need to be outspoken.228 In addition to the prevention of conflict, this indicator also 
scrutinises whether, when conflict has already materialised, a procedure can 
promote mitigating or ending it. Conflict can materialise between the Court and the 
states, but also between the Committee and the states. The opposite is also possible, 
namely that the procedure potentially contributes to conflict.  
The analysis made based on indicator 7 depends largely on the answers given 
under the indicators 2-6, as the effects these indicators seek to establish are 
potentially beneficial to preventing, minimising or ending conflict. Indicator 7 is 
mainly a useful extra indicator, because it may help to identify other aspects than 
those highlighted under the previous indicators that may help handle conflict. 
                                                        
226  See also: section IV.4.2.  
227  See: section IV.3.4.  
228  See: section IV.2.6.  
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Another reason to include this indicator separately is that, by doing so, the 
importance of handling conflict is emphasised.  
The following questions can help scrutinise whether a procedure is beneficial to 
preventing, ending or mitigating conflict:  
- To what extent does the procedure help prevent conflict in the Convention 
system? 
- To what extent does the procedure help mitigate or end conflict in the 
Convention system that has already developed? 
- More concretely, does the procedure help channel internal tension away from 
conflict? 
- How are the observations made with reference to indicators 2-6 relevant to this 
indicator?  
5.6 Applying the Indicators of Dialogue  
When drawing any conclusion in the consecutive chapters, it is important to note 
that the indicators point to a greater or lesser extent to whether a procedure 
contributes to achieving the three-pronged added value of dialogue. In other words, 
the relative weight of the indicators is not identical. Indicator 2 (sharing 
responsibilities) and indicator 7 (preventing, mitigating and ending conflict) are 
most important to this added value. Indicator 2 is of major importance, because the 
sharing of responsibilities is closely connected to one of the added values of 
dialogue, namely cooperation. Further, indicator 7 is highly important, because it 
helps to establish whether a procedure helps to prevent what should be the opposite 
result of internal tension: conflict.  
Further, all the conclusions  are based on the indicators for dialogue. When a 
procedure is negatively evaluated from this perspective, this only means that a 
procedure is of limited value to dialogue as defined in section IV.5.5. It does not 
mean that the procedure is of no importance or use to the Convention system when 
it would be evaluated from a different perspective or with a different definition of 
dialogue in mind. To illustrate, it is established that interim measures have limited 
dialogic potential in section V.3. However, from the perspective of the protection of 
the individual applicant, the procedure is of great importance.  
As explained above, the indicators are applied twice. They are applied, first, to 
how the procedures are supposed to function as can be derived from ‘paper’ and, 
second, to how the procedures function, as can be derived from ‘practice’.  
5.6.1 Paper: The Dialogic Potential  
The dialogic potential of a procedure on paper is examined in part 2, encompassing 
chapters V-VIII. The examination is based on a description of the procedures 
derived from ‘paper’, i.e. from documents, such as, the Convention, the Rules of 
Court, the Rules of the Committee for the Supervision of the Execution of 
Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements, the Assembly Rules of 
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Procedures and information documents of the Committee describing procedural 
modalities for supervision. Judgments are therefore generally not relied upon as 
they form part of practice. It is nevertheless sometimes necessary to refer to a 
judgment to describe the functioning of a procedure ‘on paper’, because some 
judgments set out how a procedure is supposed to function in a rather general 
manner. To illustrate, the binding nature of and criteria for the application of 
interim measures can only be established by reviewing the Court’s case law. 
Practice is then the way in which the Court applies these criteria to a certain case.  
The discussion of the indicators results in a conclusion as to their dialogic 
potential on paper. A procedure is considered to have clear potential, some potential 
or limited potential. Assigning one of these labels facilitates comparing the dialogic 
potential of procedures and forms the basis for determining which procedures are 
studied in part 3, on the dialogicness of the procedures in practice. Only procedures 
with clear or some potential are studied in that part, for reasons clarified below. The 
lines between the three categories are not set in stone. It is therefore important to 
motivate why a certain label is applied to a certain procedure.  
A procedure has clear dialogic potential for the purposes of this study when it, 
for example, has dialogic potential from the perspective of almost all indicators. To 
have clear dialogic potential, it is not necessary that a procedure is dialogic from the 
perspectives of all indicators. In addition to the number of indicators from which 
perspective it is dialogic, it is, for example, relevant whether a procedure has 
dialogic potential from the perspective of indicators 2 and 7, which carry a 
relatively heavy weight. It is furthermore relevant whether a procedure has the 
opposite effect which an indicator seeks to establish. This outcome would decrease 
the dialogic potential significantly and could be a reason to assign the label ‘some’ 
instead of ‘clear’. Procedures with clear dialogic potential on paper are assessed in 
part 3 in order to establish whether their potential is realised in practice. 
Considering that the procedures falling in this category have clear potential, it is 
certainly worthwhile to verify whether their potential is translated into practice and, 
if this is not the case, to find an explanation for the discrepancy between potential 
and realised potential.  
A procedure has some dialogic potential when it seems to have a dialogic 
function, but when a second thought reveals that certain factors decrease this. One 
such factor is that a procedure can be dialogic from the perspective of various 
indicators, but not from the perspective of indicators 2 and 7. Procedures with some 
potential are assessed in part 3 in order to establish their dialogicness in practice. 
Such an assessment is worthwhile, because, ultimately, it is most important that 
Convention procedures, regardless of their individual potential, jointly stimulate 
dialogue in practice and a procedure with some potential can contribute to this. Two 
procedures with some potential can, for example, complement each other and a 
procedure with some potential can contribute to dialogue in a different manner from 
procedures with clear potential. Moreover, it is possible that a procedure with some 
potential has, in practice, great dialogic value, due to factors that could not be 
foreseen when scrutinising its dialogic potential on paper. It would also be 
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worthwhile to find answers for the discrepancy between a procedure having some 
potential and its greater dialogic value in practice.  
A procedure has most evidently limited to no dialogic potential when it is only 
an opportunity for the involvement of one interlocutor, but when it has no dialogic 
potential from the perspective of indicators 2-7. This may also be the case when the 
procedure is only dialogic from the perspective of a limited number of indicators, 
but not from the perspective of indicators 2 and 7. When various indicators help 
establish that the procedure has effects contrary to indicators 2 and 7 and, in 
addition to that, the procedure is only dialogic from the perspective of a few 
indicators, this could also warrant the conclusion that a procedure has limited 
potential. More precisely therefore, limited potential means no potential as well as 
hardly any potential or close to no potential. Procedures with limited potential on 
paper are not assessed in part 3 two reasons. It is, first, unlikely that a procedure 
with limited potential on paper has dialogic potential in practice; this makes 
assessing procedures with limited potential in part 3 of this study a largely futile 
exercise. Moreover, taking into consideration the number of 26 procedures of 
interest listed in section IV.5.4, it is necessary to make a selection of procedures 
which will be studied in part 3. They can all be studied in part 2 because 
establishing their dialogic potential is less time-consuming than researching their 
effect on dialogue in practice. Departing from the assumption that a selection must 
be made as regards the procedures researched in part 3, the most relevant selection 
criterion is the dialogic potential of a procedure on paper.  
5.6.2 Practice: The Dialogicness  
Of the procedures with clear or some dialogic potential on paper, it is also assessed 
whether they are dialogic in practice. Their dialogicness in practice is assessed in 
part 3 (chapters IX-XII). Any such assessment is preceded by a description of how 
these procedures function in practice.  
The assessment of the procedures and procedural steps in part 3 cumulates in a 
conclusion on their dialogicness in practice in chapter XII. In a comparable manner 
as in the chapters concerning the potential of the procedures on paper, a procedure 
can be divided amongst three levels of dialogicness: clearly dialogic, somewhat 
dialogic and limitedly dialogic. These labels can be distinguished between in the 
same manner as explained above with regard to the dialogic potential of the 
procedures on paper.  
The information for describing the functioning of the procedures in practice is 
gathered by way of desktop research, using information available on HUDOC and 
in official Committee, Assembly and Commissioner documents. The way in which 
more precisely the information was gathered is, where relevant, explained prior to 
giving a description in chapters IX-XI. The desktop research did not always make it 
possible to adequately understand the actual functioning of a procedure. That type 
of research was therefore complemented with in-depth, qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews with persons working with some of these procedures on a daily basis. 
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These interviews served to increase the author’s understanding of the functioning of 
these procedures in practice. Because these interviews are relied upon throughout 
part 3, some remarks are made here about how the interviewees were approached, 
how the interviews were conducted and how the information from the interviews is 
relied upon.   
Four groups of in total 34 interviewees were approached: judges of the Court, 
members of staff of the Registry, agents representing their states before the Court 
and persons working in the field of execution, most of whom work for the 
Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court.229 Thirteen judges were 
approached of whom seven were interviewed. Of the twelve members of the 
Registry who were approached, eight were interviewed. For the agents representing 
their states before the Court, these numbers were: nine were approached and five 
were interviewed. As for the Execution Department, eleven persons were 
interviewed, of whom two in a combined interview. The Secretariat of the 
Execution Department compiled a list of eleven persons who volunteered for an 
interview after the author had approached the Execution Department with a request 
for interviews.230 The other interviewees were approached based on suggestions 
made to the author by persons who already had established contacts with the 
different groups of interviewees. In addition to interviews with these four groups, 
one interview was conducted with someone working for the Secretariat of the 
Committee of Ministers and two interviews with two persons who attended DH 
meetings and other meetings of the Committee.  
A few days before an interview took place, the interviewee received a 
questionnaire with questions divided per procedure. For each group, a different 
questionnaire was made.231 The order of questions in the questionnaires was not 
always followed strictly and the interviewees were encouraged to give additional 
information. The interviews took place in Strasbourg from 23 June – 4 July 2014 
and lasted between 30 to 60 minutes. The interviews were not recorded, but the 
notes taken during the interviews are on file with the author. It was agreed with the 
interviewees that their answers would be anonymised. To ensure anonymity and to 
at the same time make it possible for the author to link the information included in 
the study to the notes made during a certain interview, the interviewees are referred 
to in the footnotes as ‘Judge interview’, ‘Registry interview’, ‘Government agent 
interview’ or ‘Execution interview’, followed by a number assigned at random to 
each interviewee. All interviewees were given the opportunity to comment on the 
way in which their answers have been integrated in chapters IX-XI. 
 
                                                        
229  See Appendix I for a list of interviewees.  
230  The number of interviewees of the Execution Department was relatively high simply because the 
response was relatively high.  
231  See Appendix II for an example which was sent to interviewed judges.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF PROCEDURES IN THE 
(PRE-)MERITS PHASE 
 
 
 
Chapter V is the first chapter of part 2, encompassing chapters V-VIII. Part 2 aims 
to establish the dialogic potential on paper of procedures belonging to the (pre-) 
merits phase listed in section IV.5.4. This chapter is composed of three sections. 
Section V.1 gives a short introduction to the (pre-)merits phase and its procedures. 
The following section assesses these procedures in the light of the seven indicators 
of dialogue developed in section IV.5.6. The conclusion in section V.3 gives an 
overview of the dialogic potential on paper of the separate procedural steps. 
Whether this potential indeed materialises in practice is assessed in part 3.  
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE (PRE-)MERITS PHASE AND ITS PROCEDURES  
The (pre-)merits phase commences when a completed application form alleging a 
violation of the Convention reaches the Court and is registered. From that moment 
onwards, the procedural road of an application and the time required to reach its 
final destination in the form of a decision or judgment differs widely due to 
different factors.1 One factor is that the Court determines the order in which cases 
are dealt with, based on the importance and urgency of the allegations.2 The 
duration of the proceedings also depends on which procedures are applied, 
considering that procedures such as third-party interventions and hearings are not 
always employed. Yet another factor is that a case can be considered by different 
judicial formations: a single judge, committees of three judges, chambers of seven 
judges and the Grand Chamber of seventeen judges.3 
Single judges declare inadmissible or strike out an application when the 
application is straightforward and can be decided without further consideration and 
materials. Applications decided by this formation are not communicated to the 
respondent state. If a single judge does not make a decision, he refers the 
application to a committee or a chamber.4 Committees are competent to declare 
inadmissible or strike out an application unanimously, where such decisions can be 
                                                        
1  Leach (2011), 37. 
2  Rules 41-40 of Court; See for more information: idem. 
3  Art. 26(1) ECHR.  
4  Art. 27 ECHR; Rule 49(1) of Court.  
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taken without further examination. They can also declare a case admissible and 
render a judgment on the merits at the same time if the question underlying the case 
is subject of well-established case law. A committee can use its competences either 
before or after a case has been communicated. If neither a single judge nor a 
committee decides, a chamber decides on the admissibility and the merits of a 
complaint, jointly or in two separate rulings. A chamber is also competent to strike 
a case out and may make such a decision, as well as declare a case inadmissible, 
prior to communication.5 The Grand Chamber comes into play only when a 
chamber relinquishes jurisdiction, when a case is referred to it or when, as related in 
chapter VI, the Committee starts an infringement procedure or makes a request for 
the interpretation of a judgment.  
Once a judgment is final,6 the respondent state must execute it. Judgments are 
transmitted to the Committee, which supervises their execution.7 The Committee 
also supervises the execution of the terms of friendly settlements.8 This part of the 
proceedings forms the execution phase, which is analysed in chapter VI. 
Exceptionally, a judgment issued by a chamber is referred to the Grand Chamber, 
which will then issue a new judgment. This possibility is also discussed in chapter 
VI.9 
This chapter assesses the dialogic potential of the (pre-)merits phase, having in 
mind an application that passes the admissibility stage, of which the Court 
establishes the facts (if necessary) and that proceeds to judgment on the merits. The 
interest of this chapter mainly lies with chamber and Grand Chamber judgments for 
two reasons. The first reason is that some procedures or procedural steps, such as 
relinquishment and third-party interventions, can only be used before these two 
formations. The second reason is that judgments issued by these formations usually 
relate more to the merits and scrutinise the merits in more detail than judgments 
issued by other formations. Judgments relating to the merits, as opposed to 
judgments solely or mostly relating to procedural aspects such as admissibility, are 
most relevant because they most likely to help advance achieving the added value 
of dialogue to the Convention system. Furthermore, judgments relating to the merits 
are reasoned relatively elaborately and applications adjudicated by a chamber and 
the Grand Chamber are communicated to the government, which opens 
opportunities for dialogue.  
This chapter accordingly concentrates on procedures regarding the merits of a 
case. Those procedures that do not relate to the merits, such as the registration of an 
application or a single-judge inadmissibility decision, are left aside. The 
admissibility phase, to the extent that admissibility is not relevant to the merits of a 
complaint, is not included in this chapter. Instead, the assessment concerns the input 
                                                        
5  Arts. 28, 29(1) ECHR; Rules 53, 54A of Court.  
6  Art. 44 ECHR.  
7  Art. 46(1)-(2) ECHR.  
8  Art. 39(4) ECHR.  
9  Art. 43 ECHR.  
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into a judgment provided in the (pre-)merits phase, the way this input influences the 
merits, and the merits themselves.  
Section V.2 scrutinises the dialogic potential of twelve procedures or procedural 
steps in the (pre-)merits phase, based on the seven indicators for developed in 
section IV.5.6. In this phase, the Court may also place itself at the disposal of the 
parties with the aim of securing a friendly settlement10 or indicate to the parties an 
interim measure.11 The way in which these procedures are supposed to function on 
paper is discussed in the next sections.  
1.1 Communication  
When a chamber does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out at 
once, it communicates the application to the respondent state. Communication 
therefore means that an application is not clearly inadmissible. It also means that, 
even if the Court declares the application inadmissible at a later stage, it states its 
reasons for doing so.12 In the communication, the Court gives a statement of facts 
and poses questions to the parties about, where relevant, the facts and their view on 
the admissibility and merits. A communication is therefore an invitation to the 
respondent state to submit written observations.13 After the first communication or 
after a case has been declared admissible, the Court may invite the state to submit 
further written observations regarding the application.14 Where relevant, it may also 
invite the state to respond to third-party interventions.15  
When referring to communication in this study, not only the Court’s initial 
communication of a case to the respondent government is meant, but also additional 
communications, as well as the written observations submitted by the respondent 
state. 
1.2 Interim Measures 
Interim measures are atypical of the Convention system. Applications do not 
normally have suspensive effect, but interim measures aim at exactly that: they 
suspend the effect of a national decision until the Court has pronounced itself on the 
merits. Interim measures intend to preserve the status quo of the applicant’s 
situation, in particular the Convention right which he asserts, pending the Court’s 
                                                        
10  Art. 39 ECHR.  
11  Rule 39 of Court.  
12  Leach (2011), 41.  
13  Rule 54(2)(b) of Court.  
14  Rule 54(2)(c) of Court.  
15  Rule 44(6) of Court.  
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ruling.16 Interim measures cannot be found in the Convention, but were developed 
in practice. Since 1982, this practice has been codified, currently in Rule 39.17 
Even though interim measures were laid down in the Rules of Court, the Court 
used to rule that it did not have the power to order legally binding interim measures; 
the states should grant this power by amending the Convention.18 In 2005, the Court 
changed its position. It ruled that the respondent state’s failure to comply with an 
interim measure resulted in a violation of Article 34, because the failure prevented 
it from effectively examining the applicant’s complaint and hindered the effective 
exercise by the applicant of his Convention rights.19 In subsequent cases, the Court 
stated explicitly that interim measures are binding upon the respondent state.20 
The applicant can request an interim measure in the application or at another 
point, normally as soon as possible after the final domestic decision has been taken 
or, when this decision is imminent and a risk of immediate enforcement exists, prior 
to the decision. When the Court considers a request, it may at the same time also 
make an admissibility decision.21  
An interim measure is only granted when these criteria have been fulfilled: 
1. the situation must be imminent and exceptional; 
2. there must no longer be any suspensive domestic remedy available against the 
disputed act; 22 
3. there must be a high degree of probability that the disputed act will contravene 
the Convention; and  
4. there must be a risk of irreparable damage.23 
 
The terms of an interim measure describe the measures which a state needs to take 
or refrain from. Interim measures can apply both for the duration of the 
proceedings, but also with a time-limit.24 Additionally, the Court can indicate in its 
judgment that the indication is in force until the judgment becomes final under 
Article 44(2) or until the Grand Chamber accepts a request for referral under Article 
                                                        
16  Rule 39(1) of Court.  
17  Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, No. 15576/89, 20 March 1991, paras. 94-96; Garry (2001), 407-
408; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99 et al., 4 February 2005, paras. 103-
107; Vajić (2007), 607-611.  
18  Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, No. 15576/89, 20 March 1991, para. 102.  
19  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99 et al., 4 February 2005, para. 128; The 
Court did not use the word ‘binding’ but the binding nature of the interim measure may be derived 
from the judgment, see: Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, 
para. 1.  
20  Van Dijk et al. (2006), 111; See: Aoulmi v. France, No. 50278/99, 17 January 2006, para. 111: 
‘even though the binding nature of measures adopted under Rule 39’. 
21  Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Requests for Interim Measures, para. I.  
22  Such remedies were recommended in: HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 
April 2011, Follow-up plan para. A(3); And by the Court, see: CDDH (2012d), para. 2.  
23  Haeck and Herrera (2003), 631; See for a different, but comparable test: Leach (2011), 31; See also: 
CDDH (2013c), para. 31; Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Requests for Interim Measures.  
24  Haeck et al. (2011), 401; ECRE/ELENA (2012), 36, 52; Harris et al. (2014), 139.  
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43.25 Interim measures can be directed either towards one individual application or 
towards multiple applications.26 Interim measures, as a provisional and temporary 
measures, have no permanent legal consequences for the state and nor do they 
influence the Court’s judgment.27 The Court can exercise supervision by requesting 
information from the parties ‘on any matter connected with the implementation of 
any interim measure’.28  
1.3 Article 37 Strike-out Procedures Generally 
Article 37 empowers the Court to strike an application out of its list of cases for any 
reason coming within the meaning of subparagraph a (the applicant does not intend 
to pursue his application), b (the matter has been resolved) or c (any other reason 
that no longer justifies the continued examination of an application). This chapter 
assesses the dialogic potential of strike-out decisions made with reference to the last 
two subparagraphs. These decisions are sometimes based on a friendly settlement29 
(under subparagraph b) or on a unilateral declaration (under subparagraph c).  
In section V.2, the four strike-out procedures are discussed separately when 
necessary and jointly where possible. Five elements common to each strike-out 
procedure are introduced here before discussing the separate procedures.  
The first element is that an application can be struck out of the list ‘at any stage 
of the proceedings’,30 for example after an admissibility decision or a judgment on 
the merits in which the question of just satisfaction under Article 41 was reserved. 
The second element which the strike-out procedures have in common is that an 
application can only be struck out on the condition that special circumstances 
regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention do not require the 
continued examination of an application (the human rights condition).31 Third, after 
an application has been struck out, the Court ‘may decide to restore an application 
to its list of cases if it considers that the circumstances so justify’.32 The Court can, 
for example, restore an application when the state failed to execute the terms of a 
friendly settlement.33 The fourth common element is that, when the Court strikes an 
application out, the costs are at its discretion.34 Lastly, the Court strikes an 
application out in a judgment if an application has been declared admissible or in a 
                                                        
25  See, e.g.: Sufi and Elmi v. UK, No. 8319/07 et al., 28 June 2011, paras. 320-321. 
26  UNHCR (2007), 6; ECRE/ELENA (2012), 8-9, 39. 
27  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011, para. 355.  
28  Rule 39(3) of Court.  
29  This section does not discuss friendly settlements negotiated in the context of the PJP, even though 
they can be part of the PJP. The PJP, including friendly settlements concluded as part thereof, is 
discussed in: chapters VII and XI.  
30  Art. 37(1) ECHR.  
31  Art. 37(1) ECHR.  
32  Art. 37(2) ECHR.  
33  See, e.g.: Katić v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 13920/04, 7 July 2009.  
34  Rule 43(4) of Court.  
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decision if an application has not been declared admissible. Strike-out rulings in 
judgments are forwarded to the Committee for its supervision of the execution of 
any undertakings which may have been attached to the discontinuance or solution 
of the matter.35 Strike-out rulings in decisions are neither forwarded to nor 
supervised by the Committee, unless the Court makes an award of costs.36 Friendly 
settlements are an exception to the foregoing. They are, although struck out by 
means of a decision, transmitted to the Committee so it can supervise the execution 
of the terms of a friendly settlement.37  
1.3.1 Friendly Settlements  
The friendly settlement procedure is a rather distinct procedure for two reasons: it is 
confidential and without prejudice to contentious proceedings38 and it is 
conciliatory rather than adversarial, and extrajudicial rather than judicial. A 
settlement does therefore not need to be based on ‘purely legal considerations’.39 
The only condition for approving a friendly settlement is the human rights 
condition.  
1.3.2 Article 37(1)(b) Strike-out Decisions 
The Court can conclude that ‘the matter has been resolved’ within the meaning of 
subparagraph b in response to developments on the national level that took place 
after the communication of a case or the adoption an admissibility decision. The 
addition of this subparagraph to the Convention was intended to cover, for example, 
‘the case of an applicant who, subsequent to lodging his petition has received full 
redress at national level and therefore no longer has a valid legal interest in 
pursuing the petition’.40 The Court applies, in addition to the human rights 
condition, two other conditions for striking cases out under subparagraph b. It 
examines whether the circumstances complained of by the applicant still obtain and 
whether the state has redressed the effects of a possible violation on account of 
these circumstances.41 This approach ‘reflects the structure of the Convention’s 
supervisory machinery, which provides both for a reasoned decision or judgment as 
to whether the facts in issue are compatible with the requirements of the Convention 
(Article 45) and, if they are not, for the award of just satisfaction (Article 41)’.42 
 
                                                        
35  Rule 43(3) of Court. 
36  Rule 43(4) of Court. 
37  Rule 43(3) of Court.  
38  Art. 39(2) ECHR; Rule 62(2) of Court. 
39  Robertson (1975), 116, (Chaumont (France)); See also: Van Dijk et al. (2006), 222; Rozakis 
(2007), 1004, 1014. 
40  Explanatory Report to Protocol 8 ECHR, para. 35. 
41  Pisano v. Italy (GC) (Dec.), No. 36732/97, 24 October 2002, para. 42. 
42  Idem.  
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1.3.3 Unilateral Declarations  
In a unilateral declaration, the respondent state requests the Court to strike a case 
out within the meaning of subparagraph c. Turkey initiated the procedure in 200143 
and the Court has subsequently developed it in its case law and added it to its Rules 
of Court.44 The Court’s acceptance of this procedure is seemingly motivated by the 
possibility unilateral declarations offer to handle efficiently repetitive cases that do 
not require it to develop new case law, but that rather require it to repeat well-
established case law.  
In line with the Rules of Court, a unilateral declaration must include an 
acknowledgement of a violation and an undertaking to provide adequate redress 
and, as appropriate, remedial measures.45 Further, a state should normally make a 
unilateral declaration after a failed attempt at a friendly settlement,46 as the 
‘procedure is not, as such, intended to circumvent the applicant’s opposition to a 
friendly settlement’.47 Only where ‘exceptional circumstances so justify’, may the 
state file a declaration without first attempting a settlement.48 The respondent state 
must make the declaration in public and adversarial proceedings, separately from 
and with due respect for the confidentially of any friendly settlement proceedings.49 
These requirements in the Rules of Court result in part from a non-exhaustive list of 
‘relevant factors’ for assessing whether a settlement passes the human rights 
condition. The Court has developed the following factors in its case law:  
1. the nature of the complaints; 
2. whether the issues raised are comparable to issues already determined by the 
Court in previous cases; 
3. the nature and scope of any measures taken by the respondent Government in 
the context of the execution of judgments delivered by the Court in any such 
previous cases; 
4. the impact of these measures on the case at issue; 
5. whether the facts are in dispute between the parties, and, if so, to what extent, 
and what prima facie evidentiary value is to be attributed to the parties’ 
submissions on the facts; and 
6. whether the Court itself has already taken evidence in the case to establish 
disputed facts.50 
 
These are the factors that have not made it to the Rules of Court.  
                                                        
43  In: Akman v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 37453/97, 26 June 2001.  
44  Rule 62A of Court on unilateral declarations entered into force on 1 September 2012.  
45  Rule 62A(1)(b) of Court; Prior to the inclusion of the Rule, these were ‘relevant factors’ in the 
Court’s case law.  
46  Rule 62A(1)(a) of Court.  
47  Bazhenhov v. Russia, No. 37930/02, 20 October 2005, para. 39. 
48  Rule 62A(2) of Court.  
49  Rule 62A(1)(c) of Court.   
50  Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (GC) (Preliminary objection), No. 26307/95, 6 May 2003, paras. 76-77.  
 
 
 
 Chapter V 
 
 
180 
1.3.4 Article 37(1)(c) Strike-out Decisions  
Cases that cannot be struck out under subparagraph b may be struck out under 
subparagraph c if the Court concludes that ‘for any other reason it is no longer 
justified to continue the examination of the application’. The Convention was 
amended to include this subparagraph as a ‘general clause’; ‘[its] scope [...] should 
be limited to cases which are comparable to those mentioned in sub-paragraphs a 
and b, for example, where the applicant has died and his heirs do not have a 
sufficient legal interest to justify the further examination of the petition’.51 The 
Court has not developed any conditions for striking a case out under subparagraph c 
in addition to the human rights condition.  
This study is not interested in all subparagraph c strike-out decisions, including, 
for example strike-out decisions based on the applicant’s death. These decisions are 
only relevant to this study to the extent that they are made in response to measures 
taken by the national authorities after the communication of a case.  
1.4 Hearings  
To supplement the written information collected during communication, the Court 
may hold an oral hearing. A hearing concerns the admissibility and/or the merits 
and is organised on the Court’s initiative or at the request of a party, if the Court 
‘considers that the discharge of its functions under the Convention so requires’.52 A 
hearing is a means to clarify facts or domestic law and practice.53 The need to 
clarify is therefore an important reason to hold a hearing. It is further suggested that 
‘the legal or political importance of a case may also be relevant’.54 Prior to a 
hearing, the Court may formulate written questions to be answered by the parties, 
witnesses, experts and others.55 The questions ‘reflect what the Court considers to 
be the main questions in the case’, and may concern both the facts and legal 
matters.56 At hearing, any judge may put questions to the persons appearing before 
him.57  
1.5 Relinquishment  
A chamber may relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber when a case pending 
before it raises a serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention or 
when the resolution of a question before it might have a result inconsistent with a 
                                                        
51  Explanatory Report to Protocol 8 ECHR, para. 35. 
52  Rules 1(r), 54(5), 59(3) of Court.  
53  Leach (2011), 75.  
54  Idem. 
55  Idem.  
56  Harris et al. (2014), 138. 
57  Rule 64(2) of Court.  
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previous judgment.58 The registrar notifies the parties of a chamber’s intention to 
relinquish jurisdiction, after which they have one month to file a ‘duly reasoned’ 
objection.59 The Court normally accepts an objection as a ‘veto’ to 
relinquishment.60 Section V.2, when discussing this procedure, departs from the 
assumption that a case is relinquished and therefore adjudicated by the Grand 
Chamber. 
1.6 Third-party Interventions 
Third-party interventions may take the form of written as well as oral interventions 
at a hearing. The Convention mentions explicitly both the contracting parties and 
the Commissioner as interlocutors that may intervene.61 The grounds on which they 
may do so differ and are discussed under indicator 1 in section 2.1. Additionally, 
the president of a chamber may invite or grant leave to submit an intervention to 
any person concerned who is not the applicant in the interest of the proper 
administration of justice.62 Requests for leave must be duly reasoned and an 
invitation or grant of leave is subject to conditions set by the chamber president.63 
In this study, third-party interventions in writing are discussed under the heading 
‘third-party interventions’, while oral interventions made at hearing are discussed 
together with hearings.  
1.7 Investigations  
The Convention stipulates that the Court ‘shall examine the case together with the 
representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation’,64 usually 
after a case has been declared admissible.65 By reason of the first instance doctrine 
and, more generally, the subsidiarity principle, the Court normally relies on the 
facts as presented by the parties. The Court therefore only engages in fact-finding if 
the facts required to decide a case are unclear, for example because the domestic 
authorities are unwilling or unable to find the facts or because the documents 
presented by the parties do not suffice to establish disputed facts.66 The Court may, 
                                                        
58  Art. 30 ECHR; Rule 72 of Court.  
59  Rule 72(4) of Court; Protocol 15 ECHR will remove the words ‘unless [...] objects’, see: Art. 3 
ECHR.  
60  Costa (2008), 450; Leach (2011), 48-49; It may, however, be suggested that ‘the requirement for a 
‘duly reasoned’ objection entitles the Court to make an assessment of the reasons given and then to 
decide not to relinquish the case to the Grand Chamber. Parties should not therefore be allowed an 
automatic right of veto’, in: Leach (2011), 48-49; See also: Harris et al. (2014), 138. 
61  Art. 36(1),(3) ECHR. 
62  Art. 36(2) ECHR; Rule 44(3)(a) of Court.  
63  Rules 44(3)(b), 44(5) of Court.  
64  Art. 38 ECHR.  
65  Rule A1(3) of Court (Annex concerning Investigations). 
66  Leach et al. (2009), 24, 37. 
 
 
 
 Chapter V 
 
 
182 
‘at the request of a party or of its own motion, adopt any investigative measure 
which it considers capable of clarifying the facts of the case’.67 Such a measure can 
encompass: 
1. inviting the parties to produce documentary evidence; 
2. hearing as a witness or expert or in any other capacity any person whose 
evidence or statements seem likely to assist the Court in carrying out its tasks; 
3. asking any person or institution to express an opinion or make a written report 
on any matter considered by the Court to be relevant to the case; and 
4. appointing one or more of the Court’s members or of the other judges of the 
Court, as its delegate or delegates, to conduct an inquiry, carry out an on-site 
investigation or take evidence in some other manner.68 
 
The respondent state is obliged to ‘furnish all necessary facilities’ for the Court to 
undertake an investigation,69 which may mean it must identify witnesses and ensure 
their attendance.70 
1.8 Judgments 
The procedural step that ends the (pre-)merits phase – the judgment – is seemingly 
of little interest to this study, because it is the Court and the Court alone that issues 
it. Judgments are nevertheless discussed, because they may reflect the influence 
which the other interlocutors had on the Court’s reasoning by way of the above 
procedural steps, because they allow the Court to show that it allows for the sharing 
of responsibilities and because the Court engages in reason-giving in its judgments.  
Instead of into a ‘regular’ judgment, an application may result into a pilot 
judgment. Because the proceedings leading up to such a judgment, as well as the 
judgment itself are rather distinct, the pilot-judgment procedure is discussed 
separately in chapter VII.  
1.9 Referral 
Both the applicant and the respondent state can request in writing that a case be 
referred to the Grand Chamber within a period of three months from the date of a 
chamber judgment. The Convention stipulates that such a request may only be made 
exceptionally. Further, the parties cannot request referral when a chamber has 
declared a case inadmissible in a decision (as opposed to a judgment),71 even 
though the Court may conclude that the application is manifestly ill-founded, 
                                                        
67  Rule A1(1) of Court (Annex concerning Investigations). 
68  A chamber may also appoint any person or institution of its choice to assist the delegation in such 
manner as it sees fit, see: Rule A1(1)-(3) of Court (Annex concerning Investigations). 
69  Art. 38 ECHR; Rule A2 of Court (Annex concerning Investigations). 
70  Leach et al. (2009), 13.  
71  Art. 43(a) ECHR.  
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meaning it made an analysis involving, at least in part, establishing the facts or 
judging the merits. A panel of five Grand Chamber judges decides on the request 
and accepts it on the condition that the case raises a serious question affecting the 
interpretation or application of the Convention or a serious issue of general 
importance. The panel examines the request solely on the basis of the existing case 
file and does not need to reason its refusal. The requesting party must specify in its 
request the serious question or issue that warrants consideration by the Grand 
Chamber. If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber decides on the 
case.72  
The above-discussed procedural steps, except for referral of course, also apply 
to Grand Chamber proceedings upon referral. The parties may file further written 
observations, a hearing may take place, new or updated third-party interventions 
may be filed and a case may be struck out.73 Further, the Grand Chamber considers 
the whole case afresh; not only the serious question or issue forming the basis for 
referral. The Grand Chamber judgment therefore sets aside the entire chamber 
judgment.74  
2 APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
2.1 Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors  
Indicator 1 functions to establish which interlocutors can become involved in the 
(pre-)merits phase by means of which procedures and with whom they can 
communicate. Further, if involvement is made possible, this indicator inquires into 
what a procedure enables the interlocutor to achieve or communicate.  
Communication: Communication is the first opportunity for involvement of the 
Court. In its communication, the Court can ask the respondent state for its 
observations on the facts and the merits of an application, observations which it 
uses to inform its judgment and to which it may respond in its judgment. 
Communication is therefore a means for the Court to collect information from the 
respondent state, not only factual information, but also information on the state’s 
view on the merits. Communication is the first opportunity for involvement of the 
state as well. The respondent state has the possibility to respond to the applicant’s 
allegations and the Court’s questions. It can explain to the Court why an alleged 
violation has not taken place, why it is not responsible or what difficult structural 
problems it is faced with. The respondent state can also use its response to air its 
concerns about, for example, the problems a violation would cause in the light of 
the difficulties at the root of internal tension. Through communication, the 
respondent state might be able to convince the Court that no violation has occurred, 
                                                        
72  Art. 43 ECHR; Rule 73 of Court.  
73  Rule 71(1) of Court.  
74  Leach (2011), 81.  
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thus averting an adverse judgment. Additionally, this procedural step allows the 
state to communicate its version the facts to the Court.  
Interim measures: An interim measure is an opportunity for involvement by 
the Court, as it can indicate an interim measure of its own motion and decide on any 
request for an interim measures made by the applicant.75 Through the procedure, 
the Court communicates to the respondent state which interim measure it must take, 
hoping to prevent any (further) violations pending its pronouncement on the merits. 
The procedure also requires the Court to verify the respondent state’s compliance 
with the measure in its judgment. The Court’s communication with the respondent 
state regarding the interim measure does not concern the merits of a case, but a 
more practical matter, namely the temporary measures required to maintain the 
status quo of the applicant’s situation. Interim measures also require the 
involvement of the respondent state. The urgent implementation of an interim 
measure by the state is crucial to the effective functioning of the procedure. The 
state’s involvement, although crucial, does not allow it to communicate anything to 
the Court, because it must follow the measures ordered by the Court immediately 
and precisely. Further, the Court can give immediate notice of the measure to the 
Committee,76 but this does not give the Committee the opportunity to become 
involved. The notification only serves to facilitate following up on the procedure in 
the execution phase, should the state have failed to abide by the measure.77  
Friendly Settlements: The Convention provides that ‘the Court may place itself 
at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly 
settlement’.78 In the course of a friendly settlement procedure, the Court becomes 
involved in two capacities. First, the registrar enters ‘into contact with the parties 
with a view to securing a friendly settlement’.79 The Registry can therefore discuss 
friendly settlement proposals directly with the respondent state, making its 
involvement potentially highly influential in the sense that it can influence the terms 
of the settlement. Second, the Court’s judges must approve the settlement; they do 
not become involved in negotiations between the parties. The Court’s involvement 
in this capacity is a direct response to the respondent state’s proposal for a friendly 
settlement. The striking-out of a case based on this procedure hinges on judges’ 
approval. Without their approval, the proceedings leading to a judgment continue. 
Friendly settlements are also an opportunity for the respondent state to become 
involved. The state can interact with the Registry, make a proposal to the Court and, 
eventually, end the proceedings with the Court’s and the applicant’s approval. The 
state’s involvement, when it indeed results in a strike-out decision, is beneficial to it 
                                                        
75  Rule 39(1) of Court.  
76  Rule 39(2) of Court. 
77  Rule 39(2) was, according to some judges participating in the elaboration of the Rule, added to 
allow the Committee to follow up on non-compliance and in this way to compensate for the non-
binding nature of interim measures, see: Vajić (2007), 612. 
78  Art. 39(1) ECHR.  
79  Rule 62(1) of Court.  
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because a possibly adverse judgment is prevented. As in the case of the Court, the 
success of the procedure hinges on the state’s involvement, because without a 
friendly settlement agreed upon by the state, the Court cannot strike a case out on 
the basis of a settlement.  
Article 37(1)(b) and (c) strike-out decisions: The Court can raise of its own 
motion the question whether a case may be struck out in accordance with Article 
37(1)(b) or (c). Further, regardless of who has raised that question, the Court must 
verify that the relevant conditions are fulfilled for striking a case out. This 
opportunity for involvement allows the Court to communicate to the state that the 
steps which the state has taken warrant the conclusion that its own involvement is 
no longer necessary. A strike-out decision therefore signals the Court’s approval to 
the respondent state of the measures taken in response to an application.  
The respondent state can also become involved in these procedural steps. Its 
involvement is again important, because no reason exists to strike a case out if the 
state has not taken relevant measures.80 The state’s involvement therefore starts 
with measures taken on the national level making a strike-out decision possible. 
More importantly, because directly related to the procedural steps, the state can 
raise an objection in its pleadings, submitting to the Court that, in view of the 
measures which it has taken, a case should be struck out in accordance with 
subparagraph b or c of Article 37. As in the case of a friendly settlement, the state’s 
involvement through this procedure has a potentially great impact on the life of an 
application.  
Unilateral declarations: As any other strike-out decision, unilateral 
declarations require the Court’s involvement because the Court needs to approve 
the declaration and strike the case out on the basis of a declaration, thus 
communicating to the state that it approves the declaration and the measures 
proposed therein. The Court cannot raise the question whether a case can be struck 
out based on a unilateral declaration of its own motion, because the state has to 
request this in its declaration.  
This procedure is clearly also an opportunity for involvement by the respondent 
state. The initiative for commencing the procedure lies wholly with the state: in the 
absence of a declaration, the procedure does not commence. More so than in the 
case of friendly settlements, which require the agreement of the applicant and can 
involve the Registry’s assistance, unilateral declarations permit the state to propose 
to end the proceedings on its own terms. Making a unilateral declaration has great 
consequences for a case, as it means that, when the Court approves a declaration, 
the case is struck out, possibly against the will of the applicant.  
Hearings: Hearings are a way for the Court and the respondent state to 
supplement their exchange on the facts and merits which, in the absence of a 
hearing, only takes place during communication and in writing. Hearings allow the 
                                                        
80  As explained in section V.1.3.4, strike-out decisions based on, for example, the death of the 
applicant are not relevant to this study.  
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Court to ask factual and other questions to the state and the state to air its concerns 
and viewpoints. Additionally, hearings may enable the respondent state to clarify 
issues or to focus the attention of the Court on a certain issue that may, in several 
100 pages of written observations, be overlooked or paid less attention to.  
Next to the Court and the respondent state, two other interlocutors have the right 
to take part in hearings as third-party interveners: the Commissioner and states one 
of whose nationals is an applicant.81 Additionally, the president of the Court may, 
‘in the interest of the proper administration of justice’, invite or grant leave to 
intervene to take part in a hearing to any state which is not a party to the 
proceedings or to ‘any person concerned who is not the applicant’.82 This only 
happens in ‘exceptional cases’.83 Potentially therefore, any state can take part in 
hearings and individual Assembly members or Assembly committees can also ask 
leave to intervene as ‘any person concerned’.  
The opportunities for involvement of hearings are presumably of added value 
compared to the static written exchanges taking place during communication and in 
other procedural steps, because they allow for direct interaction during which the 
interlocutors can respond to each other more than once. Moreover, the 
Commissioner and the Assembly have the opportunity to become involved, which 
they do not have during communication for example.  
Relinquishment: Relinquishment gives the Court, more specifically the 
chambers and the Grand Chamber, the possibility to become involved. This 
procedure enables the Court to, albeit subject to the parties’ approval, pronounce 
itself about a case sitting as a Grand Chamber. It thus becomes involved in its ‘most 
solemn formation’.84 The Court may consider becoming involved in this formation 
desirable when a case prompts a serious question affecting the interpretation of the 
Convention or when a case may result in a judgment inconsistent with previous 
judgments. Importantly, once a chamber has issued judgment, it is no longer 
possible for the Court to bring a case before the Grand Chamber of its own motion. 
Whether this possibility arises depends on whether the parties request referral. The 
other side of the coin is that relinquishment, unlike referral, takes away the 
possibility for the Court to issue a judgment twice: in the formation of a chamber 
and, upon referral, sitting as a Grand Chamber.  
The respondent state becomes involved in the procedure of relinquishment, 
because a chamber cannot relinquish jurisdiction when one of the parties to the case 
objects.85 The state has the opportunity to give its opinion about the intended 
relinquishment and, through a duly reasoned opinion, it can veto relinquishment. It 
can therefore make it impossible for the Court to effect relinquishment. The other 
                                                        
81  Art. 36(1),(3) ECHR. 
82  Art. 36(2) ECHR; Rule 44(3)(a) of Court.  
83  Rule 44(3)(a) of Court. 
84  Costa (2008), 451. 
85  Art. 30 ECHR.  
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side of the coin for the state is that the possibility for it to become involved twice by 
appealing a chamber judgment vanishes.  
Third-party interventions: Non-respondent states, the Commissioner and 
members of the Assembly can become involved as a third-party intervener in 
writing on the same conditions as were outlined above with respect to intervening at 
hearing. Regardless of which interlocutor submits an intervention, the intervention 
is addressed to the Court and the Court’s decision-making on the merits can be 
influenced by the information or arguments presented in the intervention. Compared 
to hearings, the opportunities for involvement that third-party interventions offer are 
potentially broad, because, unlike in the case of hearings, leave is not only granted 
in ‘exceptional cases’ to ‘any person concerned’.86 
Investigations: Investigations offer the Court an opportunity to become 
involved in fact-finding. This procedure is evidently designed to help the Court 
establish the facts of a case and the Court can pose questions to national authorities 
in the course of an investigation.  
The involvement of the authorities in the respondent state is important to the 
success of an investigation. They play a facilitative role in the procedure. They can, 
for example, arrange meetings with experts, but can also be the subject of an 
investigation themselves.  
Judgments: Judgments only permit the Court to become involved, although the 
procedures preceding a judgment permit the involvement of other interlocutors, so 
they can give input to the Court. A judgment is the Court’s determination of the 
merits of a complaint and a communication thereof to all relevant interlocutors.  
Referral: Referral is another opportunity for involvement by the Court. First of 
all, a panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber has the opportunity to decide, in 
response to a request by an applicant or a respondent state, whether the nature of a 
case justifies its referral. When the request is approved, the Court has the 
opportunity to reconsider a case completely in a different, larger formation than 
previously. The Court cannot decide to refer a case to the Grand Chamber. This 
opportunity for involvement therefore only arises when one of the parties requests 
referral.  
Referral also gives the respondent state the opportunity to become involved in 
the proceedings after the Court has issued a judgment that is not yet final by making 
a request for referral. More specifically, in a request for referral, the respondent 
state can explain to the Court why it thinks a case is exceptional and warrants 
referral because it raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or 
application of the Convention or a serious issue of general importance. If a case is 
indeed referred, the respondent state has the possibility, by means of the other 
opportunities for involvement, to convince the Grand Chamber why a chamber 
judgment was incorrect. As explained above, this opportunity for involvement does 
not exist when the Court has declared an application inadmissible.  
                                                        
86  Art. 36(2) ECHR; Rule 44(3)(a) of Court (emphasis LRG).  
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2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
This indicator helps scrutinise the procedures in order to establish whether they 
make possible and stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the 
Convention, that is, in conformity with the subsidiarity principle, and as such.  
Communication: Communication and the subsequent filing of observations 
allow the respondent state to share responsibilities with the Court in conformity 
with the Convention. The respondent state can inform the Court, as the subsidiarity 
principle dictates it should, of the facts of a case, which facilitates the quick and 
efficient finding of the facts by the Court. The Court can stimulate this by asking 
for factual information in its communication of a case. This procedural step also 
gives the respondent state the possibility to share responsibilities with the Court by 
presenting and defending its view on the merits, either in response to specific 
questions posed by the Court or in relation to matters which it considers to be 
important.  
Interim measures: Interim measures do not promote the sharing of 
responsibilities between the Court and the states parties. On the contrary, an interim 
measure is a precise order of the Court obliging the respondent state to immediately 
take or abstain from taking specific measures. The challenge which the procedure 
poses to the subsidiarity principle should, however, not be overstated, because 
interim measures are temporary and normally only relate to the situation of the 
individual applicant. The measure does not require the states ‘to renounce important 
aspects of their sovereign powers; what they demand is more time to enable the 
[Court] to examine the case and render a decision’.87 Moreover, the subsidiarity 
principle is not disregarded altogether: the applicant must pursue domestic remedies 
with suspensive effect prior to applying for an interim measure with the Court. 
Strike-out procedures: The four strike-out procedures give respondent states a 
last chance to ‘put matters right through their own legal system before answering 
before an international body’ and thus to fulfil their primary responsibility.88 This 
means that the state can remedy an alleged violation itself and that the Court does 
not need to decide on the question of a violation. The procedures therefore 
encourage respect for the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
states in accordance with the subsidiarity principle.  
Hearings: Hearings promote the sharing of responsibilities in a similar manner 
as communication, because they also enable the respondent state to communicate 
facts and its arguments on the merits to the Court. Hearings complement 
communication, because they allow the state to bring to the attention of the Court 
factual or legal points raised during communication which it finds particularly 
important. Additionally, the respondent state, when answering the questions of the 
Court during a hearing, may supplement the information provided during 
                                                        
87  Vajić (2007), 602. 
88  Atmaca v. Germany (Dec.), No. 45293/06, 6 March 2012. 
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communication. In addition to sharing responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention, the procedure can also contribute to the sharing of responsibilities as 
such when interlocutors other than the respondent state become involved. They can 
provide information to the Court or give their legal views.  
Relinquishment: The relinquishment of its jurisdiction by a chamber to the 
Grand Chamber does not contribute to sharing responsibilities. It only means that, 
upon relinquishment, a case is adjudicated by a different formation of the Court; not 
that the Court takes on extra responsibilities or delegates responsibilities to the state 
which it would otherwise not have delegated.  
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions are a way to share 
responsibilities with the Court. Interventions can focus on issues and provide 
information to the Court of which it may, in the absence of an intervention, remain 
unaware of or has limited time and resources to collect. The reason why 
interventions provide information of which the Court may otherwise remain 
unaware of is clarified per interlocutor below. The Court can stimulate sharing 
responsibilities by way of third-party interventions by inviting interlocutors with 
useful knowledge to intervene; this would enhance the dialogic value of the 
procedure.  
Intervening and therefore non-respondent states can inform the Court of inter 
alia the consequences which an adverse judgment would have for their system, the 
sensitivities that play a role nationally and how a certain legal concept works in 
their system. In this manner, states can unburden the Court’s Research Division 
responsible for drawing up comparative law reports.89  
Protocol 14 has given the Commissioner the right to intervene ‘[w]ith a view to 
protecting the general interest more effectively’ and because the Commissioner’s 
‘experience may help enlighten the Court on certain questions, particularly in cases 
which highlight structural or systemic weaknesses in the respondent or other High 
Contracting Parties’.90 According to the Commissioner, this may enable the Court 
to better understand structures underlying a human rights problem which 
‘individual cases perhaps obscure’.91 The Commissioner can report to the Court 
about, for example, the facts (s)he found during a country visits. In this way, (s)he 
functions inter alia as a channel for bringing information from national human 
rights institutions to the Court, thus contextualising an individual complaint.92 The 
Commissioner is, in sum, well-equipped to explain to the Court the context in 
which an individual violation took place and thus to focus on problems relating 
external tension. This focus usefully complements the Court’s work.  
When an Assembly committee or individual member would be granted leave to 
intervene as ‘any person concerned’, depending on the content of an intervention, 
the work of the Court can be complemented. The Assembly could complement the 
                                                        
89  See for more information: Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich (2012).  
90  Explanatory Memorandum to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 87.  
91  Hammarberg and Dalhuisen (2009), 521. 
92  Sivonen (2012), 34.  
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Court when it, for example, informs the Court of the content of reports,93 explores 
issues relating to external tension, or when a committee explains the experience 
parliamentarians from different states have when dealing with a certain issue.  
Investigations: When the Court undertakes an investigation, this means that the 
respondent state has failed to fulfil its primary responsibility for fact-finding. The 
procedure therefore does not contribute to sharing responsibilities in conformity 
with the Convention. Quite the opposite, the Court takes on responsibilities falling 
under the respondent state’s responsibility, thus going against the sharing of 
responsibilities as the Convention stipulates. 
Judgments: A judgment is of some relevance to indicator 2 because, in a 
judgment, the Court can demonstrate that the information which it received by way 
of communication, hearings and third-party interventions indeed helped to respect 
the subsidiarity principle and usefully complemented its own work. This, however, 
does not mean that judgments themselves permit the sharing of responsibilities; 
they only describe how this happened through other procedural steps. The Court can 
also describe in a judgment how it relied of its own motion on information 
published by the other interlocutors or on standards set by them. From this 
perspective, sharing responsibilities by way of relying on publicly available 
documents does not differ from third-party interventions. What is, however, 
different from third-party interventions is that the information is not actively 
communicated to the Court, which means that the Court uses the information 
without the intervention of the other interlocutor. This difference makes that the 
sharing of responsibilities in this manner is not relevant to this study, because it is 
not the result of any sort of communication, but of the Court’s proactive use of 
publicly available information.  
Referral: Referral would contribute to sharing responsibilities in conformity 
with the subsidiarity principle if this principle would impose an obligation on the 
states to ensure that cases raising certain serious questions or issues are decided by 
the Grand Chamber. As the principle concerns the implementation of the 
Convention, to which the aforesaid obligation is not related, referrals do not 
contribute to sharing responsibilities in conformity with the subsidiarity principle.  
As for the Court, the procedure makes reconsideration by the Grand Chamber 
possible, but a Grand Chamber judgment is not necessarily more in conformity with 
the subsidiarity principle than the reconsidered chamber judgment, although this is 
a possibility. Because this is a mere possibility, not a constant feature of the 
procedure, referrals do not contribute to sharing responsibilities in conformity with 
the subsidiarity principle either.  
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2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding 
This indicator poses the question whether a procedure contributes to understanding 
between interlocutors on the European and the national level. More specifically, it 
asks whether the states parties’ understanding of the Convention system and, in the 
context of the (pre-)merits phase, the Court’s understanding of national issues 
relating to internal and external tension grows. 
Communication: Communication permits both the Court, by asking certain 
questions, and the state, by presenting information and advancing arguments, to 
increase each other’s understanding, albeit limitedly in respect of the state’s 
understanding. The questions of the Court are likely focussed on increasing its own 
understanding of the case before it, rather than on educating the state about how the 
Convention system should function. However, by selecting certain questions, the 
Court may nevertheless point out to the respondent state how a relevant Convention 
principle applies to the case before it. In their observations, states can use 
arguments relating to the three sources of internal tension to persuade the Court that 
no violation took place, thus increasing the Court’s understanding of issues relating 
to this type of tension. The states are, on the whole, probably less inclined to inform 
the Court of issues relating to external tension, because adversarial proceedings in 
an individual case do not always encourage or lend themselves to providing such 
information. However, states may be prompted to inform the Court of external 
tension when this may help create understanding and justify the choices it made in 
the difficult situation of external tension. Subsequently, the Court’s understanding 
of this type of tension may increase.  
Interim measures: Interim measures are temporary measures that leave little to 
no room for deliberation and reflection on Convention principles and the broader 
horizon of national problems. This procedure does therefore not foster mutual 
understanding: it does not offer the time and depth to achieve this.  
Strike-out procedures: The strike-out procedures do not contribute to mutual 
understanding. Although the respondent state must possess a certain level of 
understanding of the Convention system to take measures which are sufficiently 
appropriate to justify a strike-out decision, this does not necessarily mean its 
understanding increases.  
Hearings: As hearings mainly serve to clarify issues, they can be a way for the 
Court to gain understanding of the national system of the respondent state. Further, 
the Court can, by way of the questions which it poses to the states and in a 
comparable manner as during communication, try to educate the state about 
Convention principles and how they function in the case before it. As in the case of 
communication, it is likely that states focus on issues relating to internal tension 
rather than on those relating to external tension.  
Relinquishment: The procedure of relinquishment does not offer any 
significant possibility to enhance mutual understanding in the sense of this 
indicator. At best, the intention to relinquish clarifies that a chamber considers the 
case before it to be important. 
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Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions have considerable 
potential to increase the Court’s understanding of national systems, because they 
allow states to communicate to the Court information about, for example, legal 
concepts which are at issue in a case before it and which are relevant to more states 
than just the respondent state. They can also inform the Court of their disagreement 
with a previous judgment and the possible consequences of an adverse judgment for 
their domestic legal order. Moreover, third-party interventions allow the 
Commissioner and, possibly, the Assembly to enhance the Court’s understanding of 
issues relating to external tension in particular, as explained under indicator 2. The 
Court’s broader understanding of the case therefore potentially increases in two 
ways. First, in the sense that the Court pays regard to the situation in or opinion of 
states other than the respondent state and, second, in the sense that it is informed of 
the background to an individual violation. Additionally, the CDDH has proposed 
that third-party interventions by states can function as a ‘means of assisting them 
better to understand and apply the general principles of the Court’s case law, by 
involving them in litigation on specific legal issues’.94  
Investigations: Investigations can increase the Court’s knowledge of a domestic 
system, and therefore potentially achieve understanding. On-site investigations, for 
example, ‘provide delegates with a unique opportunity to gain direct, first-hand 
impressions of the locations visited […], and accordingly to supplement their 
understanding of the situation gleaned previously from reviewing the pleadings and 
available documents in the case’.95 The factual focus of investigations, however, 
limits the potential increase in understanding in the sense that establishing the facts 
relating to an individual case does not automatically mean that the Court gains 
better understanding of a national system generally and issues causing internal 
tension. Furthermore, the Court’s understanding does not necessarily increase as a 
result of interaction with the respondent state, but may also result from interaction 
with non-state officials. Therefore, whether the increase in understanding is the 
result of interaction and therefore of relevance depends on which actor provides 
information during an investigation. As for the understanding of the state under 
investigation, it can be imagined that if the Court comes to the state and carries out 
investigations there, the understanding hold by or at least the awareness of different 
domestic authorities of the Convention system increases.  
Judgments: The issuance of a judgment cannot help the Court to increase its 
understanding. In a judgment, the Court can only demonstrate how the information 
that it acquired about the relevant national legal system by way of the above-
discussed procedures informed its understanding of the national level. A judgment, 
and more specifically the Court’s determination of the merits, is, however, an 
opportunity for the Court to increase the respondent state’s understanding of the 
Convention system. When it clearly explains, with reference to Convention 
                                                        
94  Committee, ‘CM Documents’, CM(2009)51 add prov, 31 March 2009, para. 27.  
95  Leach et al. (2009), 73.  
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principles and case law, why it has come to a certain decision on the merits, its 
judgments potentially have the effect envisaged by this indicator. The requirement 
on the Court to reason its judgments, as elaborated on under indicator 5, ensures 
that this potential exists in each judgment.  
Referral: When a request for referral is accepted, the state has the opportunity 
to submit additional observations to the Court. Moreover, the Court can explain its 
view on the merits in a second judgment and other procedural opportunities for 
involvement that help increase mutual understanding may be used a second time. 
For these reasons, referral potentially increases mutual understanding. Both 
decisions accepting and refusing requests furthermore potentially increase the 
states’ understanding of which cases, in the Court’s view, raise a serious question 
affecting the interpretation/application of the Convention or a serious issue of 
general importance. The lack of reason-giving of the panel deciding on referral 
requests, however, limits the potential of decisions on requests to achieve this 
effect.  
2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Indicator 4 aims to establish whether procedures in the (pre-)merits phase contribute 
to balanced judgments in the sense that the Court, in its judgments and through the 
procedures, pays due regard to the difficulties at the root of internal tension. It is 
particularly important that the Court’s judgments are balanced, because if this 
would not be the case, they could be a potential source of conflict over internal 
tension, an outcome which dialogue aims to prevent. Judgments have this potential, 
because they are binding instruments in which the Court orders just satisfaction and 
which a respondent state must execute.  
Communication: Communication gives the respondent state the opportunity to 
explain its viewpoints to the Court. When the Court responds to these explanations 
in its judgment and bases its judgment (in part) on these explanations, its decisions 
are likely more balanced in the opinion of the respondent state than when it would 
not rely on the exchange of information during communication. Communication 
therefore potentially contributes to balanced decision-making.  
Interim measures: Interim measures, rather than as balanced, can be interpreted 
by the respondent state as unbalanced, because they empower the Court to make 
specific orders, albeit of a temporary nature, to the state. Moreover, the Court 
makes these decisions even though the state has superior knowledge of its own 
domestic system and might therefore be of the opinion that the order is unnecessary 
or unjustified. Even if the respondent state would not interpret interim measures as 
unbalanced, the decision-making during this process would not qualify as balanced, 
but at most as neutral.  
Strike-out procedures: A major risk to balanced decision-making is the finding 
of a violation by the Court, a finding which it announces publicly and which the 
respondent state presumably has opposed and does generally not welcome. The 
respondent state can, for reasons relating to internal tension, moreover interpret the 
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finding as unbalanced. As a consequence of a strike-out decision, the Court is 
precluded from making a potentially unbalanced finding because it does not 
determine the question of a violation. Instead, it makes the state the main decision-
maker anew. Therefore, the question whether a strike-out procedure encourages 
balanced decision-making by the Court does not even need to be answered.  
Hearings: In a comparable manner as communication, hearings give the 
respondent state the opportunity to explain its viewpoints to the Court, which may 
lead the Court to issue more balanced judgments than when it would not have been 
informed of these explanations. Additionally, hearings may strengthen the positive 
outcome which communication and third-party interventions potentially have from 
the perspective of this indicator because they can clarify the content of written 
documents.  
Relinquishment: Because Grand Chamber judgments are issued by the largest 
judicial formation, they may be perceived as more balanced. However, such a 
perception is not necessarily the result of more concern with issues related to 
internal tension and it is as such not the result of any dialogue between the Court 
and another interlocutor. For these reasons, relinquishment does not potentially 
contribute to balanced decision-making.  
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions potentially enhance the 
balancedness of the Court’s decisions because they are a means for non-respondent 
states to communicate their concerns and views to the Court. Further, the 
interventions complement the procedural step of communication because they allow 
states other than the respondent state to become involved. In this way, the Court’s 
judgments are not only potentially balanced because they show respect for national 
concerns and views of the respondent state, but of other states as well.  
Investigations: When the Court instigates an investigation, it aims to establish 
the facts of a case. Although the facts are a prerequisite for the Court to make 
findings as to the merits of a case, this indicator was designed mostly to help 
establish to what extent a procedure increases the balancednesss of the Court’s 
ruling on the merits by stimulating the Court to respect notions, such as, national 
knowledge and diversity. Because the facts found during investigation do not 
potentially stimulate this in any significant manner, the procedure does not 
contribute to balanced decision-making. 
Judgments: As is noted below, the Court is required to reason its judgments. 
This interlocutor must therefore think through its arguments and considerations and 
substantiate them with reasons. Reasoning potentially contributes to balanced 
decision-making, provided the Court relies on arguments relating to national 
democracy concerns, national diversity and national knowledge submitted to it by 
the states parties through other procedural steps. This contributes to balanced 
decision-making in particular if the Court also shows respect for national 
competences, concerns and views when making decisions in its judgments.  
Additionally, the possibility for a judge to annex a separate opinion, concurring 
with or dissenting from a judgment, potentially stimulates the Court to engage in 
balanced decision-making. Such opinions can make a judgment more balanced in 
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different ways, by demonstrating to the respondent state that its opinion has been 
duly considered.96 As some judges have noted, the opinions ‘[demonstrate] the 
nuances of human rights protection, [...] [indicate] that questions of interpretation 
and application [are] not always clear-cut, could provide consolation for the losing 
party who would know that some judges appreciated their position and arguments, 
and [demonstrate] openness and transparency’.97 Separate opinions have, as the 
judges also explain, the important effect of ‘rendering unpalatable decisions 
acceptable – in sweetening, as it were, the bitter judicial pill’, because they can give 
insight into the merits of the respondent state’s arguments and touch upon 
arguments left unaddressed by a judgment.98 Furthermore, separate opinions can 
provide ‘evidence that a number of judges could reach the same conclusion, albeit 
on different grounds, and that contrary arguments had been thoroughly 
ventilated’.99 Separate opinions, however, only contribute to reason-giving in a 
manner relevant to the purposes of this study when a judge writing a separate 
opinion returns to arguments of the respondent state, perhaps even sides with those 
arguments, and clarifies to the state the difficulties encountered in the decision-
making process.  
Referral: A Grand Chamber judgment issued upon referral may be, content-
wise, more balanced than the referred chamber judgment. This can be due to it 
being a fresh judgment in which the Court makes different choices or due to the fact 
that these judgments are reasoned comparatively extensively. Moreover, the Grand 
Chamber can rely on arguments of the parties brought forward a second time, which 
gives them the opportunity to clarify their position, and on arguments which the 
parties formulated in response to a chamber judgment. It should, however, be added 
that a judgment, regardless of whether it is issued by a chamber or the Grand 
Chamber, contributes to balanced decision-making. Referral therefore only 
stimulates the Court to issue even more balanced judgments; it is not the case that 
its judgments are not balanced in the absence of referral. The possibility that the 
states perceive Grand Chamber judgments as more balanced solely because they are 
issued by a different formation is irrelevant, because this result is not necessarily 
the result of more concern with issues concerning internal tension.  
2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 establishes whether and, if so, how the procedures in the (pre-)merits 
phase stimulate and make it possible for the interlocutors to give reasons for their 
decisions, preferably embedded in the Convention system. Reasons are especially 
important when the decision of one interlocutor negatively affects another, meaning 
in this phase that the Court issues an interim measure or an adverse judgment. 
                                                        
96  Art. 45(2) ECHR; Rule 74(2) of Court.  
97  White and Boussiakou (2009), 57.  
98  Merrills (1993), 40.  
99  Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 328.  
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Communication: During communication, the respondent state can give reasons 
for decisions which it made relevant to the alleged violation, as presented in the 
Court’s communication. This procedural step thus permits external reason-giving 
by the respondent state. By way of its questions, the Court can stimulate the state to 
give reasons that are embedded in the Convention system. The adversarial nature of 
the proceedings and their possible result, namely the finding of a violation, 
stimulate the state to give these reasons. Communication also enables the Court to 
ask for these reasons.  
Interim measures: The Rules of Court do not require that the Court reasons its 
interim measures. Moreover, Article 45(1), which requires that judgments and 
(in)admissibility decision are reasoned, does not apply, because interim measures 
do not take either form. On paper therefore, interim measures do not stimulate 
internal reason-giving.  
Strike-out procedures: As just noted, Article 45(1) requires the Court to reason 
judgments and (in)admissibility decisions. The Court is therefore only required to 
reason the striking-out of an application in a judgment, not if it adopts a decision. 
However, the Rules of Court provide that decisions by chambers and the Grand 
Chamber ‘shall be accompanied or followed by reasons’.100 Reasons are therefore 
given regardless of whether a decision concerns the admissibility of a case. This 
does not seem to apply to the procedure before a committee, probably because the 
committee only decides when ‘a decision can be taken without further 
examination’.101 Reason-giving is, in sum, generally stimulated.  
Hearings: In a comparable manner as during communication, a respondent state 
can explain at hearing why it took decisions resulting in an alleged violation. In this 
manner, the state engages in external reason-giving. The questions which the Court 
poses at hearing may stimulate the state to give reasons relating to the Convention 
system. Furthermore, the state is potentially stimulated to give reasons that can 
prevent the finding of a violation, because the proceedings are adversarial and 
possibly result in an adverse judgment.  
Relinquishment: From the perspective of external reason-giving, it is largely 
irrelevant whether a chamber or, upon referral, the Grand Chamber issues a 
judgment, because both formations are required to reason their judgments.102 The 
question can also be posed whether internal reason-giving, namely reason-giving 
for the decision to relinquish, is stimulated. This is not the case, since the Rules of 
Court provide that ‘[r]easons need not to be given for the decision to relinquish’.103 
Importantly, however, the objection of the respondent state is a ‘veto’ to 
relinquishment. This power decreases the problematic nature of the lack of reason-
giving, as reason-giving is particularly important when a decision is unwelcome to 
an interlocutor. Additionally, the procedure stimulates reason-giving by the 
                                                        
100  Rules 56(1) and 71(1) of Court.  
101  Rule 53(1) of Court.  
102  Art. 45 ECHR. 
103  Rule 72(3) of Court.  
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respondent state, because it must duly reason its objection to relinquishment.104 In 
spite of the foregoing, relinquishment in general does not notably contribute to 
reason-giving.  
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions may stimulate the Court 
to give reasons, because the interlocutors submitting the intervention can point out 
to the Court relevant reasons and issues which it should consider when reasoning its 
judgment. In other words, this procedure potentially stimulates the Court to engage 
in external reason-giving. Concerning internal reason-giving, the question arises 
whether the interveners need to reason their request to intervene. States parties one 
of whose nationals is an applicant and the Commissioner have the right to 
intervene, meaning they do not need to reason their request. Others must submit a 
‘duly reasoned’ request105 and are therefore stimulated to engage in reason-giving. 
Another question that arises is whether Court is required to reason its decision to 
(not) grant a request. Neither the Convention nor the Rules of Court formulate such 
a requirement. Internal reason-giving by the Court is therefore not stimulated.  
Investigations: An investigation does not contribute to external reason-giving in 
the sense that it leads to better motivated judgments. During investigations, the 
Court engages in fact-finding; its investigative exercise does not concern the merits 
of a case. Even though a clear report of the facts may make it easier to arrive at a 
conclusion on the merits and to reason this conclusion, that report does not 
contribute to reason-giving in a direct or significant manner. Moreover, regardless 
of whether it is possible to give a clear account of the facts, reason-giving is 
required. Further, internal reason-giving would be important considering the 
potentially demanding and intrusive nature of investigations from the perspective of 
the respondent state. It is also important, because it can be assumed that 
investigations are unwelcome because they mean the Court is of the opinion that the 
respondent state failed to collect the facts itself. Nevertheless, the decision to start 
an investigation is taken by a simple majority106 and the Court is not required to 
reason such decisions.107 Internal reason-giving is therefore not encouraged either. 
Judgments: In conformity with Article 45(1), the Court must reasons its 
judgments and decisions declaring applications (in)admissible.108 Judgments 
therefore contribute to internal reason-giving. The possibility to annex separate 
opinions enhances this inter alia because the opinions may direct attention to 
reasons on which the Court did not rely109 and because they are a welcome 
‘antidote to an increasingly formulaic style’ of reasoning.110 Probably more 
important than these observations is the quality of the Court’s reasoning. Because 
                                                        
104  Rule 72(1),(4) of Court. 
105  Rule 44(3)(b) of Court. 
106  Rule 23(1) of Court.; Leach et al. (2009), 36. 
107  Art. 45(1) ECHR.  
108  See also: Rules 56(1), 74(1)(h) of Court.  
109  Merrills (1993), 39-40.  
110  White and Boussiakou (2009), 60.  
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the question as to quality concerns practice more than potential, this question is not 
answered here, but is addressed in chapter IX. 
Referral: As in the case of relinquishment, it is largely irrelevant from the 
perspective of external reason-giving whether a chamber or the Grand Chamber 
decides a case, because both formations must pronounce reasoned judgments.111 
Internal reason-giving is not stimulated, because a panel refusing a request does not 
need to give reasons, even though reason-giving is especially important when a 
negative decision is made.112 However, the party making the request for referral 
must specify in its request the serious question or issue which in its view warrants 
consideration by the Grand Chamber, which means this interlocutor must engage in 
internal reason-giving.  
2.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response  
Indicator 6 facilitates analysing whether one interlocutor can respond to a decision 
made or a procedural step set by another interlocutor. The question whether the 
(pre-)merits phase provides room for an external response is answered more 
elaborately in chapter VI as a response to a judgment is mostly given in the 
execution phase. The indicator also poses the less broad question whether internal 
room for a response exists, namely the possibility to respond to decisions, if any, 
taken within the confines of a procedure.  
Communication: During communication, the state has room to respond to the 
questions posed by the Court, the statements of facts as presented by the Court and 
to the Court’s decision to communicate the case, which means that the Court sees 
no ‘clear reasons’ for declaring an application inadmissible.113 In addition to the 
foregoing, communication is obviously a response to the allegations made by the 
applicant and thus a statement of the state’s view on the merits of the complaint. 
The procedure thus offers internal room for a response, as it is a response to steps 
set within the procedural step of communication itself.  
Interim measures: Interim measures do not give the addressed state internal 
room to respond. This is not possible, because this procedural step aims to preserve 
the status quo of the applicant’s situation without delay. Moreover, the Court does 
not need to ask the state for its opinion on the appropriateness of applying the 
procedure. Neither does the procedure offer external room for a response to the 
state; it can only react to the imposition of an interim measure by implementing it as 
ordered by the Court. The binding nature and possibly preciseness of the order 
makes another response not possible.  
Strike out-out procedures: The strike-out procedures give a respondent state 
external room for a response. The measures which the state has taken or intends to 
take, based on which a case can be struck out, can be regarded as a response to the 
                                                        
111  Art. 45 ECHR.  
112  Rule 73(2) of Court. 
113  Leach (2011), 43.  
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communication of a case and, more specifically, the questions posed by the Court 
during communication. Furthermore, because strike-out decisions can be made at 
any stage of the proceedings, the state can also respond to, for example, an 
admissibility decision or a judgment on the merits in which the Court postponed 
dealing with the question of just satisfaction under Article 41. The matter of internal 
room for a response for the respondent state is not relevant in respect of strike-out 
procedures, because the state can instigate the procedures itself. The Court always 
has internal room for a response as it must adopt a strike-out ruling.  
Hearings: Hearings offer external room for a response to the respondent state. 
As in the case of communication, the state can respond to the information presented 
in the communication, alleged violations and the Court’s decision to communicate 
an application. Additionally, the state responds to questions posed to it by the Court 
at hearing about decisions it made on the national level which are relevant to the 
complaint. Hearings do not offer internal room for a response in the sense that the 
state can object to the decision to hold a hearing. This observation is however not 
very problematic, because the decision to hold a hearing is probably welcome to the 
state; room for a response is not needed to help prevent tension from erupting over 
the decision to hold a hearing.  
Relinquishment: The decision to relinquish jurisdiction and the subsequent 
adjudication of a case by the Grand Chamber decreases rather than increases 
external room to respond to a judgment. This is the consequence of the fact that, as 
a result of relinquishment, the state cannot request referral of a case and thus 
respond to an adverse judgment. Internally, however, there is room to respond as 
the state can object to a chamber’s intention to relinquish.  
Third-party interventions: Non-respondent states can potentially use third-
party interventions to comment on the Court’s case law more generally and to 
respond to previous rulings of the Court in this manner. Because these states are not 
a party to the case before the Court, it is even likely that they will do so; the 
individual case then works to trigger them to respond more generally to the Court’s 
case law. Third-party interventions therefore afford external room for a response. 
Investigations: Investigations do not give the respondent state external room for 
a response, that is, room to respond to decisions made by the Court previously. The 
states only play a facilitating role, meaning they cannot discuss with the Court their 
view on the merits of a complaint. Even when national authorities are the subject of 
an investigation, the obligatory and inquisitorial nature of the procedure and the 
Court’s leading role means states can hardly formulate a response freely, let alone a 
response to previous decisions made by the Court. The lack of room for external 
response is also due to the factual focus of the procedure, which does not lend itself 
to responding to decisions made relating to the merits. The procedure neither offers 
the respondent state internal room for a response in the sense that the Court is 
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required to ask for its opinion on the appropriateness of conducting an investigation. 
Instead, a fact-finding mission can be held without the consent of the state.114  
Judgments: A judgment is the Court’s response to the arguments and 
information provided to it by the other interlocutors through the other procedures. 
Judgments therefore provide the Court external room to respond to the other 
interlocutors in the (pre-)merits phase.  
Referral: Referral gives the respondent state, when its request for referral is 
accepted, the possibility to respond to a decision issued against it, namely a 
chamber judgment. The procedure therefore offers external room to respond for the 
state. The respondent state does, however, not have internal room to respond to a 
request for referral by the applicant. This outcome can be contrasted to 
relinquishment, where the respondent state is heard about the Court’s intention to 
relinquish. Additionally, the Court has external room to respond to new arguments 
and information provided to it, possibly by new interlocutors, after it issued its 
chamber judgment.  
2.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
The question that this indicator raises, namely whether the procedures in the (pre-
)merits phase prevent the escalation of internal tension into conflict or helps 
mitigate or end already existing conflict, is in part answered based on the 
observations made under the foregoing indicators. These observations point to 
features of the procedures which reduce the likelihood that internal tension develops 
into conflict. The discussion in this section is only a partial answer; whether conflict 
develops also depends on whether judgments offer room for a response in the 
execution phase as discussed in the next chapter.  
Communication: The reasons which a respondent state gives and the 
information which it provides during communication are potentially conflict 
preventing, because, as explained with reference to indicators 3-6 they can increase 
mutual understanding, make the Court’s judgments more balanced, improve the 
Court’s reason-giving and provide room for a response. The possibility for the state 
to provide reasons, sometimes directly in answer to questions posed by the Court, 
may clarify to the Court that a violation has not occurred. When this possibility 
eventually leads to a judgment not finding a violation, conflict can be prevented 
altogether. Alternatively, it may help the Court to better understand and to show in 
a balanced judgment that it has paid due regard to national particularities and 
sensitivities. This may make an adverse judgment easier to accept for a state, thus 
preventing conflict in a different manner. Further, when the respondent state’s 
understanding of the Convention system improves, it may be easier for it to 
understand why the Court issued an adverse judgment, making the judgment more 
acceptable and thus preventing conflict. The information and arguments provided 
                                                        
114  Leach et al. (2009), 34. 
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by the state are then a first step towards the prevention of conflict. Whether conflict 
is indeed prevented or limited depends at least in part on the last procedural step, 
namely the Court’s judgment.  
Interim measures: Interim measures in no way help channel internal tension 
away from conflict. The procedure may even cause conflict, because the Court 
makes a specific order to the state, albeit a temporary one.  
Strike-out procedures: As explained under indicator 4, the Court cannot make 
an unbalanced decision in the sense of this indicator when striking a case out of its 
list. The strike-out procedures provide the state room to respond to an application 
and its communication by taking measures which make it unnecessary for the Court 
to continue adjudicating the application. The Court is therefore precluded from 
issuing a judgment that potentially causes conflict. The procedures therefore 
potentially prevent conflict altogether. 
Hearings: Hearings have all the positive effects which indicators 3-6 serve to 
establish and these effects are potentially conflict-preventing. When the Court better 
understands the domestic situation, it is stimulated to take decisions which are 
acceptable to the respondent state. Balanced judgments and room for a response by 
the state can have a similar effect. Further, the respondent state may also find it 
easier to accept an adverse judgment when it better understands the Convention 
system. Additionally, when room for a response by the state means that the Court 
does not find a violation, conflict is prevented altogether. Conflict may also be 
prevented in a broader sense, namely conflict with states other than the respondent 
state, because hearings are an opportunity for their involvement as well.  
Relinquishment: From the perspective of indicators 3-6, relinquishment is not 
beneficial to preventing conflict. One aspect of the procedure can however be 
beneficial in that sense: the possibility for the respondent state to veto 
relinquishment. Apart from the findings made under the previous indicators, the 
effect of relinquishment in the light of indicator 7 is not unequivocal either. One the 
one hand, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction takes away the only internal appeal 
possibility for the respondent state, a possibility which otherwise can work to 
mitigate or end conflict, as will be explained when discussing referral. On the other 
hand, the result of the procedure, namely a Grand Chamber judgment, may help 
prevent conflict for two reasons. Grand Chamber judgments namely potentially 
increase the clarity of the Court’s case law, as this formation decides cases raising a 
serious question affecting the interpretation of the Convention. Besides that, these 
judgments potentially increase the unity of the Court’s case law, as the Grand 
Chamber decides cases which may otherwise have a result inconsistent with a 
previous judgment. Both legal clarity and legal unity potentially prevent conflict. In 
sum, whether relinquishment contributes to preventing conflict depends. 
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions have conflict preventing 
potential. As described above, they may increase the Court’s understanding of 
issues relating to external tension and sensitivities and problems in states other than 
the respondent state. In this way, they also potentially stimulate balanced decision-
making. When the Court’s understanding increases and its decision-making 
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becomes more balanced, conflict is potentially prevented. Further, conflict is 
potentially not only prevented with the respondent state, but also with other states, 
especially the intervening states, because the procedure makes it possible for these 
states to respond to previous judgments of the Court and to increase their 
understanding.  
Investigations: Investigations hardly can prevent conflict. The decision to 
investigate is based, amongst other things, on the respondent state’s failure to gather 
the facts of a case. Therefore, when the Court decides to instigate an investigation, 
this is a clear signal from the Court to the state that the latter has failed to fulfil its 
primary responsibility. This potentially causes conflict rather than prevents it. 
Moreover, investigations, when states do not sufficiently cooperate as required by 
virtue of Article 38, may lead to the finding of a violation of this Article. This may 
also lead to conflict or can be interpreted as a sign that conflict has already 
developed. 
Judgments: As discussed with reference to the other indicators, judgments 
potentially contribute to mutual understanding, balanced decision-making (albeit in 
a limited manner), and reason-giving. They also give the Court room to respond to 
the respondent state’s arguments. For these reasons, they potentially prevent 
conflict.  
Referral: As explained under indicators 1 and 3, referral offers the state and the 
Court an opportunity for involvement during which they may increase each other’s 
understanding. Further, it was explained under indicator 6 that this procedure gives 
states the possibility to respond to a chamber judgment. When the appeal results in 
a Grand Chamber judgment that is more acceptable than the chamber judgment in 
the respondent state’s opinion, this potentially helps to prevent conflict or, when it 
has already developed, to mitigate or end it. For these reasons, the procedure may 
help mitigate or end conflict resulting from a chamber judgment between these two 
interlocutors. It is however also possible that the applicant requests referral and that 
the Grand Chamber finds a violation whereas a chamber did not. Whether referral 
has a positive effect from the perspective of indicator 7 therefore depends on the 
circumstances of the case; a Grand Chamber judgment which is negative for the 
respondent state could even cause conflict.  
3 CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF PROCEDURES IN THE 
(PRE-)MERITS PHASE  
The conclusion to this chapter is written from the angle of the separate procedures 
or procedural steps. It is necessary to establish the dialogic potential of these 
procedures individually, because only procedures with clear or some dialogic 
potential are assessed in part 3. It should be recalled from section IV.5.6 that the 
findings made under indicators 2 and 7 contribute more to making dialogue of 
added value to the Convention system than the other indicators. Therefore, when 
drawing conclusions, the findings under these indicators carry, compared to the 
findings made under the other indicators, more weight. As was also noted in section 
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IV.5.6, a procedure or procedural step is in this conclusion is labelled as having 
clear, some or limited potential.  
Communication: The first procedural step that was assessed is communication. 
This step gives the Court and the respondent state an opportunity for involvement. 
When they become involved through this procedure, they can share responsibilities 
in conformity with the subsidiarity principle and can increase each other’s 
understanding. Moreover, their involvement can work to prevent conflict. 
Regarding the state specifically, it can engage in external reason-giving. 
Communication also gives the state internal room for a response, to respond to the 
communication itself. The procedure further encourages balanced decision-making 
by the Court. It can be concluded that communication has clear dialogic potential.  
Interim measures: Both the Court and the state become involved in the interim 
measure procedure. Although the state becomes involved, the discussion in section 
V.2 revealed that, when involved, it cannot share responsibilities with the Court, 
cannot increase the Court’s understanding of its domestic system, cannot engage in 
reason-giving and does not have room to respond. The foregoing makes the state’s 
involvement, albeit necessary for the successful completion of the procedure, not 
really dialogic. The Court’s involvement causes it to largely disregard sharing 
responsibilities in line with the subsidiarity principle, does not increase the state’s 
understanding of the Convention system and can even cause conflict. Furthermore, 
the Court does not need to give reasons for its decision to apply an interim measure 
and nor does it make a potentially balanced decision. As in the case of the state’s 
involvement, the Court’s involvement is therefore not dialogic. Interim measures 
have, in conclusion, limited to no dialogic potential.  
Strike-out procedures: Each strike-out procedure enables the Court and the 
respondent state to become involved. In addition to the Court’s judges, the Registry 
can play an important role in the friendly settlement procedure. The most 
autonomous opportunity for the respondent state’s involvement is to adopt a 
unilateral declaration, because the initiative for adopting the declaration lies wholly 
with the state itself and because these declarations enable the state to end 
Convention procedures largely on its own terms. Most importantly, the strike-out 
procedures potentially contribute to sharing responsibilities and prevent conflict all 
together. In addition to that, the procedures stimulate internal reason-giving by the 
Court and give the respondent state external room for a response. The procedure 
does not contribute to mutual understanding. The last finding does, however, not 
invalidate the conclusion that strike-out procedures have clear dialogic potential.  
Hearings: Hearings are – on paper at least – an opportunity for the involvement 
of all interlocutors, including non-respondent states, except the Committee. Some 
interlocutors, although not a party to the case, even have the right to become 
involved: the Commissioner and states one of whose nationals is an applicant. 
Hearings potentially stimulate sharing responsibilities in conformity with the 
subsidiarity principle, help prevent conflict, both with the respondent state and 
possibly other states, and reinforce mutual understanding. They also create an 
opportunity for the respondent state to engage in external reason-giving and create 
 
 
 
 Chapter V 
 
 
204 
external room for a response for this interlocutor. With regard to the Court, hearings 
encourage it to make balanced decisions. It can be concluded, considering the 
foregoing, that this procedural step has clear dialogic potential. It can be further 
remarked that communication and hearings are comparable as they yield the same 
positive results under indicators 2-7. These two procedural steps are, however, also 
different because hearings permit more interlocutors to become involved than 
communication.  
Relinquishment: Relinquishment is an opportunity for involvement of the 
Court – its only opportunity to bring a case before the Grand Chamber on its own 
initiative. The state can also become involved by objecting to relinquishment. Yet, 
relinquishment, when it indeed takes place, also means that these two interlocutors 
cannot become involved twice in two separate Convention proceedings: before and 
after referral. Relinquishment is therefore an opportunity for involvement, but also 
limits subsequent opportunities for involvement which would exist if the procedure 
would not be used. Further, the procedure does not potentially promote sharing 
responsibilities, mutual understanding, balanced decision-making or reason-giving, 
because the main result of relinquishment is the adjudication of a case by the Grand 
Chamber. The Grand Chamber procedure does not differ from a chamber procedure 
in a manner that significantly affects the Court’s decision-making. The procedure 
creates internal room for a response for the respondent state, but also makes that the 
state has less external room for a response than when the procedure would not be 
used. Further, relinquishment does not necessarily prevent conflict; whether it does 
depends on one’s perspective. Considering that the only findings relevant to 
dialogue can be nuanced, this procedure has limited dialogic potential in sum.  
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions are an opportunity for the 
involvement of all interlocutors except the Committee and, quite logically, the 
respondent state. As in the case of hearings, the Commissioner and states one of 
whose nationals is an applicant have the right to intervene. It is easier for the 
interlocutors to become involved through an intervention than through a hearing, 
because involvement through the latter procedure is only possible when the Court 
has decided to hold a hearing. Third-party interventions grant the interlocutors the 
possibility to submit a request for leave to intervene in all chamber and Grand 
Chamber cases. Moreover, unlike hearings, which are only organised in exceptional 
circumstances, the Rules of Court do not prescribe that third-party interventions are 
only admitted exceptionally. The intervening interlocutors help share 
responsibilities as such and their interventions may help prevent conflict. 
Furthermore, the interventions potentially increase the Court’s understanding of 
domestic systems other than that of the respondent state and encourage balanced 
decision-making and external reason-giving by the Court. Additionally, they can 
increase the states’ understanding. Internal reason-giving by states intervening 
under subparagraph 2 is also simulated. The procedure also gives the intervening 
interlocutors external room for a response. Third-party interventions have, all things 
considered, clear dialogic potential. This procedure is comparable to hearings, but 
differs most significantly in one respect: interventions are not an opportunity for 
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involvement of the respondent state. Due to this difference, interventions cannot 
contribute to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention or to 
increasing the understanding of the respondent state.  
Investigations: The state and the Court need to become involved in an 
investigation. The state’s involvement, due its facilitative role, does not give it room 
for a response or the possibility to share responsibilities with the Court. On the 
contrary, factual investigations by the Court go against the sharing of 
responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention. Similarly, the procedure does not 
contribute to preventing conflict, but may cause it. In other words, the procedure 
not does not have the effects the most important indicators, 2 and 7, aim to 
establish, but may have opposite effects. Nor do investigations stimulate the Court 
to engage in reason-giving or to take balanced decisions. Further, the procedure can 
help increase the state’s understanding of the Convention system and the Court’s 
understanding of the national system, but in the latter case only in a limited manner 
and not necessarily as the result of interaction with state officials. Investigations 
have limited dialogic potential in view of the finding that they have dialogic 
potential only from the perspective of one indicator and can have an effect contrary 
to indicators 2 and 7. The limited potential is the logical consequence of a 
procedure that is instigated after the respondent state has failed to finds the fact 
itself and that aims to obtain the facts from any person or institution, not necessarily 
from a state representative or institution.  
Judgments: Judgments enable only one interlocutor to become involved: the 
Court. They potentially help prevent conflict. Other positive results from a dialogic 
perspective are that judgments may increase the state’s understanding of the 
Convention system, that they encourage balanced decision-making and internal 
reason-giving by the Court, and that they give the Court external room for a 
response. On a more negative note, this procedural step does not contribute to the 
sharing of responsibilities. Judgments have, in conclusion, some dialogic potential 
considering that they do not contribute to sharing responsibilities, something which 
is particularly important to making dialogue of added value to the Convention 
system. Moreover, judgments permit only the involvement of one interlocutor, even 
though other interlocutors can give input to the Court’s ruling by way of procedural 
steps set prior to the adoption of a ruling.  
Referral: Referral is an opportunity for involvement of the respondent state 
because it can file a request for referral and for the Court because it must approve 
the request. Moreover, the procedure gives these interlocutors the opportunity to 
become involved in the above-discussed procedures for their involvement twice 
(except relinquishment). The analysis in section V.2 established that the procedure 
does not contribute to the sharing of responsibilities and does not necessarily help 
prevent conflict. Further, referral does not contribute to balanced decision-making 
or to reason-giving, except to internal reason-giving by the state requesting referral. 
More positively, however, the procedure can help increase mutual understanding 
and provides the Court and the respondent state external room for a response. The 
procedure does, however, not provide such room for a response to the respondent 
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state when the applicant party seeks referral. Referral has some dialogic potential, 
not clear potential, because it does not contribute to sharing responsibilities, does 
not necessarily contribute to preventing conflict and has other less positive results. 
The reason to label relinquishment as having limited potential and referral as having 
some potential is that referral, unlike relinquishment, potentially contributes to 
mutual understanding and gives the Court and the state room for a response. 
Moreover, referral, unlike relinquishment, makes it possible for all interlocutors to 
become involved another time, through other procedures, because proceedings start 
anew. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF PROCEDURES 
IN THE EXECUTION PHASE 
 
 
 
The previous chapter examined the input into a judgment which the interlocutors 
may give in the (pre-)merits phase, as well as judgments themselves. This chapter 
concerns the next and last phase in Convention proceedings: the execution phase, 
which ought to result in the enforcement of a judgment. This chapter assesses the 
dialogic potential of procedures enabling the interlocutors to influence the course of 
execution. 
The assessment is not limited to formal Committee procedures, but also assesses 
other procedural opportunities for involvement in the execution phase. Limiting the 
assessment to Committee procedures would likely lead to the conclusion that only 
the Committee can become involved in this phase, whilst this is not the case when a 
broader view is taken. Unlike the (pre-)merits phase, the execution phase lends 
itself to and calls for a broader view. The (pre-)merits phase concerns the relatively 
narrow and legal question whether a violation has been committed; the execution 
phase concerns broader questions that are not necessarily legal, such as, the 
question which execution measures must be taken, whether the implemented 
measures suffice and how the states can be stimulated to take execution measures. 
The questions that arise in the execution phase do not necessarily need to be 
answered by the Committee, which justifies taking a broader view that looks into 
procedures which the Committee does not master. For these reasons, procedures 
mastered by the Court, the Commissioner and the Assembly are also examined.  
An introduction (section VI.1) to the execution phase precedes the assessment of 
this phase in the light of the seven indicators for dialogue in section VI.2. The 
introduction sets out the content of the Article 46(1) obligation that rests on the 
states parties to execute the Court’s judgments, explains some of the modalities of 
the Committee’s supervision and shortly discusses the twelve procedural steps 
which section VI.2 analyses.  
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE EXECUTION PHASE AND ITS PROCEDURES  
The first paragraph of Article 46 obliges the states parties to ‘undertake to abide by 
the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties’. This 
obligation is the key to the execution phase, as it means that a judgment is not the 
end to a legal dispute concerning the question whether a violation has been 
committed, but the beginning of something equally or perhaps more important: the 
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ending, remedying and prevention of a (future) violation. The obligation to execute 
rests on a state whenever it is a party to a case. It is a binding obligation, relating 
not to any judgment or the whole judgment, but, more specifically, to final 
judgments as defined in Article 44 and to the operative provisions thereof.1 Due to 
the ‘essentially declaratory’ nature of the judgments, the obligation to execute is 
one of result.2 The respondent state therefore ‘remains free, subject to the 
supervision of the Committee, to choose the means by which it will discharge its 
legal obligation under Article 46 [...], provided that such means are compatible with 
the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment’.3 The obligation to execute applies 
broadly within a state: not only the higher authorities must for their own part 
respect the Convention rights, but they must also prevent or remedy any breach at 
the lower levels of state. Further, the obligation ‘may require action to be taken by 
any State authority’.4 
The respondent state has fulfilled its Article 46 obligation when three results 
have been achieved.5 First, the state has to end the violation identified in the 
judgment.6 Second, it must repair the consequences of the breach.7 Reparation can 
take two forms or a combination thereof: restitutio in integrum, which is reparation 
in kind, or, when this is not or partially possible, just satisfaction, which is a 
monetary award.8 Restitutio in integrum aims to restore the situation of before the 
breach as far as possible and is preferred over just satisfaction.9 Just satisfaction 
aims to ‘provide reparation solely for damage suffered by those concerned to the 
extent that such events constitute a consequence of the violation that cannot 
otherwise be remedied’.10 Reparation compensates for two types of damages: 
pecuniary damage and non-pecuniary damage.11 Pecuniary damage concerns 
material harm that can be remedied by way of financial compensation and by way 
of compensation in kind, such as, the restitution of property. Non-pecuniary damage 
concerns non-material harm, such as, mental and physical suffering. The third result 
which a state must achieve is to prevent future violations.12 This obligation is 
                                                        
1  The operative provisions may include an award of just satisfaction under Art. 41 ECHR. 
2  See also: section II.2.3.3 where the declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments was described as a 
manifestation of the subsidiarity principle in the execution phase.  
3  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, para. 406 (emphasis LRG).  
4  Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia, No. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, para. 210.  
5  These three results, or criteria for determining the reparation owed by the respondent state, can also 
be found in the international case law of courts and arbitration tribunals. The Court considers this 
case law to be a ‘precious source of inspiration’, see: Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece 
(Art. 41), No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, para. 36.  
6  Ibid, para. 34.  
7  Idem. 
8  Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 249.  
9  Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Art. 41), No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, para. 34.  
10   Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy (GC), No. 39221/98 et al., 13 July 200, para. 250.  
11  See for more information and for examples: Leach (2011), 466-474.  
12  The Court seldom refers to this obligation, see, e.g.: Lukenda v. Slovenia, No. 23032/02, 6 October 
2005, para. 98; Erçep v. Turkey, No. 43965/04, 22 November 2011, para. 80; The state is under Art. 
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different from the first two obligations, because it is of a general nature and relates 
to future events, whilst the other two relate specifically to the situation of the 
individual applicant and to repairing a past or continuous violation.  
The three results which must be achieved by virtue of Article 46 translate into 
the obligation to take individual and/or general measures.13 Individual measures 
concern the applicant’s situation and can consist of monetary awards by way of just 
satisfaction and measures in kind,14 such as the reinstatement of the applicant to the 
post of judge.15 They ensure that the violation has ceased and that, as far as 
possible, restitutio in integrum has been achieved.16 General measures give effect to 
the obligation to prevent future violations and may also be necessary to end an 
individual continuing violation.17 They involve changes to legislation, regulations 
and judicial practice.18 These measures concern, for example, bringing in line 
domestic legislation with the European Prison Rules19 or providing detainees access 
to documents required to bring a case to Strasbourg.20  
The second paragraph of Article 46 is also important to execution. It makes the 
Committee responsible for supervising the execution of the Court’s judgments. The 
exercise of the Committee’s task is governed by the Rules of the Committee for the 
supervision of the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements. 
Two points are important to understanding how the Committee fulfils it supervisory 
task. First, the Committee is assisted by the Department for the Execution of 
Judgments of the Court (Execution Department). Section X.1.2 discusses the work 
of this body in more detail. Second, the Committee’s supervision of the Court’s 
judgments is guided by a twin-track supervision system. The modalities for this 
system are laid down in an information document adopted by the Committee’s 
deputies. All cases are placed under standard or enhanced supervision. Standard 
supervision is the default form of supervision and is ‘based on the fundamental 
principle that it is for the States Parties to the Convention to ensure the effective 
execution of the Court’s judgments and decisions, i.e., the principle of subsidiarity 
of their execution’.21 Accordingly, the Committee’s involvement is formal when 
standard supervision applies and is ‘limited to verifying whether or not action plans 
                                                        
1 anyhow obliged to prevent violations. The Committee also refers to the obligation to end a 
violation, see, e.g.: Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Sanchez Cardenas v. Norway’, 
ResDH(2011)10, 4 March 2010; Committee (2012), 15.  
13  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07 et al., 10 January 2012, para. 180. 
14  Rather than into two categories, one could also divide the measures into three categories: just 
satisfaction, individual and general measures. However, because just satisfaction relates to the 
individual applicant, it is here regarded as an individual measure. 
15  Oleksandr Volkov v. Russia, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, para. 208.  
16  Rule 6(2)(b) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements.  
17  Idem.  
18  Committee (2012), 16. 
19  Gülmez v. Turkey, No. 16330/02, 20 May 2008, para. 63.  
20  Vasiliy Ivashchenko v. Ukraine, No. 760/03, 26 July 2012, para. 125.  
21  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45final, 7 December 2010, para. 14.  
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or action reports have been presented by member states’;22 it ‘rests mainly on 
states’ action’.23 Enhanced supervision applies to cases necessitating priority 
treatment, such as judgments requiring urgent individual measures, pilot judgments 
and judgments raising structural and/or complex problems. This modality implies 
more intensive and pro-active involvement on the side of the Council of Europe.24 
A state can request that a case is supervised under enhanced supervision and cases 
can be transferred from one procedure to the other by ‘a duly reasoned decision’ of 
the Committee.25 Reasons to transfer a case to enhanced supervision are the failure 
to present an action plan/report, disagreement on the contents of the action 
plan/report and serious delays.26 Although the choice between standard and 
enhanced supervision is of great importance to how the Committee supervises a 
judgment, these modalities are not scrutinised in section VI.2, because it is not an 
official procedure laid down in the Convention, but rather a policy that may 
encompass various procedures, which can be analysed in themselves. Because the 
modalities are nevertheless of importance, chapter VIII returns to them when 
discussing the findings made under indicators 2 (sharing responsibilities) and 6 
(room for a response). Further, two procedural steps discussed below, namely 
interim resolutions and bi- and multilateral meetings can be expected to be used 
mostly in cases subject to enhanced supervision.  
The execution phase, regardless of whether standard or enhanced supervision 
applies, begins with the submission of an action plan/action report by the 
respondent state to the Committee. That submission is the basis for bilateral 
consultations between the state and the Execution Department. After the 
consultations, the Committee assesses the action plan/report. When it is satisfied 
that no other execution measures are required, it closes its supervision of the case. 
The Committee may also approve the action plan and then monitor the 
implementation of the proposed execution measures. Alternatively, the Committee 
may request a revised action plan. When a state fails to submit an action plan/action 
report, the Committee’s aide, the Execution Department,27 sends a reminder to the 
respondent state. When the reminder is to no avail, the Committee evaluates the 
situation and when it concludes that execution measures are required, it may, after 
urging the state to comply with this obligation, use one of the various procedures 
discussed below to respond to the state’s failure. The Committee’s supervisory 
involvement ends when it adopts a final resolution.28  
                                                        
22  Ibid., para. 12.  
23  Ibid., para. 14. 
24  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, paras. 6, 8, 20.  
25  Ibid., paras. 9, 24.  
26  Ibid., paras. 26, 29-30.  
27  See: section X.1.2. 
28  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2009)29rev, 3 June 2009, Appendix 1.  
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1.1 Article 41-awards  
Article 41 empowers the Court to award just satisfaction to the applicant for (non-) 
pecuniary damage.29 In addition to that, legal costs and expenses are recoverable 
under the Article.30 Four conditions must be fulfilled to obtain just satisfaction. 
First, the Court must have found a violation of the Convention; the award by the 
Court then compensates the applicant for the consequences of the violation.31 A 
causal link must therefore be established between the violation and the award, 
meaning that the award is of a remedial, not of a ‘punitive’, ‘aggravated’ or 
‘exemplary’ nature.32 Second and third, the award must be ‘necessary’33 and 
‘just’.34 The fourth condition is that the applicant must have made a claim 
complying with certain formal and substantive requirements. The Court, in other 
words, does not make an award of its own motion.35 The text of Article 41 seems to 
also require that the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies to establish that 
internal law only allows for partial reparation. However, the Court does not require 
this, because if one were obliged to exhaust domestic remedies ‘a second time 
before being able to obtain from the Court just satisfaction, the total length of the 
procedure instituted […] would scarcely be in keeping with the idea of the effective 
protection of Human Rights’, thus causing ‘a situation incompatible with the aim 
and object of the Convention’.36 
When the Court orders just satisfaction, it accompanies its order by a time limit 
and the requirement to pay interest if the payment is not made in time.37 The Court 
can rule on the application of Article 41 together with the merits, but may also 
decide that the question of the application is not yet ready for decision. It then 
reserves the question in whole or in part.38 The Court does not have to rule on the 
question in a subsequent judgment when the parties reach a friendly settlement in 
the meantime, in which case the Court normally approves the settlement and strikes 
the case out.39 
                                                        
29  Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims, para. 13.  
30  Smith and Grady v. UK, No. 33985/96 (Art. 41), 25 July 2000, para. 28.  
31  Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims, para. 7. 
32  Ibid., para. 9.  
33  Art. 41 ECHR; Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims, para. 1.  
34  Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims, para. 2.  
35  Rule 60(1) of Court; Rules of Court, Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims, para. 4; Harris 
et al. (2014), 157.  
36  De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (Art. 41), No. 2832/66 et al., 10 March 1972, para. 16. 
37  Rule 75(3) of Court.  
38  Rule 75(1),(4) of Court.  
39  See, e.g.: Avramenko v. Moldova (Dec.), No.7467/06, 5 January 2010.  
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1.2 Action Plans/Reports  
Article 46 obliges the respondent state to submit information on implemented or 
envisaged execution measures, so the Committee can exercise its supervisory task. 
The action plans/reports, which require the states to submit exactly that information, 
do therefore ‘not introduce anything new’.40 The Committee sees these documents 
as ‘appropriate mechanisms for effective dialogue and transmission of relevant 
information between’ itself and the domestic execution coordinator.41 An action 
plan is defined as: 
 
A plan setting out the measures the respondent State intends to take to implement a 
judgment of the Court, including an indicative timetable. The plan shall, if possible, 
set out all measures necessary to implement the judgment. Alternatively, where it is 
not possible to determine all measures immediately, the plan shall set out the steps to 
be taken to determine the measures required, including an indicative timetable for 
such steps. It is axiomatic that action plans could contain information on measures 
already taken.42 
 
Action plans are ‘evolving documents’ which should be regularly updated and 
which should be amended when it becomes clear that certain plans are unachievable 
or inappropriate.43 The Execution Department may assist the respondent state with 
the drafting. The plans do not legally bind the state; they are ‘expressions of the 
intentions [...] for executing particular judgments’.44 An action report sets out ‘all 
the measures taken to implement a judgment [...], and/or an explanation of why no 
measures, or no further measures, are necessary’, which is an invitation to the 
Committee to end its supervisory task.45 The other states may ask questions about 
and comment on the final action report. The Committee makes an evaluation of the 
document and when the evaluation is positive, the Committee ends its involvement 
with a final resolution.46 
The Committee invites respondent states to present an action plan/report within 
six months after a judgment has become final.47 If no document has been submitted 
                                                        
40  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, Appendix 1, 
para. 1. 
41  Committee, ‘Efficient Domestic Capacity for Rapid Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, 
Rec(2008)2, 6 February 2008, paras. 1-2. 
42  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, Appendix 1, 
para. 5. 
43  Ibid., Appendix 1, para. 6. 
44  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2009)29rev, 3 June 2009, para. I.  
45  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, Appendix 1, 
para. 7. 
46  Rule 17 for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements; Committee (2013a), 28. 
47  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, Appendix 1, 
para. 3. 
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within that period, the state receives a reminder. If the state does not submit a 
document within three months of the reminder, the case is proposed for examination 
under enhanced supervision. Additionally, the Committee adopts a decision inviting 
the state to comply with its obligations without any further delay.48 
1.3 DH Meetings  
The DH (‘Droits de l’Homme’ – Human Rights) meetings of the Committee’s 
deputies, which take place four times per year, are devoted to the supervision of the 
execution of judgments and decisions of the Court.49 All the cases, regardless of 
whether they are under enhanced or standard supervision, are being considered as 
included in the agenda of each meeting.50 To avoid confusion, it is stressed here 
that the supervision of the execution of judgments is a continuous procedure. 
Supervision does therefore not just take place at DH meetings.51  
In addition to a discussion about an individual case, a more general debate can 
take place when ‘a particular matter regularly gives rise to doubts or questions’.52 
Such a general debate enables the Committee to discuss the ‘principles of its 
practice’.53 Further, a grouped debate can take place about cases that concern the 
same issue, that are all executed slowly, and about the execution of which the 
respondent state provides insufficient information.54 
1.4 Bi- and Multilateral Meetings  
The four yearly DH meetings are complemented with bi- and multilateral meetings. 
Bilateral meetings take place between the Execution Department and national 
delegations to the Committee, which may be accompanied by the government agent 
or representatives of relevant national authorities. The meetings sometimes take 
place with higher level officials, with the participation of the Director of Monitoring 
or the Director General for Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of 
Europe.55 In order to further extend bilateral contacts, the Execution Department 
may meet with the national authorities in their capital. Multilateral meetings take 
the form of, for example, roundtables or colloquies.56 Where appropriate, DH 
                                                        
48  Ibid., paras. 26-28.  
49  Rule 2(1) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements.  
50  Committee, ‘Consolidated document – New Working Methods Twin-track Supervision System’, 
para. 9(1). 
51  Ibid., para. 1(2).  
52  CDDH (2008a), para. 23. 
53  Idem. 
54  Ibid., para. 27. 
55  Ibid., para. 17-18.  
56  Ibid., para. 19-20.  
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meetings and bi- and multilateral meetings are discussed together as they have some 
features in common.  
1.5 Requests for Interpretation  
If the Committee considers that the supervision of the execution of a judgment is 
hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it can refer the matter to 
the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation.57 This procedural innovation 
is meant to facilitate the Committee’s supervisory task, as experience has 
demonstrated that difficulties may be encountered because of disagreement or 
uncertainty as to the interpretation of a judgment.58 
A referral decision requires a two-thirds majority of the representatives entitled 
to sit on the Committee.59 This qualified majority requirement ‘shows that the 
[Committee] should use this possibility sparingly, to avoid overburdening the 
Court’.60 The Committee can take a referral decision, which takes the form of an 
interim resolution, at any time during the execution process.61 That decision must 
be reasoned and must reflect the different views within the Committee and in 
particular those of the respondent state.62 The Court demands that that a request for 
interpretation fully and precisely states the nature and the source of the question of 
interpretation. Further, the request must be accompanied by information about the 
execution proceedings, a copy of the referral decision, and the contact details of the 
person appointed by the Committee to give the Court any explanations which it may 
require.63 The Committee is represented before the Court by its chair, unless the 
Committee decides otherwise.64 
The formation of the Court which adopted the judgment at issue examines the 
request.65 The Court’s decision on the question of interpretation is final and no 
separate opinions may be attached.66 The decision concerns the interpretation of the 
Court’s judgment; the Court does not pronounce itself on the execution measures 
which the respondent state has (not) taken.67  
                                                        
57  Art. 46(3) ECHR.  
58  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 96.  
59  Art. 46(3) ECHR.  
60  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 96. 
61  Rule 10(2)-(3) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 97.  
62  Rule 10(3) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
63  Rule 91 of Court.  
64  Rule 10(4) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
65  Rule 92 of Court.  
66  Rule 93 of Court.  
67  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 97. 
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1.6 Infringement Proceedings  
The Committee has the power to refer to the Court the question whether a state has 
failed to fulfil its Article 46 obligation.68 The Committee may start infringement 
proceedings when it considers that a respondent state refuses to abide by a 
judgment. This power was created to strengthen the means of pressure of the 
Committee to ensure the rapid and full execution of the Court’s judgments.69 The 
aim of infringement proceedings is hence to secure the execution of the initial 
judgment. The proceedings do not reopen the question of a violation and neither do 
they provide for a payment of a fine by the respondent state for a violation of 
Article 46(1). The drafters of Protocol 14, who created this procedure, felt that ‘the 
political pressure exerted by proceedings for non-compliance in the Grand Chamber 
and [...] the latter’s judgment’ suffice to achieve this aim.70 They furthermore 
thought that the ‘procedure’s mere existence, and the threat of using it, should act as 
an efficient new incentive to execute the Court’s judgments’.71  
Infringement proceedings can only be brought ‘in exceptional circumstances’72 
and after the respondent state has been served with a formal notice of the 
Committee’s intention to instigate the procedure, six months in advance of the start 
of the procedure.73 The notice, as well as the decision to indeed start the procedure, 
must be adopted by a two-thirds majority and takes the form of an interim 
resolution.74 The referral decision must be reasoned and must concisely reflect the 
views of the respondent state.75 The Court also requires that an infringement request 
is reasoned and that it is accompanied by: 
1. the judgment concerned; 
2. information about the execution proceedings, including, if any, the views 
expressed in writing by the parties concerned and communications submitted in 
those proceedings; 
3. copies of the formal notice served on the respondent state and the decision to 
start the infringement procedure;  
 
                                                        
68  Art. 46(4) ECHR.  
69  Rule 11(2) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements; See also: Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, paras. 98, 100.  
70  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 99.  
71  Ibid., para. 100.  
72  Rule 11(2) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements; See also: Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 100.  
73  Art. 46(4) ECHR; Rule 11(2) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms 
of Friendly Settlements 
74  Art. 46(4) ECHR; Rule 11(2)-(3) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the 
Terms of Friendly Settlements.  
75  Rule 11(3) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements.  
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4. the contact details of the person appointed by the Committee to give the Court 
any explanations which it may require; and 
5. copies of all other documents likely to elucidate the question.76  
 
The Grand Chamber decides on the referred question,77 after the Committee and the 
parties to a case have been given the opportunity to submit written comments and 
possibly after a hearing has been held.78 The Committee is normally represented 
before the Court by its chair.79 The Grand Chamber decides by way of a 
judgment.80 If it finds a violation of Article 46(1), it refers the case to the 
Committee for consideration of the measures to be taken. If no violation has 
occurred, the case is referred to the Committee for it to close its examination of the 
case.81 
1.7 Assembly Questions and Recommendations  
The Assembly representatives may at any time address to the Committee written 
questions bearing on matters within the competence of the Committee, which 
includes, based on Article 46(2), execution issues.82 The Assembly’s President 
decides whether the questions are in order and transmits them to the Committee.83 
A reply of the Committee to a written question requires unanimous support.84  
Recommendations are proposals of the Assembly addressed to the Committee.85 
They are based on a report.86 The reporting procedure starts when a motion for 
recommendation is tabled by at least 20 representatives or substitutes belonging to 5 
national delegations.87 This motion is referred for report to the relevant Assembly 
committee.88 The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, which focuses 
inter alia on reinforcing the European system of human rights protection, is the 
most relevant committee for the purposes of this study. The committee appoints a 
rapporteur who drafts a report, consisting of an operational draft recommendation 
                                                        
76  Rule 95 of Court.  
77  Art. 31(b) ECHR; Rule 96 of Court.  
78  Rules 97, 98(2) of Court.  
79  Rule 11(4) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements.  
80  Rule 99 of Court.  
81  Art. 46(5) ECHR.  
82  Rule 58(1) of Procedure of the Assembly.  
83  Rule 58(1) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
84  This is a ‘somewhat broad interpretation of the unanimity rule applicable to decisions on the 
information to be published regarding the discussions and conclusions of [Committee] meetings 
held in private’ in Art. 20(a)(iii) in conjunction with Art. 21(b) Council of Europe Statute, see: De 
Vel (1995), 48.  
85  Rule 25(1)(a) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
86  Rule 50(2) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
87  Rule 25(2) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
88  Rule 26 of Procedure of the Assembly. 
 
 
 
 The Dialogic Potential of Procedures in the Execution Phase 
 
 
217 
addressed to the Committee and an explanatory memorandum.89 The rapporteur 
may conduct fact-finding country visits as part of his/her reporting exercise. During 
such visits, (s)he, for example, examines the reasons for execution problems 
together with national authorities,90 such as, Assembly representatives, ministers, 
judges and civil society.91 The rapporteur’s committee discusses the explanatory 
memorandum and the recommendation and also votes about the latter. After the 
committee has adopted the report, the rapporteur may present it to the Assembly.92 
Amendments, which may only relate to texts submitted to the Assembly for 
adoption, may be tabled and considered, provided they have been signed by at least 
five representatives or approved by the committee submitting the report.93 
Following the debate, the Assembly votes on the draft text or texts in the report.94 
Recommendations to the Committee must be adopted by a two-thirds majority of 
the representatives casting a vote.95  
The Statute of the Council of Europe provides that the Committee ‘shall 
consider the action required to further the aim of the Council of Europe, including 
[...] the adoption by governments of a common policy with regard to particular 
matters’ on inter alia the recommendation of the Assembly.96 This provision 
explains the Assembly’s power to make recommendations to the Committee and 
why the implementation of a recommendation is beyond the competences of the 
Assembly, but within that of the Committee.97 The agenda of each session of the 
Committee’s deputies comprises any Assembly recommendation.98 The Committee 
first examines the political aspects of the document. Prior to replying to the 
Assembly or to taking the recommended action, the Committee may ask for an 
expert opinion on technical aspects of the recommendation or may hear the chair or 
rapporteur of the relevant Assembly committee. The Committee will then reply to 
the recommendation.99 A reply again requires unanimous support.100 The 
recommendation procedure is, in sum, an extensive procedure, comprising of 
(possibly) a country visit, a report, an Assembly debate on committee and plenary 
level, the actual recommendation, a Committee debate, a response of the Committee 
and (possibly) implementation measures taken by the Committee.  
                                                        
89  Rule 50(2),(4) of Procedure of the Assembly.  
90  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of [ECtHR]’, Res(2011)1787, 26 January 2011, 
para. 3.  
91  Pourgourides (2010a), Appendix 2.  
92  Rule 35(5) of Procedure of the Assembly.  
93  Rule 34(1)-(2) of Procedure of the Assembly.  
94  Rule 41(a) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
95  Art. 29 Council of Europe Statute.  
96  Art. 15(a) Council of Europe Statute.  
97  Rule 25(1)(a) of Procedure of the Assembly. 
98  Art. 4(b)(i) of Procedure of the Committee; Art. 5(1)(b) Rules of Procedure for the Meetings of the 
Ministers’ Deputies; See also: Art. 29(i) Council of Europe Statute.  
99  De Vel (1995), 48. 
100  Idem. 
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1.8 Commissioner Country Visits and Reports 
The Commissioner may directly contact governments of the Council of Europe 
states, on inter alia issues relating to the execution of the Court’s judgments and the 
implementation of the Convention.101 The states must facilitate the Commissioner’s 
contacts and the ‘independent and effective performance’ of his functions and are 
obliged to provide information ‘in good time’ if requested.102 One way to enter into 
contact is to conduct country visits. During the first ten years of office, the 
Commissioner visited all Council of Europe states to establish a general image of 
the human rights situation. The Commissioner met with members of the executive, 
parliament, the judiciary, human rights institutions and civil society and visited 
places susceptible to human rights violations, such as prisons and police stations. 
The Commissioner subsequently presented the facts which he had found in country 
reports, in which he also drew conclusions and made recommendations. After this 
initial round of visits, the Commissioner has conducted shorter and more focussed 
‘contact visits’ that do not lead to a report, fact-finding missions to establish 
whether previous recommendations have been implemented and thematic visits 
resulting in thematic reports with precise recommendations.103  
1.9 Decisions and Interim Resolutions  
The Committee decisions of interest to this study are individual decisions taken at 
DH meetings relating to specific judgments. As explained above, the Committee’s 
involvement is limited to verifying whether or not action plans/reports have been 
submitted under standard supervision. This verification takes place through the 
adoption of decisions.104 Decisions adopted with a debate ‘allow the [Committee] to 
send different signals to respondent States: if it does not decide to close the case, 
the [Committee] can deplore the absence of action and/or information, ask more or 
less detailed questions or even request specific actions on the part of the national 
authorities’.105 Decision can also be adopted without a debate, for example, under 
the enhanced procedure to provide information about the developments in the 
execution process.106 The deputies adopt decisions with a two-thirds majority.107  
The Committee may adopt interim resolutions, ‘notably in order to provide 
information on the state of progress of the execution or, where appropriate, to 
express concern about a delay in execution and/or make suggestions with respect to 
                                                        
101  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Art. 7.  
102  Ibid., Art. 6(2). 
103  Sivonen (2012), 24; See also: Lezertua and Forde (2010), 117.  
104  Committee, ‘Consolidated document – New Working methods Twin-track Supervision System’, 
para. 4(1).  
105  CDDH (2008b), para. 28.  
106  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)37, 6 September 2010, para. 21 
107  Art. 9(4) Rules of Procedure for the meetings of the Ministers’ Deputies.  
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the execution’.108 The interim resolutions can therefore function, amongst other 
things, to encourage and urge the respondent state to take execution measures or to 
criticise it by insisting on the adoption of execution measures.109 If an execution 
problem continues to exist in defiance of an interim resolution, the Committee can 
adopt additional interim resolutions to urge the state to take execution measures.110 
Interim resolutions require a two-thirds majority of the representatives casting a 
vote and of a majority of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee.111 
Interim resolutions are sometimes adopted at the request of the delegation 
concerned.112 
1.10 Final Resolutions  
The Committee adopts a final resolution after it has established that a respondent 
state has taken all necessary measures to abide by a judgment. In that resolution, the 
Committee concludes that its functions under Article 46(2) have been exercised.113 
During the supervisory exercise that leads up to the adoption of a final resolution, 
the Committee examines whether any just satisfaction awarded by the Court has 
been paid and whether, if required and taking into account the discretion which a 
state has to choose execution measures, the state has taken individual and general 
measures.114 Final resolutions are in principle adopted without a debate.115  
1.11 Individual Follow-up Cases 
Individual follow-up cases are brought by applicants to complain about inter alia 
execution and, more specifically, about the individual measures required to execute 
a previous judgment to which they were a party or lack thereof. The Court is asked 
to rule on the merits of a new case, meaning the proceedings start again in the (pre-
)merits phase. This type of cases is inadmissible in principle, because the Court has 
no jurisdiction to verify whether a state has complied with the obligations imposed 
on it by a judgment; this falls to the Committee by virtue of Article 46(2).116 
Moreover, the Convention stipulates that the Court shall not deal with any 
                                                        
108  Rule 16 for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
109  CDDH (2008b), para. 29. 
110  Leach (2011), 100-101.  
111  Art. 20(d) Council of Europe Statute.  
112  CDDH (2008b), para. 29. 
113  Rule 17 for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
114  Rule 6(2) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
115  Committee, ‘Consolidated document – New Working Methods Twin-track Supervision System’, 
para. 8.  
116  UMO Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), No. 41561/07 et al., 18 October 2011, para. 
66.  
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application that ‘is substantially the same matter that has already been examined by 
the Court [...] and contains no new information’.117 Two exceptions however exist 
to this principle that permit the Court to adjudicate individual follow-up cases. The 
first exception applies when the execution measures which the respondent state has 
implemented give rise to a new issue under the Convention.118 An execution 
measure that may give rise to such an issue is, for example, the reopening of a 
domestic criminal procedure, which may be necessary to remedy an Article 6 
violation.119 The second exception exists when a right continues to be violated in 
spite of an earlier judgment finding a violation.  
1.12 General Follow-up Cases  
In a general follow-up case, the applicant complains about general execution 
measures which a state has taken to execute a previous judgment. Unlike individual 
follow-up cases, general follow-up cases do not need to be brought by the same 
individual as the one who was a party to the previous judgment. The individual 
namely complains about general measures relating to changes in law and practice 
that affect and are important to more people than the applicant who brought the 
previous case. Because general follow-up cases can be brought by a new applicant, 
the admissibility problem that plays a role in the context of individual follow-up 
cases does not play a role here. As in the case of individual follow-up cases, the 
Court rules on the merits of a new case, meaning the proceedings start again in the 
(pre-)merits phase. 
2 APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
2.1  Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
This indicator helps determine which interlocutors can become involved through 
which procedures in execution phase. When an opportunity for involvement exists, 
the indicator also inquires into what an interlocutor can achieve by way of a 
procedure and with which interlocutors it can communicate.  
Article 41-awards: An Article 41-award gives the Court the opportunity to 
determine the amount of just satisfaction which a state must pay in the execution 
phase and to communicate this to the state and the Committee. It becomes involved 
in the execution phase in the sense that it determines which execution measures of a 
monetary nature the state is to take in that phase. Its involvement is of an indirect 
nature, geared towards influencing the course of execution. The Court cannot make 
the award of its own motion; its involvement depends on whether the applicant files 
                                                        
117  Art. 35(2)(b) ECHR.  
118  VGT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 62.  
119  Liu v. Russia (no. 2), No. 29157/09, 26 July 2011, para. 67.  
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a claim. Article 41-awards do not count as an opportunity for involvement of the 
state to communicate with another interlocutor, because it is not involved in the 
proceedings leading up to the granting of an award; its only, non-discretionary 
involvement exists of paying the award to the applicant. As for the Committee, its 
Rules on Supervision provide that it examines whether any just satisfaction awarded 
by the Court has been paid to the applicant, a task which can also be derived from 
Article 46(2).120 It therefore has the task to call upon the state to make the payment 
if it is not made within the deadline set by the Court.  
Action plans/reports: Action plans/reports are an opportunity for involvement 
of the state, allowing it to communicate to the Committee which execution 
measures it intends to take or has taken and, eventually, to suggest to the 
Committee that it ends its supervisory task. This procedural step is also an 
opportunity for involvement by the Committee, as represented by the Execution 
Department, because the latter assists the state with the preparation of the action 
plan/report. It is also an opportunity for involvement for other states as assembled 
in the Committee, because they can ask questions about and comment on the final 
report.  
DH meetings: DH meetings are an opportunity for involvement by the 
Committee, which includes the respondent state, during which they can discuss the 
state of execution of a case or, when a grouped debate takes place, group of cases. 
When a group of cases is discussed, it can be envisaged that the Committee also 
discusses structural problems which cause comparable problems in more than one 
state and how these problems can be best solved in the execution phase. Such 
discussions may help determine which execution measures should be taken and can 
also be used to encourage the state to take steps, thus advancing progress in the 
execution phase. 
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bilateral meetings, as they take place between 
the respondent state and the Committee, are clearly an opportunity for involvement 
of the state and the Committee (as assisted by the Execution Department).121 During 
the meeting, they can exchange their views on the execution of a particular 
judgment and the state can receive assistance, possibly upon its own request. 
Further, when a multilateral meeting takes place, multiple respondent states can 
become involved. Like DH meetings, the discussions can help advance progress in 
the execution phase.  
Requests for interpretation: A request for interpretation is an opportunity for 
the involvement of the Committee. Indeed, the Committee is the only interlocutor 
empowered to set this procedure in motion. It is not a means for the Committee to 
communicate with the Court or the respondent state about execution, but rather a 
possible means for the Committee to solve disagreement about the interpretation of 
a judgment between itself and the respondent state. The disagreement is probably an 
                                                        
120  Rule 6(2) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
121  See: section X.1.2.  
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obstacle to the execution dialogue and, by making a request for interpretation, the 
Committee helps the respondent state and itself to overcome this obstacle, thus 
regaining dialogue. The Committee can be represented before the Court by its chair. 
However, because no provision is made for representation of the respondent state 
before the Court, the involvement by way of the chair’s representations cannot be of 
great significance.  
This procedure is, second, an opportunity for involvement by the Court. The 
Court must rule on the interpretation of a judgment, which gives it the possibility to 
clarify its previous judgment to the Committee and the respondent state. Although 
the procedure is, unlike Article 41-awards, part of the execution phase, the Court 
does not pronounce itself on execution matters as such; it elucidates the merits of its 
previous judgment, without reconsidering them.  
The procedure is not an opportunity for involvement by the respondent state. 
The state is, unlike in the case of infringement proceedings, not notified of the 
Committee’s intention to file a request for interpretation and nor can it make 
representations before the Court. Further, although the Committee’s decision to 
refer must reflect the different views within the Committee and in particular that of 
the respondent state, the state cannot file or even compose the decision.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings grant the Court the 
opportunity to become directly involved in the execution phase, albeit only upon the 
Committee’s request. Moreover and unlike the previous procedure, the Court is 
empowered to pronounce itself on the question whether its previous judgment has 
been executed in conformity with Article 46. Further, unlike Article 41-awards, the 
procedure makes it possible for the Court to pronounce itself about execution 
matters in the execution phase, not prior to the start of that phase. The Grand 
Chamber judgment that is the result of the procedure is an answer to the 
Committee’s request, the respondent state’s execution record and the 
representations of the Committee and the state before the Court.  
The state can become involved in the procedure by way of written and oral 
representations. It presumably tries to convince the Court of why it has fulfilled its 
Article 46 obligation and when it manages to achieve this, the Committee needs to 
end its supervision. Additionally, it can end the procedure before the Court by 
taking execution measures in response to the Committee’s notification of its 
intention to start infringement proceedings. 
Infringement proceedings are also an opportunity for involvement of the 
Committee. The Committee starts the procedure and can make written and oral 
representations before the Court. In its representations, it explains why the state has 
violated Article 46, the finding of a violation of which may help the Committee to 
convince the state to implement execution measures. The procedure is also a means 
for the Committee to put pressure on the respondent state, by informing the state of 
its intention to start the procedure and through the Court’s involvement.  
Assembly questions/recommendations: Posing questions and making 
recommendations clearly are opportunities for the Assembly to become involved, 
by evaluating and potentially influencing the execution measures taken or proposed 
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by the respondent state. More concretely, they allow the Assembly to ask questions 
and make recommendations to the Committee to which the latter responds. 
Additionally, in the course of the reporting process that precedes the adoption of a 
recommendation, the Assembly’s rapporteur may make fact-finding country visits, 
which enable him to enter into contact with the national authorities. National 
authorities who may be contacted by the rapporteur do not have an opportunity for 
involvement; they only play a small and facilitative role in the process leading to a 
recommendation.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: By way of a country visit and a report 
based on that visit, the Commissioner can provide information and make 
recommendations on matters related to execution and in this way try to influence 
the execution record for the better. Unlike the Assembly’s questions and 
recommendations, the Commissioner’s reports do not speak directly to the 
Committee or warrant a response from this interlocutor, which may make it less 
likely than in the case of the Assembly’s procedures that the Commissioner’s 
reports will be part of the execution dialogue. Further, like the Assembly’s 
rapporteur, the Commissioner may contact national authorities about execution 
issues when making a country visit. For the same reasons which apply to Assembly 
recommendations, this procedure is not an opportunity for involvement of the 
national authorities.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: Both decisions and interim resolutions are 
an opportunity for involvement by the Committee. This interlocutor can 
communicate to the respondent state its opinion about the state of execution, make 
suggestions and urge the state to take action. Interim resolutions, due to their more 
formal nature, probably have a greater effect and therefore allow the Committee to 
exert comparatively much influence. Interim resolutions also provide a minor 
opportunity for the respondent state’s involvement, because the state’s delegation 
may request the adoption of an interim resolution.  
Final resolutions: Final resolutions are an opportunity for the Committee’s 
involvement or rather an opportunity for the Committee to end its involvement as 
well as the execution process at the level of the Council of Europe. By way of a 
final resolution, it communicates to the respondent state that implemented and 
envisaged execution measures suffice to oblige by Article 46. Although domestic 
execution measures form the basis for a final resolution, the respondent state as 
such does not become involved in composing the final resolution. This procedural 
step is therefore not an opportunity for involvement of the state.  
Individual follow-up cases: By way of an individual follow-up case, the Court 
can become involved in execution matters. It can, however, due to the rule that 
these cases are inadmissible, only become involved regarding two aspects of 
execution: a new violation caused by an execution measure or a continuing 
violation caused by a lack of execution measures. This procedure therefore only 
allows the Court to comment on the consequences of an execution measure or a 
lack thereof, not directly on the measure itself. Further, the Court’s involvement 
hinges on whether an applicant files a follow-up case. The Court’s follow-up ruling 
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speaks to the respondent state, telling it whether the consequences of its execution 
policy are compliant with the Convention. Further, the Committee can interpret an 
adverse judgment in a follow-up case as a reprimand, because it implies that it has 
apparently not yet been able to move the state to implement measure that do not 
harm the applicant.   
The respondent state, in the (pre-)merits and execution phase, and the 
Committee, in the execution phase, can also become involved as in any other (non-
follow-up) case. This is possible since they can become involved in any case 
through different procedures and procedural steps. This also holds for states other 
than the respondent state, the Assembly and the Commissioner. The character of the 
involvement of the other interlocutors is different from that of the Court, however. 
The Court reviews aspects of an individual case which it would otherwise not 
review, while the involvement of the other interlocutors does not differ from their 
involvement in a case that is not a follow-up case. Due to this difference, the 
procedure is scrutinised mostly from the perspective of the Court under the next 
indicators.  
General follow-up cases: A general follow-up case also gives the Court the 
opportunity to become involved in execution matters. This opportunity for 
involvement is broader than that offered by individual follow-up cases, because the 
Court’s involvement is not conditional on the existence of exceptions to the 
admissibility criteria. Besides that, the Court can pronounce itself directly about the 
general execution measures, not just about their consequences. As in the case of an 
individual follow-up case, the possibility which this procedure offers only exists 
when an individual brings a follow-up case. Further, general follow-up cases speak 
in the same manner to the Committee as individual follow-up cases and they give 
the respondent state the Court’s evaluation of the implemented general execution 
measures. For the same reasons as given with reference to individual follow-up 
cases, this procedure is analysed mostly from the Court’s perspective.  
2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities  
This indicator scrutinises the procedures in order to establish whether they make 
possible and stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the 
Convention, that is, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, and as such, that 
is, regardless of what the Convention envisages, with the Committee, the major 
decision-maker in the execution phase. More than in the (pre-)merits phase, the 
question whether a procedure ensures and enhances respect by the Court and the 
Committee for the procedural task division as laid down in the Convention between 
them is relevant, because the Court, unlike the Committee in the (pre-)merits phase, 
has possibilities to become involved in the execution phase. Additionally, the 
question is posed whether the sharing of responsibilities between the Court/ 
Committee and the respondent states is stimulated. Sharing responsibilities as 
envisaged by the Convention in this context requires the Court/Committee to 
respect the subsidiarity principle.  
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Article 41-awards: If the Court reserves the question of just satisfaction, the 
state has the possibility to solve this question itself by concluding a friendly 
settlement. As a consequence of an Article 41-award, the state cannot solve this 
question itself; the Court solves it instead. Article 41-awards therefore have a 
negative effect on sharing responsibilities in line with the subsidiarity principle. 
This is also due to the Court’s interpretation of Article 41, which absolves the 
applicant from having to exhaust domestic remedies to obtain reparation. Even 
though an Article 41-award clearly means that the Court has a say about execution 
matters, this is not problematic from the perspective of the procedural task division 
between the Court and the Committee as envisaged by the Convention. The 
Convention namely explicitly empowers the Court to award just satisfaction.  
Action plans/reports: Action plans/reports help the respondent state to 
communicate to the Committee, in a clear and structured manner, how it makes 
progress in fulfilling its primary responsibility for execution, which facilitates the 
Committee’s supervisory task. This procedural step therefore contributes to sharing 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention. The documents also contribute 
to the sharing of responsibilities between the Committee and the respondent state as 
such, because the state can, for example, be assisted in drawing up a report.  
DH meetings: DH meetings may complement and serve to discuss action 
plans/reports. They thus potentially help the respondent state and the Committee to 
share responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention in a similar manner as action 
plans/reports do.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bilateral meetings, as they complement both 
action plans/reports and DH meetings and due to their form, may also help to share 
responsibilities. During bilateral meetings, or multilateral meetings for that matter, 
the Committee may go beyond mere supervision and provide assistance to the 
states. Because the Committee provides such assistance in agreement with the 
respondent state or even at the latter’s request, this does not negatively affect the 
division of responsibilities between the Committee and the states as stipulated by 
the Convention. Providing assistance in this manner is actually a way of sharing 
responsibilities as such, as the Committee assists a respondent state in fulfilling its 
responsibility to execute.  
Requests for interpretation: By making a request for interpretation, the 
Committee asks the Court to solve a problem of interpretation. It asks, in other 
words, the Court for its assistance so it can continue to fulfil its own responsibility. 
This procedure is therefore a way for the Court and the Committee to share 
responsibilities as such.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings, in a similar manner as a 
request for interpretation, are a means for the Committee and the Court to share 
responsibilities as such. This happens in an even more dialogic manner than is the 
case for a request of interpretation, because the Committee and the respondent state 
can make representations before the Court. The procedure also enables the Court to 
directly comment on execution measures, which are for the respondent state to 
execute and the Committee to supervise under the Convention. The state may 
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consider this problematic in the light of the subsidiarity principle. The procedure 
therefore goes against the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
respondent state in conformity with the Convention generally. From the perspective 
of the division of responsibilities between the Court and the Committee, the 
procedure is not problematic. Not only is the procedure provided for in the 
Convention, but also is it started by the Committee. 
Assembly questions/recommendations: The Assembly’s involvement does not 
affect the sharing of responsibilities as laid down in the Convention, but may be of 
use to the Committee because it stimulates the Committee to fulfil its responsibility 
conscientiously. Further, recommendations accompanied by a report may inform 
the Committee of execution problems and the background thereto. In this manner, 
the Assembly possibly takes on some responsibilities which may be of use to the 
Committee. 
Commissioner country visits/reports: In a comparable manner as the 
Assembly’s involvement by way of questions and recommendations, the 
Commissioner’s involvement by way of country visits/reports may be a way to 
share responsibilities with the Committee. As the Committee does not need to 
respond to the Commissioner reports and as the Commissioner does not directly 
speak to the Committee, the sharing of responsibilities by the Commissioner is less 
outspoken and of less relevance to this study compared to Assembly questions/ 
recommendations.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: The points raised by indicator 2 are not 
relevant to decisions and interim resolutions. Although these two procedural steps 
are a means by which the Committee fulfils its responsibility, they do not affect the 
sharing of responsibilities between the Committee and another interlocutor.  
Final resolutions: As in the case of decisions and interim resolutions, the 
questions of indicator 2 are of no relevance to final resolutions. This procedural step 
is a way for the Committee to fulfil its supervisory responsibility, but it does not 
concern the sharing of responsibilities.  
Individual follow-up cases: In an individual follow-up case, the Court 
evaluates the consequences of an individual execution measure or a continuing 
violation. As a consequence, the state might feel that the Court goes beyond its 
supervisory role in the (pre-)merits phase because it decreases the discretion of a 
state in the execution phase. The procedure, because it permits the Court to 
adjudicate on issues relating to execution, may also be interpreted as giving the 
Court the means to take on responsibilities of the Committee. For these two reasons, 
the procedure does not contribute to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity 
with the Convention, but might even go against it. This taking on of responsibilities 
is, however, limited, in the sense that the Court does not comment on execution 
measures themselves, but only on their consequences. Individual follow-cases are a 
possibility for the Court to assist the respondent state in fulfilling its responsibility 
to execute a case. The procedure can, further, be interpreted as a means for the 
Court to share responsibilities with the Committee: the Committee supervises the 
execution measures, whilst the Court supervises their consequences. Therefore, 
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although the procedure goes against the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged in 
the Convention, it potentially contributes to the sharing of responsibilities as such.  
General follow-up cases: When adjudicating a general follow-up case, the 
Court can directly comment on execution measures chosen by the respondent state, 
which the Committee (has) supervised. In a stronger manner but for the same 
reasons as those which apply to individual follow-up cases, general follow-up cases 
go against the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged in the Convention, both with 
respect to the respondent state and the Committee. As in the case of individual 
follow-up cases, general follow-up cases enable the Court to share responsibilities 
with the state in respect of, this time, the execution of general measures. The 
Court’s evaluation of general execution measures may also be regarded as a way to 
share responsibilities with the Committee, because the latter is responsible for 
making this evaluation.  
2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding  
Indicator 3 facilitates examining the procedures to establish whether they contribute 
to mutual understanding between the European interlocutors and the states. In the 
context of execution, this mostly concerns the state’s understanding of their –
responsibility under Article 46. Besides that, it concerns, as the Committee is the 
most important Council of Europe supervisor and decision-maker in this phase, this 
interlocutor’s understanding of domestic problems relating to internal and external 
tension which may hamper the execution of a judgment and, more broadly, the 
implementation of the Convention. When a procedure is an opportunity for the 
Court’s involvement, it is also relevant whether a procedure enhances the Court’s 
understanding of these issues.  
Article 41-awards: Article 41-awards only serve to provide a specific amount 
of reparation to an individual. The Court’s determination of the amount in its 
judgment does not contribute to understanding by the respondent state of the 
Convention system beyond the very specific aspect of the level of just satisfaction. 
Moreover, this understanding only materialises when the Court clearly explains 
why it has decided on a certain amount and this can only be clarified when looking 
at practice, which is not done here. Considering the foregoing, Article 41-awards do 
not potentially contribute to the respondent state’s understanding of the Convention 
system.  
Action plans/reports: In an action plan/report, the respondent state informs the 
Committee of the state of execution of a judgment, about why it has not yet 
determined execution measures or why no (further) measures are necessary. By 
communicating this information, the Committee’s understanding of the national 
level and execution problems and measures likely increases.  
DH meetings: A DH meeting can be used to discuss execution matters and, 
more specifically, to explain to the Committee any difficulties which a respondent 
state encounters in the process of execution. It is also feasible that discussions at the 
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DH meetings increase the respondent state’s understanding of what Article 46(1) 
requires.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bi- and multilateral meetings can stimulate 
mutual understanding to develop for the same reasons as those which apply to DH 
meetings. Especially when the meetings are used to provide assistance to the 
respondent state or states, these procedures not only potentially allow the 
Committee to explain to the states what execution requires from them, but also how 
this can be achieved. Addressing the how-question is particularly useful when a 
state is confronted with complex execution problems relating to external tension.  
Requests for interpretation: When the Court, on the basis of a request for 
interpretation, enlightens the Committee and the respondent state about the correct 
interpretation of a judgment, this may increase the respondent state’s understanding 
of the Convention system, albeit more of the material Convention requirements than 
of execution matters.  
Infringement proceedings: As a result of infringement proceedings, the 
Court’s stance on whether a state has fulfilled its Article 46 obligation is 
established. The procedure may thus increase the respondent state’s understanding 
of the content of the obligation in a concrete case.  
Assembly questions/recommendations: The Assembly recommendations, 
because they are based on and supplemented by a report, are potentially 
instrumental to increasing the Committee’s understanding of execution issues which 
torment the states. This is possible in particular, because the recommendations are 
directly addressed to the Committee.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: As in the case of an Assembly report, a 
Commissioner report may increase the Committee’s understanding of domestic 
problems relating to the execution of a judgment. This may happen, even though the 
report is not directly addressed to the Committee when the Committee relies on a 
report of its own motion.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: Decisions and interim resolutions, although 
they may point to the execution measures which a respondent state should take, do 
not help increase mutual understanding. These documents do namely not contain 
comprehensive information or explanations. They rather serve to put pressure on 
the state to take execution measures, which it probably already knows it should 
take.  
Final resolutions: Final resolutions, due to their formal nature and limited 
content, do not lend themselves to increasing the understanding of the respondent 
state by the Committee. Also due to their nature and in the absence of the 
involvement of other interlocutors, final resolutions neither contribute to the 
Committee’s understanding of the national level.  
Individual follow-up cases: In an individual follow-up case, the Court 
establishes whether the consequences of an execution measure or lack thereof are 
compatible with the Convention. The respondent state can thus increase its 
knowledge, not of what Article 46 requires as such, but of whether the 
consequences of an individual measure taken to give effect to the Article are 
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compatible with the Convention. In the course of a follow-up case, the Court’s 
understanding of the national level may increase because it asks through 
communication the respondent state why it has made certain choices when 
executing a judgment. Although this increase is the result of communication, a 
procedural step in the pre-merits phase, the increase in knowledge of execution 
measures takes place mostly because the case is a follow-up case. The increase in 
understanding therefore counts as a result achieved by individual follow-up cases.  
General follow-up cases: Through general follow-up cases, the respondent 
state’s knowledge of which general measures are compatible with Article 46 
potentially increases. Additionally, for the same reason as given in respect of 
individual follow-up cases, the Court’s understanding increases as a result of this 
procedure.  
2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making  
Indicator 4 serves to establish whether the procedural steps in the execution phase 
contribute to balanced decision-making by the Committee in the sense that it pays 
due regard to the difficulties at the root of internal tension. The focus is on the 
Committee, because the Committee’s decisions are a potential source of conflict 
over internal tension in this phase, something which dialogue aims to prevent. The 
Committee’s decisions have this potential, because they can be a public and strong-
worded condemnation of a state for its failure to execute a judgment. Moreover, the 
Committee ultimately decides to close the execution phase and when it refuses to do 
so against the will of the respondent state, this may cause conflict.  
As indicator 1 helped to illustrate, the Court can also make various important 
decisions in the execution phase. The question must therefore also be answered 
whether balanced decision-making by this interlocutor is stimulated. This question 
can already be answered in the positive here without assessing the procedures 
individually, because all procedures in which the Court is involved result in a 
judgment and judgments clearly stimulate this, as chapter V explained. It was 
established there that judgments in particular have two features that stimulate 
balanced decision-making by the Court: the requirement on the Court to reason its 
judgments and the possibility to add separate opinions.122 
Article 41-awards: Article 41-awards do not influence how balanced the 
decisions of the Committee are. The Committee verifies whether a state has paid the 
award, but this does not make its decision more or less balanced. This procedural 
step does therefore not contribute to balanced decision-making.  
Action plans/reports: Action plans and reports can be a mechanism for the 
respondent state to communicate difficulties regarding internal tension, which 
influence the execution measures they choose, to the Committee. As the Committee 
                                                        
122  In case of a request for interpretation, separate opinions can, however, not be added.  
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can and probably will take such difficulties into account, this procedure potentially 
stimulates balanced decision-making by that interlocutor.  
DH meetings: At a meeting, the respondent state and the Committee can discuss 
issues concerning internal tension. When the Committee takes these issues 
subsequently into account, its decisions become increasingly balanced. DH 
meetings therefore potentially simulate balanced decision-making.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: For the same reasons as given in respect of DH 
meetings, bi- and multilateral meetings can stimulate balanced decision-making by 
the Committee. Additionally, when a multilateral meeting takes place, the 
Committee’s decisions potentially not only become balanced in the sense that it 
takes into consideration the viewpoint of one state, but of multiple states.  
Requests for interpretation: As a result of a request for interpretation, the 
content of a judgment of the Court is clarified. This does, however, not necessarily 
imply that the Committee will make more balanced decisions afterwards. This 
procedure does therefore not contribute to the effect which indicator 4 helps 
establish.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings commence when the 
Committee and the respondent state profoundly disagree about the question whether 
a judgment is executed in conformity with Article 46. The Court decides on this 
question. A positive answer means that the Committee closes its supervisory 
exercise; a negative answer that it continues that exercise. Because either decision is 
based on a judgment of a relative outsider that listened to representations by both, 
the respondent state may regard the decision by the Committee to continue its 
exercise as more balanced than a similar decision made in the absence of 
infringement proceedings. The procedure therefore potentially contributes to 
balanced decision-making by the Committee. Furthermore, when the Committee 
decides to close is its exercise in response to a judgment, the state will also consider 
this to be a balanced decision.  
Assembly questions/ recommendations: Assembly questions and 
recommendations, provided they, and the report added as an appendix, relate to 
issues concerning internal tension, may contribute to balanced decision-making 
when they inform the Committee’s decision-making.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: The Commissioner report may, as 
Assembly questions and recommendations, contribute to the Committee’s decision-
making in a positive sense, by making it more balanced. Compared to the Assembly 
submissions, the Commissioner’s reports have less potential to achieve this result, 
because they are not directly addressed to the Committee. 
Decisions and interim resolution: Whether decisions and interim resolutions 
contribute to balanced decision making or indeed contain balanced decisions 
depends on their content. It can be easily imagined that these documents do not 
have this effect, because they serve to put pressure on the respondent state, which 
may mean that the Committee publicly criticises the respondent state for not taking 
certain execution measures and calls upon it to take these measures, against the will 
of the state. However, the content of these documents can only be qualified without 
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speculation when examining the functioning of these procedural steps in practice. It 
is therefore, at this point, unclear whether decisions and interim resolutions 
contribute to balanced decision-making.  
Final resolutions: Final resolutions do not stimulate balanced decision-making, 
because they are prepared and adopted by the Committee on its own, without the 
direct input of other interlocutors, although it bases itself on input provided to it 
through other procedural steps. Moreover, unlike in the case of the Court and its 
judgments, the Committee is not required to reason its final resolutions.  
Individual follow-up cases: Judgments in individual follow-up cases do not 
stimulate the Committee to make balanced decisions, for example by taking into 
account national perspectives, any more than other judgments do. This procedural 
step does therefore not stimulate balanced decision-making by the Committee. 
Although, as explained in the introduction to this section, judgments (including 
individual follow-up judgments) generally contribute to balanced decision-making 
by the Court, the decision-making by the Court in this procedural step may also be 
considered as unbalanced. The Court namely decides on issues relating to 
execution. As such issues are for the state to decide and the Committee to supervise 
in conformity with a strict reading of the Convention, any decision-making in this 
area by the Court may be considered as unbalanced.  
General follow-up cases: As in the case of individual-follow up cases and for 
the same reasons as just given in respect of these cases, general follow-up cases do 
not potentially stimulate balanced decision-making by the Committee any more 
than non-follow-up judgments do. Again, as in the case of individual follow-up 
cases, although the Court’s judgments are generally balanced, the respondent state 
could regard decision-making in a general follow-up case as unbalanced, because it 
means the Court decides on execution matters.  
2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 establishes whether and, if so, how, the procedural steps in the execution 
phase stimulate and make it possible for national and European interlocutors to give 
reasons for their decisions, which are preferably embedded in the Convention 
system. Reasons are especially, but not exclusively, important when a decision of 
one interlocutor negatively affects another. 
Article 41-awards: No specific requirement exists on paper that the Court 
reasons the decision to award just satisfaction, although the Convention generally 
requires that the Court reasons its judgments.123 It is therefore assumed that this 
procedure stimulates reason-giving by the Court on paper. This qualifies as internal 
reason-giving, because the Court only gives reasons why it sets this specific 
procedural step; it does not motivate decisions taken in the course of other 
opportunities for involvement.  
                                                        
123  Art. 45(1) ECHR.  
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Action plans/reports: Action plans/reports, because they require the states to 
explain to the Committee which execution measures have been and will be 
implemented, stimulate reason-giving by the state. The Committee likely requires 
that the state gives reasons which are embedded in the Convention system, because 
it bases itself on the Court’s judgment and verifies whether the respondent state 
complies with the obligation to execute a judgment stipulated in Article 46. This is 
external reason-giving, as the explanations concern measures taken outside the 
procedural step of action plans/reports; they relate more generally to measures taken 
in the execution phase.  
DH meetings: During a DH meeting, the Committee and the respondent state 
can discuss the difficulties which a state encounters in the execution process and the 
reasons why the state has not yet solved these difficulties. Based on such 
difficulties, the Committee prolongs its supervisory exercise. Further, the 
Committee can explain why the Convention requirements must be met in spite of 
the difficulties. Mutual external reason-giving is thus potentially stimulated.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: In a comparable manner as described in respect 
of DH meetings, bi- and multilateral meetings potentially also stimulate reason-
giving by respondent states.  
Requests for interpretation: A request for interpretation simulates the 
Committee to engage in internal reason-giving because it must reason its request 
and because the request must reflect the different views within the Committee. 
Regardless of whether the Court’s ruling takes the form of a decision or a 
judgment,124 it is assumed that the requirement applies that the Court reasons its 
judgments and decisions declaring applications (in)admissible. Hence, internal 
reason-giving by the Court is stimulated when ruling on a question of interpretation; 
the Court must reason the decisions which it takes within the confines of this 
procedure.125 The Court’s ruling on a request for interpretation has in one respect 
potentially less dialogic potential than regular judgments, because no separate 
opinion may be attached to the ruling on the interpretation.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings stimulate reason-giving 
by three interlocutors. First, the Committee’s referral decision must be reasoned, 
which concerns internal reason-giving. In addition to that and provided the Court 
rules on the referred question, the Rules of Court give the Committee the 
opportunity to provide (external) reasons to explain why the state has breached its 
Article 46 obligation. It can do this either in writing or at hearing. Second, the 
respondent state also has the possibility to provide (external) reasons in writing or at 
hearing to explain why it has fulfilled the obligation to execute. Third, the Court 
must provide reasons for its infringement ruling, as its ruling takes the form of a 
judgment.126 It is further assumed that the general rule that judges in Grand 
Chamber cases are entitled to annex a separate opinion to a judgment also applies to 
                                                        
124  This is not clarified in either the Convention or the Rules of Court.  
125  Art. 45(1) ECHR.   
126  Art. 45 ECHR in conjunction with Rule 99 of Court.  
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infringement rulings as this has not explicitly been excluded.127 This further 
enhances the potential of the procedure to stimulate internal reason-giving by the 
Court.  
Assembly questions/recommendations: As the Committee responds to 
Assembly questions and recommendations, these two procedures stimulate internal 
reason-giving by the Committee. Because the Committee’s response may concern 
measures taken during execution more generally, external reason-giving is 
stimulated as well.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: Unlike in the case of the two Assembly 
procedures, the Committee is not required to respond to the findings made by the 
Commissioner during his visits and drawn up in his reports. Therefore, the 
Committee is not simulated to engage in reason-giving.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: The Committee issues a decision or interim 
resolution, not because it wants to know why a state has not yet executed a 
judgment, but in order to encourage the state to execute a judgment. Although the 
effect may be that the addressed respondent state provides reasons or excuses for a 
failure to fully execute a judgment, there is no room for this within these procedural 
steps and nor is the procedural step aiming for this. Further, the Committee is not 
obliged to reason its decision to adopt a decision/interim resolution; the information 
provided in the document probably is already a sufficient justification. These 
procedural steps do therefore not contribute to reason-giving.  
Final resolutions: No requirement exists on paper that final resolutions be 
reasoned; the Committee’s Rules only require that the resolution concludes that the 
Committee’s functions under Article 46(2) have been exercised.128 This procedure 
does therefore not stimulate reason-giving by the Committee.  
Individual follow-up cases: In the (pre-)merits phase of an individual follow-up 
case, the state is asked by the Court, though communication, to explain why it has 
not yet taken certain execution measures or why it has taken execution measures 
that allegedly cause a fresh violation. This procedure therefore stimulates the states 
to give reasons relating to the execution of a previous judgment and thus to engage 
in external reason-giving. Further, as the Court issues a judgment and because 
judgments must be reasoned, individual follow-up cases also stimulate internal 
reason-giving by the Court.  
General follow-up cases: General follow-up cases also stimulate external 
reason-giving by the state, this time in relation to the execution of a previous 
judgment by way of general measures. More specifically, they require the state to 
counter the applicant’s allegation that general execution measures have caused a 
similar violation as the Court found previously or have given rise to a new 
violation. As their individual counterpart, general follow-up cases stimulate internal 
reason-giving by the Court.  
                                                        
127  Rule 74(2) of Court.  
128  Rule 17 for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements. 
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2.6  Indicator 6: Room for a Response  
Indicator 6 analyses whether one interlocutor can respond to a decision made or a 
procedural step set by another interlocutor. The most relevant decision, for the 
execution phase as well, is probably the finding of a violation by the Court in a 
judgment. Other decisions, such as the adoption of an interim resolution by the 
Committee, are, however, also important decisions that can be evaluated under 
indicator 6. It is particularly relevant to analyse the execution phase from the 
perspective of this indicator because the execution measures are the respondent 
state’s response to a judgment. The indicator also poses the narrower question 
whether internal room for a response is left, namely the possibility to respond to 
decisions made within the confines of a procedure. 
Article 41-awards: Prior to the Court’s decision on Article 41 and during 
communication, the respondent state may respond to the applicant’s claim for just 
satisfaction.129 This possibility does, however, not give the state room to respond to 
an award of just satisfaction; the payment of the amount ordered by the Court is an 
automatic reaction to a binding and precise obligation, which does not permit any 
discretion. The state would have had room for a response, had the Court not 
interpreted Article 41 in a manner that alleviates the applicant from having to apply 
for reparation on the domestic level prior to asking the Court to make an award. 
Only when the Court reserves the Article 41 question, the state can formulate its 
own response by reaching a friendly settlement with the applicant. The possibility 
to make an Article 41-award gives the Court room to respond to a violation 
committed by the respondent state. The response is somewhat limited in the sense 
that the award is monetary and compensates for the sufferings of the individual 
applicant only. If the award would compensate for, for example, more than only the 
individual suffering, making an award would allow the Court to communicate to the 
respondent state that the violation is of an aggravated nature or that the award is 
punitive in part. 
Action plans/reports: In an action plan/report, the respondent state presents to 
the Committee its response, in the form of execution measures, to the Court’s 
judgment. This procedure therefore is a means for the state to communicate its 
response to the Committee. Although the execution measures are the actual 
response, the action plan/report is nevertheless an important procedure for 
communicating this external response in a clear and structured manner to the 
Committee and therefore offers room for a response in the sense of indicator 6.  
DH meetings: DH meetings serve as a forum for discussion of a judgment’s 
execution between the Committee and the respondent state. The state explains why 
it has responded to a judgment in a certain way and the Committee can respond to 
                                                        
129  The applicant is namely required to submit its claims within the time-limit fixed for the submission 
of the applicant’s observations on the merits, see: Rule 60(2) of Court. 
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proposed or already implemented execution measures. The meetings therefore 
provide external room for a response.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bi- and multilateral meetings provide a 
comparable forum as DH meetings do. These meetings therefore also give the state 
and the Committee external room for a response.  
Request for interpretations: A request for interpretation is not a response of 
the Committee to a judgment, but a request for clarification of the content of a 
judgment. The procedure therefore does not allow the Committee to respond to the 
content of a judgment as such. Further, although the Court’s ruling on interpretation 
is a response to the Committee’s request, it is a ruling that builds on the content of 
its own judgment, not on the observations of another interlocutor per se; the 
respondent state is not even represented before the Court during the proceedings. 
The ruling can therefore not be regarded as a response to the execution record. This 
procedure, in sum, does not provide room for a response.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings provide external room 
for a response to decisions of different interlocutors. First, the instigation of 
infringement proceedings is a response of the Committee to an alleged breach of 
Article 46 by the respondent state. The Committee can substantiate its allegation in 
both its request for a ruling and in its observations, which it makes after the Court 
has granted the request. The observations of the state to the Court are an answer to 
the Committee’s allegations and serve to explain to the Court why it has acted in 
compliance with Article 46. Finally, in the ruling, the Court responds to the 
observations of the Committee and the respondent state and, more broadly, to the 
state of execution. A strict reading of the relevant text in the Convention seems to 
suggest that the Court can only choose between two responses: finding a violation 
of Article 46 or referring the case to the Committee for it to close its examination of 
the case.130 This reading excludes the option of neither finding a violation nor 
considering that the Committee should close its examination of the case, which 
would be conceivable when the state is in the process of fulfilling its Article 46-
obligation, but has not yet completed it. When the Court indeed interprets the 
Convention as to exclude the third option, its room for a response is more limited 
than it would interpret it as giving it the possibility to: close the case, find a 
violation and make neither decision. Internally, there can be room for the state to 
respond to, or more exactly to avert, infringement proceedings. This possibility 
exists, because the Committee is required to communicate its intention to start 
infringement proceedings to the respondent state six months in advance of its actual 
request to the Court. When the state, in response to the notice of intention, 
implements certain execution measures, this may cause the Court to reject the 
Committee’s request. When the Court indeed rejects the request on that basis, the 
procedure offers the state room to respond to the Committee’s intention.  
                                                        
130  Art. 46(5) ECHR.  
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Assembly questions/recommendations: Through a question or 
recommendation, to which the Committee responds, the Assembly can 
communicate to the Committee its view on execution and on how the Committee 
has discharged its supervisory task. Further, the recommendation and attached 
report, due to their public nature, are also a way for the Assembly to communicate 
to the respondent state how it evaluates its execution endeavours. These two 
procedural steps therefore give the Assembly external room to respond to the 
execution efforts of both the respondent state and the Committee.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: Commissioner visits/reports are a way 
for the Commissioner to communicate to the states its perspective on how they have 
fulfilled their Article 46 obligation and, more generally, their obligation to 
implement the Convention.131 These procedural opportunities for the 
Commissioner’s involvement therefore give room to respond to the respondent’s 
states execution efforts.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: In a decision or interim resolution, the 
Committee responds to the progress, or lack thereof, towards the full execution of a 
judgment. These procedures thus give the Committee external room to respond.  
Final resolutions: A final resolution is the last response of the Committee to a 
respondent state’s execution measures and signifies its approval of these measures. 
This procedure is therefore a means for the Committee to respond externally to the 
state in a formal manner.  
Individual follow-up cases: In an individual follow-up case, the Court can 
respond indirectly to the individual execution measures which a state has taken, as 
supervised by the Committee. It assesses the consequences of the measures or the 
consequences of the failure to take measures. When a case is being adjudicated, the 
respondent state can use the procedures described in chapter V to respond to the 
allegations of an applicant, which means it has internal room for a response.  
General follow-up cases: General follow-up cases allow the Court to respond 
directly, albeit within the confines of the individual complaint, to general execution 
measures which the respondent state has implemented under the Committee’s 
supervision. More concretely, the Court establishes whether these measures cause 
an individual violation of the Convention or fail to remedy the general problem that 
previously generated an individual violation. As applies to individual follow-up 
cases, states have internal room to respond through other procedural steps.  
2.7  Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
Indicator 7 aims to establish whether the procedures potentially help prevent, 
mitigate or end the escalation of internal tension into conflict or, on the contrary, 
create conflict in the execution phase or exacerbate any conflict resulting from the 
(pre-)merits phase. Such conflict can materialise between the Court/Committee and 
                                                        
131  Art. 1 ECHR.  
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the states. The examination is partially based on the observations made above with 
reference to the other indicators. The discussion under indicator 7 in chapter V was 
only a partial answer to the question whether conflict can be prevented in 
Convention proceedings more generally. The answer depends to a large extent on 
how the procedures in the execution phase can mitigate conflict and, going beyond 
that, lead tension towards a positive outcome. The execution phase is particularly 
relevant, because a judgment, which forms the basis for the execution phase, is both 
the step that most likely causes conflict and the last procedural step in the (pre-) 
merits phase.  
Article 41-awards: Article 41-awards do not potentially prevent conflict. Nor 
are they a clear potential source of conflict, because the power of the Court to order 
just satisfaction is uncontroversial as it is laid down in the Convention. Moreover, 
the award is only a monetary award compensating for the suffering of the 
individual; it does not punish the respondent state or have consequences of a, 
broader, non-monetary nature.  
Action plans/reports: The previous indicators pointed out that action 
plans/reports potentially increase the Committee’s understanding of the domestic 
situation and stimulate balanced decision-making by the Committee and reason-
giving by the state. These positive potential outcomes help decrease the chance that 
conflict arises between the Committee and the respondent state, giving these 
procedures conflict preventing potential.  
DH meetings: Considering that DH meetings potentially contribute to the 
sharing of responsibilities between the Committee and the respondent state, to 
mutual understanding between these two interlocutors, to balanced decision-making 
by the Committee, to reason-giving by the Committee and the respondent state, and 
to room for the Committee’s response, they also potentially prevent conflict 
between these interlocutors. In addition to that, they provide a platform to discuss 
any conflict and find solutions to end conflict.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: As bi- and multilateral meetings contribute to 
all most all the same points as DH meetings do, bi- and multilateral meetings are 
also potentially conflict-preventing. These meetings, in particular bilateral 
meetings, can also be used as a forum to discuss, solve and end conflict.  
Requests for interpretation: The Committee only makes a request for 
interpretation when it is in disagreement with the respondent state about the 
interpretation of a judgment. The Court’s ruling on interpretation formally settles 
the disagreement. The procedure therefore has conflict mitigating or ending 
potential. This potential also materialises because the procedure can increase the 
respondent state’s understanding of the Convention system. Understanding may 
help the state accept the interpretation of a judgment which clearly follows from the 
Convention and previous comparable judgments.  
Infringement proceedings: When the Committee brings infringement 
proceedings, it means a deadlock between the Committee and the state has arisen 
over the question whether the state has fulfilled its Article 46 obligation. Like in the 
case of a request for interpretation, the Court’s ruling in this procedure means the 
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conflict between the Committee and the state is formally ended. The potential to 
end conflict is strengthened by the increase in understanding of the respondent state 
and the possibility infringement proceedings give to the Court, the Committee and 
the respondent state to exchange reasons. However, the procedure can at the same 
time also potentially exacerbate any conflict that exists between the Committee and 
the respondent state prior to the start of the procedure. Although the procedure may 
be a formal end to conflict, the state can interpret the instigation of infringement 
proceedings as an expression by the Committee of distrust in the state’s capacity or 
willingness to fully execute a judgment. The procedure could thus exacerbate any 
conflict already existing between the state and the Committee. In sum, when 
assessing the potential of infringement proceedings on paper, no final conclusion 
can be reached about whether the procedure can help prevent conflict or whether it 
rather aggravates conflict.  
Assembly questions/recommendations: Assembly questions and 
recommendations are a means for the Assembly to communicate information to the 
Committee about execution problems and, possibly, solutions as well. As observed 
above, these two procedural steps can as such increase the Committee’s 
understanding of the situation in the respondent state and can stimulate the 
Committee to make balanced decisions and to engage in reason-giving. These 
positive outcomes can, especially when they are combined, also help prevent, end 
or mitigate conflict.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: Commissioner visits potentially can also 
encourage understanding and balanced-decision making by the Committee, albeit in 
a less direct manner than the Assembly procedures. The visits/reports therefore 
potentially contribute to the effect indicator 7 facilitates establishing, although their 
potential is limited when compared to the Assembly procedures, also because the 
Commissioner procedures do not stimulate the Committee to engage in reason-
giving.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: From one perspective, decisions and 
interim measures may help end conflict or a deadlock in the execution phase, 
because these documents give the Committee a formal means to call upon the state 
to execute a judgment. If this stimulates the state to execute, a conflict is ended or 
perhaps prevented. From another perspective, decisions and interim resolutions 
could cause conflict, because they are imposed by the Committee without reason-
giving and do not necessarily stimulate balanced decision-making. To illustrate, if 
the Committee, condemns a state for not having executed a judgment in strong 
language, this may actually cause conflict. The effect of the documents in the light 
of indicator 7 is therefore not unequivocal and should therefore be studied in 
practice.  
Final resolutions: Final resolutions are the end to Convention proceedings and 
therefore welcome to the respondent state. Therefore, they do not cause conflict, but 
nor do they achieve any of the effects which indicator 7 envisages to establish; 
exactly because they are the end to the execution proceedings they cannot solve any 
disagreement that may have existed during the course of the proceedings.  
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Individual follow-up cases: Individual follow-up cases potentially help 
mitigate or end conflict between two sets of interlocutors: the Court and the state 
and the Committee and the state. As for the first set, an individual follow-up case 
provides the opportunity for the respondent state to express its disagreement, by 
way of its choice of execution measures, with the first judgment. Furthermore, in 
the process of communication of the follow-up case, it can explain its reasons for 
disagreeing with the Court. If this leads the Court to adapt its case law as laid down 
in the first case or at least to listen to the state’s concerns and to explain why it 
cannot take another course, this may help to clear a (potential) conflict between 
these two interlocutors. Second, if a deadlock has developed between the 
Committee and the state over what is required under Article 46, a follow-up 
judgment may contribute to solving this conflict by a clarification of the Court, an 
authoritative interlocutor when it comes to the interpretation of the Convention. 
One of the two disagreeing interlocutors may be persuaded by the Court’s follow-
up judgment to give in to the other’s point of view. This procedure can, however, 
also be a potential source of conflict between the Court and the respondent state. 
Even though the Court does not directly review the individual execution measures, 
the respondent state may nevertheless think that the Court disrespects the primarity 
principle by reviewing the consequences of the measures.  
General follow-up cases: For comparable reasons as outlined in relation to 
individual follow-up cases, general follow-up cases are potentially instrumental to 
ending conflict between the Court/Committee and the respondent state. Individual 
follow-up cases, also like their counterparts, can however be a potential source of 
conflict. This unfavourable potential is comparatively large. A direct review of 
general measures, as compared to an indirect review of individual measures, is 
more likely to cause conflict, because general measures have broader consequences 
with a larger impact on the respondent state and because direct review is likely 
more intrusive than indirect review.  
3  CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF PROCEDURES IN THE 
EXECUTION PHASE  
The conclusion to the execution phase is written from the angle of the separate 
procedural steps in order to draw conclusions as to their ‘dialogicness’. As was 
explained in section IV.5.6, the findings made under indicators 2 and 7 contribute 
relatively much to making dialogue of added value to the Convention system. The 
findings made in respect of these indicators therefore carry more weight compared 
to the findings made under the other indicators. It should furthermore be recalled 
from the same section that the procedures will be labelled as having ‘clear’, ‘some’ 
or ‘limited’ dialogic potential. This qualification is relevant, because only the 
functioning in practice of procedures with clear or some potential is assessed in part 
3.  
Article 41-awards: The first procedural step relevant to the execution phase, 
Article 41-awards, is an opportunity for the Court to become involved in execution 
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in an indirect manner, provided that the applicant requests an award. This step is an 
opportunity for involvement of the Committee as well. The positive aspects of these 
awards from the perspective of dialogue are that they stimulate internal reason-
giving by the Court and give the Court external room for a response. On the other 
hand, the awards do not potentially stimulate mutual understanding or balanced 
decision-making, create room for response or prevent conflict. Moreover, they do 
not give states external room for a response and potentially have an effect contrary 
to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the subsidiarity principle. 
Article 41-awards have, considering the foregoing, and especially knowing that 
they do not contribute to sharing responsibilities or preventing conflict, limited 
dialogic potential.  
Action plans/reports: The Committee and the respondent state become 
involved by way of an action plan/report. These documents help them to structure 
their dialogue and have positive effects from the perspective of each indicator. 
Action plans/reports therefore certainly have clear dialogic potential.  
DH meetings: DH meetings, as action plans/reports, permit the Committee and 
the respondent state to become involved and were evaluated positively under all 
indicators. This procedural step therefore also has clear dialogic potential. DH 
meetings have even greater dialogic potential than action plans/reports, because the 
meetings not only potentially increase the respondent state’s understanding, but also 
the Committee’s, not only stimulate the state to give external reasons, but also the 
Committee, and not only give the state external room for a response, but also the 
Committee.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bi- and multilateral meetings, although 
different types of meetings, have largely the same potential effects as DH meetings. 
Unlike DH meetings, they do, however not stimulate reason-giving by the 
Committee. Nevertheless, they also have clear dialogic potential. When a meeting is 
multilateral, states other than the respondent state or multiple respondent states can 
participate in addition to the Committee and the respondent state.  
Requests for interpretation: The Committee and the Court can become 
involved in the execution phase trough a request for interpretation. The procedure is 
potentially beneficial to the sharing of responsibilities as such between the Court 
and the Committee, to understanding by the respondent state and can help end 
conflict. The procedure also stimulates reason-giving: internal and external by the 
Committee and internal by the Court. The requests do, however, not provide room 
for a response in any sense. Overall, the procedure has clear dialogic potential.  
Infringement proceedings: Infringement proceedings are an opportunity for 
involvement of the Committee, the Court and the respondent state. The procedure 
can advance understanding of the respondent state and balanced decision-making 
by the Court and the Committee. Additionally, it stimulates internal and external 
reason-giving by the Committee, external reason-giving by the state and internal 
reason-giving by the Court. The procedure also provides room for a response: 
external in the Court and the Committee’s case and internal and external in the 
state’s case. The effect of infringement proceedings with respect to the two most 
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important indicators, namely indicators 2 and 7, is ambiguous. The procedure 
contributes to the sharing of responsibilities between the Committee and the Court 
as such, because the Court assists the Committee in its supervisory task. However, 
the procedure goes against the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
respondent state in conformity with the subsidiarity principle, because the Court 
evaluates execution measures, while the state is, in conformity with that principle, 
free to choose the means by which it discharges its obligation to execute. Moreover, 
the procedure can in theory help mitigate or end conflict between the Committee 
and the respondent state, but can worsen any already existing conflict between them 
as well. Infringement proceedings have, in sum, dialogic potential, but considering 
the ambiguous effects under indicators 2 and 7, they have some rather clear 
potential.  
Assembly questions/recommendations: Assembly questions and 
recommendations are clearly opportunities for involvement of the Assembly. 
Through these procedural steps, the Assembly can share responsibilities as such 
with the Committee and can increase understanding, balanced decision-making and 
internal and external reason-giving by the Committee. The Assembly is, further, 
given room for a response and can potentially help prevent conflict between the 
Committee and the respondent state. Due to all these positive effects, Assembly 
questions and recommendations have clear dialogic potential. 
Commissioner country visits/reports: Commissioner country visits/reports 
give the Commissioner an opportunity for involvement permitting it to potentially 
share responsibilities with the Committee, increase the Committee’s understanding 
and contribute to balanced decision-making by the Committee. Further, the existing 
procedures give the Commissioner room to respond to a state’s execution record 
and his involvement may help prevent conflict. Compared to the Assembly 
procedures, however, the Commissioner’s procedures are evaluated less positively, 
because the Commissioner does not contribute to reason-giving and the effects 
under indicators 4 and 7 were less outspoken. This difference is due to the fact that 
the Commissioner does not address the Committee directly and that the Committee 
does not need to respond to any report published by the Commissioner. Taking into 
consideration the foregoing, it can be concluded that the procedural steps of the 
Commissioner have some dialogic potential.  
Decisions and interim-measures: Decisions and interim-measures are an 
opportunity for the Committee’s involvement that give it external room for a 
response and that may, or may not, contribute to balanced decision-making. The 
effect regarding preventing and ending conflict is also not unequivocal and the 
effect as to the sharing of responsibilities was neutral. The procedures do not 
contribute to mutual understanding or to reason-giving. Because one effect was 
positive, one neutral and two not unequivocal, mostly because it cannot be 
determined here what the content of these documents is in practice, the documents 
have some dialogic potential and their practice should be examined in part 3.  
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Final resolutions: Final resolutions, another opportunity for the Committee’s 
involvement, do not have any of the positive consequences indicators 2-7 intend to 
establish. This procedural step therefore has limited or even no dialogic potential.  
Individual follow-up cases: The Court can become involved through an 
individual follow-up case. Such a case gives it the opportunity to review the 
consequences of individual execution measures. These cases are also an opportunity 
for the involvement of all other interlocutors. However, as explained in section 
VI.2, the procedure is mostly looked at from the Court’s perspective. The procedure 
contributes to mutual understanding between the Court and the Committee, 
stimulates external reason-giving by the state and internal reason-giving by the 
Court and gives the Court external room for a response. The effect of this procedure 
in the light of indicators 2, 4 and 7 is mixed. As regards indicator 2, the procedure 
goes against the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
state/Committee as envisaged by the Convention, but also potentially contributes to 
the sharing of responsibilities between them as such. Further, judgments generally 
contribute to balanced decision-making by the Court, but judgments in individual-
follow up cases may make the Court’s reason-giving unbalanced. Finally, the 
procedure can help mitigate or end conflict between the respondent state and the 
Court/Committee, but could also cause conflict between the state and the Court. On 
the whole, individual follow-up cases have dialogic potential, but this potential is 
qualified as ‘some potential’, because of the last three additions.  
General follow-up cases: In a similar sense as their individual counterparts, 
general follow-up cases enable the involvement of all interlocutors, but are most 
relevant from the Court’s perspective. In this procedure, the Court can, unlike in the 
above procedure, directly review execution measures. This procedure has 
comparable potentially positive effects as compared to individual follow-up cases. 
It also has comparable mixed effects from the perspective of indicators 2, 4 and 7. 
Both the negative and the positive effect under indicator 7 is stronger due to the 
general nature of the measures reviewed by the Court in this procedure. General 
follow-up cases therefore also have some dialogic potential. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF THE PILOT-
JUDGMENT PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
The pilot judgment-procedure (PJP) was already shortly referred to in chapter II as 
a manifestation of the effectiveness principle in the execution phase. This procedure 
is discussed separately from the other procedural steps because it is, as explained 
hereafter, a unique and uncommonly comprehensive procedure in the Convention 
system. As was the case in the previous two chapters, which concerned the (pre-
)merits and execution phases, the first section of this chapter contains an 
introduction and the second section assesses the procedure from the perspective of 
the seven indicators for dialogue. The last section gives a short summary of the 
findings.  
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE  
The CDDH advanced the PJP in 2003, in the context of a package of reform 
measures aiming to preserve the Convention system in the prospect of a 
continuously growing workload. The procedure was presented as a measure for the 
prevention of violations and the improvement of domestic remedies.1 The Court 
picked up the proposal and suggested amending the Convention to include the PJP, 
but the CDDH considered this unnecessary.2 In 2004, the Committee issued a 
resolution inviting the Court to identify in its judgments, where relevant, both the 
underlying systemic problem and its source. This approach could assist the 
respondent state in remedying the problem and would help the Committee to 
exercise its supervisory task.3 The Court took up the invitation in Broniowski v. 
Poland, its first pilot judgment, pronounced in 2004.4  
In the absence of a firm Convention basis, the Court has relied on Article 46 to 
legally justify its recourse to the procedure.5 After some years of practice, it 
inserted a new rule on the PJP into the Rules of Court,6 which entered into force on 
1 April 2011. Since then, a pilot judgment can be defined as a judgment:  
                                                        
1  CDDH (2003), 3, 9.  
2  Paraskeva (2011), 434.  
3  Committee, ‘Judgments Revealing an Underlying Systemic Problem’, Res(2004)3, 12 May 2004.  
4  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004; See for a more extensive introduction to 
the procedure: Haider (2014), 24-31. 
5  Garlicki (2007), 185; Darcy (2009), 38; Fribergh (2012).  
6  Rule 61 of Court .  
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1. that the Court qualifies as such;7  
2. in which the Court identifies the dysfunction that has given or may give rise to 
similar applications; and  
3. in which it orders – in the operative provisions of the judgment – the remedial 
measures the respondent state must take.8 
 
This study only relies on judgments ‘in the strict sense’,9 namely judgments that 
incorporate each element. ‘Quasi-pilot’ or ‘Article 46-judgments’ also exist, 
incorporating, for example, only the second element. They are not considered here, 
but in chapter X as part of the Court’s practice of Article 46-indications.  
The PJP pursues two aims.10 It aims at facilitating the execution of the Court’s 
judgments and at inducing states to resolve large numbers of individual cases 
arising from the same structural problem.11 The ‘central idea’ behind this 
procedural innovation is that applicants obtain redress faster if domestic remedies 
are created.12 Further, one ‘of the relevant factors considered by the Court in 
devising and applying that procedure has been the growing threat to the Convention 
system resulting from large numbers of repetitive cases that derive from, among 
other things, the same structural or systemic problem’.13 The PJP is therefore 
clearly a response to the threats posed by external tension.  
The PJP does not differ in each respect from non-pilot proceedings. As in any 
other judgment, the Court determines whether the respondent state has violated the 
Convention rights of the applicant in a pilot judgment. This chapter and chapter XI 
only examine those aspects of the PJP that are different from non-pilot judgments or 
form a substantial part of the procedure; other aspects have already been discussed 
in chapters V and VI. The following sections address the run-up to the procedure, 
the content of a pilot judgment and the PJP as it continues after the Court has 
adopted a pilot judgment.  
1.1 Run-up to the Pilot Judgment  
A PJP may be initiated by the Court of its own motion or at the request of the 
parties.14 The Court ‘may initiate a [PJP] where the facts of an application reveal in 
the Contracting State concerned the existence of a structural or systemic problem or 
other similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar 
applications’.15 Therefore, the procedure can only be initiated when two conditions 
                                                        
7  Leach (2011), 87. 
8  Rule 61(3) of Court.  
9  ECtHR (2015g), 1.  
10  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 117. 
11  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, paras. 126-127.  
12  ECtHR (2009), para. 6.  
13  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 234.  
14  Rule 61(2)(b) of Court.  
15  Rule 61(1) of Court.  
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have been fulfilled. First, a structural or systemic problem must exist and, second, 
that problem should have caused similar applications in the past or should do so in 
the future. As the word ‘may’ indicates, the Court is not obliged to apply the 
procedure when both conditions have been fulfilled. Regardless of which 
interlocutor initiated the procedure, the parties always have the possibility to give 
their views on whether the application under examination results from the existence 
of a structural problem and on the suitability of processing the application in 
accordance with the procedure.16 The Court, however, only seeks views; it does not 
need the parties’ approval to start the procedure.  
1.2 Content of the Pilot Judgment  
In the operative provisions of a pilot judgment, the Court must identify the nature of 
the structural or systemic problem or other dysfunction as established in its 
judgment and the type of remedial measures which the respondent state is required 
to take at the domestic level.17 The Court can further order that the remedial 
measures must be adopted within a specified time, ‘bearing in mind the nature of 
the measures required and the speed with which the problem which it has identified 
can be remedied’.18 As regards the applicant who has brought the case that 
eventually became subject to the PJP, the Court may reserve the question of just 
satisfaction either in whole or in part pending the adoption by the respondent state 
of the measures specified in the judgment.19 And as for all similar applications, the 
Court may ‘as appropriate’ adjourn their examination pending the adoption of the 
remedial measures required by virtue of the operative provisions.20  
1.3 After the Pilot Judgment  
The Rules of Court speak of the ‘pilot judgment procedure’. It is clear that this 
procedure formally starts when the Court issues a pilot judgment, but, much 
remains unclear about how the procedure is to proceed and how, if at all, it is 
formally closed. The Rules of Court do provide that when the parties to the pilot 
judgment reach a friendly settlement, such agreement shall comprise a declaration 
by the state ‘on the implementation of the general measures identified in the pilot 
judgment as well as the redress to be afforded to other [...] applicants’.21 It is also 
provided for in the Rules of Court that the Court can resume the examination of 
applications previously adjourned.22 These two provisions, however, shed little 
                                                        
16  Rule 61(2)(a) of Court.  
17  Rule 61(3) of Court.  
18  Rule 61(4) of Court.  
19  Rule 61(5) of Court.  
20  Rule 61(6)(a) of Court.  
21  Rule 61(7) of Court. 
22  Rule 61(8) of Court.  
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light on how the execution stage of a pilot judgment is to proceed. Examining the 
functioning of the procedure in practice is therefore essential to any discussion of 
the execution of pilot judgments, as is done in chapter XI.  
2  APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
2.1  Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors  
Indicator 1 inquires into which interlocutors have an opportunity for involvement in 
the PJP. If an interlocutor can become involved, the following question is what it 
can achieve and with which interlocutors it can communicate. Opportunities for 
involvement existing in both pilot and non-pilot procedures, such as the 
communication of a case, are not discussed here, as they have already been 
addressed in chapter V. This implies that opportunities for involvement of the 
Commissioner and the Assembly are left aside completely, because the PJP does 
not influence their capacity to use these opportunities. 
2.1.1 The Court  
The Court plays different, yet always important roles at various moments in the 
PJP. First of all, it decides to apply the PJP. It can do so of its own motion, but also 
on the request of the parties or even against their will. As a consequence of this 
decision, a case no longer concerns just the individual applicant, but becomes 
exemplar of a broader problem necessitating general measures. Second, the Court 
identifies the underlying problem triggering the application of the procedure in its 
pilot judgment. This is a clear signal to the respondent state that a major problem 
exists that has given rise or may give rise to similar applications. Applying the PJP 
is therefore an expression of concern by the Court for the number of applications 
that have been or will be brought to Strasbourg. After the Court has identified that 
problem it, third, indicates remedial measures, possibly accompanied by a deadline 
in the operative part of the judgment. The Court thus gives clear directions to the 
respondent state as to which execution measures it must take. The fourth possibility 
for involvement of the Court is to adjourn – as appropriate – the examination of all 
similar applications pending the adoption of remedial measures by the respondent 
state.23 The first four procedures for involvement belong to the (pre-)merits phase.  
In addition to the four possibilities for involvement in the (pre-)merits phase, it 
is clear from the Rules of Court that the Court can also become involved in the 
execution phase: it is foreseen that the parties conclude a friendly settlement, which 
the Court must subsequently approve, and the Court can continue the examination 
of previously adjourned cases. Regarding friendly settlements, it must be added that 
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this opportunity only arises if the Court has adjourned dealing with the question of 
just satisfaction at least in part in its pilot judgment, which is expressly mentioned 
as a possibility in Rule 61.24 As for the possibility to resume examining previously 
adjourned applications, this enables the Court to take control if it turns out that a 
respondent state is unable or unwilling to solve these applications at home. In sum, 
it can be concluded based on the foregoing that the Court expects to become 
involved in the execution phase of a pilot judgment by evaluating implemented 
execution measures (or a lack thereof) and by taking action if no such measures are 
implemented.  
2.1.2 The Respondent State  
The respondent state’s active involvement is of the utmost importance to the 
procedure; without its efforts and determination, remedial measures are not 
implemented, in spite of the Court’s involvement and the Committee’s supervision. 
More specifically, the respondent state has four opportunities for involvement. The 
first step which it can set is to request the Court to initiate the PJP.25 Therefore, like 
the Court, but subject to the latter’s approval, the state has the possibility to make a 
case exemplar of a domestic problem. Second, when contemplating applying the 
PJP, the Court asks the respondent state’s view on the suitability of a case for the 
PJP. This is a possibility to exert influence, although the state’s approval is not 
required for applying the procedure. The state can either encourage or try to keep 
the Court from applying the procedure. More specifically, the state can use this 
opportunity to air its concerns as to the influence which the application of the PJP 
might have on internal tension. When the Court decides to adjourn the examination 
of all similar applications pending the implementation of remedial measures, it 
gives the state a third opportunity for involvement: to take measures in respect of 
these applications. Based on the measures, the state can subsequently ask the Court 
to strike the cases of its list in accordance with Article 37. The adjournment of these 
applications therefore gives the respondent state the possibility to find a solution for 
the problems complained of in respect of pending applications and thus to prevent 
adverse judgments. It should, however, be noted that the Court may at any time 
examine an adjourned application where ‘the interest of the proper administration of 
justice so require’.26 The fourth and last opportunity for involvement is the 
possibility to reach a friendly settlement in which the parties agree on general 
measures and redress to be afforded to other (actual) applicants. The settlement is a 
means to inform the Court of the execution measures which the state intends to take 
or has already taken, which can be regarded as its response to a pilot judgment. It 
can be derived from the four opportunities for involvement that the respondent has 
little control over whether it can become involved and whether its involvement has 
                                                        
24  Rule 61(6)(a) of Court. 
25  Rule 61(2)(b) of Court.  
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any influence: the first opportunity is subject to the Court’s approval, the second 
cannot prevent that the PJP is applied, the third depends on whether the Court has 
adjourned dealing with similar applications and the fourth on whether the Court has 
reserved dealing with the question of Article 41 and whether the applicant agrees.  
2.1.3 The Committee  
The Committee becomes involved in the PJP by virtue of Article 46(2), which 
makes this interlocutor responsible for supervising the execution of the Court’s 
judgments. The Court informs the Committee of the adoption of each pilot 
judgment,27 after which the latter examines the judgment under the enhanced 
supervision procedure.28 The Court’s influence on and involvement in the execution 
of a pilot judgment could risk limiting the possibilities for the Committee’s 
involvement under Article 46(2). This risk should, however, not be overstated, for 
reasons given under indicator 2. The Committee’s supervision of pilot judgments, 
including the opportunities for involvement available to it, do not differ 
significantly from when it supervises other judgments receiving enhanced 
supervision. Further, both pilot and non-pilot judgments can require the execution 
of general measures. Considering the foregoing and because chapter VI already 
outlined the procedural opportunities for involvement of the Committee in the 
execution phase, these opportunities are not repeated here.  
2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
Indicator 2 facilitates analysing the PJP through the lens of sharing responsibilities. 
Responsibilities can be shared as envisaged by the Convention, that is, in line with 
the subsidiarity principle and the procedural task division between the Court and the 
Committee, and as such, that is, regardless of how the Convention envisages that 
responsibilities should be divided. More specifically, in this section the sharing of 
responsibilities between the Court and the respondent state and the Court and the 
Committee is analysed. Because the sharing of responsibilities between the 
Committee and the respondent state is not expected to differ significantly from 
when they share responsibilities during the execution of a non-pilot judgment (to 
which enhanced supervision applies), this type of sharing of responsibilities is not 
discussed. 
2.2.1 Court – Respondent State  
The PJP is, from one perspective, detrimental to the sharing of responsibilities 
between the Court and the respondent state in conformity with the Convention and 
                                                        
27  Rule 61(9) of Court.  
28  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45final, 7 December 2010, para. I(10).  
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more specifically the subsidiarity principle. The Court orders remedial measures, 
possibly with a deadline. This is, as the Court reiterates even in its pilot judgments, 
‘in principle not its task’.29 In addition to that, the Court may evaluate implemented 
execution measures, something which it would normally not do. Such involvement 
of the Court can be unwelcome to the respondent state because the former can 
decide to apply the PJP against the will of the latter.  
Paradoxically however, the procedure may also enhance the sharing 
responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention. The reason for this possibility is 
connected to the observation that the existence of a domestic problem causing 
repetitive violations means that the state has failed to fulfil its primary 
responsibility.30 In response to this failure, the Court assumes responsibilities that it 
should not carry out from the viewpoint of the subsidiarity principle, but which it 
does nevertheless to give effect to the effectiveness principle.31 The successful 
conclusion of a PJP means that such a problem is (being) solved and that the state 
has resumed its primary responsibility. This allows the Court to restrict itself to its 
subsidiary role. Therefore, the procedure holds the promise of promoting respect for 
the principle of subsidiarity and ‘restoring the balance in the relationship between 
international protection and domestic system’.32 This is a valuable promise, as 
chapter II concluded that the states parties have, on the whole, not yet succeeded in 
effectively implementing the Convention.33 In the language of chapter IV, the PJP 
can contribute to eliminating instances of external tension that decrease the 
system’s effectiveness and that may reinforce internal tension.34 From this 
perspective, the PJP can be characterised as a wake-up call for the respondent state 
to remind it in thorough, firm and binding language that it should assume its 
primary responsibility so the Court can limit itself to its own – subsidiary – task 
again. The PJP is a drastic response by the Court to a structural problem at domestic 
level that, if unsolved, would compromise respect for the subsidiarity principle and 
almost inevitably would lead to large numbers of repetitive cases. The Court 
facilitates sharing responsibilities in conformity with the Convention most when it 
adjourns all applications similar to the pilot application pending the adoption of 
remedial measures. Thus, the respondent state becomes again responsible for 
dealing with these cases, which is in line with the subsidiarity principle, and, 
ultimately the aim of the procedure.35  
Besides the foregoing, the PJP potentially also contributes to the sharing of 
responsibilities as such. When the Court identifies the problem and identifies 
remedial measures, it assists respondent states ‘in the performance of their duty 
                                                        
29  Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 89.  
30  Fribergh (2009), 140.  
31  See also: section II.2.4.3.  
32  Wildhaber (2004a).  
33  See: section II.3.7.  
34  See: section IV.3.4.  
35  Leach et al. (2010), 30.  
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under Article 46’ and in the difficult exercise of solving a complex domestic 
problem.36  
2.2.2 Court – Committee  
The PJP can further be regarded as a procedure blurring the otherwise clear-cut 
procedural task division between the Court and the Committee as envisaged by the 
Convention. The Court, when it pronounces a pilot judgment, comes on the 
Committee’s terrain and goes beyond its judicial role by stipulating remedial 
measures and becoming involved in the execution phase. The Court’s encroachment 
on the Committee’s terrain would be particularly visible if the Court applies the PJP 
to a category of cases when the Committee is still supervising the execution of 
earlier judgments in cases falling in the same category.  
In spite of the foregoing, the PJP can be regarded as a procedure enabling the 
Court to assist the Committee in fulfilling its supervisory role as such. Especially 
when, despite the Committee’s efforts, similar applications continue to reach the 
Court, the application of the PJP potentially assists the Committee in its task, which 
it has apparently not been able to complete fully.37 The PJP has this potential 
because a pilot judgment analyses and identifies a structural problem and orders, in 
a binding fashion, measures required to end a stream of similar applications.38 As 
the Court can identify and describe a domestic problem in its pilot judgments in 
some detail, the Court can be of assistance to the Committee. Further, because the 
Court repeats its findings as to the dysfunction in the operative parts of a pilot 
judgment,39 the finding is probably more persuasive. This wake-up call makes the 
obligation to implement remedial measures comparatively hard to escape for the 
state.  
2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding  
Indicator 3 was designed to help establish whether a procedure contributes to 
understanding between European interlocutors and the states. Most relevantly in the 
PJP, the question can be posed whether the respondent state’s understanding of its 
obligations under Article 46 is enhanced as a result of the application of the 
procedure and whether the Court and the Committee’s understanding increases of 
the domestic problem warranting the procedure’s application.   
It is proposed that the PJP enhances understanding by the respondent state of the 
Convention system. As explained under indicator 2, the procedure is a wake-up call 
for the state, reminding it that it should assume its primary responsibility. This 
                                                        
36  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, para. 194.  
37  Fribergh (2009).  
38  See also: Garlicki (2007), 190.  
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furthers the implementation of the principle of subsidiarity40 and probably also 
increases the state’s understanding of, or rather points out again, how the system is 
supposed to function.41  
The procedure also increases the Court and the Committee’s understanding of 
domestic legal systems and implementation problems connected to external tension. 
The procedure is designed to solve implementation problems: the Court, in a pilot 
judgment, always identifies the nature of such a problem as well as the measures 
required to remedy the violations caused by the problem.42 In other words, the 
Court must gain understanding of the background to a problem, by relying on, for 
example, third-party interventions and domestic judgments. It also requires that the 
Court and the Committee acquire some knowledge of relevant remedial measures. 
The PJP therefore increases the understanding of the Court and the Committee of 
the domestic level because gaining such understanding can be regarded as an 
informal prerequisite for employing the procedure successfully.  
2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Indicator 4 serves to establish whether the PJP advances balanced decision-making 
so as to prevent that the difficulties at the root of internal tension cause conflict. The 
focus of the analysis lies on the Court’s decision-making, because as was outlined 
under indicator 1, especially the Court has decision-making powers in the PJP 
which it does not have in other proceedings.  
The Court’s decision-making in the PJP can be interpreted as unbalanced in 
various respects. The procedure namely permits the Court to issue, of its own 
motion and possibly against the will of the respondent state, a judgment with 
findings going beyond the individual application and imposing binding orders of a 
general nature, possibly accompanied by a deadline. Moreover, the Court may 
review the implementation of these measures. Such review could be interpreted by 
the respondent state as unbalanced per se, because it is, in principle, not the Court’s 
task to become involved in reviewing execution. Whether the respondent state 
perceives these aspects indeed as unbalanced probably depends on whether it shares 
the Court’s view that the domestic problem identified must be solved urgently, 
whether similar applications are adjourned, the level of detail of the measures 
ordered and the Court’s evaluation of the measures. Further, the extent to which a 
decision is regarded as unbalanced may also be offset by certain factors. As 
indicator 3 illustrated, the Court needs to gain understanding of the problem 
underlying an individual violation and when it demonstrates it has gained such 
understanding, its potentially unbalanced decision may in practice be rather 
balanced. The Court’s listening to the respondent state’s opinion on the suitability 
                                                        
40  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 108.  
41  Although a lack of understanding is probably not the reason for the large numbers of repetitive 
cases.  
42  Rule 61(3) of Court.  
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of applying the PJP to a case may also speak in favour of the PJP on this point, even 
though the Court does not necessarily need to follow that opinion.  
Moreover, the potentially unbalanced nature of the Court’s decision-making can 
be largely explained by the problem lying at the root of any pilot judgment, namely 
that the state has failed to fulfil its primary responsibility for implementing the 
Convention. This failure unsettles the equilibrium in the division of responsibilities 
between the European and national authorities. In turn, it causes the Court to apply 
a procedure that involves somewhat unbalanced decision-making, in order to restore 
the equilibrium eventually. Viewed from this perspective, the extent to which the 
PJP is unbalanced can be explained and oftentimes justified. 
2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 facilitates determining whether the PJP stimulates reason-giving of 
especially the Court, because it is the major decision-maker in the PJP.  
In the course of the PJP, the Court makes a number of decisions that, 
individually or jointly, can have a significant impact of a legal, financial or 
administrative nature on the respondent state. It is therefore highly important that 
the Court reasons these decisions. This possibly increases the persuasiveness of the 
pilot judgment and of the remedial measures ordered in the judgment, which, in 
turn, facilitates the successful conclusion the procedure. If the Court takes the 
decision to apply the PJP, to identify a dysfunction and to order general measures in 
a judgment, these decisions must be reasoned in accordance with Article 45. 
Internal reason-giving by the Court is therefore encouraged.  
2.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response 
Indicator 6 facilitates analysing whether the interlocutors can respond to procedural 
steps set by another interlocutor. This concerns external room for a response. The 
indicator also poses the less broad question whether internal room for a response 
exists: the possibility to respond to decisions made as part of the PJP.  
The decision to apply the PJP, including the identification of the problem and 
the remedial measures, is the Court’s response to the existence of a problem in the 
respondent state. Indeed, the Court can only apply the procedure if such a problem 
exists. As this problem may have already given rise to similar applications, it is 
potentially also a response to the state’s failure to adequately execute previous 
judgments. In addition to that, the PJP gives the Court the possibility to respond to 
the execution measures taken by the respondent state in the course of the procedure.  
The respondent state has some room for a response, as the Court asks for its 
opinion when considering applying the procedure. Even though the Court does not 
need to listen to the state’s opinion, this opportunity for involvement nevertheless 
provides internal room for a response. External room for a response to a judgment 
of the Court in the execution phase is for the respondent state on the whole more 
limited than in case of a non-pilot judgment. A pilot judgment places the respondent 
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state under a clear and explicit legal obligation to take remedial measures of a 
general nature, sometimes within a deadline. Moreover, the Committee places pilot 
judgments normally under enhanced supervision, which means that it follows the 
execution process comparatively closely. In addition to the Committee, the Court 
also supervises execution. Although the precise modalities of execution are open for 
debate during such a process, the execution measures which must be taken are 
clearer and more closely supervised by two interlocutors instead of one. This makes 
it harder to escape the basic obligation to execute, although the obligation applies 
equally outside the context of the PJP. Notwithstanding the foregoing, one 
particular opportunity for the respondent state gives it more room to respond in the 
sphere of the PJP than outside that sphere. When the Court adjourns the 
examination of all similar applications pending the adoption of remedial measures 
required by a pilot judgment, the state can respond by dealing with these 
applications again on the domestic level, provided it takes measures justifying 
striking the applications out under Article 37.  
2.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
Indicator 7 serves to establish whether the PJP can help to prevent, mitigate or end 
the escalation of internal tension into conflict or, on the contrary, create conflict. 
This is partly determined based on the findings made under the previous indicators.  
Because the Court orders remedial measures of a binding nature in its pilot 
judgment, the judgment sows the seeds of conflict between the Court and the 
respondent state when the state disagrees with the measures. This negative potential 
is strengthened when the Court applies the PJP in spite of the respondent state’s 
opposition to the procedure and because the Court possibly reviews the respondent 
state’s execution efforts. When the Court and the state disagree about whether 
certain implemented measures suffice for the purposes of Article 46, the conflict 
can exacerbate. Moreover, this supervisory exercise can also be a new source of 
conflict in itself. The procedure can also be interpreted as conflict-provoking 
because it is from one perspective detrimental to the sharing of responsibilities in 
conformity with the Convention and because the decision-making by the Court can 
be perceived as unbalanced. Moreover, the PJP leaves generally less room for a 
response to the respondent state than non-pilot judgments. It should, however, be 
noted that the procedure may also be interpreted as contributing to sharing 
responsibilities, that the procedure potentially increases mutual understanding and 
that its unbalanced character is understandable and mitigated to some extent. These 
factors may decrease the detrimental effect of the PJP from the perspective of 
indicator 7, but do not justify the conclusion that the procedure is beneficial to 
handling conflict.  
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3 CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF THE PILOT-JUDGMENT 
PROCEDURE  
A label must be given to the PJP in accordance with section IV.5.5, qualifying the 
PJP as having clear, some or limited dialogic potential. Regarding the assignment of 
a label, is it important to restate that indicators 2 and 7 are of relatively much 
importance, because they contribute more to making dialogue of added value as 
compared to the other indicators.  
When considering the above findings in section VII.2 jointly, it can be 
concluded that the PJP has certainly dialogic potential from the perspective of 
indicators 3 and 5. The procedure is, however, not dialogic in view of indicators 4 
and 7. Further, the procedure can be both beneficial and detrimental to dialogue 
from the perspective of indicators 2 and 6. Overall, the PJP has dialogic potential 
but this potential is qualified as ‘some potential’, not as ‘clear potential’, because it 
is equivocal in respect of various indicators and non-existing in respect of two 
indicators.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS: THE DIALOGIC POTENTIAL OF 
CONVENTION-RELATED PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
 
This chapter forms the conclusion to part 2 on the dialogic potential of Convention-
related procedures as laid down in documents, such as the Convention, the Rules of 
Court and the Rules of the Committee for the Supervision of the Execution of 
Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements. The chapter is a compilation 
of the findings made in chapters V-VII. It thereby answers one of the questions 
posed in chapter IV, namely whether the Convention-related procedures have 
dialogic potential on paper. It integrates the findings made regarding the (pre-
)merits and the execution phase and the PJP in the light of the seven indicators for 
dialogue. The last section of this chapter gives an overview of the level of dialogic 
potential the Convention-related procedures.  
1 INDICATOR 1: PROCEDURAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVOLVEMENT OF 
ALL INTERLOCUTORS  
Each interlocutor has an opportunity to become involved through one or more of the 
procedures and procedural steps discussed in chapters V-VII. The number of 
opportunities, however, differs as well as the manner in which the interlocutors can 
become involved and in which phase they can become involved. All interlocutors, 
except the Committee, can become involved in both the (pre-)merits and the 
execution phase; the Committee cannot become involved in the (pre-)merits phase.  
The states may become involved in two capacities: as a respondent state and 
without being a party to a case. The respondent state logically has various 
opportunities for involvement in the both phases, because it must answer the 
applicant’s allegations and, if it is held to be responsible for a violation, execute a 
judgment. That state also plays a special role in the PJP, through four opportunities 
for involvement which are virtually unique to the PJP. The respondent state can 
request the application of the PJP, give its opinion on whether the PJP should be 
applied and reach a friendly settlement with the applicant in the pilot case. 
Additionally, the state sometimes has the opportunity to solve adjourned cases 
itself. The state has, however little control over whether it can indeed use these 
possibilities and whether its involvement is of any consequence. States other than 
the respondent state can become involved in the (pre-)merits phase by way of 
hearings and third-party interventions. They have a right to become thus involved 
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when one of their nationals is an applicant. In the execution phase, they have an 
opportunity for involvement when the Committee organises a multilateral meeting. 
As could be anticipated, the Court has most opportunities for involvement in the 
(pre-)merits phase. Two procedural steps, namely judgments and Article 41-awards, 
are only an opportunity for the involvement of the Court. Not only the Court, but 
also its Registry is a potentially important player, especially in friendly settlement 
proceedings. The conclusion that the Court can also become involved in the 
execution phase is remarkable, since the Committee is responsible for supervising 
the execution of judgments under Article 46(2). It becomes involved through a 
request for interpretation or infringement proceedings or, in yet another manner, 
through follow-up cases. The Court plays furthermore a special role in the PJP, 
including in supervising the execution of a pilot judgment. In the run-up to the pilot 
judgment and in the pilot judgment itself, it is the Court that decides to apply the 
PJP, identifies the problem triggering the application of the procedure and remedial 
measures and, possibly, adjourns the examination of similar applications. The same 
interlocutor may also become involved in the execution phase by evaluating 
execution measures and taking steps if these measures are not taken. Opportunities 
for involvement by the Court therefore abound, perhaps even to such an extent that 
it risks going beyond its task description in the Convention.  
The Committee neither plays a special role in the PJP nor can become involved 
in the (pre-)merits phase; its opportunities for involvement all relate to supervising 
the execution of a judgment. The Committee’s position is a logical consequence of 
its task description in Article 46. The opportunities for involvement of the 
Committee therefore remain within the bounds of the task assigned to it by the 
Convention. It can use decisions, interim resolutions and final resolutions to give its 
opinion about the state of execution of a judgment. The Committee can also ask the 
Court to clarify its judgment through a request for interpretation. Further, the 
Committee and the respondent state can discuss execution issues by means of action 
plans/reports, DH and meetings and bilateral meetings. The Committee can discuss 
these issues with a broader pool of states through multilateral meetings. In 
infringement proceedings, the Committee interacts with both the respondent state 
and the Court. 
The Commissioner and the Assembly also may become involved, even though 
the Convention does not assign a specific role to them as regards the adjudication or 
execution of judgments. In the (pre-)merits phase, the Commissioner has the right 
to intervene through third-party interventions and to participate at hearing in certain 
cases. The Assembly does not have such a right, but can ask for leave to intervene. 
Unlike in the (pre-)merits phase, the Commissioner does not have a formal 
opportunity to become involved in execution matters. The Commissioner can 
nevertheless, by issuing reports based on country visits, try to encourage the 
execution of judgments. The Assembly also lacks a formal opportunity created to 
become involved in execution matters. However, the Assembly has access to a 
formal means to communicate with the Committee generally, which it can use to 
enter into a dialogue about execution matters: questions and recommendations 
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based on reports, to which the Committee responds. On paper, the Commissioner 
and the Assembly do not play a special role in the PJP.  
2 INDICATOR 2: SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES  
The interlocutors that become involved in the (pre-)merits phase can also share 
responsibilities as such with the Court. Sharing responsibilities as such can be 
brought about by hearings and third-party interventions; these procedures make it 
possible for involved interlocutors to complement the Court’s work. Additionally, 
various procedures and procedural steps encourage sharing responsibilities as 
envisaged by the Convention: communication, strike-out procedures and hearings. 
Only one procedural step in this phase, interim measures, potentially has a negative 
effect on the sharing of responsibilities. Further, relinquishment, investigations, 
judgments and referral do not attain the objective of sharing responsibilities. 
In the execution phase, the Court, the Commissioner and the Assembly can 
share responsibilities as such with the Committee, and the Court can share such 
responsibilities with the respondent state as well. Further, the Committee and the 
respondent state may share responsibilities by way of action plans/reports and DH, 
bi- and multilateral meetings and DH meetings. To what extent the Committee and 
the respondent state share responsibilities in line with the subsidiarity principle 
depends principally on which supervisory system applies: standard or enhanced 
supervision. When the Committee exercises standard supervision, its own 
involvement is formal and minimal and the respondent state can fulfil its primary 
responsibility largely at its own discretion.  
More so than in the (pre-)merits phase, the sharing of responsibilities in 
conformity with the Convention is under tension in the execution phase and in the 
PJP. The Court’s involvement in this phase and procedure may cause such tension 
because it allows the Court to take on responsibilities which the Convention assigns 
to the respondent state or the Committee. The PJP in particular blurs the otherwise 
clear-cut task division between the Court and the Committee. At the same time, the 
Court’s involvement means responsibilities are shared as such, with the Committee 
alone through infringement proceedings, requests for interpretation and with both 
the Committee and the respondent state through follow-up cases and the PJP. The 
Court can therefore assist the Committee in its supervisory task. Furthermore, the 
PJP, in addition to conflicting with, can also contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities between the Court and the respondent state in conformity with the 
Convention. The Court’s involvement therefore has negative consequences from 
one perspective, but from another perspective can also achieve a beneficial result. 
3 INDICATOR 3: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING  
Both the understanding of the Court of the situation and sensitivities in the 
respondent state as well as the respondent state’s understanding of the Convention 
system can increase as the result of various procedural opportunities for 
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involvement in the (pre-)merits phase. The Court’s understanding of sensitivities 
relating to internal and external tension in the respondent state can be built up by 
means of communication, hearings, third-party interventions, investigations and 
referral. The respondent state’s understanding of the Convention system may also 
increase as the result of communication, hearings, investigations, judgments and 
referral. Moreover, other states’ understanding can be enhanced, when they 
intervene as a third party. Interim measures, strike-out procedures and 
relinquishment do not have the effect indicator 3 seeks to establish. 
In the execution phase, the Committee’s understanding of the respondent state 
and the respondent state’s understanding of execution aspects of the Convention 
system can augment. The Committee’s understanding can be extended by means of 
action plans/reports, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings, Assembly questions/ 
recommendations and Commissioner visits/reports. Further, the respondent state’s 
understanding may increase as a result of various procedures: DH, bi- and 
multilateral meetings, requests for interpretation, infringement proceedings and 
follow-up cases. Additionally, the Court’s understanding can also develop through 
follow-up cases. Article 41-awards, decisions and interim/final resolutions do not 
help improve understanding of any interlocutor. Besides, the PJP contributes to 
understanding as regards each involved interlocutor.  
4 INDICATOR 4: BALANCED DECISION-MAKING  
Balanced decision-making, which concerns the Court’s decision-making in the (pre-
)merits phase, is activated either because a procedure enables other interlocutors to 
impart their perspective on a certain issue or information to the Court or because the 
Court is stimulated to engage in reason-giving. Communication, hearings, third-
party interventions and judgments stimulate reason-giving by the Court in that 
phase. The first three procedures enable the respondent state and other interlocutors 
to impart their perspective to the Court. When their perspectives influence the 
Court’s decision-making, this potentially contributes to balanced judgments. 
Judgments have this effect potentially because they must be reasoned and because 
separate opinions can be attached. Further, when the Court makes a strike-out 
decision, it is precluded from making unbalanced decisions altogether. Strike-out 
procedures could therefore not be relevantly assessed under indicator 4. Interim 
measures, relinquishment, investigations and referral do not contribute to balanced 
decision-making. When the Court’s decision-making affects execution matters, 
balanced-decision making by this interlocutor is encouraged by requests for 
interpretation and infringement proceedings. Follow-up cases both stimulate 
balanced-decision making and go against this. Further, the Court’s decision-making 
in the course of the PJP is unbalanced in various respects.  
Balanced decision-making by the Committee in the execution phase is 
potentially boosted by a whole range of procedural steps, allowing other 
interlocutors to impart information or their viewpoint to the Committee. These steps 
are action plans/reports, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings, infringement 
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proceedings, Assembly questions/recommendations and Commissioner country 
visits/reports. Requests for interpretation and final resolutions have no such effect. 
Whether interim resolutions and decisions potentially have this effect could not be 
established.  
5 INDICATOR 5: REASON-GIVING  
Reason-giving by the Court is, regardless of the phase or procedure, required when 
it issues a ruling in the form of a judgment and also for most of its decisions. The 
foregoing includes pilot judgments, Article 41-awards and strike-out decisions. 
Third-party interventions potentially also stimulate the Court to engage in external 
reason-giving. The Court is not stimulated to engage in reason-giving by interim 
measures, relinquishment, refusing leave for a third-party intervention, deciding to 
investigate and (not) granting a request for referral. The lack of reason-giving by 
the Court in respect of referral is not overly problematic from the perspective of 
dialogue, because the state can veto the Court’s intended decision. Whenever the 
Court makes a decision influencing the execution phase, it is required to reason its 
decision and thus to engage in internal reason-giving. 
As regards the state, reason-giving for relevant decisions taken nationally is 
encouraged by different procedures in both phases. In the (pre-)merits phase, 
external reason-giving by the state is possible through communication and hearings. 
The Court can stimulate this type of reason-giving by asking questions, which may 
be assumed to induce the state to give reasons that relate to the Convention 
(principles) and its jurisprudence. In the execution phase, the respondent state’s 
reason-giving is also activated, in the sense that reasons must be given for taking a 
certain approach to executing a judgment. This effect is potentially achieved by 
action plans/reports, DH and bi- and multilateral meetings, infringement 
proceedings and individual and general follow-up cases.  
Additionally, the Committee engages in reason-giving by responding to an 
Assembly question or recommendation. Although its Rules do not require the 
Committee to reason a final resolution, probably its most important decision, nor its 
decisions or interim resolutions, various other procedural steps encourage it to 
engage in reason-giving prior to the adoption of this resolution. These other steps 
are DH meetings, requests for interpretation, and infringement proceedings.  
In addition to external reason-giving, internal reason-giving is furthermore 
generally required when an interlocutors makes a certain demand. In particular, it is 
required when an interlocutor submits a third-party intervention,1 requests referral, 
makes a request for interpretation or starts infringement proceedings.  
                                                        
1  This does not apply to states one of whose nationals is an applicant and the Commissioner.  
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6 INDICATOR 6: ROOM FOR A RESPONSE  
In the (pre-)merits phase, internal room to respond for the respondent state only 
exists for communication and relinquishment. Both strike-out procedures and 
hearings are a way for the respondent state to give an external response to the 
decision to communicate and to exchanges during communication. Strike-out 
procedures allow for a particularly strong external response, because they lead to 
the return of an application to the domestic level without a ruling of the Court on 
the merits of an alleged violation. The states also have external room to respond in 
the sense that they can respond to a previous judgment. The respondent state does 
so through referral and other states through third-party interventions. The procedure 
of relinquishment decreases external room for a response of the respondent state. As 
for the Court, its judgments allow it to respond to the arguments and information 
provided to it by the state throughout the (pre-)merits phase. 
In the execution phase, each interlocutor has external room for a response, to 
respond to decisions made by other interlocutors during the execution phase or 
already in the (pre-)merits phase. Most important in view of internal tension, the 
respondent state requires external room for a response to execute a judgment. One 
particular aspect of a judgment, namely Article 41-awards, does not leave the 
respondent state any room to respond at its own discretion. Further, its discretion is 
curtailed when a chamber relinquishes jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber and when 
the Court issues a pilot judgment. Whether the respondent state has room to respond 
to a judgment at its own discretion, without intensive supervision by the 
Committee, depends largely on whether the Committee applies enhanced or 
standard supervision; standard supervision gives it most room. As in the case of 
indicator 2 therefore, the results under indicator 6 should not only be established by 
scrutinising separate procedures, but also by establishing which supervisory system 
applies. The respondent state has also access to various procedural opportunities for 
involvement to discuss its response to a judgment with the Committee and to 
respond to decisions made by the Committee in the execution phase, such as, the 
adoption of an interim resolution. These opportunities are action plans/reports, DH, 
bi- and multilateral meetings. Further, the state can respond to the Committee’s 
intention to start infringement proceedings and the Committee’s allegation that it 
has violated Article 46, a constant feature of infringement proceedings. 
Infringement proceedings are also a way for the Committee to respond to the state’s 
execution efforts. The Committee can further use decisions, interim resolutions, 
final resolutions and DH, bi- and multilateral meetings for that purpose. 
Additionally, the Court may respond to a state’s execution record by different 
means. Infringement proceedings give it the possibility to rule on and thus to 
respond to how a judgment has been executed. The Court can also comment on the 
consequences of individual execution measures in individual follow-up cases and 
on general execution measures in general follow-up cases. Besides that, the 
Assembly and the Commissioner can respond to a state’s execution record. The 
Assembly can also respond to the Committee’s efforts in the execution phase.  
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The PJP offers the respondent state and in particular the Court room for a 
response. The Court responds to the failure of a respondent state to implement the 
Convention; the respondent state to the suitability of a case for the PJP. A pilot 
judgment gives the state however generally less external room for a response than 
other judgments, but if the examination of all similar applications is adjourned 
pending the adopting of remedial measures, the state has comparably more room to 
respond in one respect than in non-pilot judgments. 
7 INDICATOR 7: PREVENTING, MITIGATING AND ENDING CONFLICT  
In the (pre-)merits phase, conflict between the Court and the respondent state and 
possibly other states parties as well is potentially prevented by various procedures 
and procedural steps. Exchanges between the interlocutors during communication 
and at hearings are the first steps towards this outcome. Strike-out procedures 
prevent conflict most effectively, while third-party interventions, as well as 
hearings, potentially prevent conflict with more states than just the respondent state. 
A judgment can also help prevent conflict and referral potentially mitigates or ends 
already existing conflict, but does not necessarily achieve this aim. Likewise, 
relinquishment may, or may not, function to prevent conflict. Interim measures and 
investigations do not prevent conflict; they potentially create it.  
In the execution phase, conflict may also be provoked between the state and the 
Court as the result of individual and general follow-up cases. Several procedures in 
the execution phase potentially prevent conflict between the Committee and the 
respondent state: action plans/reports, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings, requests 
for interpretation, the Assembly and Commissioner procedures and follow-up cases. 
Infringement proceedings can, depending on the perspective, help solve conflict or, 
contrarily, exacerbate already-existing conflict. Decisions and interim resolutions 
possibly cause conflict. As regards follow-up cases, although they potentially 
prevent conflict between the Court/Committee and the respondent state, they may 
also cause conflict between the Court and the state. Article 41-awards and final 
resolutions do not have any effect relevant to indicator 7. The PJP is detrimental to 
preventing, mitigating or ending conflict. What is more, the procedure may even be 
a potential source of conflict.  
8 OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS PER PROCEDURE  
The findings outlined above have clarified that the procedures and procedural steps, 
including the PJP, in the (pre-)merits and the execution phase potentially achieve 
the effects which the seven indicators for dialogue serve to establish. The 
procedures, when assessed jointly, therefore certainly have dialogic potential; 
whether this potential is translated into dialogicness in practice is researched in part 
3. Each interlocutor has an opportunity for involvement and mutual understanding 
is potentially fostered. Further, the procedures potentially contribute to sharing 
responsibilities and to balanced decision-making, although the Court’s involvement 
 
 
 
 Chapter VIII 
 
 
262 
in the execution phase and the PJP may partially invalidate this conclusion. The 
procedures also stimulate the interlocutors to engage in reason-giving and help 
prevent, mitigate and end conflict, except in some respects. Finally, they also create 
room for a response, but the breath of the respondent state’s room for a response 
can be limited by various (procedural) factors.  
As can be recalled from section IV.5.7, for the purposes of this study, the 
potential for dialogue of a certain procedure is classified as limited, some or clear. It 
was also explained in that section that only procedures which received the latter two 
labels are assessed in part 3. Figure 2 gives an overview of the labels assigned in the 
conclusions to chapters V-VII.  
 
Figure 2: Overview Dialogic Potential per Procedure  
 
Limited dialogic potential    
1.  Interim measures 2.  Investigations  
3.  Relinquishment 4.  Article 41-awards  
5. Final resolutions    
 
Some dialogic potential  
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8. Infringement proceedings  9. Commissioner country visits and 
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10. Decisions and interim measures  11. Individual follow-up cases  
12. General follow-up cases 13. Pilot-Judgment Procedure 
 
Clear dialogic potential  
  
14. Communication 15. Friendly settlements 
16. Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions 17. Unilateral declarations  
18.  Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions 19. Hearings 
20. Third-party interventions 21.  Action plans/reports 
22. DH meetings 23. Bi- and multilateral meetings 
24. Requests for interpretation 25. Assembly questions and 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE DIALOGICNESS OF PROCEDURES IN THE  
(PRE-)MERITS PHASE 
 
 
 
Part 2 has established the dialogic potential of Convention-related procedures on 
paper and gave an overview of procedures with limited, some or clear dialogic 
potential. The question whether these procedures translate their dialogic potential 
on paper into dialogicness in practice is answered in the part 3, which commences 
with this chapter.  
The way in which the relevant procedures are supposed to function on paper was 
already described in part 2. This chapter supplements these descriptions by 
outlining how these procedures function in practice. Subsequently, the functioning 
in practice of these procedures is assessed in the light of the seven indictors for 
dialogue so as to make it possible to draw conclusions as to the dialogicness of the 
procedures in practice.  
1 THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PROCEDURES IN PRACTICE  
1.1 Communication 
1.1.1 Methodology  
In this section, not only the questions which the Court poses to the parties in the 
‘Statement of Facts and Questions’ when communicating a case are discussed, but 
also the state’s written observations submitted in response to that statement. Prior to 
this describing this however, other contacts between the respondent state and the 
Registry are described.  
This section is written, in addition to based on sources such as the research 
interviews, in part based on a selection of communicated cases from the 
‘Communicated Cases 2010-2011’ documents collection on HUDOC.1 The 
selection was made by performing a search in the collection on 24 January 2014, 
with language filter ‘English’. The results, in total 3286, were sorted by the newest 
date, and the first 50 results were selected. All communications referred to in this 
chapter result from this selection, unless otherwise indicated. 
                                                        
1  The Court is expanding this collection, it was (still) called the ‘2008-2011 Communicated Cases’ 
documents collection in June 2015.  
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1.1.2 Contacts Prior to and After Communication 
Before and after a case is communicated to the state,2 contacts can take place 
between the Court (in the person of case lawyers and other persons working for the 
Registry) and the respondent state (in the person of agents representing a state 
before the Court).3 Whether these contacts take place depends on how well persons 
know each other and whether they have a friendly working relationship.4 Such 
relationships are sometimes maintained by setting up informal meetings whenever 
an agent is in Strasbourg,5 but the contacts are also in writing,6 or by phone or e-
mail.7 As an interviewee noted, the Registry is rather approachable for government 
agents.8 
Using their contacts at the Registry, the agents can, for example, ask whether a 
case is already pending before the Court, possibly on request of other domestic 
authorities.9 They can also ask whether any documents will be sent,10 or what is 
meant by a question posed by the Court.11 Further, they can notify the Court of an 
event that is relevant to the application (e.g. an upcoming meeting of the applicant 
with the immigration authorities),12 or they can warn the Registry that it can expect 
a document, such as a request for an extension of a deadline.13 The contact can also 
be initiated by the Registry, which, for example, can ask questions about the 
evidence relevant to an interim measure14 or which can convey that an applicant 
threatens to commit suicide.15 More generally as regards the content of these 
contacts, the interviewees emphasised their factual or procedural nature; they do not 
touch on the merits of the application.16 One interviewee indicated that if the 
informal question of an agent is too far-reaching, an official letter is asked for.17  
The contacts were generally evaluated positively by the interviewees, although 
one interviewee at the Registry explained that (s)he preferred not to have contacts, 
                                                        
2  Government agent interview 1 (prior communication); Government agent interview 3 (prior and 
after communication); Government agent interview 5 (after communication).  
3  All interviewees, including each agent, asked about informal contacts, confirmed that these contacts 
take place; Informal contacts can extend to Judges, to discuss general matters in the form of an 
‘academic dialogue’ (Government agent interview 5).  
4  Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 3; Registry interview 8.  
5  Government agent interview 1; Registry interview 2.  
6  Registry interview 1; Registry interview 3. 
7  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 3. 
8  Government agent interview 5. 
9  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 5; Registry interview 1. 
10  Government agent interview 2.  
11  Registry interview 4.  
12  Government agent interview 3.  
13  Government agent interview 1; Registry interview 4. 
14  Registry interview 1; Registry interview 8. 
15  Government agent 1.  
16  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 2; Government agent interview 3; 
Government agent interview 5; Registry interview 1; Registry 8 interview.  
17  Registry interview 8.  
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unless asked a concrete question by an agent.18 Further, the contacts were called 
important or even necessary for the purpose of coordination, the smooth running of 
the procedures and the clarification of unclear issues.19 An interviewee also 
emphasised, however, that contacts are delicate and they should not be used to go 
‘behind the applicant’s back’.20  
1.1.3 The Court’s Questions  
The Court can use the communication of a case to ask questions on the case in the 
‘Statement of Facts and Questions’. In practice, the Court does not always do so.21 
Its practice with regard to applications relating to well-established case law (in 
particular repetitive cases),22 is ‘not to expect to receive such observations from the 
government – with a view to discouraging an adversarial approach in such cases 
where there is a clear violation of the Convention, and with a view to resolving or 
settling the case’.23 The UK, for example, is not expected to make any observations 
on the prisoners voting rights cases which are communicated in groups of cases, 
because the case law is so well-established. For the same reason, applicants are 
asked not to submit any claims under Article 41.24 Regardless of the Court’s 
expectations, however, the respondent state can choose to submit observations.25  
When the Court does pose questions, it normally asks the parties whether there 
was an interference with the applicant’s Convention rights. That question is 
accompanied by a description on account of which facts the alleged interference 
took place. The Court can additionally ask whether the interference would be 
justified in terms of the applicable Convention article.26 It also frequently requests 
the parties to submit evidence and information. Such requests relate to, for example, 
CCTV footage27 or information about the applicant’s placement in a prison cell 
                                                        
18  Registry interview 1. 
19  Government agent interview 2; Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 5; 
Registry interview 3. 
20  Registry interview 2.  
21  See, e.g.: Pruszynski v. Poland (Comm.), No. 23943/09, 21 December 2012; Kit v. Poland 
(Comm.), No. 25968/10, 21 December 2011. 
22  Well-established case law is case law which a chamber of seven judges has consistently applied and 
which, therefore, does not require the Court to develop its jurisprudence. Exceptionally, the notion 
may also refer to a single judgment on a question of principle, especially when issued by the Grand 
Chamber (Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 68). The Court established such case 
law in, e.g., Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, where it elaborated on the problem 
of delays in the enforcement of domestic decisions in Ukraine. The Court relied in on this case law 
in, e.g.: Khaynatskyy and Others v. Ukraine, No. 12895/08 et al., 9 January 2014, paras. 15-16. 
23  Leach (2011), 43 (emphasis original); This was confirmed by: Registry interview 5.  
24  CDDH (2013f); Registry interview 1.  
25  Execution interview 8.  
26  Isayeva v. Russia (Comm.), No. 10099/10, 21 December 2011; Temchenko v. Ukraine (Comm.), 
No. 30579/10, 26 December 2011.  
27  Kalkan and Yıldız v. Turkey (Comm.), No. 37361/09, 26 December 2011. 
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with smokers.28 Comparably, the Court can seek an explanation of certain facts, 
wondering why it took six months to order the applicant’s medical examination.29 
Other questions relate to admissibility. The Court can inquire whether the applicant 
has exhausted all relevant remedies,30 for example, or whether he complied with the 
six-month rule.31 More specifically, it can ask whether a constitutional appeal is 
effective within the meaning of Article 35.32 As these examples show, the level of 
detail of the questions varies. According to one interviewee, there may be 
differences in this regard from chamber to chamber and from section to section,33 
and, according to another, differences exist depending on the judge rapporteur, 
registrar or case lawyer involved.34 However, regardless of how specific the Court’s 
questions are, the respondent state cannot exclude the possibility that observations 
which go beyond the Court’s questions are considered to be desirable by the Court. 
An agent who once asked the Registry whether observations were only required for 
the complaints addressed by the Court’s questions, received the formal answer that 
the observations should be as comprehensible as possible.35  
The interviewees indicated that detailed questions facilitate the work of the 
respondent state when drafting its observations, especially because applicants tend 
to raise various different possible violations.36 Such questions can also facilitate the 
Court’s work, because the more specific the question, the clearer the information 
which is received usually.37 The Court can guide the state in its answers, by, for 
example, calling upon it to address the applicant’s vulnerability38 or the justification 
for the police officers’ use of force against the applicant.39 Besides that, it can invite 
the parties to make their comments in the light of certain judgments. To illustrate, 
the Court once asked Ukraine whether the refusal of the Supreme Court to reopen 
domestic proceedings in the light of a previous judgment constituted a ‘new issue’ 
under the Convention falling within its jurisdiction.40 Also when the Court does not 
                                                        
28  Stancu v. Romania (Comm.), No. 60914/09, 26 December 2011. 
29  Sapožkovs v. Latvia (Comm.), No. 8550/03, 19 December 2011.  
30  Kubrak v. Poland (Comm.), No. 59189/10, 20 December 2011.  
31  Aktoploikes Grammes Thiras v. Greece (Comm.), No. 21200/04, 12 May 2010.  
32  Plut and Srčnik v. Slovenia (Comm.), No. 58718/10, 12 December 2011.  
33  Government agent interview 1.  
34  Registry interview 3.  
35  Government agent interview 1.  
36  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 2.  
37  Registry interview 3.  
38  F.N. v. UK (Comm.), No. 3202/09, 26 December 2011.  
39  Kalkan and Yıldız v. Turkey (Comm.), No. 37361/09, 26 December 2011.  
40  Bochan v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 22251/08, 26 September 2011; See also, e.g.: Stanciu v. Romania 
(Comm.), No. 35972/05, 31 May 2010; Haidari and Others v. Denmark and Greece (Comm.), No. 
18483/11, 26 September 2011; Berger-Krall and Nine Others v. Slovenia (Comm.), No. 14717/04, 
7 November 2011. 
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explicitly invite the parties to relate their observations to previous case law, it can 
refer to its case law in the communication.41  
Although applications are normally brought by individuals and, therefore, most 
questions deal with the applicant’s personal situation, some relate to complaints of a 
more general nature, concerning the potentially systemic character of a violation, 
execution affairs or the PJP. The question whether a complaint reveals a systemic 
problem is often joined with a reference to previous repetitive judgments.42 
Working on the assumption that a violation indeed amounts to such a problem, the 
Court can ask whether an application should be considered under Article 4643 or 
whether a Convention right is violated in conjunction with that Article.44 As regards 
execution measures, the Court can ask the parties to comment on whether a problem 
should be remedied through legislative measures,45 which measures would be most 
appropriate,46 and whether any measures have already been implemented to avoid 
repetitive judgments.47 Further, the Court sometimes explicitly raises the issue 
whether an application is suitable for consideration under the PJP.48 In other cases, 
it wonders whether the facts disclose the existence of a systemic problem on 
account of shortcomings in legislation or practice, which may give rise to numerous 
similar applications.49 The latter question can be regarded as a reference to a 
condition for the application of the PJP.50 Finally, instead of seeking the parties’ 
view on the suitability of a case for the PJP, the Court may invite the respondent 
state to comment on, should it issue a pilot judgment, how and in within what time 
                                                        
41  See, e.g.: Voronkov v. Russia (Comm.), No. 39678/03 , 14 December 2011; Jaloud v. the 
Netherlands (Comm.), No. 47708/08, 26 December 2011; Korkuc v. Lithuania (Comm.), No. 
21920/10, 26 December 2011.  
42  See, e.g.: Finger v. Bulgaria (Comm.), No. 37346/05, 15 March 2010; Hadji v. Moldova (Comm.), 
No. 32844/07, 20 December 2010; Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 2944/06 et al., 
4 July 2011.  
43  Albu and 63 Others v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 34796/09, 14 March 2011; Korzachenko v. Ukraine 
(Comm.), No. 4588/11, 4 July 2011.  
44  Egmez v. Turkey (Comm.), No. 12214/07, 20 September 2010; Hurter v. Switzerland (Comm.), No. 
48111/07, 11 January 2010; Kudeshkina v. Russia (Comm.), No. 28727/11, 3 October 2011.  
45  Oshlakov v. Russia (Comm.), No. 56662/09, 27 January 2011; Albu and 63 Others v. Ukraine 
(Comm.), No. 34796/09, 14 March 2011.  
46  Korzachenko v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 4588/11, 4 July 2011.  
47  Atanasiu and Poenaru v. Romania (Comm.), No. 30767/05, 22 February 2010; Ryabkin and Others 
v. Russia (Comm.), No. 52166/08, 7 April 2011; Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 
2944/06 et al., 4 July 2011.  
48  Stanciu v. Romania (Comm.), No. 35972/05, 31 May 2010; Molotchko v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 
12275/10, 21 June 2010; Berger-Krall and Nine Others v. Slovenia (Comm.), No. 14717/04, 7 
November 2011.  
49  See, e.g.: Kolesnyk and Three Others v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 57116/10, 12 September 2011; 
Serebryanskyy and Komyagin v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 54704/10, 12 September 2011; Sukhanov 
and Ilchenko v. Ukraine (Comm.), No. 68385/10, 12 September 2011. 
50  Rule 61(1) of Court.  
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frame it can establish an effective domestic solution to the systemic problem 
identified in the judgment.51 
In some instances, the first round of questions apparently does not provide the 
Court with sufficient information. The Court then ‘recommunicated’ a case to pose 
additional questions.52 It can, for example, pose additional questions about one 
aspect of a case which it initially, prior to the first round of questions, expected to 
be inadmissible53 or about the existence of a systemic problem.54 It can also ask 
extra questions after it has declared a case admissible, to ask for the parties’ 
comments on the substance of the case.55 
The mere communication of a case is a signal for the parties that the Court 
suspects that the facts of the case reveal a problem in the light of the Convention. 
After all, a case that does clearly not reveal such a problem would be declared 
inadmissible by a single judge without being communicated.56 Further, because the 
questions of the Court focus on those aspects of the application which it finds 
important or potentially problematic, the questions allow the parties to determine on 
which complaints the judgment will likely focus.57 When, for example, the 
applicant raises various points under Article 6 and the Court asks the parties to 
comment ‘in particular’ on one point, this can be interpreted as the Court being 
interested only or mostly in that point.58 The Court ‘delineates’ the application in 
this manner.59 Furthermore, the letter accompanying the communication can even 
direct the state to only answer the questions put by the Court and can announce that 
the rest of the application may be declared inadmissible by a single judge.60 By way 
of another example, questions on admissibility, especially those on non-exhaustion 
                                                        
51  Ryabkin and Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 52166/08, 7 April 2011.  
52  Judge interview 3; Registry interview 3; See, e.g.: Ryabkin and Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 
52166/08, 7 April 2011 (date of first communication: 17 November 2009); Aslakhanova and 
Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 2944/06 et al., 4 July 2011.  
53  Registry interview 1.  
54  Ryabkin and Others v. Russia (Comm.), No. 52166/08, 7 April 2011; Aslakhanova and Others v. 
Russia (Comm.), No. 2944/06 et al., 4 July 2011. 
55  S.J. v. Belgium (Comm.), No. 70055/10, 30 November 2010 (date lodged) (this example was 
mentioned by one of the interviewees and does not result from the sample of 50 communicated 
cases).  
56  Art. 27(1) ECHR; Rule 49(1) of Court; Leach (2011), 41; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 
ECHR, para. 67; Government agent interview 4; Registry interview 8.  
57  Registry interview 1; See also: Leach (2011), 43 (‘[...] the Court may ask the government specific 
questions in relation to a particular Article of the Convention which may give a good indication of 
the Court’s thinking as to the crux of the case’). 
58  Government agent interview 1.  
59  Idem.  
60  Government agent interview 2; See for examples of where the Court communicated only certain 
complaints of the applicant and declared the remainder of the application inadmissible: Zamferesko 
v. Ukraine, No. 30075/06, 15 November 2012, para. 4; Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft 
mbH v. Austria, No. 39394/98, 13 November 2013, para. 7.  
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and victim status, can be interpreted to mean that Court expects the case to be 
inadmissible on that ground.61  
The foregoing means, as two agents explained, that the Court’s questions are 
assumed to be hints by definition.62 It has even be proposed that when the Court 
refers in a subtle manner to previous case law, this can be interpreted as a sign that 
it will probably find a violation, which may stimulate the conclusion of a friendly 
settlement.63 Nevertheless, as another agent remarked, the questions are neutrally 
posed, which means one cannot really know the initial view of the Court from the 
questions.64 The focus of the Court is, moreover, not set in stone as a result of the 
exchanges during communication. It may turn out that the Court, in its judgment, 
takes account of matters not touched upon by the questions or issues not 
commented on by the state.65  
The Court does normally not refer to the content of its communication in its 
judgment. Only in a highly exceptional case it explained that and why it had 
communicated the applications with an ‘emphasis on Article 13’, namely because, 
even though it had already ‘determined similar issues in previous cases and 
ascertained the member States’ obligations under the Convention’, it continued ‘to 
receive hundreds of meritorious applications of that kind from the Russian 
Federation as a result of the deficiencies of domestic remedies’.66  
1.1.4 The Respondent State’s Observations  
As can be expected based on the above discussion, the Court’s questions are 
important in guiding the state’s observations, which can normally be submitted 
twice: in response to, first, communication and, second, to the applicant’s claim for 
just satisfaction. The states can make their observations as brief as possible, but are 
expected to at least answer the questions posed by the Court.67 Nevertheless, the 
observations need not to be limited to the issues raised by the questions.68 Although 
the state can concentrate on the questions,69 thus making the questions the 
framework of its observations,70 it is free to go beyond them to address, for 
example, admissibility issues left unaddressed by the Court.71 If the state limits 
itself to the questions, its observations can be accompanied by a disclaimer that 
                                                        
61  Government agent interview 1.  
62  Government agent interview 2; Government agent interview 3.  
63  Folkert Jensma, ‘Eén Grensverleggende Uitspraak per Jaar Is Wel Genoeg’, NRC Handelsblad, 24 
November 2012.  
64  Government agent interview 4.  
65  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 3.  
66  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 137.  
67  Registry interview 4. 
68  Registry interview 1.  
69  Government agent interview 2; Government agent interview 5. 
70  Government agent interview 1; Registry interview 4.  
71  Government agent interview 5.  
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only those questions are addressed or, when the observations only address 
admissibility, that it reserves the right to submit observations on the merits.72  
Depending on the case, the focus of the state’s observations lies on the merits or 
the facts.73 When the state is of the opinion that the applicant misrepresented the 
facts, it is particularly important for it to address the facts and to invite the Court to 
amend the statement of facts.74 The state can base such an invitation on, for 
example, the facts as established in domestic judgments and files about a case 
compiled by domestic courts.75 The discussion of relevant domestic law can also be 
part of the observations, because, even though, for important cases the judge elected 
in respect of the respondent state concerned sits on a case, the judge’s expertise 
knows its limits and that judge is only one of the seven deciding a case (in a 
chamber case).76 Lastly, the observations can address the merits as they are not only 
about informing the Court, but also about persuading it.77 One interviewee indicated 
that the quality of the observations is considered to be higher if the government not 
only gives arguments in favour of its standpoints, but also addresses and makes an 
effort to refute any counterarguments.78 Also, the persuasiveness of the arguments 
depends on the way in which they are formulated. In particular, repeating the same 
arguments in repetitive meritorious cases, without taking into consideration 
previous judgments on the same issue, is not considered desirable.79  
As was confirmed by some interviewees, the quality of the observations on the 
facts, domestic law and the merits can help the reasoning of the Court80 and can 
have a major impact on the outcome of the case.81 One interviewee explained that it 
is harder to find a violation if the respondent state does a good job.82 This is 
particularly important in cases where it is not apparent that a violation was 
committed;83 if there is a strong case, the quality of the observations makes less of a 
difference. Moreover, if the case at issue is important, the Court reaches its own 
conclusions, irrespective of the quality of the observations.84 
                                                        
72  Government agent interview 1.  
73  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 5; The government can choose to 
address the facts extensively, even though the Court has already dealt with them in some detail, 
because one of the aims of the observations is to fully inform the Court (Government agent 
interview 3).  
74  Government agent interview 5.  
75  Government agent interview 1.  
76  Government agent interview 3. 
77  Government agent interview 3. 
78  Judge interview 1.  
79  Idem. 
80  Registry interview 8. 
81  Judge interview 7; Registry interview 2.  
82  Judge interview 2. 
83  Judge interview 2; Registry interview 3. 
84  Registry interview 5.  
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The quality of the observations differs however, including as regards whether 
the state answers the Court’s questions at all or at least satisfyingly.85 Also from the 
Court’s judgments it is sometimes apparent that the observations of the government 
were not up to scratch and that, therefore, the Court found one or multiple 
violations. To give one example, in Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, about the right to 
education in prison, the Court noted that the national authorities gave various 
reasons for refusing the applicant’s request to enrol in a school operating inside his 
prison and that the state relied on three different grounds to justify the refusal.86 
Further, the state neither supported its arguments with any evidence relating to the 
conditions applicable in the prison, nor provided the Court with any statistical 
information on the availability of resources at the school so as to justify, for 
example, a policy of concentrating limited resources on those prisoners with the 
longest sentences.87 In the light of these shortcomings, the Court found a violation 
of Article 2 of Protocol 1.88  
According to the interviewees, there are differences in quality per state,89 but 
also per case.90 The quality of observations in Grand Chamber cases is for example 
generally higher than those in chamber cases91 and when there are many cases 
relating to the same subject, the quality may increase.92 A range of factors helps 
explain these differences. One factor is the experience of a state with the 
Convention system and its legal history, which can cause the quality of the 
observations of certain Central and Eastern European states to vary a lot.93 Further, 
when the state can rely for its observations on high quality domestic judgments, this 
can boost the quality of its observations.94 Language capabilities can also play a 
role. Observations drafted in another language than one of the two official 
Convention languages may, for example, be poorly translated into English or 
French.95 Further, time and (human) resources have an impact on the quality.96 It 
was indicated in the interviews, for example, that when an understaffed office of the 
government’s agent receives more resources, it is immediately noticeable that the 
quality of the observations resulting from this office improves.97 Sometimes, the 
agents ask lawyers from outside their office to assist them in drafting the 
observations, but whether this positively impacts on the quality of the observations 
                                                        
85  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 3; Judge interview 6; Judge interview 7; Registry interview 2; 
Registry interview 4. 
86  No. 16032/07, 27 May 2014, paras. 35-36.  
87  Ibid., para. 39.  
88  Ibid., para. 42.  
89  Judge interview 6.  
90  Judge interview 2; Registry interview 3; Registry interview 4; Registry interview 5.  
91  Registry interview 5.  
92  Judge interview 3.  
93  Registry interview 5.  
94  Registry interview 1.  
95  Ibid.  
96  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 4.  
97  Registry interview 2.  
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depends. One interviewee indicated that the observations are inevitably weaker if 
there is no outside help.98  
The differences in the quality of the observations as regards the facts and, more 
broadly, the government’s willingness or ability to furnish the Court with relevant 
information are exposed by the observation that the Court ‘has not been shy to 
record violations of [Article 38]’.99 This article obliges the states to furnish all 
necessary facilities to the Court in its task of establishing the facts. When the Court 
requests evidence from the states, the obligation to furnish the evidence becomes 
binding ‘from the moment such a request has been formulated, whether it be on 
initial communication of an application to the Government or at a subsequent stage 
in the proceedings’.100 The Court has found violations of Article 38 on account of, 
for example, the failure of the state to submit an unexpurgated copy of an 
investigation file and of the withholding of crucial documents.101 If the state has not 
advanced an explanation for its failure to submit the required documents, the Court 
establishes a violation of the said Article,102 as ‘it is of the utmost importance for 
the effective operation of the system of individual petition [...] that States should 
furnish all necessary facilities to make possible a proper and effective examination 
of applications.103 Article 38 can also be violated because of the submission of 
incomplete or distorted copies of documents, the refusal to submit original 
documents and delayed submissions.104 
A finding of a violation of Article 38 is not the only possible consequence of 
incomplete observations or submissions in answer to requests of the Court. As 
provided for in the Rules of Court, ‘where a party fails to adduce evidence or 
provide information requested by the Court or to divulge relevant information of its 
own motion [...], the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate’.105 
For example, when ‘persons are found injured or dead, or who have disappeared, in 
an area within the exclusive control of the authorities of the State and there is prima 
facie evidence that the State may be involved, the burden of proof may [...] shift to 
the Government since the events in issue may lie wholly, or in large part, within the 
exclusive knowledge of the authorities’.106 In these circumstances, the Court may 
draw ‘strong inferences’ if the state ‘[fails] to disclose crucial documents to enable 
the Court to establish the facts or otherwise provide a satisfactory and convincing 
explanation’.107 Similarly, ‘where the events lie wholly, or in large part, within the 
exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of the death of a person within 
                                                        
98  Idem.  
99  Harris et al. (2014), 146. 
100  Janowiec and Others v. Russia (GC), No. 55508/07 et al., 21 October 2013, para. 203.  
101  Benzer and Others v. Turkey, No. 23502/06, 12 November 2013, para. 160.  
102  Ibid., para. 161.  
103  Janowiec and Others v. Russia (GC), No. 55508/07 et al., 21 October 2013, para. 202.  
104  Ibid., para. 203-204.  
105  Rule 44C(1) of Court.  
106  Varnava and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 16064/90, 18 September 2009, para. 184. 
107  Idem.  
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their control of custody, the burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the 
authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation of, in particular, the 
causes of the detained person’s death’.108 In other circumstances as well, the burden 
of proof may be constructed in such a manner that the state must provide a 
convincing explanation in its observations in order to prevent the Court from 
finding a violation. To illustrate, in Article 2 cases, the state must ensure that it 
explains convincingly in its observations that the use of force, resulting in the 
deprivation of life, was ‘no more than absolutely necessary’.109 Also with regard to 
admissibility, when the state claims non-exhaustion of domestic remedies by the 
applicant, it must ‘satisfy the Court that the remedy was an effective one available 
in theory and practice at the relevant time’.110 Moreover, if the state fails to address 
an issue of admissibility at all, it is not for the Court to repair this failure ex 
officio.111 Further, in Article 8, 9, 10 and 11 cases, the observations must explain 
why sufficient reasons existed to interfere with or restrict a right. If the state does 
not provide such an explanation, this certainly does not help its case.112  
As shown by the above discussion, persuasive observations with relevant 
evidence are of importance if the state does not want to risk losing a case, especially 
because the mere fact of communication already means that the Court suspects that 
there is a problem in Convention terms. Moreover, this suspicion grows if the state 
cannot give a proper explanation of what happened.113  
1.2 Friendly Settlements  
This section first deals with the frequency and areas of use of friendly settlements 
and then with the different reasons which may prompt a state to negotiate and 
conclude a friendly settlement. Subsequently, the practice of friendly settlements is 
described along the lines of the chronological order of the life of a settlement: how 
the Court can place itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a 
friendly settlement, what the terms of a friendly settlement can entail, how the 
Court assesses the document in the light of the human rights condition and, finally, 
the possibility of restoral.  
1.2.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
In 1995, the Head of Division at the Registry concluded that ‘les règlements 
amiables sont apparus tardivement devant la Cour et n’occupent encore qu’une 
                                                        
108  Salman v. Turkey (GC), No. 21986/93, 27 June 2000, para. 100.  
109  Art. 2(2) ECHR.  
110  Sejdovic v. Italy (GC), No. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, para. 46.  
111  Registry interview 2.  
112  Judge Interview 4.  
113  Registry interview 8.  
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place modeste dans son activité’.114 Friendly settlements have now, however, 
assumed a place of importance. Their number has expanded from 151 in 2001 to 
1,303 in 2012.115 The number of friendly settlements keeps on increasing, with 
fifteen percent from 2013 to 2014, leading to a total of 1,696 friendly settlements in 
2014 on a total of 86,063 applications decided (of which 2,388 by judgment).116 
The main explanation for this increase appears to be that the Registry has become 
more proactive with regard to friendly settlements, as explained below.  
Friendly settlements are negotiated in cases of any subject matter, including in 
cases relating to ‘areas with unclear and disputed human rights situations’117 and in 
cases where the applicant alleges a grave violation of Article 2 or 3.118 Settlements 
are, however, most frequently used to strike repetitive violations out which the 
Court can decide based on well-established case law, such as, case law on the 
length of procedures.119 The majority of friendly settlements are routine 
settlements, a term introduced below.120 
As friendly settlements are usually faster than ordinary proceedings, their 
frequent use in repetitive cases may help alleviate the Court’s caseload. This applies 
in particular to routine friendly settlements. For this reason probably, the Interlaken, 
Izmir and Brussels Declarations encourage their use.121 The above figures, which 
show a rapid increase in the number of approved friendly settlements, are proof of 
the Court’s response to that encouragement. Friendly settlements therefore no 
longer only function, as explained in chapter V, to promote respect for the sharing 
of responsibilities in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, but have also 
become a means to deal with the caseload.122  
1.2.2 Reasons (not) to Settle  
States are generally willing to settle because they wish to avert an adverse 
judgment, and thus a public condemnation.123 Moreover, an adverse judgment 
                                                        
114  Berger, cited in: Keller et al. (2010), 4.  
115  ECtHR (2002), 70; ECtHR (2015d), 13.  
116  ECtHR (2015d), 4, 6.  
117  Keller et al. (2010), 51.  
118  See, e.g.: Yavuz and Others v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 40872/07, 5 June 2012; Canpolat v. Turkey 
(Dec.), No. 27382/07, 4 December 2012; Duran v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 55768/11, 29 January 2013. 
119  Ang and Berghmans (2005), 92; See also: Committee, ‘The Practice in Respect of Friendly 
Settlements’, Res(2002)59, 18 December 2002.  
120  Keller et al. (2010), 70.  
121  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Action Plan para. 
7(a)(i); HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. 
E(1-2); HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, 
Declaration para. 9; See for more encouragements: Committee, ‘The Practice in Respect of 
Friendly Settlements’, Res(2002)59, 18 December 2002; Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, 
para. 93.  
122  Keller et al. (2010), 138.  
123  Leach (2011), 64. 
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possibly imposes the obligation on them, by virtue of Article 46, to make general 
changes to their domestic legal system, changes which they may wish to avoid. 
Alternatively, they may rather want to make these changes as part of other 
legislative amendments and at their own pace, instead of at once in response to a 
judgment.124 Generally, a settlement also is faster and therefore likely to be cheaper 
than ordinary proceedings.125 Concluding friendly settlements therefore saves 
resources.126 Another advantage for the states is that this procedure prevents an 
increase in negative statistics, because no violation – that would otherwise 
potentially be recorded – is found in a decision endorsing a friendly settlement.127 
Finally, a strong case of the applicant may work as an incentive to settle.128 
The more immediate reason for a state to settle depends on the facts of a case 
and various other circumstances. One reason may be that the state has solved or is 
in the process of solving a domestic problem that caused an alleged violation, 
possibly as part of the execution of a previous judgment.129 Friendly settlements are 
then used to ‘remedy transitional problems’.130 Such problems arise, for example, 
when new legislation has been drafted, but still has to be implemented, or when 
new legislation does not apply retroactively.131 Further, the nature of a violation 
may be a reason to pursue settlements. For example, Germany considered it to be 
undesirable to defend cases before the Court where the applicants complained about 
protracted domestic legal proceedings, so it relied on a policy of trying to settle 
such cases instead.132 Another reason, or at least an incentive to settle a case, may 
be the express invitation of the Court to the respondent state to settle a group of 
cases, which it did in relation to Poland, as explained below. The Court may also 
hint at the desirability of settling a case through the way it phrases its questions and 
the references which it makes to previous case law when communicating a case. In 
particular, the communication may be phrased so the state derives from it that the 
Court will likely find a violation, which, as explained above, may provide an 
incentive to settle.133  
                                                        
124  Ibid., 64; Government agent interview 4. 
125  Leach (2011), 64. 
126  Government agent interview 1.  
127  Keller et al. (2010), 76.  
128  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 5. 
129  Keller et al. (2010), 63-64; Leach (2011), 64.  
130  Keller et al. (2010), 115; See, e.g.: Chapman v. UK (Dec.), No. 27970/02, 24 June 2008.  
131  See, e.g.: Manasson v. Sweden (Dec.), No. 41265/9, 20 July 2004; Hyde v. UK (Dec.), No. 
63287/00, 5 September 2006 (cited by: Keller et al. (2010), 116); Townend Sr. And Townend Jr. v. 
UK (Dec.), No. 9119/80, 23 January 1987 (cited by: Van Dijk et al. (2006), 227).  
132  Keller et al. (2010), 113-114; See, e.g.: Grimm v. Germany (Dec.), No. 27696/05, 13 March 2007.  
133  Folkert Jensma, ‘Eén Grensverleggende Uitspraak per Jaar Is Wel Genoeg’, NRC Handelsblad, 24 
November 2012. The interview explains that former Judge Myjer used to give hints to the 
Netherlands in the communication of a case and in this way prevented many cases against the 
Netherlands. According to a source, the Netherlands was sometimes asked whether it had not taken 
an overly formalistic approach. The Netherlands then concluded from these subtle references to 
previous judgments how Strasbourg might decide, which resulted in a settlement.  
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A reason to not settle can be that the applicant asks for a remedy other than an 
amount of money. When the applicant, for example, wants the reopening of a case, 
the response can simply be that this cannot be decided on in a friendly settlement, 
but should be put before a domestic judge.134 It is also possible that the body 
competent to approve the payment of the amount of money agreed upon does not 
give its authorisation.135 Further, when a case raises a matter of principle, the state 
may prefer to litigate rather than to settle.136  
1.2.3 The Court Placing Itself at the Disposal of the Parties  
The Convention provides that the Court ‘may place itself at the disposal of the 
parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement’.137 In the letter 
accompanying the communication of a case, a standard phrase is added to remind 
the parties of this possibility.138 According to the Court’s Rules, ‘[t]he Chamber 
shall take any steps that appear appropriate to facilitate’ a settlement.139 The 
Registry takes on this task in practice and invites the parties to settle a case during 
and after communication.140 The judges’ task is therefore limited to approving or 
rejecting a friendly settlement; they are not involved in the negotiations.141 
Subsequently, the steps of the Registry differ and hinge on whether an 
application can be resolved on the basis of well-established case law.142 When this 
is possible, proceedings can end in a ‘routine friendly settlement’,143 as most 
settlements do currently.144 In other instances, ‘non-paper’ or ‘real’ settlements are 
an option, that is, settlements where the applicant and the state enter into 
negotiations.145  
The Registry acts proactively when facilitating a routine friendly settlement: it 
sends a ready-made settlement proposal, which consist of an amount for redress, to 
the parties when communicating the case.146 The amount is based on the tables 
employed by the Court to calculate the amount of just satisfaction, plus a bit 
extra.147 The Registry takes this proactive approach almost systematically, 
                                                        
134  Government agent interview 2.  
135  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 5.  
136  Government agent interview 1; Registry interview 5.  
137  Art. 39(1) ECHR.  
138  Registry interview 2. 
139  Rule 62(1) of Court.  
140  Keller et al. (2010), 78-79, 150; Rule 62(1) of Court.  
141  Ibid., 139.  
142  Ibid., 65.  
143  Keller et al. (2010) introduced this term. 
144  Ibid., 69-70; See also: Harris (2014), 128. 
145  Keller et al. (2010), 69; The Court refers internally to such settlements as ‘non-paper settlements’.  
146  Ibid., 34; Leach (2011), 63; The amount ‘is based on the so-called tableaux developed internally by 
the Registry to provide a guide for the calculation of just satisfaction under Art. 41 ECHR and for 
the sums awarded in comparable judgments of the Court’, see: Keller et al. (2010), 36. 
147  Registry interview 8. 
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especially in length of proceedings cases, because there is a prima facie violation.148 
More generally, the approach is taken in areas of well-established case law and 
irrespective of whether the parties intend to settle.149 The procedure preceding a 
routine settlement is completely in writing and the parties do not negotiate about the 
Registry’s proposal and nor is the Registry therefore involved in any 
negotiations.150 Negotiations are even practically impossible, because the Court 
closes settlements proceedings as soon as the parties reject a proposal.151 If the 
applicant disagrees, unilateral declarations often form an alternative ground for 
striking out a case.152  
The Registry’s proactive approach has extended beyond individual cases in at 
least two ways. First, it was agreed informally with Poland to employ friendly 
settlements regularly in relation to certain groups of applications,153 and the 
Registry has visited other states with a view to developing comparable settlement 
strategies. Such visits should facilitate future settlements, especially because they 
allow the Registry to meet with the competent ministers and representatives of the 
treasury.154 Second, the Court once wrote administratively to Italy to ask it to 
conclude friendly settlements in 5,800 applications on the length of proceedings and 
the lack of an effective domestic remedy. The settlements should be based on the 
awards made in Gaglione v. Italy.155  
Different government agents evaluate the Registry’s proactive approach in these 
‘standard’ cases as effective.156 Further, one interviewee mentioned that the 
proposal of a sum of money by the Registry makes things easier157 and another said 
that the indication of a sum of money by the Registry is of great assistance, because 
it means that the applicant knows that a larger sum cannot be obtained. This 
interviewee sometimes asks of his own motion the Registry to propose a sum, 
because negotiating directly with the applicant would be pointless.158 The proactive 
approach has also been criticised, however, because some proposals are solely 
based on the applicant’s submissions. In these circumstances, the state in question 
does not have an opportunity to present its view on the case.159 Furthermore, one 
interviewee warned that the Court should be careful with being proactive outside 
                                                        
148  Registry interview 2; Registry interview 7.  
149  Keller et al. (2010), 66, 79.  
150  Ibid., 139, 152; Registry interview 3. 
151  Keller et al. (2010), 66-67.  
152  Ibid., 82.  
153  Ibid., 79.  
154  Registry interview 2.  
155  CDDH (2013b), para. 12; Registry interview 7.  
156  Keller et al. (2010), 79.  
157  Government agent interview 4 
158  Government agent interview 5.  
159  Keller et al. (2010), 78.  
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the context of repetitive cases so as to avoid circumventing the applicant’s 
participation.160  
In respect of non-paper or real settlements and outside the context of well-
established case law, the Registry’s role is usually more passive. It notifies the 
parties that it is at their disposal with a view to securing a friendly settlement, after 
which it is for the parties to contact the Registry if they desire its assistance.161 The 
parties then do the ‘main work’ and the Registry only helps them exceptionally.162 
The Registry can, for example, meet with the parties to find a solution for the points 
on which they cannot agree.163 Additionally, it can organise a meeting between the 
parties, propose a draft settlement or suggest a sum of money.164 In the past, the 
Court also sometimes invited the parties to Strasbourg for negotiations, but this is 
no longer done.165 Friendly settlements can be said to be a casualty of the Court’s 
workload and non-paper settlements have become a luxury.166  
Non-paper settlement negotiations are, as their name already indicates, usually 
face-to-face.167 The Registry, for example, participated in negotiations leading to 
the friendly settlement about the reserved Article 41 question in the pilot judgments 
Hutten-Czapska and Broniowski, which proceeded as follows according to the 
Polish agent:  
 
Before the Government enters into negotiations, we determine the general measures 
as part of a draft law or as part of a scheme included in this draft law. During the 
friendly settlement negotiations, this draft is commented on by the applicant and by 
the Registry. The Registry decides at this preliminary stage whether the proposed 
draft is compatible with the remedy used in these kinds of cases. Usually, the general 
measure is the most important for the Government. Individual measures are of lesser 
interest because they concern only one person.168 
 
More in general, it has been said that negotiations are ‘indispensable’ to any pilot 
friendly settlement.169 At same time, these negotiations are rather difficult, because 
both individual and general measures are negotiated, meaning that ‘[a]ll actors 
involved [...] play different roles and have different interest’.170 
                                                        
160  Registry interview 2.  
161  Keller et al. (2010), 34. 
162  Ibid., 149.  
163  See, e.g.: Vogt v. Germany (GC) (Art. 41), No. 17851/91, 2 September 1996, paras. 5-6.  
164  Keller et al. (2010), 70; Leach (2011), 64; Harris et al. (2014), 128; See, e.g.: Akten and Others v. 
Turkey (Dec.), No. 31301/96, 16 May 2002; Şahinli v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 31279/96,16 May 2002. 
165  Registry interview 1.  
166  Registry interview 5.  
167  Keller et al. (2010), 151.  
168  Ibid., 176.  
169  Ibid., 83.  
170  Idem.  
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1.2.4 Terms of Friendly Settlements  
The terms of a friendly settlement vary. Such variation is possible because, unlike 
unilateral declarations, they do not need to include certain elements. Two elements 
can nevertheless be found in most settlements: the ex gratia payment of a sum of 
money by the respondent state to the applicant,171 and the undertaking of the parties 
not to request referral to the Grand Chamber.172 Other elements are less commonly 
included. States sometimes express their regret for the occurrence of certain events 
or convey their apologies to the applicant.173 Further, they can acknowledge a 
violation or, on the contrary, spell out that their statement does not constitute an 
acknowledgement.174 More ambiguously, the state can admit that certain events 
posed ‘problems’ under the Convention.175 Finally, the parties can agree that the 
state takes individual or general measures instead of or alongside the payment of a 
sum of money. For example, one applicant, when accepting a settlement, took into 
consideration the intention of the respondent state to enact a relevant bill into 
law.176 In another case, the state agreed to submit before the Court additional 
observations reflecting legal and administrative changes.177  
1.2.5 The Human Rights Condition  
When a repetitive application results in a friendly settlement, the Court does not 
engage in any substantive reasoning as to whether respect for human rights requires 
it to continue examining the application. It merely repeats the standard formula that 
‘[i]t is satisfied that the settlement is based on respect for human rights [...] and 
finds no reason to justify a continued examination of the application’ and then 
strikes the case out.178 Also outside the context of repetitive applications, including 
in cases of allegedly grave violations, the Court normally limits itself to repeating 
the said formula.179 The Court repeated that formula, for example, in a case where 
                                                        
171  Ibid., 47.  
172  Ibid., 39.  
173  Ibid., 44; See, e.g.: Oates v. Poland (Dec.), No. 35036/97, 7 September 2000; Denmark v. Turkey 
(GC) (Dec.), No. 34382/97, 5 April 2000, para. 21; Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 1) 
(Dec.), No. 41138/98 et al., 5 July 2005, para. 29.  
174  Keller et al. (2010), 45; See, e.g.: Köksal v. the Netherlands, No. 31725/96, 20 March 2001, para. 
14.  
175  Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 1), No. 41138/98 et al., 5 July 2005, para. 29.  
176   Croke v. Ireland (Dec.), No. 41138/98, 5 July 2005, para. 11.  
177  Lotter and Lotter v. Bulgaria, No. 39015/97, 19 May 2004, para. 17; See for another undertaking to 
implement extensive non-monetary measures: Moldovan and Others v. Romania (no. 1), No. 
41138/98 et al., 5 July 2005, para. 29.  
178  See, e.g. repetitive cases on the length of civil proceedings in Hungary: Vallent v. Hungary (Dec.), 
No. 41476/10, 12 July 2010; Strasser v. Hungary (Dec.), No. 28454/13, 19 November 2013; Kék v. 
Hungary (Dec.), No. 27643/10, 19 November 2013.  
179  Weber (2007), 235.  
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the applicant inter alia complained that the treatment to which she had been 
subjected during her arrest and detention had been inhuman and degrading.180  
Exceptionally, however, the Court does expound on the human rights condition. 
The old Court, for example, took formal note of a settlement and observed that, 
although the applicant regarded the settlement as being clearly in accordance with 
his own interest, it ‘must satisfy that there are not reasons of public order (ordre 
public) of a kind which would necessitate the continuation of the proceedings’.181 
The Court then noted that ‘in several earlier cases it has determined issues 
analogous to that arising in the instant case’ under Article 5(3), but the same could 
not be said of whether Article 6 is applicable at the stage of preliminary 
investigations.182 In spite of this, the Court approved the settlement, noting that its 
case law already provided certain indications as to the applicability of Article 6 
during preliminary investigations and that the respondent state had undertaken to 
submit new legislation whilst taking into account relevant case law.183 These two 
elements, namely the existence of case law in the area of the alleged violation and 
the enactment of new legislation or the intention to do so, recur in other cases where 
the Court provides reasons for its decision to approve a friendly settlement.184 It is 
not possible to obtain insight into the Court’s interpretation of the human rights 
condition as a result of refuted friendly settlements as there is no relevant case law. 
The Court never mentions that it refuted a friendly settlement, let alone gives 
reasons for this, presumably due to the confidentiality of the friendly settlements 
proceedings.185 The Court’s lack of reasoning makes it hard to verify why it finds 
that the human rights condition is fulfilled in a given application.186  
1.2.6 Restoral of Application  
The questions whether the Court has made use of the possibility to restore an 
application is discussed here and in the following three sections, because if the 
                                                        
180  H.D. v. Poland, No. 33310/96, 20 June 2002, para. 36.  
181  Can v. Austria, No. 9300/81, 30 September 1985, para. 15; This Rule, which does not longer exist 
in its current form, stipulated that, ‘[t]he Chamber may, having regard to the responsibilities of the 
Court under Article 19 of the Convention, decide that, notwithstanding the notice of [...] friendly 
settlement [...] it should proceed with the consideration of the case’, see: Revised Rules of Court 
(adopted on 24 November 1982).  
182  Can v. Austria, No. 9300/81, 30 September 1985, para. 15.  
183  Ibid., paras. 17-18.  
184  See, e.g.: Sutherland v. UK, No. 25186/94, 27 March 2001, para. 20; Selim v. Cyprus, No. 
47293/99, 16 July 2002, para. 16; Brocco v. Italy, No. 68074/01, 7 April 2005 , para. 19; Smoleanu 
v. Romania (GC), No. 30324/96, 6 April 2006, para. 48.  
185  The Commission never mentioned a refusal (Van Dijk et al. (2006), 224) and Court has mentioned 
this once (Keller et al. (2010), 39-40). In that exceptional case, the Court did not provide grounds 
for its refusal, but it simply stated that ‘respect for human rights [...] required the further 
examination of the case’, see: Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine (Dec.), No. 72713/01, 29 March 
2005, para. 7.  
186  Keller et al. (2010), 53-54. 
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase 
 
 
283 
Court does so regularly, it has an extra possibility to communicate with the 
respondent state. The Court, however, virtually never uses its power to restore an 
application to its list after it has struck out an application based on a friendly 
settlement.187 It nevertheless regularly reminds the parties of this possibility when 
striking a case out.188 It does probably not need to use this power, because states 
tend to execute the terms of friendly settlements fully and within the agreed 
deadline. Only one instance is known of where the Court decided to restore an 
application. In that case, the respondent state had transferred the sum of money 
agreed upon in the settlement to the applicants’ bank account. The Court 
nevertheless ceded to the applicants’ request of restoral, because, due to their 
disability and legal status, the mere transfer did not suffice, as only a fraction of the 
money was spent on their subsistence and because their housing situation remained 
deplorable.189  
1.3 Article 37(1)(b) Strike-out Decisions  
After outlining the frequency and areas of use of subparagraph b strike-out 
decisions (‘the matter has been resolved’), this section goes on to discuss whether, 
in practice, the state or the Court first suggests striking a case out on this basis. 
Thereafter, it is explained how the Court scrutinises, in the light of the human rights 
condition and other conditions, cases which may be struck out. Finally, the section 
addresses shortly whether subparagraph b decisions are mostly made in decisions or 
judgments, whether costs are ever awarded and whether the Court has restored 
cases which it struck out under subparagraph b.  
1.3.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
No statistics are available about how many cases the Court strikes out based on 
subparagraph b, where it does not base its decision on a friendly settlement. The 
Court appears to take such decisions mostly in immigration and asylum cases 
concerning Article 3 or 8, where the state decided to overturn the decision to deport 
the applicant (and to grant him a residence permit).190 Outside that context, the 
Court has, for example, struck a case out because the state provided free dentures to 
the applicant who had brought a complaint under Articles 3 and 8 about the refusal 
to provide him with dentures whilst being in prison,191 and because a Supreme 
                                                        
187  Art. 37(2) ECHR.  
188  See, e.g.: Ghasabyan and Others v. Armenia (Dec.), No. 23566/05, 15 November 2011, para. 30.  
189  Katić v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 13920/04, 7 July 2009.  
190  Stojanović v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 34425/04, 19 May 2009, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Zagrebelsky.  
191  Ibid., para. 80.  
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Court quashed the proceedings about which the applicant had complained under 
inter alia Article 6(2).192 
1.3.2 Initiative  
Both the Court and the respondent state may raise the issue whether an application 
can be struck out based on subparagraph b.193 The Court usually raises the issue of 
its own motion if new developments have been brought to its attention which may 
lead to the conclusion that the matter complained of has been resolved.194 Such 
developments, due to the subject matter of many subparagraph b decisions, 
regularly relate to decisions made in domestic immigration procedures. Another 
example of a development being a reason to hold that a case has been solved is the 
examination of a witness during retrial and the subsequent acquittal of an applicant 
who had complained that previous criminal proceedings had been unfair because 
the domestic courts had refused to call the witness for defence.195  
1.3.3 The Human Rights Condition and other Criteria  
As explained in chapter V, the Court uses two criteria to establish whether a matter 
‘has been resolved’. It examines, first, whether the circumstances complained of by 
the applicant still obtain and, second, whether the state has redressed the effects of a 
possible violation on account of these circumstances. The examination can be rather 
detailed, as the below examples illustrate.196 The Court examines the criteria prior 
to considering an alleged violation, under the heading ‘Application of Article 37 of 
the Convention’,197 or during its consideration of an alleged violation.198 When the 
Court indeed considers a matter to have been resolved within the meaning of 
subparagraph b, it is unnecessary to examine objections of the respondent state 
relating to, for example, admissibility.199 
                                                        
192  Reinmuller v. Austria (Dec.), No. 69169/01, 18 November 2004, para. 15. 
193  See for examples of where the respondent state took the initiative: Yang Chun Jin alias Yang 
Xiaolin v. Hungary, No. 58073/00, 8 March 2001; Shevanova v. Latvia, No. 58822/00, 15 June 
2006; Perry v. Latvia, No. 30273/03, 8 November 2007. 
194  See, e.g.: Association SOS Attentats and de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, 
para. 29; El Majjaoui & Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands, No. 25525/03, 20 December 
2007, para. 29.  
195  Pisano v. Italy, No. 36732/97, 24 October 2002, paras. 30, 40.  
196  See also, e.g.: Raif Oglu v. Greece, No. 33738/96, 27 June 2000, paras. 24-27; Bari v. Sweden 
(Dec.), No. 56726/00, 5 March 2002; Ohlen v. Denmark, No. 63214/00, 24 February 2005, para. 
27-34; Borisov v. Lithuania, No. 9958/04, 14 June 2011, para. 108.  
197  See, e.g.: Pisano v. Italy, No. 36732/97, 24 October 2002, para. 40; Association SOS Attentats and 
de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, para. 30.  
198  See, e.g.: Logothetis v. Greece, No. 46352/99, 21 April 2001, para. 14; Börekçioğulları (Çökmez) 
and Others v. Turkey, No. 58650/00, 19 October 2006, para. 41.  
199  Stojanović v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 34425/04, 19 May 2009, para. 79.  
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With regard to the question whether the impugned circumstances still obtain, the 
Court, for example, establishes whether ‘the key aspect of the applicants’ direct 
complaint persists’.200 When a complaint is about the applicant’s deportation or his 
illegal status within a state, the ‘minimum steps required are firstly, the setting-
aside of the deportation order and, secondly, the issuing or recognition of a 
residence permit’.201 
Subsequently, the Court approaches the question of redress by determining 
whether the authorities have adequately and sufficiently redressed the situation 
complained of.202 Merely offering some redress is not enough, as the Court’s 
refusal to strike out Konstantin Markin v. Russia illustrates. In that case, the 
applicant complained of the domestic authorities’ refusal to grant him parental leave 
on account of his gender. The authorities subsequently granted him leave. However, 
because the leave was granted with a one-year delay and therefore for two instead 
of three years and because the applicant was neither compensated for the delay nor 
for the reduction, the Court did not strike the case out.203 In some cases, the Court 
has required no other measures than those required to end the situation complained 
of. This occurred, for example, when an applicant’s stay in Lithuania was 
regularised.204 Whether this suffices depends on the circumstances of the case, 
however. In another case, brought against Latvia, the regularisation of the 
applicant’s stay did not constitute adequate and sufficient redress, because the 
period of insecurity and legal uncertainty which she underwent when she was 
illegally resident was comparably long and the regularisation did not erase that 
period.205 Thus, the Court ascertains whether the measures taken actually suffice to 
fully remedy the complaint in question.206 Legislative amendments do normally not 
provide adequate redress,207 because, even though they may enable the applicant to 
bring legal proceedings to end the situation complained of, they do not offer redress 
for the possible violation committed prior to the change in legislation.208 
Comparably, the Court has ruled that a domestic judgment did not offer redress, 
because it had no retroactive effect.209 
Even though the Court, when applying the two criteria, does not establish 
whether the respondent state committed a violation, it may nevertheless analyse the 
facts of a case in the light of the material Convention rights in order to come to its 
                                                        
200  Association SOS Attentats and de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, para. 34.  
201  Shevanova v. Latvia, No. 58822/00 , 15 June 2006, para. 44.  
202  Mihailovs v. Latvia, No. 35939/10, 22 January 2013, para. 86.  
203  (GC), No. 30078/06, 22 March 2010, para. 88.  
204  Borisov v. Lithuania, No. 9958/04, 14 June 2011, para. 109-113.  
205  Shevanova v. Latvia, No. 58822/00 , 15 June 2006, paras. 47-48.  
206  Ibid., para. 44. 
207  See, e.g.: L. and V. v. Austria, No. 39392/98 et al., 9 January 2003, para. 43; Mihailovs v. Latvia, 
No. 35939/10, 22 January 2013, para. 88.  
208  Mihailovs v. Latvia, No. 35939/10, 22 January 2013, para. 91. 
209  See, e.g.: Börekçioğulları (Çökmez) and Others v. Turkey, No. 58650/00, 19 October 2006, para. 
41.  
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decision as to whether these criteria are fulfilled. Thus, for example, it has 
established whether a newly introduced measure permits the applicants to freely 
exercise their Article 8 rights,210 whether the facts raise an Article 9 issue,211 or 
whether – subsequent to a new domestic judicial decision – the applicant continues 
to be a victim of an Article 6(1) violation.212  
After the Court has concluded that both conditions for the application of 
subparagraph b are met, meaning that a case is ‘resolved’, it verifies whether no 
particular reasons relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention 
require it to continue its examination of the application.213 It may also find that the 
refusal to strike a case out can be based on the two criteria which are specific to 
subparagraph b as well as on the human rights condition.214  
1.3.4 Decision or Judgment; Award of Costs; Restoral of Application  
The question whether a case is struck out in a decision or a judgment and whether 
the Court makes an award of costs is relevant to the procedural life of a case that 
was struck out under subparagraph b, or for that matter under subparagraph c or 
based on a unilateral declaration. As explained in chapter V, only strike-out 
judgments, not decisions, are forwarded to the Committee for its supervision, unless 
the Court made an award of costs.  
An application can be struck out ‘at any stage of the proceedings’,215 and the 
Court in practice indeed appears to do so. Applications can therefore be struck out 
in both decisions and in judgments. As in non-strike out cases, the Court awards 
costs in strike-out decisions, based on Rule 43(4). It has emphasised that ‘unlike 
Article 41 [...], which comes into play only if the Court has previously found “that 
there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto”, Rule 43 § 4 
allows the Court to make an award solely for costs and expenses’.216 Furthermore, it 
held that ‘the general principles governing reimbursement of costs under Rule 43 § 
4 are essentially the same as under Article 41 [...]’, meaning that the costs must 
relate to the alleged violation and must be reasonable.217  
As in the case of any other strike-out decision, the Court can decide to restore an 
application which it struck out within the meaning of subparagraph b. However, the 
author is not aware of any such decision.  
                                                        
210  See e.g.: Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (GC), No. 60654/00, 15 January 2007, para. 102.  
211  El Majjaoui & Stichting Touba Moskee v. the Netherlands, No. 25525/03, 20 December 2007, para. 
32.  
212  Ohlen v. Denmark, No. 63214/00, 24 February 2005, para. 27.  
213  Borisov v. Lithuania, No. 9958/04, 14 June 2011, para. 114. 
214  Konstantin Markin v. Russia, (GC), No. 30078/06, 22 March 2010, para. 89.  
215  Art. 37(1) ECHR.  
216  Shevanova v. Latvia, No. 58822/00 , 15 June 2006, para. 53.  
217  Ibid., para. 55.  
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1.4 Unilateral Declarations  
This section also starts off with a description of the frequency and areas of use of 
the procedural step of striking a case out based on a unilateral declaration. Then the 
reasons why a state may take this step, as well as the reasons for the Court to 
(dis)approve a unilateral declaration are dealt with. Prior to discussing the question 
whether the Court decides on unilateral declarations in a judgment or decisions, 
whether it awards costs and whether it ever restores a case after having approved a 
unilateral declaration, some extra messages which the Court can send to the state 
when striking a case out are examined.  
1.4.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
Since Turkey issued the first unilateral declaration in 2001, unilateral declarations 
have become a constant feature of Convention proceedings. Their number rose from 
30 in 2007,218 to 706 in 2011, but dropped down to 606 in 2012.219 In 2013 and 
2014 these numbers were 409 and 502 respectively.220 Just like friendly settlements, 
unilateral declarations are and can be used in any case, regardless of its subject 
matter.221 The Court has, for example, struck out several Article 2applications 
based on a unilateral declaration.222 Most unilateral declarations are, however, 
accepted in cases where the respondent state admitted a breach of Article 6(1).223 
The Court has also used unilateral declarations as part of a new method to deal 
with repetitive cases concerning the problem of non-execution of domestic 
judgments in Ukraine. The examination of these cases was adjourned pending the 
execution of a pilot judgment,224 but the Court resumed their examination because 
Ukraine failed to execute that judgment. In Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine, the 
Court examined 116 previously adjourned applications, the so-called ‘post Ivanov 
cases’, and found violations of Articles 6(1), 13 and 1 of Protocol 1.225 When 
awarding just satisfaction, it remarked that its ‘principal task is to secure the respect 
for human rights, rather than compensate applicants’ losses minutely and 
exhaustively’ and that the emphasis of its activity ‘is on passing public judgments 
                                                        
218  ECtHR (2012c), 1; The number of applicants involved in these is probably a lot more since 
application can be joined (especially in repetitive cases), see, e.g.: Vlasova and Others v. Russia 
(Dec.), No. 30351/06, 18 September 2012 (concerning 101 applicants in 32 applications).  
219  ECtHR (2013a), 6, 13.  
220  ECtHR (2015d), 4.  
221  See for examples of accepted unilateral declarations in the examination of complaints made under 
various Articles: Ceka v. Albania, No. 26872/05, 23 October 2012, paras. 38-39.  
222  See, e.g.: Akman v. Turkey, No. 37453/97, 26 June 2001; Haran v. Turkey, No. 25754/94, 26 March 
2002; Alder v. UK, No. 42078/02, 22 November 2011.  
223  Keller et al. (2010), 112.  
224  Pilot judgment: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009. 
225  Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine, No. 703/05 et al., 26 July 2012, para. 19.  
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that set human-rights standards across Europe’.226 The applications therefore called 
for a ‘unified approach’,227 meaning that it awarded 3,000 Euros to applicants who 
had been waiting for more than three years and 1,500 Euros to other applicants.228 
The Registry then invited Ukraine to prepare unilateral declarations based on the 
simplified awards of the Court. When Ukraine would fail to make such awards, the 
Court would give judgment after six months.  
The Registry process in this new approach is also simplified:  
 
only key facts are entered in the case-management information system from the file, 
after which everything is computerised [...]. There is no summary of the individual 
facts; instead, a single line of data is presented as part of a table. The Ukrainian 
authorities do not receive the application form or any submitted documents unless 
they request them. There is no reference to friendly settlement, since this would 
prolong proceedings. The state and the Registry agreed that the Registry would 
communicate a maximum of 250 cases.229 
 
As the description of the so-called ‘expedited committee procedure’ clarifies, there 
is no room for friendly settlement negotiations; Ukraine could immediately issue a 
unilateral declaration. Also in the context of the PJP, the Court may instruct the 
state to provide ad hoc redress at the domestic level by means of friendly 
settlements and unilateral declarations.230 
1.4.2 Reasons to (not) Issue a Unilateral Declaration  
Generally, unilateral declarations are considered to be in the respondent state’s 
interest, because, like friendly settlements, they prevent a negative increase in the 
Court’s statistics concerning the number of violations per state. A unilateral 
declaration namely forestalls the finding of a violation by the Court. Therefore, the 
conviction that the Court, if it were to adjudicate the case, will find a violation can 
be an incentive for issuing a unilateral declaration.231 Further, unilateral 
declarations are, also like friendly settlements, on the whole regarded as being 
efficient in terms of time and costs compared to litigating a case.232 Additionally, 
the state itself chooses the terms, which may make unilateral declarations more 
appealing to states than friendly settlements, which terms are proposed by the 
                                                        
226  Ibid., paras. 23-24. 
227  Ibid., para. 24.  
228  Ibid., paras. 23-25; CDDH (2013b), para. 13.  
229  CDDH (2013b), para. 14.  
230  See, e.g.: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 99.  
231  Government agent interview 5.  
232  Idem ((s)he confirmed that unilateral declarations save money for the respondent state).  
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Registry or need to be negotiated with the applicant.233 A more immediate reason 
can be the Court’s invitation to conclude unilateral declarations. As was explained 
above, the Registry issued such an invitation in response to Kharuk and Others v. 
Ukraine. Lastly, another immediate reason to issue a declaration may be the failure 
of friendly settlement negotiations. In particular when an applicant has, in the 
opinion of state, unreasonable demands and a settlement proposed by the Court is 
not achieved for that reason, the state may file a unilateral declaration.234 In fact, 
failed negotiations are a criterion for the Court’s approval of a settlement.  
The required acknowledgement of a violation can form an obstacle to filing a 
unilateral observation. As one interviewed government agent explained, when the 
Court does not approve of a unilateral declaration, the position of the government is 
weakened because of the acknowledgment. The interviewed agent preferred not to 
use the procedure for this reason and is particularly careful because the Court 
sometimes did not accept the amount in the unilateral declaration, even though the 
same amount was proposed by the Registry in a ready-made proposal as part of the 
routine friendly settlement procedure.235 Another agent, however, stated that only 
exceptionally the acknowledgement requirement would constitute an impediment to 
filing a unilateral declaration.236 A third agent explained that the requirement could 
be problematic for substantive reasons if there was a relevant Supreme Court 
judgment finding no violation, which meant that the state then hardly could make a 
unilateral declaration. In other cases, for example on the length of proceedings, 
where the violation is obvious, it would be easier to make an acknowledgment.237 
1.4.3 The Human Rights Condition and other Criteria  
The Court scrutinises unilateral declarations generally more strictly than friendly 
settlements. Especially unilateral declarations ‘submitted in sensitive or complex 
cases, and those concerning the most serious human rights abuses’ are examined 
with ‘particular care and attention’.238 The stricter scrutiny is the logical 
consequence of the fact that unilateral declarations are issued against the will of the 
applicant. Moreover, Rule 62A contains some specific criteria for unilateral 
declarations, in addition to the human rights condition. The Court had already 
developed some of these criteria as relevant factors in order to scrutinise 
declarations in the light of the human rights condition in Tahsin Acar v. Turkey.239 
These factors have therefore now become codified criteria. The criteria are:  
                                                        
233  The declaration remains, however, subject to the Court’s approval. Besides that, as was explained 
above, the Registry’s proposal of a sum of money for a friendly settlement may be regarded as 
convenient by the state.  
234  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 4. 
235  Government agent interview 2.  
236  Government agent interview 5.  
237  Government agent interview 4.  
238  ECtHR (2012c), 1.  
239  (GC), No. 26307/95, 8 April 2004.  
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1. an acknowledgment of the violation; 
2. the provision of adequate redress; and  
3. first attempting a friendly settlement.  
 
Although the Court inserted Rule 62A in the Rules of Court on 2 April 2012, it 
hardly refers to the new Rule when analysing unilateral declarations. At most, it 
mentions the Rule,240 but even this happens rarely. In only one case the Court 
examined the declaration ‘in the light of the principles emerging from its case law, 
in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment […], and codified in Rule 62A’.241  
Due to this stricter scrutiny and because unilateral declarations are not of a 
confidential nature, many examples of a refusal of the Court to accept a unilateral 
declaration can be found. To illustrate, the Court rejected about 28 percent of all 
unilateral declarations in one category of applications against Poland where the 
applicants complained about the same piece of legislation.242 
In spite of its comparably strict scrutiny, the Court’s acceptance of certain 
unilateral declarations has been criticised, because some violations ‘arguably [had] 
not been adequately resolved by the Government’s proposed terms’243 and because 
‘[i]n some cases, the Court accepted a unilateral declaration based on a questionable 
offer from the respondent Government’.244 The requirement on the states to 
explicitly acknowledge the occurrence of a violation and the Court’s systemic 
application of the Tahsin Acar factors probably remedies the problems the criticism 
relates to. The elaborateness of the Court’s reasoning differs per judgment. Even in 
the context of an admitted Article 3 violation, its reasoning may be limited, as is 
demonstrated by these considerations:  
 
12. Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government’s 
declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed the Court considers that 
it is no longer justified to continue the examination of this part of the application 
(Article 37 § 1(c)). 
13. The Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention 
and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part 
of the application [...].245 
 
                                                        
240  See, e.g.: Taktakishvili v. Georgia (Dec.), No. 46055/06, No. 16 October 2012, para. 14; Romano 
and Others v. Italy (Dec.), No. 15323/11 et al., 12 March 2013; Battaglia v. Italy (Dec.), No. 
126/12, 25 June 2013.  
241  Tomeo v. Germany (Dec.), No. 27081/09, 19 March 2013.  
242  Keller et al. (2010), 133.  
243  Leach (2011), 72; See for other critical remarks: Toğcu v. Turkey, No. 27601/95, 9 April 2002, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides; Sardaro (2003), 621-623; Ang and Berghmans (2005), 
101-102; Rozakis (2007), 1014.  
244  Keller et al. (2010), 67.  
245  M.S.-D. and I.D. v. Poland (Dec.), No. 32420/07, 22 October 2013; See also: Ionel v. Moldova 
(Dec.), No. 24032/08, 29 March 2011.  
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However, the Court reasons its decision to approve a unilateral declaration normally 
more extensively, as the below discussion illustrates. This discussion is structured 
around the three criteria formulated in the Rules of Court and the Tahsin Acar 
factors which help the Court establish whether a unilateral declaration fulfils the 
human rights condition.  
The requirement that a state acknowledges a violation does not appear to be a 
major stumbling block for approving unilateral declarations. This is probably due to 
the fact that when the state does not want to admit a violation, it simply does not 
make a declaration. However, this may be different when the state does not 
sufficiently clarify to which complaints its admissions relate. In that situation, the 
Court cannot ‘fully ascertain the scope of the unilateral declaration and, therefore, 
cannot evaluate whether or not the [admissions] are sufficient to find that respect 
for human rights does not require it to examine the case further’.246 Additionally, 
the state must address each complaint in its declaration. When the declaration, for 
example, only concerns the applicant’s pre-placement detention, but not the 
lawfulness of his subsequent detention under Article 5, the Court refuses to strike 
the case out.247 
The Court rejects most unilateral declarations because the redress offered is 
inadequate, which goes against the second requirement in Rule 62A.248 Adequate 
redress means that the proposed payment bears a reasonable relation to the amounts 
awarded in similar cases.249 The state should clearly describe the payment, as the 
Court can reject a unilateral declaration inter alia because the ‘undertakings aimed 
at remedying the applicant’s individual situation are vague and unspecific’.250 The 
Court’s assessment of the question whether a case is indeed similar to another case 
and of the question whether the amount is indeed in line with previous awards can 
be rather elaborate.251 The payment should not be ex gratia in nature, as a payment 
denying liability is in contradiction with the requirement that the state 
acknowledges a violation. The Court nevertheless exceptionally accepts unilateral 
declarations proposing an ex gratia payment, without explaining why it accepts the 
declaration in spite of the nature of the payment.252 Further, the proposed redress 
may not be made conditional on the applicant’s fulfilment of certain requirements, 
because such a term makes the declaration not ‘truly unilateral’.253 In addition to a 
monetary award for damages, it is also relevant whether the applicant’s claims for 
                                                        
246  Bazjaks v. Latvia, No. 71572/01, 19 October 2010, paras. 51-52.  
247  Nelissen v. the Netherlands, No. 6051/07, 5 April 2011, paras. 39-40.  
248  Keller et al. (2010), 104.  
249  See, e.g.: Choumakov v. Poland (no. 2), No. 55777/08, 1 February 2011, para. 39; Przemyk v. 
Poland, No. 22426/11, 17 September 2013, para. 41. 
250   Nikolayev v. Russia, No. 37927/02, 2 March 2006, para. 34.  
251  See, e.g.: Tur v. Poland, No. 21695/05, 23 October 2007, paras. 42-44; Guliyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 
1) (Dec.), No. 35559/05, 4 October 2011. 
252  Bazjaks v. Latvia, No. 71572/01, 19 October 2010, para. 52; See, e.g.: Urtāns v. Latvia (Dec.), No. 
25623/04, 7 April 2009, para. 16; Daģis v. Latvia (Dec.), No. 7843/02, 30 June 2009, para. 41.  
253  Danielyan and Others v. Armenia, No. 25825/05, 9 October 2012, para. 26.  
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costs and expenses are covered by the amount in the declaration.254 The Court 
‘welcomes in principle’ redress in kind, provided it is sufficiently clearly and 
certainly described.255 When the respondent state, for example, proposes to provide 
a flat to the applicant, it should provide ‘sufficient details of the flat in question’.256 
Failing to take measures of a non-pecuniary nature may even be a reason to reject a 
declaration. The Court, for example, rejected a declaration because, despite an 
acknowledgement of a violation of the applicant’s rights guaranteed under Article 
5(3), he remained in remanded custody.257 The failure to provide adequate redress 
alone is sufficient ground to reject a declaration, regardless of whether other 
conditions are fulfilled.258  
Rule 62A also provides that where ‘exceptional circumstances’ so justify, a 
declaration may be filed in the absence of an attempt at a friendly settlement.259 In 
other words, a declaration must normally be preceded by settlement negotiations. 
The Court does not usually address this criterion specifically, probably because it 
can be easily derived from the facts of a case that it has been fulfilled. In addition, 
the repetitive nature of an application appears to justify skipping the negotiations, as 
the Court accepts unilateral declarations in respect of these applications without an 
attempt at a friendly settlement.260 Considering that repetitive applications are the 
rule rather than the exception, this makes these circumstances hardly exceptional.  
The nature of the complaint is one of the Tahsin Acar factors that have not been 
codified. The Court uses this factor to establish whether the particular 
circumstances of a case offer a sufficient basis for finding that the human rights 
condition does not require it to continue examining the case. The Court hardly ever 
uses this condition and approves unilateral declarations regardless of, for example, 
the serious nature of a complaint. When the Court does mention the nature of the 
complaint as a reason for refusal, however, this factor is only one amongst other 
reasons for refusal. Therefore, this factor alone does not seem to withhold the Court 
from accepting a declaration. In Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, for example, the 
serious nature of the allegations of trafficking in human beings was one of the 
reasons to keep the case on the Court’s list.261 In another judgment, the Court 
emphasised the serious nature of the allegations, which, together with the lack of an 
undertaking by the government to take adequate general and individual pecuniary 
measures, made the Court continue its examination.262 Further, the Court once took 
                                                        
254  Postek v. Poland (Dec.), No. 4551/10, 11 October 2011, para. 21.  
255  Delvina v. Albania (Art. 41), No. 49106/06, 21 May 2013, para. 13. 
256  Ibid., para. 26.  
257  Henryk Sikorski v. Poland, No. 10041/09, 25 January 2011, paras. 24-26; See also: Zdziarski v. 
Poland, No. 14239/09, 25 January 2011; Jęczmieniowski v. Poland, No. 747/09, 25 January 2011.  
258  See, e.g.: Wawrzynowicz v. Poland, No. 73192/01, 17 July 2007, paras. 36-42. 
259  Rule 62A(2) of Court.  
260  CDDH (2013g), para. 19.  
261  No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, para. 199.  
262  Przemyk v. Poland, No. 22426/11, 17 September 2013, paras. 41-42.  
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note of the ‘complex nature’ of the complaints, which, together with another factor, 
made that it did not find it appropriate to strike the case out.263  
Another Tahsin Acar factor which cannot be found in the Rule 62A is whether 
the issues raised by the applicant are comparable to issues already determined by 
the Court in previous cases. The Court normally verifies whether this is indeed the 
case. It often notes that the issues are comparable or that abundant well-established 
case law exists.264 As many declarations are issued in areas of well-established case 
law, this criterion is often easily fulfilled. This was not the case in Rantsev however, 
where the Court underlined the paucity of case law on the interpretation and 
application of Article 4 in the context of trafficking.265 Further, in a case against 
Ukraine, the Court, in finding that it needed to continue its examination of the case, 
took also ‘into account that the issues raised in the present application under 
Articles 7 and 11 [...] have not been previously examined by this Court in respect of 
Ukraine’.266 Nevertheless, the lack of previous case law is not always a reason to 
reject a declaration. The Court once approved a settlement even though it had ‘not 
examined comparable cases against Ukraine before’. Importantly, however, it noted 
immediately thereafter that the alleged violations ‘did not stem from any larger-
scale issues [...] calling for the application of general measures in order to avoid 
similar infringements in the future’.267 The factor of the lack of existence of 
previous case law may therefore carry little weight when the application is not 
prompted by a general problem.  
The Court also held in Tahsin Acar, and subsequently copied into the Rules of 
Court, that certain relevance is attached to the nature and the scope of measures 
taken in the context of the execution of previous judgments and the impact of these 
measures on the case under consideration. A respondent state can therefore use a 
declaration to confirm that it is taking general measures to execute a previous 
judgment.268 The relevance of the two factors, the Court reflected in one judgment, 
lies in its conviction that another judgment on the merits is not useful when the state 
has already addressed a systemic problem in general measures set out previously, 
for example in a friendly settlement, and again in the unilateral declaration under 
consideration.269 The Court only occasionally assesses a unilateral declaration in the 
light of these two interconnected factors. When assessing a unilateral declaration in 
a repetitive application, it does usually not establish whether measures are being 
taken to remedy the systemic problem at the core of the application. If the Court 
                                                        
263  Wieczorek v. Poland, No. 18176/05, 8 December 2009, para. 34. 
264  See, e.g.: Iudin v. Moldova (Dec.), No. 7347/04, 11 October 2011; Van Galen and Others v. the 
Netherlands (Dec.), No. 13143/08, 17 September 2013, paras. 23-24.  
265  No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, para. 200.  
266  Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, No. 20372/11, 11 April 2013, para. 45; See also: Wieczorek v. Poland, No. 
18176/05, 8 December 2009, para. 34.  
267  Rokhlya v. Ukraine (Dec.), No. 46014/07, 17 May 2011.  
268  See, e.g.: Gambar v. Azerbaijan, No. 4741/06 et al., 9 December 2010.  
269  Gergely v. Romania, No. 57885/00, 26 April 2007, para. 26; See also: Kalanyos and Others v. 
Romania, No. 57884/00, 26 April 2007. 
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takes these factors into consideration at all, it, for example, strikes a case out due to 
the nature of the admission in the declaration and against the background of a 
Supreme Court judgment which was in conformity with its earlier case law and with 
which the declaration complies.270 In another case, the Court struck a case out inter 
alia because the respondent state intended to take general measures following a 
previous judgment and because these measures were already under the Committee’s 
examination.271 The factors can of course also be a reason to continue to examine a 
case and therefore to reject a unilateral declaration. One of the Court’s motives to 
reject a declaration issued by Poland was, for example, that remedies set up 
previously to reduce the excessive length of proceedings proved to be ineffective in 
the applicant’s situation.272 
It is furthermore potentially important whether a respondent state lays down in 
the declaration that it is prepared to execute a previous judgment. This factor was 
not mentioned in the list of relevant factors in Tahsin Acar, but can be added to the 
list as the list was not meant to be limitative. To illustrate, the Court remarked in a 
Polish case that it ‘cannot but note that’ the excessive length of judicial proceedings 
and delays in investigating allegations of violations of Articles 2 and 3 ‘disclose a 
structural problem which calls for adequate general measures to be taken by the 
authorities’.273 As no such measures were mentioned in the declaration and also 
because the proposed sum was too low, the Court refused to strike the case out.274 
The general measures which the state undertakes to implement should be described 
sufficiently specifically. The undertaking ‘to adopt all necessary measures in order 
to avoid similar infringements’, is too general.275  
The Court can also take into account whether the facts are in dispute between 
the parties. This factor, mentioned in Tahsin Acar, proved to be a bar to the Court’s 
approval of the unilateral declaration in that case.276 It seems that, so far, Tahsin 
Acar was the first and only judgment where this factor was a problem. When 
examining other unilateral declarations, the Court does normally not even refer to 
this factor, and indeed it has not been codified in Rule 62A.277 
Finally, in some cases, the Court applies none of the above criteria or relevant 
factors. These are cases where the state adopted a unilateral declaration after the 
                                                        
270  Heinse v. the Netherlands (Dec.), No. 34399/05, 23 September 2008.  
271  Bushati and Others v. Albania (Dec.), No. 6397/04, 14 February 2012, para. 16; See also: Swedish 
Transport Workers Union v. Sweden, No. 53507/99, 18 July 2006; B.H. v. UK (Dec.), No. 
59580/00, 25 September 2007; X. v. Moldova (Dec.), No. 37507/02, 5 January 2010.  
272  Krawczak v. Poland (Dec.) No. 40387/06, 8 April 2008, para. 20.  
273  Przemyk v. Poland, No. 22426/11, 17 September 2013, para. 41.  
274  Ibid., paras. 42-43.  
275  Bazjaks v. Latvia, No. 71572/01, 19 October 2010, para. 52; Compare with (also rather general): 
Panasenkovs v. Latvia (Dec.), No. 12569/03, 16 March 2010, para. 34.  
276  Tahsin Acar v. Turkey (Preliminary objection), No. 26307/95, 6 May 2003, para. 78.  
277  See for exceptions where the Court only noted that the facts were not in dispute, without further 
elaborating on this factor: Wnuk v. Poland (Dec.), No. 20136/02, 3 June 2008; Rokhlya v. Ukraine 
(Dec.), No. 46014/07, 17 May 2011; Paterson v. UK (Dec.), No. 19923/10, 3 September 2013.  
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Court had issued a judgment in which it postponed dealing with Article 41. In the 
ensuing Article 41 judgment, the Court then solely examines the declaration in the 
light of the general principles in respect of Article 41.278 
The above discussion has illustrated how the Court uses the different codified 
criteria and the Tahsin Acar factors to decide whether or not a unilateral declaration 
warrants a strike-out decision. From this discussion, it emerges that the Court does 
not always apply each criterion and each factor when scrutinising a declaration. It, 
however, normally at least reviews the nature of the admission, the amount of 
compensation offered and the question whether already clear case law exists on the 
topic of the application.279 The only criterion that is never explicitly mentioned is 
that a unilateral declaration must be issued after an attempt at a friendly settlement.  
1.4.4 Extra Message from the Court  
The Court sometimes underlines the limited scope of a strike-out decision where a 
unilateral declaration has been made. It may, for example, state that its decision is 
‘a final resolution of [the] application only in so far as the proceedings before the 
Court are concerned’.280 The ruling is therefore ‘without prejudice to the use by the 
applicant of other remedies before the domestic courts to claim further 
compensation’ in respect of his complaint about, for example, the length of 
domestic proceedings.281 When the impugned domestic proceedings are still 
pending, the Court can add that, whatever it decides, ‘is without prejudice to the 
merits of the applicant’s domestic claim or, indeed, her ability to obtain redress for 
any additional procedural delay which may occur after the date of the present 
judgment’.282 Further, in the context of a delay of domestic proceedings, the Court 
has clarified that, in spite of the acceptance of the unilateral declaration, ‘the State 
should still ensure that all necessary steps are taken to allow the proceedings to be 
concluded as speedily as possible, whilst ensuring the proper administration of 
justice’.283  
                                                        
278  Megadat.com SRL v. Moldova (Art. 41), No. 21151/04, 17 May 2011, para. 10; Althoff and Others 
v. Germany (Art. 41), No. 5631/05, 27 September 2012, para. 17; Donati v. Italy (Art. 41), No. 
63242/00, 15 November 2012, para. 15; The Court is, however, not wholly consistent, as it applied 
the Tahsin Acar factors to one declaration in an Art. 41 judgment, see: Racu v. Moldova (Art. 41), 
No. 13136/07, 20 April 2010, para. 17. 
279  See, e.g.: Smirnova and Others v. Russia, No. 30354/06 et al., 18 December 2012; Gordon v. UK 
(Dec.), No. 10671/10, 26 March 2013; Beridze v. Georgia (Dec.), No. 16206/06, 30 April 2013.  
280  Petrovs v. Lativa (Dec.), No. 29254/05, 30 March 2010, para. 17; See also: Stobik v. Poland (Dec.), 
No. 10995/07, 27 April 2010; Taktakishvili v. Georgia (Dec.), No. 46055/06, No. 16 October 2012, 
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282  Spica v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 43014/06, 18 October 2006.  
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(Dec.), No. 40053/06, 23 March 2010.  
 
 
 
 Chapter IX 
 
 
296 
1.4.5 Decision or Judgment; Award of Costs; Restoral of Application  
The Court only exceptionally strikes a case out in a judgment rather than in a 
decision in the context of a unilateral declaration. This has happened when the 
Court took a separate decision on the admissibility of an application,284 when the 
unilateral declaration was issued after the Court reserved the Article 41 question in 
its merits judgment, and when only part of the application could be struck out based 
on the declaration.285 Outside these circumstances, which occur rarely, the Court 
virtually never approves a unilateral declaration in a judgment.286 
The Court awards costs only in very few decisions in which it accepts a 
unilateral declaration.287 This is in conformity with the Court’s policy document on 
unilateral declarations, where it writes that it ‘may exceptionally make’ an award of 
costs in these circumstances, when the costs are not provided for or if or the amount 
is insufficient.288 The states facilitate this by oftentimes including the following 
formula in their declaration: the proposed sum of money ‘is to cover any pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses’.289 Instead of making an 
award itself, the Court can also continue its examination of the case because the 
amount put forward by the respondent state in the unilateral declaration does not 
take into account the costs and expenses incurred by the applicant.290  
The Court has only once restored an application to its list subsequently to a 
strike-out decision based on a unilateral declaration.291 In examining whether the 
circumstances justified restoring that application, the Court had regard to the 
criteria established in inter alia Tahsin Acar. In the relevant case, it considered 
restoral to be justified, because, after the Court’s strike-out decision, the respondent 
state had made the undertaking to pay compensation conditional on steps which it 
obliged the applicants to take and which they failed to take. In the restoral decision, 
                                                        
284  See, e.g.: Van Houten v. the Netherlands, No. 25149/03, 29 September 2005; Alder v. UK, No. 
42078/02, 22 November 2011; Ceka v. Albania, No. 26872/05, 23 October 2012.  
285  See, e.g.: Niskasaari and Others v. Finland, No. 37520/07, 6 July 2010; Bystrowski v. Poland, No. 
15476/02, 13 September 2011; Paweł Pawlak v. Poland, No. 13421/03, 30 October 2012.  
286  A search performed in HUDOC on 10 January 2014 in all judgments of the Court with the words 
‘unilateral declaration’, which yielded 172 hits, gave this image of practice, see for probably the 
only exception (i.e. not issued in the circumstances related): Goggins and Others v. UK, No. 
30089/04 et al., 19 July 2011.  
287  Search performed in the HUDOC decisions’ database with the key words “43 § 4” and “déclaration 
unilateral”, as well as “43 § 4” and “unilateral declaration”, on 10 January 2014 resulted in 15 
relevant hits, see, e.g.: X. v. Moldova (Dec.), No. 37507/02, 5 January 2010; Stepuleac v. Moldova 
(Dec.), No. 20269/09 et al., 16 March 2010; Tabagari v. Georgia (Dec.), No. 70820/10 et al., 18 
June 2013.  
288  ECtHR (2012c), 2.  
289  See, e.g.: Vallent v. Hungary (Dec.), No. 41476/10, 19 November 2013; Popovschi v. Moldova 
(Dec.), No. 1487/11, 3 December 2013; Szwed v. Poland (Dec.), No. 36646/09, 5 December 2013.  
290  Postek v. Poland (Dec.), No. 4551/10, 11 October 2011, para. 21.  
291   Keller et al. (2010), 56.  
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the Court found that the condition made the declaration no longer ‘truly 
unilateral’.292  
Although the Court has only once restored an application in the current context, 
it often reminds the respondent state, after approving a declaration, of the 
possibility of restoral.293 A reason for the Court to include this reminder is that, as it 
recalled once, ‘the [Committee] is competent to supervise the execution of its final 
judgments only’.294 Therefore, as the Court normally strikes a case out based on a 
unilateral declaration in a decision, restoral is the only option for European 
supervision of the execution of a declaration.  
1.5  Article 37(1)(c) Strike-out Decisions  
The structure of this section is comparable to the other sections on Article 37: it 
begins with the frequency and areas of use of subparagraph c strike-out decisions, 
then outlines the Court’s interpretation of the human rights condition in the light of 
this subparagraph, explains which form rulings take and whether the Court awards 
costs and, lastly, notes whether the Court has ever restored an application which it 
struck out under the said subparagraph. As was explained in chapter V, only some 
decisions made under subparagraph c are of interest to this study, namely those 
decisions which are rendered in reaction to measures taken by in particular 
domestic authorities after the communication of a case.  
1.5.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
As explained below, the grounds to strike a case out on the basis of subparagraph c 
coincide with the particular circumstances of a case. It is therefore difficult to 
generalise about practice. Nevertheless, some categories can be distinguished in 
which most cases appear to fall.295  
The Court frequently makes a subparagraph c decision in response to 
developments in domestic migration proceedings. A domestic authority may, for 
example, have decided to set aside the applicant’s expulsion order.296 Further, the 
decision may be a reaction to the absence of a domestic decision to authorise the 
                                                        
292  Aleksentseva and Others v. Russia (Dec.), No. 75025/01 et al., 23 March 2006.  
293  See, e.g.: Fesik v. Ukraine (Dec.), No. 2704/11, 11 December 2012; Gordon v. UK (Dec.), No. 
10671/10, 26 March 2013; Beridze v. Georgia (Dec.), No. 16206/06 , 30 April 2013.  
294  Josipović v. Serbia (Dec.), No. 18369/07, 4 March 2008.  
295  See for exceptions: Victor-Emmanuel de Savoie v. Italy, No. 53360/99, 24 April 2003, paras. 29-31 
(on the amendment of domestic law and the applicant’s return to Italy); Kovačić and Others v. 
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Convention application). 
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applicant’s extradition297 or to an undertaking of the state to not remove the 
applicant until domestic courts have taken a fresh decision regarding his removal.298 
Additionally, the applicant may have been granted refugee status299 or a residence 
permit.300 In response to the communication of one case, for example, the UK wrote 
to the Court that it would suspend all Dublin removals to Greece and that it would 
consider the asylum claims in these cases pending a preliminary reference before 
the CJEU. After having obtained additional clarification, the Court struck 233 cases 
out, because the UK’s undertaking meant the applicants would not be removed 
without a full examination of their claims.301 
Another area of use is cases where the applicant entered into some sort of 
agreement which affects his complaint before the Court. The applicant may have, 
for example, agreed a settlement with his former employer regarding all disputes 
concerning his employment. In the relevant case, the applicant had complained that, 
as regards his dismissal, he was denied access to court and that the judicial 
proceedings had been unfair. Due to the agreement, the former Commission found 
it not justified to continue its examination of the application pursuant to 
subparagraph c.302 Other agreements justifying striking a case out are, for example, 
a settlement with a municipality concerning the restitution of an apartment303 and a 
compensation agreement with a foreign association.304 
A special category of rulings are ‘judgments of principle’ in refugee cases 
concerning the question whether (a particular group of) refugees can be deported to 
a certain region or state.305 The level of generality of such a judgment enables the 
respondent state as well as other states to take measures to bring their legal or 
policy framework in conformity with the Convention as interpreted in the judgment 
of principle. These measures can justify striking comparable applications out within 
the meaning of subparagraph c.306 This category of strike-out decisions can be 
distinguished from the above strike-out cases relating to migration matters, because 
this category is a clear reaction to a certain judgment - a judgment of principle - of 
the Court. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is a judgment of principle, in which the 
Court held that removing refugees to Greece under the Dublin Regulation violated 
                                                        
297  Atmaca v. Germany (Dec.), No. 45293/06, 6 March 2012; In these cases the expulsion order against 
the applicant had become statute-barred because the validity of the order had expired: B.Z. v. 
Sweden, No. 74352/11, 18 December 2012; P.Z. and Others v. Sweden, No. 68194/10, 18 
December 2012; Atayeva and Burman v. Sweden, No. 17471/11, 31 October 2013.  
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300  Szyszkowski v. San Marino (Dec.), No. 76966/01, 29 March 2005.  
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305  See also: CDDH (2013b), para. 10.  
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the Convention.307 Subsequently, the Court assumed a proactive role to ensure that 
relevant states parties reacted to its judgment: it contacted them to ask what 
practical consequences they would draw from M.S.S. When the states had adapted 
their policy in accordance with the judgment, the Court struck comparable 
applications out.308 Another judgment of principle is Sufi and Elmi v. UK, about 
removals to Somalia.309 The UK reacted of its own motion to that judgment by 
sending a proposal to the Court to lift interim measures applicable to similar cases. 
The applicants would be allowed to submit further representations in light of the 
judgment of principle and when an asylum claim would nevertheless be refused, the 
applicant could apply to domestic remedies. The Court accepted the proposal and 
struck 176 applications out.310  
1.5.2 The Human Rights Condition  
Both the Court311 and the respondent state312 take the initiative to raise the issue 
whether an application can be struck out within the meaning of subparagraph c. The 
Court has held that ‘[i]t is clear from [subparagraph c] that [it] enjoys wide 
discretion in identifying grounds capable of being relied upon in striking out an 
application on this basis, it being understood, however, that such grounds must 
reside in the particular circumstances of each case’.313 The wide discretion which 
the Court has assumed is reflected in its case law;314 it has not formulated specific 
conditions for the applicability of subparagraph c in addition to the human rights 
condition. The two conditions for subparagraph b strike-out decisions do, for 
example, not apply: under subparagraph c, the Court can strike out an application 
out even though the ‘key aspect’ of the applicant’s complaint persists and even 
though the applicant was not granted redress.315 Moreover, when striking a case out 
under that subparagraph, the Court does not elaborate on the human rights 
                                                        
307  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09, 21 January 2011, paras. 338-368.  
308  See, e.g.: Shakor and Others v. Finland (Dec.), No. 10941/10 et al., 28 June 2011; Ali Gedi and 
Others v. Austria (Dec.), No. 61567/10 et al., 4 October 2011.  
309  No. 8319/07 et al., 28 June 2011; See also: N.A. v. UK, No. 25904/07, 17 July 2008.  
310  Musa and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 8276/07 et al., 26 June 2012; M. v. UK, No. 45196/06, 18 
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response to the N.A. case: M.H. and A.S. v. UK (Dec.), No. 38267/07 et al., 16 December 2008.  
311  See, e.g.: Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 44574/98 et al., 3 October 2008; Atmaca v. 
Germany (Dec.), No. 45293/06, 6 March 2012. 
312  See, e.g.: Victor-Emmanuel de Savoie v. Italy, No. 53360/99, 24 April 2003; Atayeva and Burman 
v. Sweden, No. 17471/11, 31 October 2013.  
313  Association SOS Attentats and de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, para. 37.  
314  In addition to strike-out decisions based on unilateral declarations, the Court strikes out cases under 
subparagraph c because the parties reached an agreement or settlement, resulting in the loss of the 
applicant’s victim status, because the applicant had died, because of a lack of diligence on part of 
the applicant or because the applicant had failed to appoint a lawyer to represent him, see: Ibid., 
para. 37.  
315  See, e.g.: Ibid., para. 34.  
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condition. It usually merely repeats the formula that it ‘is satisfied that respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention […] does not require it at present to 
continue the examination of any of the applications’.316 Indeed, this condition is 
therefore virtually never a reason for it to refuse striking a case out.317  
The Court does, however, explain which developments on the national level 
justify its decision. The length of its explanations differs per judgment318 and the 
Court only exceptionally explains why not subparagraph a or b, but c is 
applicable.319 Furthermore, the Court has attached importance to the possibility of 
judicial review at the national level or of a domestic appeal320 and the possibility for 
the applicant to lodge a fresh application before it, after a case is struck out.321  
1.5.3 Decision or Judgment; Award of Costs; Restoral of an Application  
The Court sometimes strikes a case out in a judgment, because the application was 
declared admissible,322 and sometimes in a decision.323 The award of costs is 
usually not mentioned, and in the one case where the applicant asked for a 
reimbursement of procedural costs, the Court did not ‘consider it appropriate to 
make such an award’.324 The Committee can therefore only sometimes supervise 
the execution of cases which were struck out under subparagraph c. The author is 
not aware of any case that was struck out based on subparagraph c and that was 
subsequently restored to the Court’s list of cases.  
1.6 Hearings 
Prior to exploring the practice of hearings, this section commences with a short note 
on methodology, to clarify how a picture of the practice has been created. Next, the 
frequency and areas of use of hearings are outlined, the question is addressed on 
                                                        
316  See, e.g.: Victor-Emmanuel de Savoie v. Italy, No. 53360/99, 24 April 2003, para. 30; Kovačić and 
Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 44574/98 et al., 3 October 2008, para. 268; Atayeva and Burman v. 
Sweden, No. 17471/11, 31 October 2013, para. 23.  
317  The author has not found any example. 
318  See for a short explanation: Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 44574/98 et al., 3 October 
2008, para. 267; See for a comparably longer explanation: Association SOS Attentats and de Boery 
v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, paras. 38-39; F.I. and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 
8655/10, 15 March 2011.  
319  See, e.g.: Association SOS Attentats and de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, 
paras. 32-39; Atmaca v. Germany (Dec.), No. 45293/06, 6 March 2012.  
320  See, e.g.: Shakor and Others v. Finland (Dec.), No. 10941/10 et al., 28 June 2011; Atayeva and 
Burman v. Sweden, No. 17471/11, 31 October 2013, para. 22. 
321  See, e.g.: Shakor and Others v. Finland (Dec.), No. 10941/10 et al., 28 June 2011; Ali Gedi and 
Others v. Austria (Dec.), No. 61567/10 et al., 4 October 2011; Musa and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 
8276/07 et al., 26 June 2012.  
322  See, e.g.: Atayeva and Burman v. Sweden, No. 17471/11, 31 October 2013, paras. 19-24.  
323  F.I. and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 8655/10, 15 March 2011 
324  Ali Gedi and Others v. Austria (Dec.), No. 61567/10 et al., 4 October 2011.  
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whose initiative hearings are organised and possible reasons for holding a hearing 
are enumerated. The last three elements of this section describe the Court’s 
questions prior to and at hearing, the state’s oral observations and, where relevant, 
the third-party interveners’ oral observations.  
1.6.1 Methodology  
This section is mainly based on the information derived from seven hearings and, 
more specifically, two parts thereof: the government’s observations and the 
questions of the judges. When available, the observations by a state third-party and 
the Commissioner, as well as their answers to the questions of the judges, are also 
incorporated. The hearings in the following seven cases were analysed: Eweida and 
Others v. UK, The Centre for Legal Resources (CLR) on behalf of Valentin 
Câmpeanu v. Ukraine, Jaloud v. the Netherlands, Vučković and Others v. Serbia, 
Volkov v. Ukraine, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece and Al Nashiri v. Poland. This 
selection was made to include cases from different states and concerning different 
problems,325 chamber and Grand Chamber cases, referred and relinquished cases 
and third-party interventions by states and the Commissioner. In addition to an 
analysis of the seven hearings, a quick scan was made of the in total 92 hearings 
held in 2010-2013. This group of hearings was assessed in a less detailed manner 
than the seven just-mentioned hearings, as the only aim was to obtain a better 
insight in the areas of use of hearings.326 
1.6.2 Frequency and Areas of Use  
Since 2002, the Court notes the number of hearings in its Annual Report or on the 
part of the website streaming webcasts of the hearings. This information exposes 
that from 2002 to 2013, between 45 to 19 hearings were held per year, with an 
average of 29 hearings per year. The number of Grand Chamber hearings has 
outnumbered the number of chamber hearings constantly since 2007. In 2012 and 
2013, only 19 hearings were held per year, of which 16 Grand Chamber hearings in 
2013 and 12 in 2012.  
 
                                                        
325  Such as, sensitive, widespread, factual and jurisdictional problems and problems with a potential 
impact on states other than the respondent state.  
326  These years were selected because they were the most recent years available at the time of writing 
and because they yielded 92 (Grand Chamber and chamber) hearings, which was considered to be 
sufficient to give a good image of the type of cases for which a hearing is held. Although each 
hearing was looked at, not each hearing falls into one of the categories discussed below and some 
fall into more than one category. It is not necessary that each hearing falls into one of the categories 
as the purpose of this exercise is not to systematically subdivide hearings into categories, but to 
give some insight into the type of cases which are selected for hearing.  
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Figure 3: Hearings (2002-2013)  
 
Year  Grand Chamber Chamber Total 
2014327 20 2 22 
2013328 16 3 19 
2012329 11 8 19 
2011330 21 7 28 
2010331 18 8 26 
2009332 18 10 28 
2008333 18 10 28 
2007334 16 10 26 
2006335 16 17 34 
2005336 25 20 45 
2004337 9 17 26 
2003338 9 28 37 
2002339 12 21 33 
 
Figure 3 shows a decrease in the number of hearings, in particular of chamber 
hearings. It transpired from the interviews that the decrease is not the result of a 
conscious policy, but must instead be regarded as an inevitable consequence of the 
Court’s heavy case-load, in combination with the limited added value of hearings, 
as will be explained below, and their labour-intensive nature.340 
Cases selected for a hearing usually raise a serious question affecting the 
interpretation or the application of the Convention or risk having a result 
inconsistent with a previous judgment.341 The quick scan of the 92 hearings held in 
2010-2013 gives a clearer image of the issues discussed at hearing. One such issue 
                                                        
327  ECtHR (2015a), 63; Because the number of chamber hearings is not mentioned in the Annual 
Reports of 2014-2011, the number is based on the number of webcasts of chamber hearings on the 
ECtHR’s website. It may, however, be the case that not of each chamber hearing a webcast is made 
available.  
328  ECtHR (2014), 59; See also: comment about 2014.  
329  ECtHR (2013b), 59; See also: comment about 2014.  
330  ECtHR (2012a), 65; See also: comment about 2014.  
331  ECtHR (2011a), 65-67.  
332  ECtHR (2010a), 57-59.  
333  ECtHR (2009), 55-57.  
334  ECtHR (2008), 51-53.  
335  ECtHR (2007), 47-49.  
336  ECtHR (2006), 40-42.  
337  ECtHR (2005), 46-48. 
338  ECtHR (2004), 40-42.  
339  ECtHR (2003), 35-36.  
340  Judge interview 2; Judge interview 4; Judge interview 7; Government agent interview 4. Registry 
interview 5. 
341  This is in line with the requirements for referral and relinquishment to the Grand Chamber, before 
which most hearings take place, see: Arts. 30, 43(2) ECHR.  
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was the reach of the jurisdiction of the Court or of the states parties under the 
Convention.342 Further, a notable number of cases involved domestic criminal 
law343 or the deportation or extradition of the applicant.344 More generally, hearings 
were organised in cases concerning particularly serious345 or widespread 
violations.346 Four hearings were held in cases brought by persons who had held a 
high position in the respondent state: a former prime minister,347 a well-known 
politician,348 a former president349 and a former Supreme Court judge.350 Also 
examined at a hearing were matters relating to the interpretation of the Convention, 
such as positive obligations,351 the possibility of overturning previous case law352 
and an issue which was new for the Court, namely forced sterilisation.353 Finally, a 
large group of cases concerned sensitive issues, such as affairs relating to 
                                                        
342  Al-Skeini and Others v. UK (GC), No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011; Al Jedda v. UK, No. 27021/08 (GC), 
7 July 2011; Nada v. Switzerland (GC), No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012; Catan and Others v. 
Moldova and Russia (GC), No. 43370/04 et al., 19 October 2012; Janowiec and Others v. Russia 
(GC), No. 55508/07 et al., 21 October 2013; Center for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin 
Câmpeanu v. Romania (GC), No. 47848/08, 17 July 2014; Hassan v. UK (GC), No. 29750/09, 16 
September 2014; And in 2015: Chiragov and Others v. Armenia (GC), No. 13216/05, 16 June 
2015.  
343  McFarlane v. Ireland (GC), No. 31333/06, 10 September 2010; Sakhnovskiy v. Russia (GC), No. 
21272/03, 2 November 2010; Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 
December 2011; Gillberg v. Sweden (GC), No. 41723/06, 3 April 2012; Van der Heijden v. the 
Netherlands (GC), No. 42857/05, 3 April 2012; Vinter and Others v. UK (GC), No. 66069/09, 9 
July 2013; Allen v. UK, No. 25424/09 (GC), 25424/09, 12 July 2013; Maktouf and Damjanovic v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (GC), No. 2312/08 et al., 18 July 2013; Del Rio Prada v. Spain (GC), No. 
42750/09, 21 October 2013; Marguš v. Croatia (GC), No. 4455/10, 27 May 2014.  
344  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011; Othman v. UK, No. 8139/09, 
17 January 2012; I.M. v. France, No. 9152/09, 2 February 2012; Hirsi and Others v. Italy (GC), 
No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012; De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 
2012; X. v. Latvia (GC), No. 27853/09, 26 November 2013; Jeunesse v. the Netherlands (GC), No. 
12738/10, 3 October 2014. 
345  Enoukidze and Guirgvliani v. Georgia, No. 25091/07, 26 April 2011; El-Masri v. the FYROM 
(GC), No. 39630/09, 13 December 2012; Al Nashiri v. Poland, No. 28761/11, 24 July 2014; 
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, No. 7511/13, 24 July 2014; Mocanu and Others v. Romania 
(GC), No. 10865/09 et al., 17 September 2014.  
346  Atanasiu and Poenaru v. Romania, No. 30767/05, 12 October 2010; Atanasiu and Others v. 
Romania, No. 33800/06, 12 October 2010; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC) (Art. 41), No. 
26828/06, 12 March 2014; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 
and the FYROM (GC), No. 60642/08, 16 July 2014.  
347  Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, No. 49872/11, 30 April 2013.  
348  Lutsenko v. Ukraine, No. 6492/11, 3 July 2012.  
349  Paksas v. Lithuania (GC), No. 34932/04, 6 January 2011.  
350  Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013.  
351  Mosley v. UK, No. 48009/08, 10 May 2011; Söderman v. Sweden (GC), No. 5786/08, 12 November 
2013; O’Keeffe v. Ireland (GC), No. 35810/09, 18 January 2014.  
352  Bayatyan v. Armenia (GC), No. 23459/03, 7 July 2011.  
353  V.C. v. Slovakia, No. 18968/07, 8 November 2011.  
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religion,354 sex change,355 procreation techniques, the rights of same-sex couples,356 
and disenfranchisement.357 
1.6.3 Initiative  
A respondent state can ask the Court to hold a hearing and the parties are asked by 
the Court whether they would like a hearing as a matter of practice.358 However, 
hearings are probably not often requested and then granted as two of the 
interviewed agents had never requested a hearing,359 two were neither sure nor 
could exclude the possibility that they had done so,360 and one had requested a 
hearing a couple of times, but to no avail.361 Requesting a hearing in Grand 
Chamber cases is not even necessary because, as rule of thumb, hearings are held in 
such cases. For chamber cases, the judge rapporteur can also suggest a hearing.362 
One agent mentioned that (s)he was once given notice of the Court’s intention to 
hold a hearing, after which he was given four weeks to comment.363 However, as 
another agent explained, if the Court thinks there should be a hearing, it will not 
make its decision dependent of the approval of the respondent state.364 Moreover, it 
is clear from the interviews that the Court will only grant a request for a hearing if it 
finds there are compelling reasons for doing so.365 In fact, therefore, although the 
state’s opinion may be asked and although the state may request a hearing, its views 
on the desirability of holding a hearing are not of any real importance in practice. 
1.6.4 Reasons for Holding a Hearing  
As already mentioned, the Court is generally reluctant to have hearings at chamber 
level for reasons of capacity; a strong justification would be required to organise a 
                                                        
354  Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011; Eweida and Others v. UK, No. 48420/10 et al., 
15 January 2013; Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v. Romania (GC), No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013; 
Fernandez Martinez v. Spain (GC), No. 56030/07, 12 June 2014; S.A.S. v. France (GC), No. 
43835/11, 1 July 2014. 
355  Hamalainen v. Finland (GC), No. 37359/09, 16 July 2014. 
356  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010; Gas and Dubois v. France, No. 25951/07, 
15 March 2012; X. and Others v. Austria (GC), No. 19010/07, 19 February 2013; Vallianatos and 
Others v. Greece (GC), No. 29381/09 et al., 7 November 2013.  
357  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) (GC), No. 126/05, 22 May 2012. 
358  Leach (2011), 75; Government agent interview 3 ((s)he indicates that this question is posed when it 
is clear that the case will likely be dealt with on the merits). 
359  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 2.  
360  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 5.  
361  Government agent interview 4. 
362  Judge interview 7.  
363  Government agent interview 5.  
364  Government agent interview 3; See also: Harris et al. (2014), 138 (‘It is not open to the parties to 
object if the Court schedules a hearing’). 
365  Registry interview 5.  
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hearing nevertheless.366 By contrast, hearings take place almost automatically in 
each Grand Chamber case,367 because these cases are deemed to be the most 
important and sensitive cases.368 Indeed, a hearing was organised for all judgments 
which the Grand Chamber pronounced in 2013.369 The Court, however, has now 
started to filter out Grand Chamber cases in which no hearing is necessary, the 
ground for not holding such a hearing being that the case raises a purely legal 
question. This decision is taken by the president of the Grand Chamber after 
consulting the parties.370  
One reason why so few cases are selected for a hearing is that the usefulness of 
hearing generally is considered to be limited. The function of hearings which was 
mentioned most often in the interviews is that they are a vehicle for the Court to 
show its ‘public’ or ‘human’ face. The Court, which normally relies on a wholly 
written procedure, thus becomes visible to the outside world, especially because the 
media attention for a case increases if a hearing is held.371 The substantive added 
value of a hearing for an individual case is considered to be less important. If the 
interviewees considered that such value existed at all, this was mostly to clarify the 
facts, not to discuss legal issues.372 As an agent explained, the added value may be 
that the judges are given a more complete picture of what happened, as it can be 
assumed that they already know their own case law.373 Indeed, it sometimes occurs 
that facts, which were not included in the observations, surface during a hearing.374 
It was also mentioned that one part of the hearings in particular, namely the 
questions posed by the Court and the answers thereto can be useful. One 
interviewee even noted that, if no questions are asked, hearings have no added 
value.375 Questions make it easy to interact and allow the judges to immediately ask 
for clarification.376 The answers received at hearing can be better than those 
received in writing, because both parties are present at hearing.377 However, it was 
also noted that the questions are sometimes not actually answered.378  
                                                        
366  Judge interview 2. 
367  Government agent interview 1; Judge interview 7; Registry interview 5. 
368  Judge interview 2. 
369  ECtHR (2014), 59 and check on HUDOC; The Court issued, additionally, one judgment on Art. 41 
in 2013.  
370  Judge interview 6; See: Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012, para. 7; Bochan 
v. Ukraine (no. 2) (GC), No. 22251/08, 5 February 2015, para. 7.  
371  Government agent interview 3; Judge interview 2; Judge interview 3; Judge interview 4; Judge 
interview 6; Judge interview 7. 
372  Judge interview 6.  
373  Government agent interview 3. 
374  Judge interview 6.  
375  Government agent interview 1.  
376  Government agent interview 1; Judge interview 1; Judge interview 3; Registry interview 5. 
377  Judge interview 3.  
378  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 4.  
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More in general, the interviewees considered that hearings usually are not very 
useful,379 because they do not add new elements to the legal analysis,380 seldom 
change the judges’ opinion381 and are often a repetition of the pleadings in the 
written observations.382 The general opinion is therefore that there is little use in 
holding hearings, especially for the case at issue and the legal questions raised by 
the case.383 Nevertheless, it should also be noted that hearings provide a possibility 
to change the opinion of the judges, because when a hearing takes place, no (draft) 
judgment is already available, which is the case when the judges deliberate about a 
case for which no hearing was organised.384  
1.6.5 The Court’s Questions  
Prior to the hearing, the judges can ask extra written questions to the state, which 
gives the state the opportunity to submit additional written observations,385 in 
addition to those submitted in response to communication and the Article 41 claim 
of the applicant. These extra questions are often more specific than the questions 
posed at the start of the proceedings.386 
The judges have the opportunity to pose oral questions to the parties after the 
(third) parties have made their observations. They asked questions in all seven 
above-mentioned hearings. This has, however, not always been the case outside that 
sample.387 The number of judges asking a question ranged between three and six 
and the judges asked about one to four questions each. It seems that most questions 
are directed at the state, but oftentimes the questions are addressed to both parties. 
Additionally, the judges may pose questions to a third-party intervener specifically. 
The questions were sometimes predominantly legal, sometimes predominantly 
factual and during other hearings both types of questions were asked. The nature of 
the questions posed probably depends on the type of case before the Court. In 
Jaloud, Vučković and Others, Volkov and M.S.S. the questions were mostly or 
solely of a legal nature. By contrast, the questions posed in Al Nashiri concerned 
the facts and the domestic legal framework. At two hearings, a judge asked a factual 
question and apologised for asking that question if the answer could be found in the 
                                                        
379  Judge interview 3; Judge interview 6. 
380  Government agent interview 5; Judge interview 7. 
381  Government agent interview 5; Judge interview 4.  
382  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 4; Judge interview 6.  
383  Only one interviewee asked for his opinion about the added value of hearings was enthusiastic 
about them and expressed that there should be more of them (Government agent interview 4).  
384  Myjer (2012), 153. When a hearing takes place the judges are, however, sent various other 
documents, including a note about the content of the case of the judge rapporteur, and a usually a 
rather specific report of the research division of the Registry.  
385  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 5; Registry interview 5. 
386  Government agent interview 3. 
387  See: the webcast of the hearing in the case of Kononov v. Latvia (GC), No. 36376/04, 17 May 
2010.  
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written observations of the parties.388 It therefore seems that the judges do not 
always read all written materials available, at least not prior to the hearing. The 
questions are usually posed rather succinctly, without references to the Court’s own 
case law or underlying Convention principles. During the time of the old Court, 
advanced notice was given to the parties of which questions the judges would ask at 
hearing. This is, however, no longer the case. Prior to a hearing, the judges do 
discuss amongst themselves the questions which they are planning on asking.389 
1.6.6 The Respondent State’s Observations  
In order to give some insight into the oral observations of the respondent state and 
as a basis to estimate their contribution to the dialogicness of the procedure before 
the Court, their observations in the seven above-mentioned cases are summarised 
here.  
The UK agent in the case of Eweida and Others referred elaborately to the 
Court’s case law, explaining what parallels could be drawn with previous cases and 
emphasising the consistency, coherence and correctness in principle of the Court’s 
approach. He then explained the relevance of that case law to the applicants’ cases. 
Additionally, the agent cited the findings made in domestic judgments, in which the 
judges had ‘faithfully’ applied the Court’s case law.  
The Ukrainian agent chose to focus its oral submissions in CLR on behalf of 
Valentin Câmpeanu solely on the admissibility question of whether the applicant, 
an NGO bringing a case on behalf of a deceased person, had standing before the 
Court. This question was ‘clearly the main concern raised by the application’. The 
silence as regards the merits could, however, not be interpreted as an 
acknowledgment of a violation, the agent explained in response to a question to that 
effect posed by one of the judges. Giving the NGO standing would come down to 
an indirect conventional amendment and would result in an overly broad 
interpretation of the Convention, which would neglect both the wording and the 
spirit of Article 34. This position, the agent argued, found support in the Court’s 
case law. Further, she warned that the interpretation of the ‘Convention must be 
prudent in order to avoid bringing about elements that were not intended to be 
included when the Convention was drafted’ and that a line should be drawn 
between ‘judicial interpretation which is permissible and judicial law-making which 
is not’. Besides, the agent underlined that giving standing to NGOs under domestic 
law in some circumstances did not mean that they should also have standing in 
Strasbourg.  
The agent presenting the oral observations of the Netherlands in Jaloud, a case 
about extraterritorial jurisdiction, clarified that he intended to amplify, not to 
                                                        
388  The third Judge asking a question in Eweida and Others and the second Judge asking a question in 
Jaloud; Two interviewees confirmed that the judges sometimes ask rather basic questions at 
hearing: Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 5. 
389  Registry interview 5.  
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replace the written comments and referred to the written memorial of the UK, the 
intervener, to support his own pleadings. He remarked that the ‘Court’s case law on 
the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction is – frankly speaking – not always easy to 
grasp’ and then explained why the Netherlands was in a fundamentally different 
position than the UK in the case of Al Skeini, a case about a comparable question 
with a comparable set of facts. The last part of the pleadings concerned the merits 
of the case, namely the alleged violation of Article 2.  
In the hearing of Vučković and Others, the Serbian agent commenced with 
expressing the respondent state’s regret at the impugned events and with 
underlining the difficult situation of war with which Serbia was faced in the 1990s. 
He added that the state was searching for a solution for the impugned measures and 
that a relevant law was in the process of adoption. The oral observations alluded to 
the subsidiarity principle, as the agent mentioned that certain matters should be for 
domestic courts to decide and that states are afforded a margin of appreciation in 
security matters. Further, the agent distinguished the case of Vučković and Others 
from comparable cases and reacted rather extensively to the applicants’ 
observations, maintaining that some had abused judicial procedures. The 
observations on the merits were meant to complement previous observations. 
Although the case had been referred to the Grand Chamber, the agent did not react 
to the chamber judgment directly, although he did state that the facts were ‘not 
clearly’ represented in that judgment.  
Ukraine’s oral observations in the case of Volkov existed out of answers to 
written questions posed by the Court prior to the hearing. This agent further 
highlighted that there had been numerous and substantial changes in legislation.  
The Belgian agents in the hearing of M.S.S. focussed on outlining the facts of 
the case, responded to the Court’s written questions and addressed the question of 
whether the applicant had been afforded an effective remedy within the meaning of 
Article 13. The presentation of the Greek agent was divided into two parts. The first 
part was an elaborate response to the criticism of the Commissioner and other third-
party interveners of Greek asylum law, policy and practice. Prior to giving Greece’s 
response, the agent stressed that, regardless of any criticism, the case concerned an 
individual application and should be treated as such. She added that reforms were in 
the pipeline that would improve the position of asylum seekers in Greece. In the 
second part, the agent first sketched the background against which the case should 
be seen, namely the Dublin Regulation and its impact on ‘massive immigration’ 
into Greece, and then detailed what the facts of the case were, inter alia stressing 
that the applicant had exposed himself to deportation. The agent’s conclusion was 
that, in the light of the facts, the case left no room to find any violation.  
The oral pleadings in the case of Al Nashiri were delivered by the government 
agent and the prosecutor responsible for the case on the domestic level. The first 
part of the pleadings concerned Article 38. One day prior to the public hearing, a 
fact-finding hearing was held followed by a hearing with the parties. These two 
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hearings were confidential and they were held in camera.390 During the public 
hearing, it was argued that the proceedings before the Court to clarify the facts were 
contrary to the subsidiarity principle and that the Court risked adopting the role of a 
court of first instance. On a higher level of detail, it was explained to the Court how 
important the confidentiality of certain documents was and that the Rules of Court 
currently provided insufficient safeguards in this respect. The Polish agent also 
argued that the state did not violate the Convention, especially not Article 38. The 
second part of the pleadings, clearly connected to the first, concerned the question 
of the effectiveness of domestic investigations and how the Polish criminal system 
operates, with references to inter alia the principle of legalism, extensive judicial 
oversight and the most important rights of injured persons. An issue that apparently 
was discussed the day before was also mentioned, namely the fact that the length of 
domestic proceedings cannot be a decisive element in deciding that the domestic 
investigations were insufficient.  
This brief survey clearly demonstrates the highly diverse nature of the 
observations made before the Court, not only in substantive terms, but also in terms 
of strategy. One agent clearly responded to the questions which the Court had 
communicated before the hearing, for example, whilst other agents mainly 
responded elaborately to the applicant’s allegations. Similarly, while some agents 
focused on the facts of a case, other pleadings were mostly legal. As one 
interviewed agent noted, the focus at hearing is probably more on the application of 
the Convention to the facts of the case, rather than on the facts or domestic 
legislation.391 A commonality that may be derived from the above summaries is that 
the states usually try to present the worst possible image of the applicant and the 
best possible image of themselves. Also, they generally seem to want to attract the 
Court’s sympathy by stressing that they are undertaking reform measures, by 
explaining the difficult situation they have been or were in and by stressing the 
applicant’s uncooperative stance or improper intentions. As one interviewed agent 
confirmed, (s)he normally – and quite logically – emphasises the strong points of a 
case at hearing.392  
1.6.7 Third-parties’ Observations  
In order to also give some insight into the oral observations of the third-party 
interveners, as was just done with regard to the respondent state’s observations, 
their observations made in some of the seven hearings are now outlined.   
In the case of M.S.S, both the Netherlands and the UK made an oral intervention. 
The Dutch agent first mentioned that the Netherlands was grateful for being 
allowed to contribute, ‘particularly to this oral hearing as we understand that it is 
                                                        
390  ECtHR, ‘Press Release; Chamber Hearing concerning the Secret “Rendition” of Two Men 
Suspected of Terrorist Acts’, ECHR 357 (2013), 3 December 2013.  
391  Government agent interview 3. 
392  Government agent interview 5.  
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highly uncommon for third parties to participate in the oral stage of proceedings’.393 
Thereafter, he explained why the states parties should not be held responsible for 
the situation in Greece. The UK agent focussed on propositions of the law, namely 
inter alia that the states have the right to control the entry of aliens and that it is not 
for Strasbourg to pronounce itself on potential violations. He stated that the UK, in 
its capacity of intervener, did not propose to address the facts of the case. The oral 
observations ended with an invitation to the Court to start from the assumption that, 
where removal of an applicant to a contracting state is involved, the receiving state 
will comply with its Convention obligations and the removal will not infringe the 
Convention, unless there is proof that the applicant would face a real and concrete 
risk of serious an irreparable harm in respect of which he would have no effective 
remedy. In its intervention in Jaloud, the UK addressed the Court on issues of 
principle raised by the case and emphasised the differences between this case and 
that of Al Skeini v. UK.  
Commissioner Hammarberg made the first ever oral Commissioner intervention 
in M.S.S. He clarified that his approach has been to be very selective in participating 
in hearings. Further, he intends to only intervene in particularly important cases 
which will have a broader repercussion and which are of importance to the defence 
of human rights in the Council of Europe. Furthermore, he will limit himself to 
intervening in cases to which he genuinely feels he can contribute with background 
information. As another commissioner, Commissioner Muižnieks, stated on another 
occasion: ‘I intervene if I can have added value and on-the-ground knowledge of 
the issue’.394 The M.S.S. case was, according to the Commissioner Hammarberg, of 
extreme importance and a case to which he could contribute, because he had 
followed the developments in Greece and because he had paid two visits to Greece 
during which he had spoken with domestic authorities, such as border guards, and 
refugees. Further, he had published two relevant reports with recommendations.395 
The sum of the Commissioner’s observations was that the Greek asylum system 
was dysfunctional and that, therefore, Greece’s asylum law and practice were not in 
compliance with international and European human rights standards. The 
Commissioner’s second intervention at hearing was in the case of CLR on behalf of 
Valentin Câmpeanu. His decision to intervene ‘marked the importance of this case’ 
and logically fits in with a theme on which he focussed in 2013: persons with 
disabilities.396 The Commissioner further noted that the rights of persons with 
disabilities has been central to his work and then remarked that his overall 
                                                        
393  In the interviews, it was confirmed that states who ask to intervene orally are sometime refused by 
the Court (Registry interview 8); See for other exceptional oral interventions by a state third-party: 
Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011 (eight out of ten states that were allowed to 
intervene in writing were also allowed to intervene at hearing); Kononov v. Latvia (GC), No. 
36376/04, 17 May 2010 (oral intervention by Russia); and S.A.S. v. France (GC), No. 43835/11, 1 
July 2014 (oral intervention by Belgium).  
394  Muižnieks (2014), 49.  
395  See also: section X.2.8.  
396  See also: section X.2.8.1.  
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assessment is that access to justice for persons with disabilities, especially mental 
disabilities, is highly insufficient. He then explained why the Court needs to adapt 
the standing requirement.  
1.7 Third-party Interventions  
1.7.1 Methodology  
This section is based on the results which two searches on HUDOC yielded, in 
addition to other sources, such as the research interviews and a Report of Judgments 
and Decisions of the Court. Both searches were performed on 27 January 2014. For 
the first search, the keyword ‘Article 36 § 1’ was used (437 results) and for the 
second ‘Article 36 § 2’ (290 results); no filters were applied. Of the results 
delivered by the first search, only those cases in which a state indeed intervened 
were further examined; cases in which the Court only notes that the state did not 
make use of its right to intervene were left aside. The formulation of the keywords 
inescapably means that the results only concern judgments issued by the new Court, 
because before Protocol 11 entered into force, third-party interventions were 
regulated by Article 48 (old).  
1.7.2 State Article 36(1) Interventions 
A state has a right to intervene under Article 36(1) when one of its nationals is an 
applicant to the case. The Court always informs the states when they have this right, 
so they can actually exercise their right if they want to.397 The results of the first 
search make clear, however, that the states do not use their right to intervene in the 
majority of cases. Cyprus has made most use of its right to intervene. It submitted 
observations in a large number of cases brought by Cypriots against Turkey, all 
relating to various problems caused by the division of the island.398 The general 
lack of interest in intervening was confirmed in the interviews. To illustrate, one 
interviewed agent indicated that his state did normally not intervene if a national is 
involved399 and, according to another, his state had never intervened when it had the 
right to do so.400 The states of two other agents, however, seemed to be more 
inclined to intervene in order to protect a national or a company.401  
                                                        
397  Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 2; See for an exception to this rule I. v. Sweden, 
No. 61204/09, 5 September 2013, discussed in some detail below.  
398  See amongst many examples: Strati v. Turkey, No. 16082/90, 22 September 2009; Hapeshis and 
Others v. Turkey, No. 38179/97, 22 September 2009; Skyropiia Yialias Ltd v. Turkey, No. 
47884/99, 22 September 2009. 
399  Government agent interview 3. 
400  Government agent interview 4 
401  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 5. 
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Article 36(1) could be interpreted as giving states an unconditional right to 
intervene based on the nationality of the applicant (‘shall have the right to submit 
written comments’).402 The Court has, however, interpreted this provision 
differently in I. v. Sweden, concerning the complaint of Russian nationals of 
Chechen origin that their deportation to Russia would be in violation of Articles 2 
and 3. Russia wanted to exercise its right to intervene, in response to which the 
Court observed that Article 36(1) ‘reflects the right of diplomatic protection which 
gives a State an opportunity to protect its nationals in a situation where they suffer 
an injury as a result of a breach of public international law by another Member 
State’.403 An intervener is not in a position to offer protection when applicants 
complain that the intervener itself would violate their human rights.404 In the words 
of an interviewee, if the applicant is being prosecuted by a state, it would be wrong 
to inform that state, that is, the prosecutor.405 Article 36(1) does furthermore not 
give intervening states a right to defend themselves before the Court; states only 
have that right when they are a respondent state.406 In the light of these 
considerations, the Court ruled that the right to intervene ‘does not apply in cases 
where the applicants’ reason for applying to the Court is fear of being returned to 
the relevant Member State, which allegedly will subject them to a treatment 
contrary to Articles 2 and 3’.407 Consequently, the Court did not invite Russia to 
intervene as it normally does when Article 36(1) is of relevance and, even if Russia 
submitted comments nevertheless, it did not mention them in its judgment.408 The 
Court has not consistently applied the rule formulated in I., however. In a more 
recent case with a comparable set of facts against Azerbaijan it did invite Russia to 
intervene and outlined Russia’s observations in the judgment. The applicant 
complained that his extradition from Azerbaijan to Russia would violate Article 3. 
Russia was nevertheless given the opportunity to emphasise that a refusal to 
extradite the applicant would seriously harm its own interest and that the applicant 
would not be subjected to treatment contrary to that article.409 It therefore neither 
protected that applicant’s interest nor stuck to the rule that the right to intervene 
does not include the right to defend itself.  
The Court has also once prevented Turkey from exercising its right to intervene, 
on a wholly different, more procedural ground: the potential intervener had filed its 
notification that it wished to exercise its right to intervene four days after the expiry 
of the time limit.410 On this ground, the Court did not take the notification into 
                                                        
402  Emphasis added.  
403  I. v. Sweden, No. 61204/09, 5 September 2013, para. 42.  
404  Ibid., para. 44.  
405  Registry interview 2.  
406  I. v. Sweden, No. 61204/09, 5 September 2013, para. 44.  
407  Ibid., para. 45.  
408  Ibid., para. 46.  
409  Chankayev v. Azerbaijan, No. 56688/12, 14 November 2013, para. 63.  
410  Rule 44(1)(b) of Court provides: ‘[i]f a Contracting Party wishes to exercise its right under Article 
36 § 1 [...] to submit written comments or to take part in a hearing, it shall so advise the Registrar in 
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consideration.411 It did therefore not use the possibility, provided for in the Rules of 
Court, to fix another time limit ‘for exceptional reasons’.412  
When states do exercise their right to intervene, Article 8 is often the subject 
matter of the case, mostly because the applicant was removed (e.g. expelled or 
extradited) from the respondent state to the intervening state.413 The complaint 
under that article can also relate to the length of proceedings in the respondent state 
to enforce a domestic judgment ordering the return of the applicant’s child to the 
intervening state414 or to the failure of the authorities in the respondent state to 
regularise the stay of the applicants despite their long period of residence.415 
Examples outside the realm of Article 8 are a Turkish intervention in an Austrian 
case on the refusal of the Austrian authorities to pay the applicant tax credits and 
family allowance416 and a Swiss case where a Turkish national was criminally 
convicted for publicly challenging the existence of the Armenian genocide.417  
1.7.3 State Article 36(2) Interventions 
Article 36(2) interventions are explored more elaborately here than Article 36(1) 
interventions, because the latter type of interventions is usually a sort of diplomatic 
service to the applicant, making them of less interest from the perspective of 
dialogue. Under Article 36(2), the president of the Court may invite any state party 
which is not a party to the proceedings to intervene. Only two examples were 
found, after performing the second search, of the Court inviting a state to intervene. 
The Court asked France to intervene in an Article 41 case against Belgium where 
the applicant had obtained compensation from a French compensation fund after the 
Court issued judgment on the merits. The Court specifically requested comments on 
the question whether France could claim back the compensation out of the sum of 
just satisfaction which would be awarded against Belgium.418 In a Cypriot case 
concerning the powers of domestic courts to deal with contempt of court, the Court 
invited Malta’s observations, presumably because Maltese law knows the concept 
of contempt of court.419 Additionally, in a case where Croatia exercised its right to 
                                                        
writing not later than twelve weeks after the transmission or notification referred to in the preceding 
sub-paragraph’. 
411  Göçer v. the Netherlands, No. 51392/99, 3 October 2002, para. 8.  
412  Rule 44(1)(b) of Court.  
413  See, e.g.: Cılız v. the Netherlands, No. 29192/95, 11 July 2000; Yildiz v. Austria, No. 37295/97, 31 
October 2002; Kaya v. Germany, No. 31753/02, 28 June 2007.  
414  Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, No. 14737/09, 12 July 2011; Chabrowski v. Ukraine, No. 
61680/10, 17 January 2013.  
415  Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (GC), No. 60654/00, 15 January 2007.  
416  Efe v. Austria, No. 9134/06, 8 January 2013.  
417  Perinçek v. Switzerland, No. 27510/08, 17 December 2013; See also: Tănase v. Moldova (GC), No. 
7/08, 27 April 2010; Diamante and Pelliccioni v. San Marino, No. 32250/08, 27 September 2011; 
Vikulov and Others v. Latvia, No. 16870/03, 25 September 2012.  
418  Trévalec v. Belgium, No. 30812/07, 25 June 2013, para. 6.  
419  Kyprianou v. Cyprus (GC), No. 73797/01, 15 December 2005, paras. 11, 53-57. 
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intervene, the Court inquired whether Croatia could confirm the accuracy of certain 
pieces of information.420 The Court can therefore, also when it has not invited an 
intervention, pose questions.  
The second search also demonstrated that states parties do not often request 
leave to intervene. The Court’s Reports of Judgments and Decisions, in which only 
cases with the highest level of importance appear, illustrates the rarity of these 
interventions.421 Notwithstanding the importance of the cases collected in the 
report, states intervened in only in 3 out of the 30 cases selected for publication in 
2011.422 The frequency of interventions differs per state. The UK is known for 
being probably the most active intervener,423 whilst other states have only 
intervened once.424  
In accordance with the Rules of Court, states must duly reason their request to 
intervene and the Court can set conditions for the intervention.425 The interviewees 
clarified that it is highly unlikely that the Court refuses a request,426 which makes it 
less important to indeed duly reason the request, provided the request is made 
within the deadline.427 Giving states virtually always leave to intervene is 
considered to be important, because, considering the de facto erga omnes working 
of the Court’s judgments, they may be responsible for changing domestic 
legislation in the face of an adverse judgment against another state.428 If a request 
would be refused, the possibility to engage in a dialogue about the de facto erga 
omnes working would be denied.429 Further, as masters of the Convention, the 
states can be said to have a special interest in submitting an intervention to the 
Court, the body that interprets that document.430 When a state is allowed to 
intervene in writing, this does, however, not necessarily mean it can also intervene 
at hearing.431  
When a state intervenes it is, as third-party interveners are, requested to not 
comment on the specific facts and merits of the case; an intervention should be 
detached from the case.432 It does occur that an intervention does not fully comply 
                                                        
420  Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia, No. 44574/98 et al., 3 October 2008, para. 248.  
421  See for information about importance levels: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int.  
422  ECtHR (2012b). 
423  Government agent interview 3. 
424  Government agent interview 2.  
425  Rules 44(3)(b), 44(5) of Court.  
426  Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 4; Registry interview 5; Registry interview 8; 
See also: Harris et al. (2014), 153.  
427  See: Rule 44(3)(b) of Court.  
428  Judge interview 5.  
429  Idem.  
430  Idem. 
431  Registry interview 8.  
432  Government agent interview 3; Judge interview 5; This condition does of course not apply to 
interventions made under Art. 36(1) ECHR (Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 8). 
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with this condition.433 In this situation, The Court may return the intervention to the 
state and ask it to redo its job, but this virtually never happens.434 
The subject matter of interventions under Article 36(2) often touches on 
sensitive matters, such as, IVF-treatment,435 abortion,436 same-sex marriage437 and 
religious symbols in class rooms.438 Besides that, states intervene in cases raising 
important matters concerning their own jurisdiction439 or that of the Court.440 
Regardless of its subject matter and specific focus, the content of an intervention 
is usually forward-looking in the sense that the intervener aims to prevent the 
finding of a violation. Preventing such a finding is in the interest of the intervener, 
because it may have a comparable legal framework as the respondent state, which 
might be the object of future cases coming before the Court if a violation is indeed 
found. The respondent state and the intervener then in fact find themselves in a 
comparable or similar position. By way of illustration, the intervening state may, in 
support of the respondent state, try to convince the Court that a certain practice or 
legal concept existing in both the respondent state and in its own system does not 
violate the Convention.441 The respondent state and intervener can, for example, 
both be subject to an EU Regulation,442 know trial by jury443 or have in place a 
blanket ban on convicted prisoners’ voting.444 In a more explanatory manner, the 
intervening state can shed light on the requirements imposed on it by virtue of 
international or EU law445 or on a particular aspect of its domestic legal system,446 
or it may emphasise the historical roots of legislation.447 Interveners have given 
explanations, for example, about the international law requirement of head of state 
                                                        
433  Judge interview 4; Judge interview 5; Registry interview 4. 
434  Judge interview 5. 
435  S.H. and Others v. Austria (GC), No. 57813/00, 3 November 2011. 
436  A.B.C. v. Ireland (GC), No. 25579/05, 16 December 2010.  
437  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010.  
438  Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011.  
439  Markovic and Others v. Italy (GC), No. 1398/03, 14 December 2006; Nada v. Switzerland (GC), 
No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012.  
440  Bosphorus v. Ireland (GC), No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005.  
441  See, e.g.: Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands (GC), No. 39343/98 et al., 6 May 2003.  
442  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011.  
443  Taxquet v. Belgium (GC), No. 926/05, 16 November 2010.  
444  Hirst v. UK (no. 2) (GC), No. 74025/01, 6 October 2005, para. 55 (the intervener expressed its 
concern that the judgment ‘would have a horizontal effect on other countries which imposed a 
blanket ban’); See also: Bäck v. Finland, No. 37598/97, 20 July 2004; Enea v. Italy (GC), No. 
74912/01, 17 September 2009; S.H. and Others v. Austria (GC), No. 57813/00, 3 November 2011.  
445  See, e.g.: Bosphorus v. Ireland (GC), No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, para. 131; See also: Nada v. 
Switzerland (GC), No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012, paras. 107, 111.  
446  A. v. UK , No. 35373/97, 17 December 2002, paras. 37-56; Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands 
(GC), No. 39343/98 et al., 6 May 2003, paras. 185-189; Bäck v. Finland, No. 37598/97, 20 July 
2004, paras. 25-35; AB Kurt Kellermann v. Sweden, No. 41579/98, 26 October 2004, para. 57; 
Kyprianou v. Cyprus (GC), No. 73797/01, 15 December 2005, para. 111; TV Vest As & Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway, No. 21132/05, 11 December 2008, paras. 52, 54; S.H. and Others v. 
Austria (GC), No. 57813/00, 3 November 2011, paras. 69-71, 72.  
447  A. v. UK , No. 35373/97, 17 December 2002, para. 39. 
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immunity448 and about domestic legal concepts, such as parliamentary immunity.449 
In addition to its explanations, the intervener may submit a copy of a relevant 
domestic judgment.450  
For similar reasons, a state may want to remind the Court of how it is supposed 
to function and of the limits of its jurisdiction.451 Interveners often refer to the 
margin of appreciationand,452  connected to that, the diversity of practice or lack of 
consensus in the states parties.453 An intervener may even warn the Court that it 
risks taking a ‘political position’454 and that it ‘should not extend its powers to 
harmonising the domestic law of the States Parties’.455 Although the focus of these 
interventions is different, they all aim to prevent the finding of a violation.  
Furthermore, a state can argue why a previous judgment was incorrect. States 
make such interventions in particular in Grand Chamber referral cases, because they 
disagree with the chamber judgment,456 or in chamber cases on the same subject 
matter as the Court decided on previously.457 In this context, the state can explain 
what the consequences would be of following the chamber’s approach458 or express 
‘surprise at the case law developed by the Court’.459 These interventions are 
backward looking because they aim to persuade the Grand Chamber to not follow a 
chamber or, more generally, the Court to change its case law.  
States can also intervene to ask the Court to provide clarification. Lithuania for 
example asked the Court to develop general Convention principles on the minimum 
degree of protection to which a woman requesting an abortion was to be accorded 
vis-à-vis her unborn child.460 The UK invited the Court to confirm ‘the existence, 
                                                        
448  Association SOS Attentats and de Boery v. France (Dec.), No. 76642/01, 4 October 2006, para. 26.  
449  A. v. UK , No. 35373/97, 17 December 2002, paras. 37-56.  
450  TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, No. 21132/05, 11 December 2008, para. 57.  
451  Bosphorus v. Ireland (GC), No. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, paras. 129, 131; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) 
(GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 169; VGT v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 32772/02, 30 June 
2009, paras. 56-57.  
452  Kyprianou v. Cyprus (GC), No. 73797/01, 15 December 2005, para. 111; Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 
64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 60; TV Vest As & Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, No. 
21132/05, 11 December 2008, para. 53. 
453  Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, No. 30141/04, 24 June 2010, para. 46; Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 
30814/06, 18 March 2011, para. 49; S.H. and Others v. Austria (GC), No. 57813/00, 3 November 
2011, para. 73; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) (GC), No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, para. 75.  
454  Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, para. 47.  
455  Taxquet v. Belgium (GC), No. 926/05, 16 November 2010, para. 82; See also: Musci v. Italy (GC), 
No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 59. 
456  Kyprianou v. Cyprus (GC), No. 73797/01, 15 December 2005, paras. 105-106, 109; Taxquet v. 
Belgium (GC), No. 926/05, 16 November 2010, para. 78; Lautsi v. Italy (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 
March 2011, para. 47.  
457  Saadi v. UK (GC), No. 13229/03, 29 January 2008, para. 122; TV Vest As & Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway, No. 21132/05, 11 December 2008, para. 55; Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) 
(GC), No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, para. 78.  
458  Sejdovic v. Italy (GC), No. 56581/00, 1 March 2006 , para. 80; Stoll v. Switzerland (GC), No. 
69698/01, 10 December 2007, para. 90.  
459  Stoll v. Switzerland (GC), No. 69698/01, 10 December 2007, para. 88.  
460  A.B.C. v. Ireland (GC), No. 25579/05, 16 December 2010, para. 193-195. 
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for the purposes of Article 6 [...], of an “exclusionary rule” on statements that had 
been obtained directly by torture, with the result that a violation of this Article 
should be found where the rule applied, irrespective of the overall fairness of the 
proceedings’.461 Comparable interventions were received from the Czech Republic, 
Poland and Slovakia in a number of Article 6 cases concerning the length of civil 
proceedings in Italy.462 The Czech government asked for ‘as many guidelines as 
possible [...] so that they could set in place a [compensatory] remedy [for length of 
proceedings cases] which would incontestably be effective’.463 In Poland’s 
submission, the ‘Court should indicate what just satisfaction consisted of’, because 
it is ‘very difficult’ to establish general rules concerning just satisfaction from the 
Court’s case law.464 Domestic courts were therefore ‘not in a position to rely on the 
Court’s case law and make decisions compatible with it’.465 Slovakia added to this 
that the Court’s judgments could only become ‘clear instructions’ for the domestic 
courts if ‘the considerations on which the Court based its determination of non-
pecuniary damage [would be] part of the reasons for its decision’.466 The Court 
replied to the interveners that ‘it would be impossible and impracticable to try to 
provide a list of detailed explanations [concerning just satisfaction] covering every 
eventuality’.467 It considered ‘that all the necessary elements can be found in its 
previous decisions available in the Court’s case law database’.468  
The above examples demonstrate that states, which are in a comparable situation 
as the respondent state, use third-party interventions to communicate anything they 
                                                        
461  El Haski v. Belgium, No. 649/08, 25 September 2012, para. 74.  
462  See in addition to the cases mentioned in the footnotes below: Giuseppina and Orestina Procaccini 
v. Italy (GC), No. 65075/01, 29 March 2006; Riccardi Pizzati v. Italy (GC), No. 62361/00, 29 
March 2006; Apicella v. Italy (GC), No. 64890/01, 29 March 2006; Ernestina Zullo v. Italy (GC), 
No. 64897/01, 29 March 2006.  
463  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 61; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 60; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 168.  
464  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 61; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 60; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 168.  
464  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 136 (see also para. 135); Cocchiarella v. 
Italy (GC), No. 64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 136 (see also para. 135); Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) 
(GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 265 (see also para. 264). 
465  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 136; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 136; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 265.  
466  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 137; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 137; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 266.  
467  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 138; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 138; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 267.  
468  Musci v. Italy (GC), No. 64699/01, 29 March 2006, para. 138; Cocchiarella v. Italy (GC), No. 
64886/01, 29 March 2006, para. 138; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
para. 267.  
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wish: reasons, information, explanations and questions. In submitting an 
intervention, they aim to influence the outcome of a case before the Court, move the 
Court to change its previous case law or help clarify the Court’s view on a certain 
issue. As was confirmed in the interviews, states pursue the first two aims because 
the finding of a violation would mean or confirm that their own practice or 
legislation is in breach of the Convention.469 Quite another reason or incentive may 
be that the respondent state actively asks other states to intervene. Doing this is 
facilitated by way of an e-mail list including the e-mail addresses of all government 
agents, which is used to send out questions like this one.470  
1.7.4 The Commissioner’s Interventions  
It can be presumed that the Commissioner has only intervened in a small number of 
cases because (s)he is ‘cautious about becoming involved in litigation (for example 
as third party intervenor), being mindful of the specific roles stipulated in the 
European Convention for both the Court and the Committee’.471 This carefulness is 
likely motivated by the requirement in the resolution founding the Commissioner 
that (s)he ‘shall respect the competence of, and perform functions other than those 
fulfilled by, the supervisory bodies set up under the [Convention]’.472 Moreover, the 
Commissioner is probably careful because the ‘institution of the [Commissioner] 
was, from the outset, marked by the discussion on its relation with the European 
Court’.473 The Commissioner’s limited resources and the danger that his/her 
‘interventions [...] could be interpreted as directly favouring the complainant or the 
member state concerned’, which would negatively impact on how the office’s 
impartiality is perceived, are other reasons to intervene exceptionally.474  
As regards the content of the Commissioner’s interventions, the intervention that 
the office submitted on its own initiative concerned the treatment of a person with a 
disability in Romania, the protection of the human rights of persons with disabilities 
being a priority for the Commissioner.475 The Commissioner commented in general 
terms on inter alia relevant international and European standards and the 
requirement of standing before the Court.476 The first time the Commissioner 
intervened in response to the Court’s request, he replied to specific questions about 
the facts posed by the Court. These questions were asked because the 
                                                        
469  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 4; 
Government agent interview 5; Registry interview 4.  
470  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 2. 
471  Leach et al. (2010), 182. 
472  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Art. 1(2). 
473  Weber (2010), 1.  
474  Sivonen (2012), 34.  
475  Commissioner, ‘Third-Party Intervention in The Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin 
Câmpeanu v. Romania’, CommDH(2011)37, 14 October 2011, para. 3.  
476  Ibid., paras. 5-16.  
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Commissioner had assisted the applicant on a state visit.477 The second requested 
intervention concerned a group of fourteen cases relating to the transfer of asylum 
seekers from the Netherlands to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. The 
protection of the human rights of asylum seekers and refugees is another priority 
theme for the Commissioner. He based his submissions on state visits and 
continuous country monitoring and discussed the basic features of refugee 
protection in Greece, major issues concerning asylum procedures and human rights 
safeguards and detention conditions.478 The conclusion was that asylum law and 
practice in Greece violated international and European human rights standards.479 
The third intervention also concerned the transfer of asylum seekers to Greece 
under the Dublin Regulation, this time from Belgium. The Commissioner made an 
oral intervention before the Grand Chamber and in his written observations he 
reiterated and updated his previous observations.480 More generally, the 
Commissioner bases his interventions on his country and thematic activities and 
does not comment on the facts or the merits, but addresses ‘only those aspects deem 
to be of particular interest in the matter’.481 Indeed, the Court has indicated that the 
Commissioner’s interventions, like other interventions, should not concern the facts 
of a case, but only ‘those aspects deem to be of particular interest in the matter’.482 
1.7.5 The Assembly’s Interventions  
As far as the author is aware, the Assembly has never intervened in a case before 
the Court. One member of the Assembly asked for leave to intervene on behalf of 
the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in the case Nada v. Switzerland, 
but was refused leave.483 As this example illustrates, at least some parliamentarians 
would like to intervene and they would like to do more as they have invited the 
Committee to ‘consider with it if and how the Assembly should be able to bring 
before the [Court] serious violations by one of the Contracting Parties of the rights 
guaranteed by the [Convention]’.484  
The reason for the refusal in Nada, the Court’s President explained, was that he 
did ‘not believe that it would be appropriate (or possible) for either you or the 
                                                        
477  Commissioner, ‘Third-Party Intervention in Mamasakhlisi v. Georgia and Russia’, 
CommDH(2007)18, 16 August 2007. 
478  Commissioner, ‘Third-Party Intervention in 14 Applications concerning the Netherlands and 
Greece’, CommDH(2010)9, 10 March 2010, paras. 3-5.  
479  Ibid., para. 47; The Court stuck the 14 applications of the list in response to the consequences 
which the Netherlands drew from: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 
2011.  
480  Commissioner, ‘Third-Party Intervention in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece’, CommDH(2010)22, 31 
May 2010, para. 4.  
481  Weber (2010), 4.  
482  Ibid., 1.  
483  Nada v. Switzerland (GC), No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012.  
484  Assembly, ‘The Institutional Balance at the Council of Europe’, Rec(2006)1763, 2 October 2006, 
para. 21(1).  
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committee to make a third-party intervention in the case’.485 Why exactly the 
President refused the intervention is not clear. The Court does not categorically rule 
out interventions by international representatives, as it did allow 33 members of the 
EU parliament to intervene collectively in Lautsi v. Italy.486 It may therefore rather 
rule out third-party interventions from other Council of Europe institutions 
categorically (with the exception of the Commissioner who has a right, vested in the 
Convention, to intervene),487 or there may be other reasons to refuse such leave to 
appeal specifically to Assembly representatives. One such reason may be that the 
interventions are expected to be politically charged and therefore of limited use.  
1.8 Judgments 
This comparably long section on the Court’s judgments first describes how the 
Court can rely, in its judgments, on the other interlocutors when establishing the 
facts and the merits. It then explains, all under the heading ‘reasoning’, for which 
different audiences a judgment can be written and why the Court’s reasoning has 
been praised as well as criticised. The last two sections address the scope of a 
judgment and the separate opinions which can be annexed to a judgment.  
1.8.1 Reliance on Others for the Facts  
When establishing the facts, the Court can rely, first of all, on the findings of 
national authorities. Indeed, it has frequently stated that it will normally avoid 
establishing the facts itself as it is ‘sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role’, 
making it ‘cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where 
this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case’.488 
Further, for the Court, as an international court, there exist ‘natural limits [...] when 
it comes to conducting effective fact-finding’489 and domestic courts are ‘better 
placed and equipped as fact finding tribunals’.490 Fact finding should therefore ‘as a 
matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic authorities’.491 
In this light, the Court considers the furnishing of necessary facilities for the 
establishment of the facts by national authorities to be ‘of fundamental importance 
for the proper and effective functioning of the Convention system’.492 Generally 
                                                        
485  Assembly, ‘Information Note: Compatibility of UN Security Council and EU [terrorist] Black Lists 
with European Convention on Human Rights requirements’, AS/Jur/Inf (2010) 05, 7 December 
2010, 3.  
486  No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011, para. 8.  
487  Judge interview 5. 
488  El-Masri v. the FYROM (GC), No. 39630/09, 13 December 2012, para. 155.  
489  Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, para. 200.  
490  Jordan v. UK, No. 24746/94 , 4 May 2001, para. 111.  
491  Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, para. 200; See also: Committee, 
‘States’ Obligation to Co-operate with the [ECtHR]’, ResDH(2006)45, 4 July 2006.  
492  Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, para. 200.  
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therefore, the Court does not substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of 
domestic courts; only ‘cogent elements’ may lead it to depart from their findings.493 
Nonetheless, in Article 2 or 3 cases, the Court must apply ‘particular thorough 
scrutiny [...] even if certain domestic proceedings and investigations have already 
taken place’.494 The foregoing standards also apply when no domestic court 
proceedings took place because the authorities did not find sufficient evidence to 
initiate such proceedings.495 However, as one of the interviewees remarked, it is of 
relevance which domestic authority established the facts. If it was, for example, the 
police, without the facts having been tested by a domestic court, the Court adopts a 
rather critical attitude.496  
Next to not substituting its own assessment of the facts for that of domestic 
courts, the Court will normally not look for factual information itself.497 
Occasionally, it makes use of the competences which it has to conduct an 
investigation.498 Since the start of the new millennium, however, the number of 
investigations has decreased and the Court now only rarely undertakes an 
investigation.499 The new Court only conducted eighteen fact-finding missions in its 
first decennium.500 These missions are, next to hearings, another casualty of the 
Court’s strained resources.501 Rather than adopting investigative measures, the 
Court currently usually draws inferences as to the well-foundedness of the 
applicant’s allegations when the government fails to submit relevant information 
without a satisfactory explanation.502 Another strategy to deal with disputed facts is 
finding a violation of a right in its procedural aspect, for example, because of a 
failure to carry out an effective investigation.503  
The Court may, however, actively look for factual information itself, albeit not 
by way of an investigation but by way of collecting relevant materials, in Article 3 
cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extradition. In these cases, the Court’s 
supervisory task under Article 19 means it takes into consideration materials other 
than those made available by the domestic authorities and that a ‘full and ex nunc 
assessment is called for as the situation in a country of destination may change in 
the course of time’.504 Therefore, the Court always collects necessary country of 
origin information itself.505  
                                                        
493  Gäfgen v. Germany (GC), No. 22978/05, 1 June 2010, para. 93; See also: Munjaz v. UK, No. 
2913/06, 17 July 2012, para. 50.  
494  Adalı v. Turkey, No. 38187/97, 31 March 2005, para. 213.  
495  Idem.  
496  Judge interview 3.  
497  Judge interview 6; Registry interview 8. 
498  See: section V.1.7.  
499  Dembour (2002), 618; Harris et al. (2014), 144.  
500  Leach et al. (2009), 27.  
501  Ibid., 42. 
502  See, e.g.: Pekaslan v. Turkey, No. 4572/06 et al., 20 March 2012, para. 61. 
503  See, e.g.: Zakriyeva and Others v. Russia, No. 20583/04, 8 January 2009, paras. 75-90.  
504  Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, No. 1948/04, 11 January 2007, para. 136. 
505  Registry interview 8.  
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The Court also relies on factual reports issued by the Committee, the 
Commissioner and the Assembly. The importance of such reports has increased 
now that the Court, due to its heavy work-load, no longer engages in fact-finding 
missions.506 The Committee, although more of a standard-setting and supervisory 
than a fact-finding body, sometimes publishes documents of relevance to the Court. 
These documents include so-called information documents, such as, the Third 
Annual Report on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy for 2003,507 
or decisions or interim resolutions adopted in respect of the enforcement of cases 
concerning a structural problem. For example, in Dimitrov and Hamanov v. 
Bulgaria, the Court, in its reasoning leading up to the conclusion that a practice 
incompatible with the Convention existed, referred to an interim resolution finding 
that legislative reforms had not yet produced their full impact on the problem at 
issue.508 Further, the Court has relied on factual reports issued by the Assembly 
relating to, for example, major structural deficiencies509 or extraordinary 
renditions510 and it frequently511 refers to reports of the Commissioner.512 These 
documents are not brought to the Court’s attention by the relevant body,513 but the 
Court itself searches for them proactively.514 For this purpose, it may contact other 
institutions informally to ask whether they have worked on a certain issue.515 
1.8.2 Reliance on Others for the Merits  
The Court’s virtually always summarises the arguments of the parties prior to its 
own evaluation of the merits.516 Although the presentation of such a summary does 
not necessarily mean that the Court relies on the arguments of the respondent state, 
it at least demonstrates it considers them. The domestic courts’ appreciation of the 
merits seems to be of particular relevance. To illustrate, one of the interviewees 
remarked that the Court attaches more importance to the findings of a domestic 
                                                        
506  Registry interview 3.  
507  Referred to in: Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 223 (the Court 
noted that ‘[t]he annual reports of the [Committee] on the excessive length of judicial proceedings 
in Italy [...] scarcely seem to reflect substantial changes in the area’). 
508  No. 48059/06, 10 May 2011, para. 112; See also: Vlad and Others v. Romania, No. 40756/06 et al., 
26 November 2013, para. 156.  
509  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 44. 
510  El-Masri v. the FYROM (GC), No. 39630/09, 13 December 2012, paras. 35, 37, 43-46 et al.  
511  Sivonen (2012), 34.  
512  See e.g.: Léger v. France, No. 19324/02, 1 April 2006, para. 49 (referring to a report on the 
effective respect for human rights in France); D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (GC), No. 
57325/00, 13 November 2007, para. 43 (referring to a report on the human rights situation of 
Roma, Sinti and Travellers in Europe); Davydov and Others v. Ukraine, No. 17674/02 et al., 1 July 
2010, para. 108 (referring to a report on a country visit to Ukraine).  
513  Registry interview 4; Registry interview 6.  
514  Registry interview 2; Registry interview 4.  
515  Registry interview 6.  
516  Merrills (1993), 35; White and Boussiakou (2009a), 43-44.  
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court in an asylum or migration case than to the opinion of the responsible minister, 
because for the minister, party politics can play a role.517 As a President of the 
Court explained, the Court ‘takes utmost account of national constitutional courts’ 
decisions,’ but also added that ‘[i]t cannot, however be satisfied at the mere 
existence of a decision and endorse it without further ado’.518 Since the applicants 
are required to exhaust domestic remedies,519 domestic courts normally have the 
opportunity to make known their views before a case reaches Strasbourg. The 
Court’s reliance on these views finds expression in the reproduction (in part) of 
domestic judgments in the Court’s own judgments and in the Court’s reasoning in 
deciding on the merits of the case. To illustrate, in a case against Norway, the Court 
stated that it ‘will take the [...] considerations [of the Supreme Court] as a starting 
point for its own examination of the case’520 and that ‘having regard to the careful 
and thorough review carried out by the national courts [...] it sees no reason to call 
into doubt [their] assessment’.521  
Three elements in the Court’s case law are summarised to illustrate how and 
why the Court bases itself (partially) on the determination of the merits by domestic 
courts. The weight attached to a domestic judgment differs depending on the 
strength of the judicial system in which the domestic court operates.522  
First, the Court often rejects cases as manifestly ill-founded based on the 
reasoning of domestic courts.523 The Court, for example, once found that ‘there is 
nothing to suggest that the decision-making process leading to the impugned 
measures by the domestic court was unfair or failed to involve the applicant to a 
degree sufficient to protect his interests’.524 The Court declared another case 
inadmissible on the same ground, because the conclusions drawn by the domestic 
court did not ‘disclose any apparent arbitrariness, capable of raising issues under 
Article 6’.525 In relation to the first element, the Brighton Declaration affirmed that 
‘an application should be regarded as manifestly ill-founded [...] to the extent that 
the Court considers that that application raises a complaint that has been duly 
considered by a domestic court applying the rights guaranteed by the Convention in 
light of well-established case law of the Court’.526 
                                                        
517  Judge interview 3.  
518  Costa (2011b), 3.  
519  Art. 35(1) ECHR.  
520  Vilnes and Others v. Norway, No. 52806/09, 5 December 2013, para. 223.  
521  Ibid., para. 224.  
522  Judge interview 2. 
523  Amos (2012), 565; Art. 35(3)(a) ECHR.  
524  Tiemann v. France and Germany (Dec.), No. 47457/99 et al., 27 April 2000.  
525  Carriero v. Italy (Dec.), No. 39767/98, 10 April 2003; Fryckman and Fryckman-Yhtiö Oy v. 
Finland (Dec.), No. 36288/97, 15 November 2005; Stichting voor Educatie en Beroepsonderwijs 
Zadkine (Dec.), No. 34865/07, 29 September 2009.  
526  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 15(d); The 
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A second recurring element is the phrase ‘the European Court should have the 
benefit of the view of the national courts, as being in direct and continuous contact 
with the forces of their countries’.527 This phrase is not mere rhetoric; it may for 
example mean that the applicant still has to exhaust domestic remedies528 or that the 
respondent government should put arguments to the Court consistent with the 
position adopted before domestic courts.529  
Third, the Court can make explicit its reliance on domestic courts by stating it 
agrees with their reasoning, thus embracing their views on the merits.530 Being able 
to rely on domestic courts, can, according to a President ‘greatly [facilitate] our task 
of adjudication’.531 With respect to the UK, he added that ‘in the great majority of 
cases our Court followed the conclusions reached by the appeal courts’.532 Another 
former President sees ‘the fact that the Court itself sometimes draws on domestic 
decisions’ as the ‘corollary of the domestic courts’ readiness to accommodate the 
Court’s case law’.533 To illustrate, in a case on the balancing of Articles 8 and 10, 
the Court expressed its agreement with all separate findings made by the domestic 
courts. It agreed to, amongst other findings, their finding of what constitutes a 
subject of public discussion and to their finding that the public had a right to be 
informed.534 The Court concluded that the courts had applied the criteria established 
in its own case law and that they had given ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons for 
arriving at the conclusion that Article 8 outweighed Article 10.535 Therefore, the 
Court did not ‘see any strong reason to substitute its own view for that of the 
                                                        
527  Burden v. UK (GC), No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, para. 42; Marangos v. Cyprus, No. 12846/05, 4 
December 2008, para. 23; Manole and Others v. Moldova, No. 13936/02, 17 September 2009, para. 
83; Al-Skeini and Others v. UK (GC), No. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para. 99; Colon v. Netherlands 
(Dec.), No. 49458/06, 15 May 2012, para. 54.  
528  Burden v. UK (GC), No. 13378/05, 29 April 2008, paras. 42-44. 
529  A. and Others v. UK (GC), No. 3455/05, 19 February 2009, para. 154.  
530  See, e.g.: Carson and Others v. UK (GC), No. 42184/05, 16 March 2010, paras. 84, 89; Ališić and 
Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 
November 2012, para. 69; Willcox and Hurford v. UK (Dec.), No. 43759/10 et al., 8 January 2013, 
paras. 78, 90; Animal Defenders International v. UK (GC), No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, para. 116. 
531  Bratza (2011), 507; He cites as examples of where ‘the compelling reasoning and analysis of the 
relevant case-law by the national courts has formed the basis of the Strasbourg Court’s own 
judgment’: Pretty v. UK, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002; Stafford v. UK (GC), No. 46295/99, 28 May 
2002; Christine Goodwin v. UK (GC), No. 28957/95, 11 July 2002; He cites as examples of where 
‘the Grand Chamber substantially adopted the responding employed by the House of Lords’: N. v. 
UK (GC), No. 26565/05, 27 May 2008.  
532  Bratza (2011), 507; See, e.g.: Carson and Others v. UK (GC), No. 42184/05, 16 March 2010, paras. 
83-90.  
533  Costa (2007d); Costa cites as examples: Thivet v. France (Dec.), No. 57071/00, 24 October 2000; 
Maltzan and Others v. Germany (Dec.) (GC), No. 71916/01 et al., 2 March 2005; Russian 
Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, No. 55066/00 et al., 11 January 2007.  
534  Verlagsgruppe News GmbH and Bobi v. Austria, No. 59631/09, 4 December 2012, paras. 75-76.  
535  Ibid., para. 94.  
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contested decisions of the domestic courts’ and found no violation of Article 10.536 
In some recent cases, the Court has formulated the requirement that ‘strong reasons’ 
are needed to substitute its own findings for that of national courts if their reasoning 
is ‘sufficient and consistent with the criteria’ which it established previously.537 The 
Court follows this approach in particular in cases requiring the balancing of the 
right to freedom of expression against a competing right, such as, the right to 
respect for private life,538 the right to freedom of assembly539 or the right to honour 
and dignity.540 In such cases, the Court expects the domestic courts to achieve ‘an 
overall, optimal balance between the competing rights’.541 It has also applied this 
approach in cases where the respondent government argued against the findings of 
domestic courts542 and in certain Article 6 cases.543 These examples are part of a 
development where the Court ‘[i]nstead of assessing the substantive reasons 
provided by the states in justification of an interference with a fundamental right, 
increasingly focuses on the quality and transparency of the national procedure and 
judicial remedies that have been used in relation to the disputed decision or rule’.544 
If this procedure and these remedies are sufficient, the Court does normally not 
conduct its own balancing exercise, but relies on that of the domestic courts.545  
Nonetheless, as was indicated during the interviews, the Court relies more on the 
facts than on the merits as presented by the respondent state, if only because the 
application of the Convention is its task in principle.546 Indeed, the Court has noted 
that the final evaluation of the question whether ‘an interference in a particular case 
                                                        
536  Ibid., paras. 94-95; See for comparable considerations in a comparable case: Küchl v. Austria, No. 
51151/06, 4 December 2012; Contrast with: Von Hannover v. Germany, No. 59320/00, 24 June 
2004.  
537  Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain (GC), No. 28955/06 et al., 12 September 2011, para. 57; See 
also: MGN Limited v. UK, No. 39401/04, 18 January 2011, para. 150; Ion Cârstea v. Romania, No. 
20531/06, 28 October 2014, para. 32; Delfi AS v. Estonia (GC), No. 64569/09, 16 June 2015, para. 
139; Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, No. 931/13, 21 July 2015, para. 
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538  See, e.g.: Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012, paras. 
106-107; Aksu v. Turkey (GC), No. 4149/04 et al., 15 March 2012, para. 74.  
539  See, e.g.: Fáber v. Hungary, No. 40721/08, 24 July 2012, para. 28.  
540  See, e.g.: Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain (GC), No. 28955/06 et al., 12 September 2011, para. 
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541  Fáber v. Hungary, No. 40721/08, 24 July 2012, para. 28; See also: Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 
2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012, paras. 106-107.  
542  See, e.g.: Kormoš v. Slovakia, No. 46092/06, 8 November 2011, para. 65; G.B. and R.B. v. the 
Republic of Moldova, No. 16761/09, 18 December 2012, para. 28;  
543  See, e.g.: Roche v. UK (GC), No. 32555/96, 19 October 2005, para. 120; Boulois v. Luxembourg 
(GC), No. 37575/04, 3 April 2012, para. 91; These cases concern the issue whether there is a right 
recognised under domestic law in the sense of (civil) ‘rights and obligation’ under Art. 6(1) ECHR.  
544  Gerards (2014b), 52 
545  Ibid., 54.  
546  Judge interview 2; Judge interview 6; See also: Art. 32 ECHR.  
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is “necessary”, as that term is to be understood within the meaning of Article 8 [...], 
remains subject to review by the Court’.547 
In addition to submitting information about how domestic courts decided the 
case at issue, the state can supply the Court with comparative legal information 
gathered by it. During the interviews, it was explained that the government agents, 
who all have each other’s e-mail addresses, regularly pose questions about each 
other’s legal systems. In fact, they receive such questions almost on a weekly 
basis.548 To illustrate, the UK sought comments on the extent of state immunity 
provided by national law from all states parties. It received 21.549 The Court 
qualified the responses as ‘largely hypothetical’, meaning they did ‘not permit the 
drawing of any conclusions as to the extent to which national laws recognise the 
official nature of acts of torture for the purposes of State immunity’.550 Further, the 
Netherlands submitted to the Court the results of a survey covering fifteen states 
parties from which it appeared that compelling a person to give evidence against a 
long-standing companion with whom one is in a stable family relationship ‘was in 
no way unusual’.551 However, in the light of the Court’s own research on 
testimonial privilege,552 the Court observed that a ‘wide variety of practices among 
the […] States relating to the compellability of witnesses’ exits.553 As a last 
example, the Swiss government adduced a study of the Swiss Institute of 
Comparative Law analysing the legislation in fourteen European states as well as 
the US and Canada on the offence of the denial of crimes against humanity, 
especially genocide.554 The Court referred to this report, stating that the report 
revealed that only two out of the sixteen states made it a criminal offence to negate 
genocide outside the context of Nazi crimes. Other states did apparently not 
consider that there existed a pressing social need for enacting such legislation and 
Switzerland had not demonstrated that that such a need existed.555 The UK, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland clearly compiled and presented information to the 
Court to persuade the Court that (no) consensus exists about a certain issue, which, 
in turn, was supposed to help support the argument that no violation took place. 
However, as the UK example demonstrates, the Court will not necessary rely on the 
information. Further, as can be derived from the Dutch example, the Court can also 
conduct its own research and can compare its own findings with those of the state. 
In the interviews it was confirmed that, especially in Grand Chamber cases, the 
comparative analysis submitted by (third) parties is checked.556 This can be done 
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relatively easily, as the Court’s Research Division prepares comparative law reports 
for most Grand Chamber and for some chamber cases anyway.557 Finally, the Swiss 
example shows that the Court can and does use the materials submitted to it in the 
manner it deems appropriate, even if this means that the materials adduced by a 
state are used to undermine the arguments of that state. Considering the foregoing, 
the comparative information submitted by the state can assist the Court, but the 
Court neither takes the state’s findings nor the state’s conclusions for granted.  
The Court can also refer to the Committee, the Assembly and the Commissioner 
in their capacity of standard-setting bodies when determining the merits.558 If it 
does so, it usually enumerates the relevant Council of Europe materials in one part 
of a judgment. In some cases, the Court leaves it at the enumeration,559 mentioning 
the materials to demonstrate its awareness of them and, thus, of the background to 
an issue.560 In other cases, the Court returns to the materials and relies on them 
when determining the merits. The Court has, for example, mentioned documents 
issued by the Commissioner, such as, an opinion concerning independent and 
effective determination of complaints against the police,561 a recommendation 
concerning inter alia the rights of aliens wishing to enter a states party562 and a 
press release.563 It has also ‘drawn the authorities’ attention to the importance of 
[the European Prison Rules, adopted by the Committee], notwithstanding its non-
binding nature for the member states’.564 In one case where it applied this document 
it found that ‘conditions in which the applicant was detained were proper and 
complied with the European Prison Rules’, which meant it did not find an Article 3 
violation on this account.565 In another case, about the inability for the applicant as 
a person with dual nationality to stand as a candidate in parliamentary elections, the 
Court, stated that it ‘is also signification that [...] the [Assembly] expressed concern 
[in two different resolutions] at the changes to the electoral legislation, which they 
                                                        
557  Idem; See also: Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich (2012), 273-274; These reports do not ‘advocate a 
particular approach but rather [present] a spectrum of possible outcomes of a particular issue’ 
(Dzehtsiarou and Lukashevich (2012), 273).  
558  As the Commissioner is not involved in standard-setting, these considerations do not apply to this 
interlocutor.  
559  See, e.g.: Baka v. Hungary , No. 20261/12, 27 May 2014, paras. 47-55.  
560  Judge interview 3; Registry interview 4; Registry interview 5; Registry interview 6;.  
561  Kolevi v. Bulgaria, No. 1108/02, 5 November 2009, para. 152.  
562  Gaforov v. Russia, No. 25404/09, 21 October 2010, para. 87; See also: Sidikovy v. Russia, No. 
73455/11, 20 June 2013, para. 114; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC) (Art. 41), No. 26828/06, 12 
March 2014, para. 222. 
563  Baka v. Hungary, No. 20261/12, 27 May 2014, para. 51. 
564  Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, No. 28300/06, 20 January 2009, para. 96.  
565  Ramirez Sanchez v. France, No. 59450/00, 4 July 2006, para. 130; See for a case where the Court, 
with reference to the European Prison Rules found a violation: Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, No. 
28300/06, 20 January 2009, para. 96; See for other references to Committee documents: R.R. and 
Others v. Hungary, No. 19400/11, 4 December 2012, para. 32. 
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considered restricted opportunities for political forces to participate effectively in 
the political process and thus weakened pluralism’.566 
The Court relies on ‘intrinsically non-binding instruments of the [Council of 
Europe] organs, in particular recommendations and resolutions of the [Committee] 
and the [Assembly]’ because they provide an additional means of interpreting the 
Convention.567 For that reason it has even supported ‘its reasoning by reference to 
norms emanating from other [Council of Europe] organs, even though those organs 
have no function of representing the States Parties to the Convention’.568 The Court 
can rely on these sources because it has ‘never considered the provisions of the 
Convention as the sole framework of reference for the interpretation of the rights 
and freedoms enshrined therein’.569 This approach suits what the Court ‘has 
consistently held’, namely that ‘it must take into account relevant international 
instruments and reports, and in particular those of other [Council of Europe] organs, 
in order to interpret the guarantees of the Convention and to establish whether there 
is a common European standard in the field’.570 These documents can therefore be 
particularly useful to establishing whether consensus exists or not. When a Council 
of Europe instrument is indeed ‘a common standard which the respondent State has 
failed to meet, this may constitute a relevant consideration for the Court when it 
interprets the provisions of the Convention in specific cases’.571 In the interviews it 
was confirmed that soft-law instruments can play a role in answering the question 
whether a common standard exists,572 considering that, even though the instruments 
do perhaps not bind the states, they give an indication of the states’ intent and 
practice.573 Another reason, mentioned in the interviews, for the Court to rely on 
documents of other European interlocutors, is that relying on them helps legitimise 
the Court’s judgment when, for example, setting a new step in its case law. These 
documents namely show that other parts of the Council of Europe have reached a 
similar result.574 The Court’s reliance on soft-law instruments has been criticised by 
some agents, because it means the Court can transform these instruments into 
binding obligations by way of its judgments, something which may have a chilling 
effect on the states’ willingness to adopt new soft-law instruments. The Court is 
aware of this criticism.575  
                                                        
566  Tănase v. Moldova (GC), No. 7/08, 27 April 2010, para. 168; See for other references to the 
Assembly: Kiyutin v. Russia, No. 2700/10, 10 March 2011, para. 57; Sitaropoulos and 
Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (GC), No. 42202/07, 15 March 2012, para. 73.  
567  Demir and Baykara v. Turkey (GC), No. 34503/97, 12 November 2008, para. 74.  
568  Ibid., para. 75.  
569  Ibid., para. 67.  
570  Tănase v. Moldova (GC), No. 7/08, 27 April 2010, para. 176. 
571  Idem.  
572  Judge interview 3; Registry interview 6. 
573  Registry interview 1.    
574  Judge interview 3; Registry interview 5; Registry interview 6; See also: Dzehtsiarou and 
Lukashevich (2012), 274 (this article only concerned comparative law materials; not materials of 
other Council of Europe bodies). 
575  Registry interview 2; Registry interview 6.  
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 As the above examples show, the documents of the other Council of Europe 
bodies are taken into consideration and can carry some weight. However, it 
remains, ‘for the Court to decide which international instruments and reports it 
considers relevant and how much weight to attribute to them’.576 This may be a way 
for the Court to deal with the just-mentioned criticism, as it shows that the Court 
does not rely on these documents automatically, but scrutinises them carefully. To 
illustrate, in a case touching, inter alia, on the problem of forced and child 
marriages of Roma women, the Court noted ‘with interest’ Assembly resolutions on 
this matter.577 It, however, added that the resolutions predated the events and 
‘therefore at the time of the alleged events not only was there not any binding 
instrument, as remains the case to date, but in actual fact there was not enough 
awareness and consensus among the international community to condemn such 
actions’.578 Instead, the Court held that the ‘prevailing document at the time’ was a 
UN Convention.579 In the case of S.A.S. v. France, the Court quoted a resolution 
and recommendation of the Assembly, as well as a ‘viewpoint’ of the 
Commissioner, all of which pleaded against a general prohibition of full veiling.580 
The Court concluded nevertheless that the French prohibition did not violate the 
Convention.581 As a last example, the Court once stated in a judgment that ‘[w]hile 
[it] is aware of the recommendation of the [Committee] to the effect that 
educational facilities should be made available to all prisoners, it recalls that Article 
2 of Protocol No. 1 does not place an obligation on Contracting States to organise 
educational facilities for prisoners where such facilities are not already in place’.582 
It also noted that the ‘value of providing education in prison [...] has been 
recognised by the [Committee]’, but this value had to be balanced against the fact 
that the Court did not ‘consider any of the grounds relied on by the Government to 
be persuasive’.583 
In sum, the degree of influence of the documents which are relevant to the 
merits of the case and which were issued by another Council of Europe institution 
differs per case and is always determined by the Court. As was expressed during the 
interviews, the documents are important, can be quite influential and are taken into 
consideration,584 but they are not decisive.585 The Court takes the elements which 
                                                        
576  Kiyutin v. Russia, No. 2700/10, 10 March 2011, para. 67. 
577  M. and Others v. Italy and Bulgaria, No. 40020/03, 31 July 2012, para. 164.  
578  Idem.  
579  Idem; The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages (1962).  
580  No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014, para. 35-37. 
581  S.A.S. v. France (GC), No. 43835/11, 1 July 2014, paras. 159, 162 and 163.  
582  Velyo Velev v. Bulgaria, No. 16032/07, 27 May 2014, para. 34.  
583  Ibid., para. 41.  
584  Judge interview 2; Judge interview 4; Registry interview 1; Registry interview 2; Registry 
interview 5.  
585  Judge interview 6  
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are useful to it and maintains the last word on the interpretation of the 
Convention.586 
1.8.3 Reasoning  
The interviewed Judges appear to write their judgments for different sorts of 
audiences or without a specific audience in mind.587 (S)he can, for example, 
principally write a judgment as a message to domestic judges to persuade them as 
part of a dialogue,588 it can be addressed to everyone with a law degree, which 
includes domestic judges, as well as to the broader public,589 or the primary 
audience can be the parties, in order to explain them why one won and the other lost 
the case.590 Several Judges noted, however, that they did not write primarily for the 
applicant, as is witnessed by the fact that the judgments are written in abstract and 
complex language which most applicants do not understand.591 For one Judge, the 
reasoning deployed in the Court’s rulings is addressed to multiple recipients, 
naturally beginning with the parties themselves but extending to others such as 
governments, national judges and other public authorities in all the states, NGO’s, 
the academic community and, not least, the public at large, with the aim of securing 
their support for the decision arrived at.592 However unrepresentative the small 
sample of interviewed Judges may be, their answers do demonstrate that judgments 
are not written with one, mutually agreed upon audience, but with different and 
varying audiences in mind.  
The Court’s judgments have been described as ‘exceptionally well reasoned’, 
‘scrupulously’ examining the questions it seeks to answer ‘as to the facts, the law 
and the practice’,593 whilst taking ‘into account a variety of considerations’, 
including precedent, general principles of international law and ‘considerations with 
a direct bearing on the Convention such as the values of a democratic society’.594 
The Court has created ‘a framework within which reasoned debate can be 
conducted’.595 Moreover, ‘many commentators seeking to analyze the success of 
the [...] ECHR emphasize the fact of legal reasoning, in the sense that judicial 
opinions are reasoned at all, as much as the quality of that reasoning’.596 The agents 
interviewed agreed with the foregoing. As one of them noted, especially when 
                                                        
586  Judge interview 1. 
587  Judge interview 4.  
588  Judge interview 2; Judge interview 6. 
589  Judge interview 1.  
590  Judge interview 2; Judge interview 7.  
591  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 6. 
592  Judge interview 7.  
593  François Ost, cited in: Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 319.  
594  Merrills (1993), 35.  
595  Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 323.  
596  Idem.  
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evaluating the reasoning in general, the quality is high597 and as another remarked, 
although it is hard to evaluate the quality in general, the quality is brilliant when 
compared to that of other international bodies.598  
The Court’s style of reasoning has been called ‘searching and tentative,’ which 
means it openly wrestles ‘with the weaknesses as well as the strength of [its] 
positions’.599 Its style has also been characterised as ‘quite elaborative’, its 
methodological approach being ‘oriented rather towards explaining and convincing 
than simply towards issuing dry commands’.600 Further, the judgments are ‘drafted 
in an explicative manner: the main idea is to show what legal norms (precedents) 
are governing the outcome of the case and how those norms (precedents) find 
application to the facts of the case’.601 This style of reasoning can be illustrated by 
the Court’s practice to ‘avoid offending the sensibilities of its audience’, even when 
it disagrees with the respondent state’s arguments.602 One technique of which it 
makes ‘extensive use’ to achieve this is to emphasise the most persuasive points of 
the respondent state’s arguments to show it has considered and appreciated them.603 
The Court, for example, repeatedly states that it ‘accepts’ a certain argument 
advanced by the state or that it ‘does not underestimate’ the difficulty of a situation, 
after which it adds the adverb ‘however’ and explains why it nevertheless goes on 
to find a violation.604 Further, the Court regularly refers to the arguments advanced 
by the respondent state in order to explain, based on Convention principles and case 
law, why it disagrees.605 
In spite of this collection of positive remarks, not all decisions and judgments 
are reasoned or include reasons that are more than formulas and that relate to the 
specific facts of the application. This is due to ‘the pressure of the ECtHR’s 
caseload [which] has led the Court to significantly reduce the amount of reasoning 
provided in its judgments’.606 Inadmissibility and strike out decisions by single 
                                                        
597  Government agent interview 3.  
598  Government agent interview 5. 
599  Gledon, cited in: Helfer and Slaughter (1997), 320.  
600  Garlicki (2009), 391. 
601  Ibid., 394. 
602  Merrills (1993), 31. 
603  Idem. 
604  See, e.g., for ‘the Court accepts [...] however’: Gurenko v. Russia, No. 41828/10, 5 February 2012, 
para. 67; Rutkowski and Others v. Poland, No. 72287/10, 7 July 2015, para. 220; See, e.g., for ‘the 
Court does not underestimate [...] however’: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 
21 January 2011, para. 223; El-Masri v. the FYROM (GC), No. 39630/09, 13 December 2012, para. 
192; Melnichuk and Others v. Romania, No. 35279/10 and others, 5 May 2015, para. 99. 
605  See, e.g.: Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), No. 36760/06, 17 January 2012, para. 128 (explaining why the 
state could not rely on a certain case and why the state could not sufficiently justify the action it had 
taken in relation to the applicant); Vistiņš and Perepjolkins v. Latvia (GC), No. 25 October 2012, 
para. 123 (explaining why a judgment on which the state relied was fundamentally different from 
the case under consideration); Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012, 
para. 97 (explaining why it could not subscribe to the analysis of the government of the Art. 13 
obligations).  
606  Brems and Lavrysen (2013), 185. 
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judges only ‘very briefly state the reasons’ and decisions made by committees are 
‘delivered in a standard format which provides no reasons relating to the particular 
case other than a formulaic response referring to the admissibility criteria under 
Article 35’.607 This means that a large portion of the Court’s rulings is hardly 
reasoned, considering that in 2014, the single-judge formation decided 78,660 cases 
and that judgments issued by committees accounted for 59 percent of the 
applications decided by judgment.608  
Furthermore, the Court’s judgments have sometimes been criticised for an 
apparent lack of consistency and clarity. These two points are of great importance 
because they enhance the legal certainty. They therefore make it easier for national 
authorities to apply Convention principles and the Court’s case law and thus to play 
their primary role in the Convention system. This, in turn, better enables the Court 
to play its subsidiary role.609 According to the Brighton Declaration, the qualities of 
clarity and consistency are ‘particularly important when the Court addresses issues 
of general principle’.610 It is perhaps inevitable that criticism as to consistency 
arises, considering that the Court has decided on the examination of about 627,500 
applications611 and that 47 judges, divided into 5 sections, work in 2 languages, 
whilst deciding cases in either of 4 formations612 with the assistance of about 270 
lawyers and support staff.613 One Judge relates that (s)he was ‘not happy with what 
we have at the moment’ in respect of coherence and consistency, which is in part 
due to the abundance of case law.614 A President of the Court believes that the 
Court ‘should strive for greater clarity in the way in which it’ expresses its 
judgments, ‘which too frequently seem to have caused exasperation among national 
judges, confronted with the task of interpreting an applying them’.615 Not only the 
Court’s own judges, but also previously the UK House of Lords and currently the 
UK Supreme Court have criticised the Strasbourg jurisprudence of for a lack of ‘its 
customary clarity’.616 A President adds that the ‘over-frequent use [...] of the term 
                                                        
607  Leach (2011), 41.  
608  ECtHR (2015d), 4-5.  
609  CDDH (2012b), Appendix, paras. 15-21; HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 
20 April 2012, para. 23. 
610  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, para. 23. 
611  ECtHR (2015f), 4.  
612  Single-judge, committee, chamber and Grand Chamber.  
613  Harris et al. (2014), 112: ‘At the time of writing (August 2013) there are more than 650 officials in 
the Registry including 270 lawyers and support staff’; See also: Berger who explains that some 
instances of conflict are inevitable, considering the ‘the large number of judgments and decisions 
pronounced every year; the number of people drafting them [...]; the composition of the Sections, 
which favours geographical diversity and different legal systems; the existence of four Chambers in 
each Section; the assignment of cases concerning the same State or the same subject to different 
Sections; the fact that 10 of the 17 members of the Grand Chamber are drawn by lots in each case; 
and the renewal every six months of two of the five members of the panel of the Grand Chamber’ 
(Berger (2010), 185). 
614  White and Boussiakou (2009b), 181; See also: Barkhuysen and Van Emmerik (2009), 443.  
615  Bratza (2011), 511.  
616  Lord Nicholls in N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, para. 14. 
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“in principle” and “as a rule” [...] has particularly been commented on by one senior 
Judge as leading to considerable uncertainty as to whether the case should or should 
not stand as an authority governing the result in a particular case’.617 The clarity of 
the judgments is also impaired by the Court’s practice to ‘sometimes [use] a general 
approach’ and to revert in other cases ‘to highly specific review of the case before 
it’.618 The Court’s case law on grounds of discrimination illustrates more 
specifically in what regard clarity may be lacking. This branch of case law can be 
characterised as ‘confused and, in some respects, unconvincing’, because the Court 
has not adopted a single approach to defining grounds of discrimination.619 It is 
therefore presumably difficult for national judges to predict to what facts Article 14 
applies and therefore to apply the Court’s case law.620 The clarity and consistency 
of the case law have been the subject of the high level conferences on the future of 
the Court. The Interlaken Declaration ‘stresses the importance of ensuring the 
clarity and consistency of the Court’s case law and calls, in particular, for a uniform 
and rigorous application of the criteria concerning admissibility and the Court’s 
jurisdiction’621 and the Izmir and Brussels Declarations reaffirm the importance.622 
Further, the Brighton Declaration notes that the Court considers amending its Rules 
to oblige chambers to relinquish jurisdiction when they envisage departing from 
settled case law’ and ‘[w]elcomes the steps that the Court is taking to maintain and 
enhance the high quality of its judgments and in particular to ensure that the clarity 
and consistency of judgments are increased even further’.623 Any criticism of the 
clarity and consistency means the quality of the Court’s reasoning and judgments is 
called into question.  
The importance of quality from the perspective of the execution of the Court’s 
judgments was also underlined, by an agent who explained that when the domestic 
authorities perceive the quality of a judgment to be unsatisfactory, this may have 
repercussions for their willingness to execute.624 The quality and especially the 
clarity of the Court’s judgments as well as friendly settlements was also criticised in 
the light of execution by the interviewees of the Execution Department.625 Some 
examples of this criticism are discussed to demonstrate how part of a judgment may 
potentially hamper the execution process. Importantly, this is criticism is given 
                                                        
617   Bratza (2011), 511; See also: Amos (2012), 569; Donald et al. (2012), 107-110.  
618  Gerards (2009), 427.  
619  Gerards (2013), 112. See for another example: Gerards (2014a) (on the lack of clarity on the 
application of the manifestly ill-founded admissibility criterion). 
620  Gerards (2013), 112. 
621  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, para. 4.  
622  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. F(2)(a); 
HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
para. A(1).  
623  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, paras. 23, 25(c); See also: 
HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
para. A(1)a.  
624  Government agent interview 1. 
625  Execution interview 1.  
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from the Execution Department’s and not the states’ perspective, as the latter may 
sometimes prefer vagueness over clarity in order to maintain leeway. These 
examples are nevertheless discussed because they help illustrate that the manner in 
which a judgment is phrased may have – probably unintended and possibly 
complicating – consequences for the execution phase.  
In two deportation cases against Sweden concerning Article 3, the Court held 
that the expulsion order against the applicant would not give rise to a violation, 
‘provided that she is not returned to parts of Iraq situated outside the Kurdistan 
Region’.626 This formulation meant that the Court did not find a violation, not even 
potentially. In comparable cases, the Court usually establishes a potential violation 
by finding that the applicant’s deportation or expulsion – if executed – would be in 
violation of Article 3.627 The difference between finding no violation and finding a 
(potential) violation for the execution process is that the Committee will not 
supervise the execution of the judgment in the former case, while it will in the latter 
case. This is in conformity with the Committee’s Rules, which stipulate that the 
Committee invites the respondent state to inform it of measures taken in 
consequence of the judgment ‘[w]hen [...] the Court has decided that there has been 
a violation.628 In a more practical sense, this means that Sweden will probably not 
want to provide the Execution Department with information about whether the 
applicant has indeed not been returned to parts of Iraq situated outside the Kurdistan 
Region.629 Therefore, although the applicants are in a comparable factual situation, 
because they cannot be deported to a certain region or state, their position as regards 
execution is different. Another example is the Court’s finding under Article 41 that 
it cannot ‘discern any causal link between the violations found and the pecuniary 
damage alleged’.630 This phrase may be used by the respondent state as an excuse 
for not reopening a case when being asked to do so by the Execution Department.631 
Reopening a case may be appropriate, for example, when the applicant has been 
convicted despite a potential infringement of his rights as guaranteed by Article 
6.632 Further, in some cases where the Court examined whether a justification 
existed for an interference with Article 8, it concluded that no justification is 
possible, because the interference was not proportionate. It sometimes allegedly 
jumps to this conclusion without addressing the other requirements in detail, even 
though, the question of, for example, whether there is a legal basis, is important to 
the execution process. A lack of a legal basis would namely require changes to the 
                                                        
626  W.H. v. Sweden, No. 49341/10, 27 March 2014, para. 2 operative provisions; A.A.M. v. Sweden, 
No. 68519/10, 3 April 2014, para. 2 operative provisions.  
627  See, e.g.: Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, No. 1948/04, 11 January 2007, para. 2 operative 
provisions; NA. v. UK, No. 25904/07, 17 July 2008, para. 2 operative provisions.  
628  Rule 6(1) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements (emphasis added).  
629  Execution interview 11.  
630  See, e.g.: Nerattini v. Greece, No. 43529/07, 18 December 2008, para. 44. 
631  Execution interview 11.  
632  Krasniki v. the Czech Republic, No. 51277/99, 28 February 2006, para. 93.  
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domestic legal framework.633 A final example is a judgment regarding an applicant 
who had a removal order pending against him. The applicant did, in practice, not 
have access to a remedy enabling a national authority to examine the lawfulness of 
the removal order prior to his removal because the police could deport him in less 
than half an hour after he availed himself of the remedy. The Court found a 
violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8.634 Prior to making this finding, 
it remarked that for a remedy to be effective in the context of Article 8 ‘there must 
be genuine intervention by the [domestic] court or “national authority”.635 It did 
therefore impose not the comparably clear rule which applies to comparable Article 
2, 3 and 4 of Protocol 4 cases, namely that persons with an expulsion order against 
them should have access to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect when they 
complain that their expulsion would expose them to a real risk of treatment contrary 
to these articles.636 The foregoing makes a case like this not very clear for the 
purpose of execution.637 Or, as a concurring Judge stated: ‘I have misgivings about 
the helpfulness, for the purpose of execution, of the finding [...] that “in order for a 
remedy to be effective and to avoid any risk of arbitrary decision, there must be 
genuine intervention by the court or ‘national authority’”.638 According to this 
Judge, ‘only a statutory requirement to refrain from deporting the subject, at least 
until the courts have had a reasonable chance to decide whether or not the 
circumstances warrant a stay of execution, is capable of preventing this situation 
from recurring’.639  
On a more general note, the staff of the Execution Department expressed that the 
Court does normally not seem to have an ‘execution perspective’ when reasoning 
its judgment.640 According to them, judgments would be drafted differently if the 
Court would have that perspective.641 It was, however, also noted that the number 
of judgments that, due to a lack of clarity, make it hard to know how to execute a 
judgment, is not very high642 and that, if there is problem, a solution can often be 
found in common sense.643 
                                                        
633  Execution interview 13.  
634  De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012, para. 100. 
635  Ibid., para. 93.  
636  Ibid., para. 82.  
637  Execution interview 3.  
638  De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Kalaydjieva.  
639  Idem. 
640  Execution interview 3; Execution interview 11. 
641  Execution interview 13.  
642  Execution interview 12.  
643  Execution interview 13.  
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1.8.4 Scope  
The scope of the Court’s judgments varies invariably, although it is in principles 
limited. Already in its first judgment, Lawless v. Ireland, the Court emphasised the 
narrow scope of its judgments. The scope is limited because it has neither the 
‘power to consider a point raised in a general’ manner nor to ‘interpret the 
Convention in an abstract manner’; it can only interpret the document ‘in relation to 
such specific cases as are referred to it’.644 Connected to that, the scope is not 
overly broad because ‘only High Contracting Parties which are “parties to the case” 
are bound by [its] decision’, meaning it is ‘not competent to take decisions [...] 
which would affect all Parties to the Convention’.645 Consequently, the Court 
engages in ‘strongly case-based reasoning’, making it difficult to predict in what 
direction its case law develops.646  
However, the Court’s interpretation of its task and of the purpose of the 
Convention is not so narrow as to exclude the possibility altogether to adjudicate a 
case beyond the situation in which the individual applicant finds himself. The Court 
has ‘not accepted the final consequence of the consistent application of [an 
individualised] approach, which would be that no general conclusions may be 
drawn from the interpretations and criteria provided in its case law’.647 On the 
contrary, an important framework within which a judgment is written is the 
development of the Court’s case law,648 as is evidenced by the question ‘[w]hether 
there is a need for development of the case law’, posed by the Court in one of its 
judgments.649 This is also evidenced by the Court’s reiteration of the main 
principles set out in its case law as regards the delays in enforcement of domestic 
judgments, in spite of the fact that the parties did not dispute that Article 6 was 
breached. It was appropriate to reiterate these principles ‘for the sake of future 
adjudication and settlement of similar cases’.650 Different elements in the Court’s 
case law and practice help illustrate that the judgments vary in scope and that the 
scope is generally broader than suggested in Lawless.  
The Court holds that although it ‘is not formally bound to follow any of its 
judgments’, it is ‘in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality 
before the law that it should not depart, without cogent reason, from precedents laid 
down in previous cases’.651 When it nevertheless does so, it ‘has adopted the 
practice of providing a detailed justification’.652 A justification can be found in 
‘uncertainty in existing jurisprudence, rapidly increase numbers of complaints to the 
                                                        
644  No. 332/57, 14 November 1960. 
645  Idem. 
646  Gerards (2012a), 183; See also: Gerards (2009), 419.  
647  Gerards (2009), 424. 
648  Judge interview 3.  
649  Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland, No. 63235/00, 19 April 2007, heading preceding para. 50. 
650  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 167.  
651  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, para. 104. 
652  Brems and Lavrysen (2013), 186-187.  
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase 
 
 
337 
Court concerning a specific right/freedom guaranteed by the Convention and the 
application of the living instrument doctrine to the interpretation of the 
Convention’.653 The rule is therefore that the Court follows its own precedents, 
meaning the scope of a judgment potentially extends to future cases in the sense 
that these cases are likely decided with reference to previous judgments. 
Consequently, the Court normally examines the merits of the case before it in the 
light of relevant precedents and discusses whether and to what extent the facts of 
the case are comparable to the facts of precedents.  
Further, it is the Court’s practice to commence its assessment of the merits with 
reiterating the principles applicable to the article at issue, such as ‘general [...] 
principles concerning pluralism and audio-visual media’,654 and with reiterating 
relevant case law. Additionally, the Court, prior to assessing the merits of a case, 
explains which conclusions it drew in previous comparable cases655 or which lines 
of reasoning it has developed in its case law.656  
The broader scope of its judgments also becomes apparent when the Court 
seems to give de facto erga omnes effect to a judgment. Although it does not 
explicitly refer to this term, it realises that ‘judgments issued in individual cases 
establish precedents albeit to greater or lesser extent’.657 As was noted in an 
interview, the Court always takes into consideration this effect.658 This realisation 
makes the Court careful to frame a judgment ‘in such a way as to prevent 
applications in latter cases’.659 More importantly, the Court holds that ‘its 
judgments serve not only to decide those cases brought before it but, more 
generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the 
Convention, thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the 
engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties’.660 This conception of the 
purpose of its judgments matches the Court’s vision of the purpose of the 
Convention system, which is, in addition to providing individual relief, ‘to 
determine issues on public-policy grounds in the common interest, thereby raising 
the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights 
jurisprudence throughout the community of the Convention States’.661 These 
considerations may be a reason to continue examining a case, even though the 
violation at issue is already admitted and remedied in part, when the case gives the 
Court the opportunity to elaborate on the interpretation and application of the 
                                                        
653  Mowbray (2009), 200-201.  
654  Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy (GC), No. 38433/09, 7 June 2012, paras. 129-135.  
655  Herrmann v. Germany (GC), No. 9300/07, 26 June 2012, paras. 75-77.  
656  See, e.g.: Idalov v. Russia (GC), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012, paras. 115-126.  
657  Pretty v. UK, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, para. 75; See also: ECtHR (2015e), para. 5.  
658  Judge interview 3.  
659  Pretty v. UK, No. 2346/02, 29 April 2002, para. 75. 
660  Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, No. 25965/04, 7 January 2010, para. 197.  
661  Idem. 
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Convention in an area of scarce case law.662 The foregoing illustrates that the Court, 
albeit implicitly, considers that some judgments have de facto erga omnes effect, 
because they set a precedent that is not just relevant to the respondent state. The 
Grand Chamber demonstrated this particularly well in Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3), 
where it – under the heading ‘whether the principles set forth in the Hirst judgment 
should be confirmed’ – clarified that the interpretative authority of the judgment 
was not only relevant to Italy, but also to the UK. The judgment meant that the UK 
could no longer postpone executing a previous judgment.663 As a last example, the 
Court held in Fabris v. France that the obligation on the respondent state to take 
measures to prevent further violations similar to those found in the Court’s 
judgments, ‘imposes an obligation on domestic courts to ensure, in conformity with 
their constitutional order and having regard to the principle of legal certainty, the 
full effect of the Convention standards, as interpreted by the Court.664 Apart from 
the Court’s case law, the Court’s judges writing extra-judicially have referred to the 
de facto erga omnes effect of judgments.665 States may also support that effect since 
they sometimes take, usually legislative, action in response to a judgment against 
another state. In this way, they implement the Convention and prevent possible 
future violations.666 Moreover, the Interlaken Declaration advances it, as it calls 
upon the states parties to commit themselves to ‘taking into account the Court’s 
developing case law, also with a view to considering the conclusions to be drawn 
from a judgment finding a violation of the Convention by another State, where the 
same problem of principle exists within their own legal system’.667 Also an 
Assembly rapporteur has fervently advanced the desirability of the effect.668  
Another illustration of the rather broad scope of the Court’s judgments is one 
particular type of judgments, namely Grand Chamber judgments. These judgments 
are meant to ‘contain general statements about the proper interpretation and general 
application of the Convention’.669 The Grand Chamber, for example, issued the 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment as a ‘judgment of principle’. The 
importance attached by the Court itself to Grand Chamber judgments can also be 
derived from the fact that a chamber sometimes decides to adjourn its examination 
of an application awaiting the outcome of a relevant case pending before the Grand 
                                                        
662  Ibid., paras. 200-201; See also: Ireland v. UK (Plenary), No. 5310/71, 18 January 1978, paras. 153-
155; Guzzardi v. Italy (Plenary), No. 7367/76, 6 November 1980, para. 86; Karner v. Austria, No. 
40016/98, 24 July 2003, paras. 26-28. 
663  (GC), No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, paras. 93-96.  
664  Fabris v. France (GC), No. 16574/08, 7 February 2013, para. 75; See for another example: Opuz v. 
Turkey, No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009, par. 163.  
665  See, e.g.: Costa (2009b), 6-7; Trajkovska (2010).  
666  See for descriptions of examples: Zwaak (2001), 623; Costa (2007d); Pourgourides (2010b).  
667  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Action Plan para. 
4(c); See also: HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, 
Action Plan para. B(1)(d).  
668  See, e.g.: Pourgourides (2010b).  
669  Gerards (2009), 426.  
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Chamber.670 However, the interpretative authority of a Grand Chamber may be 
questioned by the state, as one agent noted, when it issued a 9-8 judgment. 671 Or, as 
a Judge stated, if Grand Chamber judgments are meant to give guidance, a 9-8 vote 
is unfortunate, especially when many concurring opinions are added, which means 
there is hardly a majority.672 
In sum, the scope of the Court’s judgments is broader than could be expected 
based on Lawless. The broader scope can be derived from inter alia the Court’s 
practice to stick to precedents set in previous judgments, its reiteration of applicable 
case law and principles in its judgments, the de facto erga omnes effect of its 
judgments and Grand Chamber judgments.   
1.8.5 Separate Opinions  
Separate opinions are discussed here because they are a potential means for an 
individual judge or group of judges to communicate with the state. To explore 
whether separate opinions are indeed used in this manner in practice, the focus and 
audience of these opinions is discussed too.  
Judges make frequent use of their entitlement to add a separate opinion, which 
they do in about 75 percent of all judgments on the merits.673 Most separate 
opinions take the form of a concurring opinion, namely four out of five.674 The 
readiness to append an opinion is also illustrated by the fact that to the 38 Grand 
Chamber judgments on the merits issued in 2012 and 2013,675 89 separate opinions 
were added. Only six judgments remained without an opinion.676  
Whether a judge delivers a separate opinion is determined by his ‘judicial 
temperament’, which is shaped by his experience and values.677 More specifically, 
‘it is the differential view of the requirements of a democratic society reflecting the 
value pluralism at the heart of the Convention which accounts for the majority of 
dissenting opinions’.678 In view of these findings it is unsurprising that the judge 
elected in respect of the respondent state normally does not dissent alone;679 if he 
                                                        
670  See, e.g.: Aoulmi v. France, No. 50278/99, 17 January 2006, para. 41; Wallishauser v. Austria, No. 
156/04, 17 July 2012, para. 4; Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, No. 
5809/08, 26 November 2013, para. 7; Zagrebačka banka d.d. v. Croatia, No. 39544/05, 12 
December 2013, para. 5.  
671  Government agent interview 1.  
672  Judge interview 3.  
673  Figures from a research based on a database of all judgments from 1999 to 2004.  
674  White and Boussiakou (2009a), 53.  
675  26 in 2012; 12 in 2013.  
676  Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012; Sitaropoulos and 
Giakoumopoulos v. Greece (GC), No. 42202/07, 15 March 2012; Gillberg v. Sweden (GC), No. 
41723/06, 3 April 2012; Idalov v. Russia (GC), No. 5826/03, 22 May 2012; Sabri Güneş v. Turkey 
(GC), No. 27396/06, 29 June 2012; Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012.  
677  White and Boussiakou (2009a), 59.  
678  Idem.  
679  Ibid., 49.  
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dissents, he is often joined by others.680 Further, the main reason for writing a 
dissent is that the dissenter disagrees with the majority’s reasoning and findings.681 
As an interviewed Judge expressed, (s)he writes a dissent simply because (s)he 
cannot have his/her name added to a judgment,682 or, as another Judge expressed, 
because (s)he fundamentally disagrees with a judgment or feels sorry for a party.683 
They may also write an opinion to justify their vote684 or to try to change the 
Court’s case law in the future.685 An additional reason to write a dissenting opinion 
is the unwritten rule that the Judges who do not support a Grand Chamber judgment 
note this in a (short) opinion. This normally also happens in chamber judgments of 
importance level 1 or 2.686  
Separate opinions can be useful for the majority, because they can facilitate 
removing the weak points from a judgment and thus to strengthen its reasoning, 
provided the opinion can be taken into consideration prior to the adoption of the 
judgment.687 Whether this is indeed possible depends on whether an opinion is 
shared beforehand. Although this is possible, it is only done exceptionally.688 This 
situation can be contrasted to that of the time of the old Court during which judges 
had to distribute at least an outline of their opinion together with the draft 
judgment.689 Judges are now only encouraged to announce beforehand that they 
will write a separate opinion so others can join.690 A practical obstacle to sharing an 
opinion, as well as to writing an opinion before the adoption of a draft judgment, is 
that it must already be clear in which direction the majority will go prior to the 
adoption of the draft. This is not always clear in chamber cases, but is normally 
clear in Grand Chamber cases.691 However, even when the opinion is not written 
before the deliberations take place, the judge who intends to write a separate 
opinion is expected to at least bring forward his/her views during the deliberations 
so these views can be discussed. This holds in particular for concurring opinions.692 
In spite of practical obstacles, it has occurred that the reasoning or opinion of the 
majority changed as a result of an opinion.693 It has even happened in a Grand 
Chamber case that it turned out that a concurring opinion was supported by the 
majority of the majority. On that occasion, the concurring opinion became the 
                                                        
680  Idem.  
681  Ibid., 179.  
682  Judge interview 4.  
683  Judge interview 2. 
684  Judge interview 3; Judge interview 6.  
685  Judge interview 2. 
686  Myjer (2012), 92.  
687  Judge interview 4; Judge interview 7. 
688  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 2; Judge 7 interview.  
689  Judge interview 7.  
690  Judge interview 6.  
691  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 3; Judge interview 6.  
692  Myjer (2012), 130-131. 
693  Judge interview 3; Judge interview 4.  
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judgment.694 In addition to assisting the majority, separate opinions can help the 
panel deciding on whether or not to accept the request to refer a case to the Grand 
Chamber,695 as well as the respondent state when contemplating requesting 
referral.696 Separate opinions can also be of importance for persons outside the 
Court, for example because they may give some insight into the otherwise secret 
deliberations of the judges.697  
The audience of the separate opinions can be illustrated by going through the 89 
separate opinions annexed to the 38 Grand Chamber judgments in 2012-2013. At 
the time of writing these were the first full two calendar years available. The result 
which these two years yielded in terms of Grand Chamber judgments, namely 89, 
was considered to be sufficient to give some insight into the practice of separate 
opinions. From this exercise, it becomes apparent that the opinions are very much 
internally oriented, towards (dis)agreement with the majority, and that they are a 
reaction to the majority’s reasoning and ruling. The judges speak to each other and 
do not mainly react to the submissions of others. The opinions often seem to focus 
on the appropriate interpretation of the Convention or application of the Court’s 
case law. To illustrate, reasons to deliver an opinion were ‘the importance of the 
issues involved in the case on which the Court has been sharply divided’,698 the 
apparent departure from previous case law,699 the need to engage in a broader 
discussion700 and the Court’s decision to not examine separately a certain 
complaint.701 Nonetheless, one interviewed Judge said that his/her peers are not his 
main audience, but academic commentators.702 Another Judge noted that the 
audience which (s)he has in mind for a judgment, namely the scientific community 
in a broad sense, which includes domestic judges, the public and the applicants, was 
not different for separate opinions.703  
An opinion sometimes also speaks to the national authorities in a more or less 
direct manner. In a judgment where according to one Judge the state had ‘blatantly 
                                                        
694  Myjer (2012), 131. 
695  Judge interview 2. 
696  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 4.  
697  Judge 7 interview. 
698  Animal Defenders International v. UK (GC), No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Bratza para. 1.  
699  Ibid., Joint Dissenting Opinion of Ziemele, Sajo, Kalaydjiyeva, Vučininć and De Gaetano para. 1.  
700  Hirsi and Others v. Italy (GC), No. 27765/09, 23 February 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque; Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (GC), No. 2312/08 et 
al., 18 July 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vučinić 
para. 1.  
701  Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), No. 36760/06, 17 January 2012, Joint Partly Dissention Opinion of 
Judges Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Laffranque; Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), No. 36760/06, 17 
January 2012, Partly Dissention Opinion of Judge Kalaydjiyeva; Catan and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia (GC), No. 43370/04 et al., 19 October 2012, Joint Partly Dissention Opinion of Judges 
Tulkens, Vajić, Berro-Lefèvre, Bianku, Poalelungi and Keller para.1; Söderman v. Sweden (GC), 
No. 5786/08, 12 November 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque.  
702  Judge interview 6.  
703  Judge interview 1.  
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disregarded the judgments of the Constitutional Court of Slovenia’ for years,704 
another remarked that:  
 
In fairness to the national legal system, we must consider the honourable and 
courageous stance – faced with the continuity of this appalling situation – taken twice 
by the Constitutional Court in Slovenia. This proves all over again that the national 
defence of constitutional rights is the best antechamber for our own protection of 
human rights. [...] in this colossal instance the Constitutional Court had identified the 
injustice. It was the malevolent political will that impeded the rule of law and 
blocked the proper judicial remedy.705 
 
These remarks seem to speak more or less directly to the Slovenian Constitutional 
Court, in support of its judgments, and perhaps also to the executive, but then rather 
more critically. In another judgment, the concurring Judge gave the respondent state 
different options as to how it could fulfil its obligation to execute a judgment under 
Article 46, although he also remarked that the state is ‘free to choose the means 
whereby’ it fulfils that obligation.706 Further, the Judges have, again in support of 
domestic courts, commented that ‘the national courts of Latvia sufficiently 
complied with [relevant] procedural requirements’707 and that the majority’s view 
did not ‘do justice to the decision or reasoning of the national courts’ and that they 
disagreed with the view that ‘the Regional Court should have done more’.708  
More indirectly, the dissenting or concurring judges sometimes seem to come to 
the aid of domestic authorities by stating that a judgment ‘leaves unresolved the 
question – perhaps the most important from a domestic court’s point of view – of 
what may or may not be said in civil compensation proceedings arising from the 
same facts which had given rise to the criminal prosecution or investigation’.709 
This particular statement was complemented with the remark that it was to be hoped 
that Court will ‘one day reassess Article 6 § 2, particularly in the light of the 
difficulties our case law has created for national courts in dealing with 
post-acquittal proceedings’.710 A concurring opinion has also criticised a judgment 
of the Court for not providing ‘a clear and defined standard for national authorities 
to comply with, leaving the door half open to the casuistic exercise of discretion by 
national authorities in cases of expulsion or removal with the risk of irreversible 
                                                        
704  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC) (Art. 41), No. 26828/06, 12 March 2014, Partly Concurring, 
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Vučinić. 
705  Ibid., Concurring Opinion of Judge Zupančič.  
706  Vinter and Others v. UK (GC), No. 66069/09, 9 July 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Mahoney 
para. 21.  
707  X. v. Latvia (GC), No. 27853/09, 26 November 2013, Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, 
Vajić, Hajiyev, Šikuta, Hirvelä, Nicolaou, Raimondi and Nussberger paras. 3, 7, 9.  
708  Idem. 
709  Allen v. UK, No. 25424/09 (GC), 25424/09, 12 July 2013, Separate Opinion of Judge de Gaetano 
para. 1.  
710  Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge de Gaetano para. 2.  
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damage for the migrant’s family life’.711 This statement can be read as a call on the 
Court to provide the state with clearer guidelines for the execution of a judgment, 
which the state may consider to be in its advantage, although the opposite is also 
possible. Further, the judges can refer to and rely on domestic judgments in their 
opinion, thus approving the choices made by domestic judges.712 
The contrary is also possible, namely that the judges use a separate opinion to 
criticise the respondent state or certain domestic authorities. These comments also 
seem to speak to the domestic authorities, but now in a less positive manner. They 
have, for example, expressed surprise at the respondent state’s viewpoint,713 
criticised a domestic court for its decision,714 or explained that they were not 
persuaded by the explanations of the respondent state.715 More specifically, the 
judges can explain why the state’s reliance on a certain judgment is not 
appropriate,716 why the state’s justification for a restriction on a Convention right is 
insufficient,717 or why ‘the Government were mistaken in confusing the apparent 
lack of interest shown by these applicants with the loss of their status as victims’.718 
Courts can be the subject of criticism in a separate opinion as well.719 In a very 
general manner, some dissenters have explained that the ‘direct contact (or vicinity) 
[of the national authorities with the vital forces of their countries]’ does not, as the 
Court expects, place them in ‘a better position than the international judge to give 
                                                        
711  De Souza Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Pinto de Albuquerque Joined by Judge Vučinić.  
712  Austin and Others v. UK (GC), No. 39692/09 et al., 15 March 2012, Joint Dissenting Opinion of 
Judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Garlicki paras. 9, 10, 11 and 15; Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. 
Switzerland (GC), No. 16354/06, 13 July 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bratza, para. 9; Nada 
v. Switzerland (GC), No. 10593/08, 12 September 2012, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges 
Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska paras. 8, 12; Nada v. Switzerland (GC), No. 10593/08, 12 
September 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni paras. 8, 10; Animal Defenders 
International v. UK (GC), No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Bratza paras. 
2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 15, 17;  
713  Animal Defenders International v. UK (GC), No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Ziemele, Sajo, Kalaydjiyeva, Vučininć and De Gaetano para. 14.  
714  Del Rio Prada v. Spain (GC), No. 42750/09, 21 October 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Nicolaou para. 10.  
715  Konstantin Markin v. Russia, (GC), No. 30078/06, 22 March 2010, Partly Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Kalaydjieva.  
716  Animal Defenders International v. UK (GC), No. 48876/08, 22 April 2013, Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Tulkens, Joined by Judges Spielmann and Lafranque para. 8.  
717  Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens, Joined by Judges Spielmann and Lafranque para. 20.  
718  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06 (Art. 41), 12 March 2014, Partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Costa; See also: Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (GC), No. 16354/06, 
13 July 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque; Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v. 
Romania (GC), No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Spielmann, 
Villiger, López Guerra, Bianku, Møse and Jäderblom para. 5. 
719  Aksu v. Turkey (GC), No. 4149/04 et al., 15 March 2012, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gyulumyan; 
Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (GC), No. 2312/08 et al., 18 July 2013, 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judge Vučinić. 
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an opinion on the ‘necessity’ of a ‘restriction’. They argue the opposite, namely that 
‘the same direct contact [...] may have a distortive impact on their judgment’.720 
To return to the question posed above, separate opinions can indeed be a way for 
a judge to communicate with or at least send a signal to the state or specific 
domestic authorities in a more or less direct manner. However, the opinions are also 
directed at other audiences and can be of interest to others, such as the majority or 
the panel deciding on the question of referral.  
1.9 Referral  
1.9.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
From 2003-2013, as can be derived from Figure 4, referral was requested in respect 
of 2339 cases, which comes down to an average of 213 per year. 1000 requests 
were submitted by the respondent state, of which 57 by both parties. In the period of 
November 1998 to October 2011, 53.63 percent of the successful requests were 
made by the respondent states, whilst they submitted 40.01 percent of all requests, 
meaning states were comparably successful.721 The panel accepted only 4.86 
percent of all requests from 2003-2013. In the same period, the Court issued 104 
judgments on the merits in referral cases.722  
The interviewees gave various explanations for the low number of accepted 
referrals, namely there being a limit to the number of Grand Chamber judgments 
which can be issued per year,723 the high number of requests for referral724 and the 
restrictive criteria for referral, which only allow exceptional cases to be referred.725  
The number of both requested and granted referrals and, therefore, of Grand 
Chamber judgments in referred cases as opposed to relinquished cases may 
decrease as a consequence of the future entry-into-force of Protocol 15. This 
Protocol namely removes the currently existing possibility for the parties to object 
to the relinquishment of jurisdiction by a chamber to the Grand Chamber.726 This 
removal likely means that more cases will be relinquished and that, therefore, fewer 
cases will be accepted for referral, considering that the criteria for relinquishment 
and referral are comparable.727 
 
  
                                                        
720  Mouvement Raëlien Suisse v. Switzerland (GC), No. 16354/06, 13 July 2012, Joint Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska and Vučinić.  
721  ECtHR (2011d), 4.  
722  See: Figure 4.  
723  Judge interview 4.  
724  Judge interview 2. 
725  Registry interview 5.  
726  Art. 3 Protocol 15 ECHR.  
727  Government agent interview 4.  
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Figure 4: Referrals (2003-2013)728 
 
Year Referral 
judgments 
on the 
merits 
Total 
number of 
Grand 
Chamber 
judgments 
Cases in 
respect 
of which 
a request 
was 
made 
Requests 
by the 
state 
Requests 
by the 
applicant 
Requests 
by the 
state and 
the 
applicant 
Accepted 
requests 
2013729 7 12 150 78 70 4 10 
2012730 14 26 185 80 98 7 7 
2011731 7 13 239 108 131 6 11 
2010732 13 18 264 129 135 7 11 
2009733 11 17 359 176 183 5 11 
2008734 8 16 295 134 161 8 10 
2007735 7 12 246 75 171 5 9 
2006736 17 25 210 47 163 6 13 
2005737 7 11 183 104 79 2 16 
2004738 8 15 121 56 65 5 7 
2003739 5 11 87 13 74 2 9 
Total  104 176 2339 1000 1330 57 114 
1.9.2 Reasons for Submitting a Request  
The interviewed agents gave a range of factors which can play a role in their 
decision to submit a request for referral. A judgment finding a violation does not 
constitute a sufficient reason to refer. On the contrary, one agent explained that 
(s)he sometimes advises against referral, because ‘it could make matters worse’ as 
the Grand Chamber can, for example, find additional violations.740 Another agent 
noted that, even if other authorities are in favour of referral, (s)he sometimes 
explains them that such a request can only be made for a good reason and may 
persuade them to renounce their intention to request referral if there is no such 
                                                        
728  The Annual Reports of before 2003 do not contain information about the number of received 
requests.  
729  ECtHR (2014), 61.  
730  ECtHR (2013b), 58-59. 
731  ECtHR (2012a), 65, 147.  
732  ECtHR (2011a), 65, 141.  
733  ECtHR (2010a), 57, 135. 
734  ECtHR (2009), 55, 123. 
735  ECtHR (2008), 51, 129.  
736  ECtHR (2007), 47, 89.  
737  ECtHR (2006), 40, 116.  
738  ECtHR (2005), 46, 111. 
739  ECtHR (2004), 40, 100.  
740  Government agent interview 1.  
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reason.741 However, probably not all states exercise such self-restraint, because 
another interviewee remarked that some states ask for referral in each case.742  
One factor contributing to indeed requesting referral appears to be the 
distribution of votes in a chamber judgment: in particular a distribution of four to 
three militates in favour of referral, especially if there are dissenting opinions 
agreeing with the respondent state.743 Another factor is the conviction that it is 
possible to plead convincingly against the reasoning of a chamber.744 This factor is 
not decisive, however, since a request for referral is sometimes submitted, even 
though the agent does not expect that the request will be granted. Indeed, asking for 
referral does not hurt, since a refusal does not tend to attract any (media) 
attention.745 Moreover, asking for referral can be important to conveying a message 
to domestic authorities or the national media. The third possible explanatory factor 
therefore is that the government wants to express the perception that the Court went 
‘too far’, for example because a case was domestically or legally sensitive or 
because a case had major repercussions for the domestic legal system.746 Moreover, 
the state can express its view that a chamber overstepped the margin of appreciation 
or that there was no basis in the Court’s jurisprudence for the judgment.747 Finally, 
in some cases a request also may be a way to make a point towards the Court, in 
particular to express that perhaps the Court should look at an issue again.748  
The requesting respondent state may sometimes ask, through its agent, other 
states to support its request.749 If given, the support is expressed in a one-page letter 
addressed to the Registry.750 Whether the support indeed carries weight for the 
panel deciding on the request is open to doubt, because an interviewee said that 
(s)he was not sure if letters of support are put before the panel.751  
1.9.3 Reasons for (not) Accepting a Request  
As was noted in chapter V, the Convention does not require that the panel reasons 
its rejections; the Court is only obliged to give reasons for judgments and 
(in)admissibility decisions.752 In practice, the panel indeed gives no reasons.753 The 
panel has stuck to its practice, ignoring the invitation in the Izmir Declaration to 
                                                        
741  Government agent interview 4 
742  Judge interview 2. 
743  Government agent interview 3; Government agent interview 4.  
744  Government agent interview 3.  
745  Idem.  
746  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 2; Government agent interview 5. 
747  Government agent interview 1; Government agent interview 5. 
748  Government agent interview 1.  
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750  Government agent interview 5.  
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‘[c]onsider that decisions [...] to reject requests for referral [...] are clearly reasoned, 
thereby avoiding repetitive requests and ensuring better understanding of Chamber 
judgments’.754 According to the Court, reasoning would be impracticable, because 
it would result in a significant increase of its already daunting workload.755  
For these reasons, instead of instructing the panel to engage in reason-giving, the 
Court published a report describing general principles adopted by the panel since its 
establishment in 1998. The report should give a ‘better understanding’ of the 
panel’s practice and should ‘assist the parties in assessing the prospects of success 
of a referral request’.756 The publication gives the main categories of reasons for 
accepting or rejecting a request and these reasons are summarised and illustrated 
below. The categories are fluid and, in practice, other reasons may move the panel 
to (not) refer.757 The report does therefore not enable the parties to ‘anticipate the 
Panel’s decision with a high degree of precision’.758 However, there were only 185 
cases in respect of which a request was made in 2012 and 159 in 2013, which is the 
lowest number of requests since 2004. Moreover, these numbers are significantly 
lower than in the four preceding years as can be seen in Figure 4. If this is indeed 
the consequence of the publication of the report, one of the wishes expressed in the 
Izmir Declaration, namely the avoidance of repetitive requests, is fulfilled at least in 
part.  
The first reason militating in favour of referral is that a chamber judgment 
departs from existing case law principles and thus jeopardises the consistency of the 
Court’s case law. The Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) judgment, discussed further below, 
was referred for this reason.759 The panel may also refer because a case offers the 
Grand Chamber the opportunity to develop the Court’s case law.760 The Salduz v. 
Turkey case was such an opportunity, which the Grand Chamber seized. It 
formulated the – new – rule that Article 6 requires access to a lawyer as from the 
first interrogation of a suspect by the police.761 The panel’s approval may also be 
motivated by wanting to give the Grand Chamber the opportunity to clarify already 
existing principles.762 In the referred case of Üner v. the Netherlands, for example, 
the Grand Chamber clarified that the Boultif-criteria for assessing whether an 
expulsion measures is necessary and proportionate, should also be applied to cases 
concerning settled migrants who are to be expelled because of a criminal 
conviction.763 Like the Grand Chamber, a chamber can develop the Court’s case 
                                                        
754  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. F(2)(e).  
755  ECtHR (2011d), 4; Judge interview 5; Registry interview 5.  
756  ECtHR (2011d), 3. 
757  Ibid., 11.  
758  Ibid., 3. 
759  Ibid., 7.  
760  Ibid., 7-8.  
761  (GC), No. 36391/02, 27 November 2008, para. 55.  
762  ECtHR (2011d), 8.  
763  (GC), No. 46410/99, 18 October 2006, para. 60; See also: Kotov v. Russia (GC), No. 54522/00, 3 
April 2012, para. 98.  
 
 
 
 Chapter IX 
 
 
348 
law. In these circumstances, the panel may accept a referral request so the Grand 
Chamber can sanction the development.764 A development which was approved by 
the Grand Chamber was, for example, the first ever finding of a violation of Article 
34 on account of the failure to comply with an interim measure.765 Another reason 
for referral is that a chamber adjudicated on a new or sensitive matter,766 such as the 
prohibition of wearing the Islamic headscarf at university,767 prisoners’ right to 
artificial insemination768 and the discriminatory treatment of Roma children in 
education.769 In this context, the panel may feel that guidance is needed, which the 
Grand Chamber is in a position to give as the Court’s largest formation.770  
Even when a case does not touch on a new matter, it can raise an issue of 
general importance and this too is a reason to refer, as provided for in Article 
43(2).771 The matters of the protection of the marine environment from pollution772 
or of crime-fighting on the high seas were, for example, considered to be of general 
importance.773 Finally, the panel can grant a request because the case has a high-
profile, raising complicated legal questions and having serious consequences for the 
respondent state because of the applicant’s identity or the sensitive nature of the 
issue under scrutiny.774 Öcalan v. Turkey, a case brought by the former PKK 
leader,775 Gäfgen v. Germany, on an infamous kidnapping and murder,776 and 
Lautsi and Others v. Italy, on the presence of crucifixes in classrooms, were 
referred for (inter alia) this reason.777  
As the foregoing illustrates, the panel clearly takes Article 43(2) as a starting 
point, stipulating that it requests, in exceptional cases, if an application raises a 
serious question or issue. Neither the factual complexity nor political delicacy of a 
case, nor the number of dissenting opinions, is therefore in and of itself a reason to 
refer.778 Consequently, requests are as a matter of course refused when they merely 
challenge a chamber’s assessment of the facts or application of well-established 
case law. Furthermore, disagreement with the award of just satisfaction is in 
principle not a reason to refer. The last reason to refuse is that the case does not 
raise an issue of importance to the other states parties, but that is of specific concern 
                                                        
764  ECtHR (2011d), 9.  
765  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (GC), No. 46827/99, 4 February 2005, para. 129.  
766  ECtHR (2011d), 9.  
767  Leyla Şahin v. Turkey (GC), No. 44774/98, 10 November 2005.  
768  Dickson v. UK (GC), No. 44362/04, 4 December 2007. 
769  D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic (GC), No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007. 
770  ECtHR (2011d), 9-10.  
771  Ibid., 10.  
772  Mangouras v. Spain (GC), No. 12050/04, 28 September 2010.  
773  Medvedyev and Others v. France (GC), No. 3394/03, 29 March 2010.  
774  ECtHR (2011d), 10. 
775  (GC), No. 46221/99, 12 May 2005.  
776  (GC), No. 22978/05 , 1 June 2010.  
777  (GC), No. 30814/06, 18 March 2011.  
778  ECtHR (2011d), 5; In an interview it was, however, noted that a separate opinion is important for 
the Panel (Judge interview 2) 
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to the respondent state, due to a legislative peculiarity unknown to other states.779 
Importantly, a refusal does not mean that the Grand Chamber is formally bound in 
any way to a chamber judgment in other proceedings.780 
1.9.4 Scope of a Case before the Grand Chamber 
A request for referral is a request that ‘the case’ be sent to the Grand Chamber.781 
The entire case is therefore referred; referral is not partial in the sense that it is 
limited to a serious question or issue. By implication, the Grand Chamber judgment 
overturns and supplants a chamber judgment altogether.782 ‘The case’ encompasses 
all matters declared admissible in a chamber judgment.783 Consequently, the Grand 
Chamber cannot reverse the decision of a chamber to declare an application 
partially inadmissible.784  
The permitted scope of the parties’ pleas before the Grand Chamber may be 
limited by the position on the merits which they defended previously. The Grand 
Chamber ‘does not exclude the possibility of estoppel where one of the parties 
breaks good faith through a radical change of position’.785 It formulated this rule in 
a case where the applicants had accepted before a chamber that the measures 
complained of were prescribed by law.786 Yet, before the Grand Chamber, they 
argued that the relevant law was not sufficiently foreseeable.787 The Court 
permitted this argument, as the applicants had referred to it in their initial 
applications.788  
The respondent state’s previous pleas of admissibility also limit the permitted 
scope of its pleas before the Grand Chamber. Rule 55 requires that the states raise – 
in principle – any plea of inadmissibility in its observations on the admissibility of 
the application. It is therefore estopped from raising the objection of non-exhaustion 
of domestic remedies before the Grand Chamber for the first time.789 The same 
holds for the plea that the application is inadmissible because it is anonymous.790 
The Grand Chamber itself can nonetheless review admissibility issues in a similar 
                                                        
779  ECtHR (2011d), 13.  
780  Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 46113/99, 1 March 2010, para. 82.  
781  Art. 43(1) ECHR.  
782  K. and T. v. Finland (GC), No. 25702/94, 12 July 2001, para. 140.  
783  Ibid., para. 141; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 41340/98, 13 
February 2003, para. 56. 
784  Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (GC), No. 60654/00, 15 January 2007, paras. 59-62.  
785  Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 41340/98, 13 February 2003, 
para. 56. 
786  Idem.  
787  Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey (GC), No. 41340/98, 13 February 2003, 
para. 52-53.  
788  Ibid., para. 56.  
789  Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia (GC), No. 14939/03, 10 February 2009, para. 46; Mooren v. Germany, 
No. 11364/03 , 9 July 2009, para. 59.  
790  Sindicatul ‘Pastorul cel Bun’ v. Romania (GC), No. 2330/09, 9 July 2013, para. 69. 
 
 
 
 Chapter IX 
 
 
350 
manner as a chamber.791 This is in accordance with Article 35(4) which provides 
that the Court may reject ‘at any stage of the proceedings’ any application which it 
considers to be inadmissible.792  
States are despite Rule 55 not estopped from raising admissibility issues 
touching on the Court’s jurisdiction before the Grand Chamber for the first time, 
which includes the six-month rule and the compatibility ratione temporis, personae 
or materiae of the application. One reason for allowing this is that these issues do 
not just relate to admissibility, but also to the Court’s jurisdiction. The Court must 
verify the jurisdictional compatibility of an application at any stage of the 
proceedings, because the objections raised by the parties, rather than the 
Convention, would otherwise define the scope of its jurisdiction.793 Another reason 
is that examining the said admissibility issue serves the broader interest of legal 
certainty. Consequently, the failure of the respondent state to raise such an issue 
previously is not a reason for the Court to ignore it subsequently.794 These two 
reasons as they are presented by the Court mostly point out why the Grand 
Chamber should examine certain admissibility questions of its own motion; not so 
much why the respondent state should be permitted to raise the issue. The two 
reasons for allowing the state to raise these admissibility issues are therefore not 
quite convincing.  
1.9.5 Chamber and Grand Chamber Judgments Compared 
From 2009-2011, the panel accepted 32 referral requests.795 The Grand Chamber 
judgments were similar to the corresponding chamber judgment in thirteen cases,796 
in the sense that the operative provisions concerning the merits were similar.797 
                                                        
791  K. and T. v. Finland (GC), No. 25702/94, 12 July 2001, para. 141. 
792  N.C. v. Italy (GC), No. 24952/94 , 18 December 2002, para. 47; Blečić v. Croatia (GC), No. 
59532/00, 8 March 2006, para. 65; Creangă v. Romania (GC), No. 29226/03, 23 February 2012, 
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793  Blečić v. Croatia (GC), No. 59532/00, 8 March 2006, paras. 66-67; Demir and Baykara v. Turkey 
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Another fifteen judgments were different in that sense798 and the operative 
provisions concerning the merits were similar in some respects and different in 
other respects in four judgments.799 Although these figures do not disclose whether 
the two formations reached a similar conclusion for similar reasons in the first 
group of thirteen judgments, they do demonstrate that the Grand Chamber, at least 
in the above three years, in the majority of cases arrived at a (partially) different 
conclusion.  
The reasons for the Grand Chamber to depart from the findings of a chamber, 
that is to find a violation where a chamber did not and vice verse, are diverse. Some 
of these reasons are discussed here in order to illustrate their diversity and in order 
to give some insight into why the Grand Chamber reaches a different verdict at 
times. All examples are taken from the 33 referred cases from 2009-2011. In some 
cases, the Grand Chamber mentions explicitly why it departs from a chamber 
judgment; in other cases, this must be derived from its reasoning. 
The most common point of contention is how the requirements in the 
Convention as interpreted by the Court should be applied to the facts of a case. The 
two formations can, for example, disagree about whether a dispute over ‘rights’ 
within the meaning of Article 6 exists. In Boulois v. Luxembourg, a chamber found 
that the applicant had a right to prison leave, which meant the procedural safeguards 
of Article 6 applied, whilst the Grand Chamber concluded otherwise.800 Further, in 
Fabris v. France, the Grand Chamber did not adopt the findings of a chamber that 
the difference in treatment between the applicant, as ‘a child born of adultery’, and 
his mother’s legitimate children had pursued the legitimate aim of guaranteeing 
legal certainty in a proportionate manner. The Grand Chamber therefore ruled that 
Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 had been breached.801 Other divergences 
resulted from the question whether an interference with the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression was prescribed by law802 and whether the ‘very essence’ of 
the applicants’ voting rights had been violated.803 The case of Kotov v. Russia 
                                                        
798  Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (GC), No. 38224/03, 31 March 2009; Kononov v. Latvia 
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799  Taxquet v. Belgium (GC), No. 926/05, 16 November 2010; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (GC), No. 
23458/02, 24 March 2011; Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 December 
2011; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC) (Art. 41), No. 26828/06, 12 March 2014.  
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clearly illustrates how the two formations can differ in the application of 
requirements which have been developed in the Court’s case law. A chamber found, 
based on previous case law that the insolvency liquidator about whose acts the 
applicant complained was a state representative;804 the Grand Chamber found that 
he was not.805 Herrmann v. Germany provides another illustration. The Grand 
Chamber, contrary to the chamber, did not consider that the German hunting laws 
were ‘substantially different’ from the hunting laws in France, examined in 
Chassagnou, or in Luxembourg, examined in Schneider.806 In these two judgments 
it had found violations of the right to the protection of property. In the light of its 
findings in these previous two judgments and in order to ensure consistency, the 
Grand Chamber found a violation of that right in Herrmann as well.807 Other 
examples are the question whether crucifixes were ‘powerful external symbols’ 
within the meaning of Dahlab v. Switzerland,808 or whether the national authorities 
overstepped the margin of appreciation.809 
Another point of contention does not so much concern the application of the 
Court’s case law, but its interpretation. For example, in Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3), the 
Grand Chamber considered that the chamber had taken a broad view of Hirst v. UK 
(no. 2), which it did not ‘fully share’.810 The Grand Chamber, unlike the chamber, 
decided that the intervention of a judge is not among the essential criteria for 
determining the proportionality of a disenfranchisement measure.811 In Sabri Güneş 
v. Turkey, the Grand Chamber disagreed with the chamber’s view that, according to 
the Court’s case law, domestic law and practice is decisive in determining the 
starting point of the six-month time limit in Article 35(1).812  
Additionally, the two formations can evaluate differently the need to examine a 
complaint. The chamber remarked in Kurić and Others v. Slovenia that ‘in view of 
its finding of a violation of Article 8 [...], it was not necessary to rule on the [...] 
complaint under Article 14’.813 The Grand Chamber, however, considered this 
necessary, due to the ‘importance of the discrimination issue in the present case’.814 
A difference does not always stem from a difference in viewpoint as regards the 
application/interpretation of the Convention/case law or the need to examine a 
violation. The difference can also result, for example, from developments in the 
                                                        
804  Kotov v. Russia, No. 54522/00, 14 January 2010, para. 52.  
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Ribeiro v. France (GC), No. 22689/07, 13 December 2012, para. 53.  
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applicants’ situation since the date of a chamber judgment815 or the decision of the 
Grand Chamber to change established case law on account of the ‘living 
instrument’ approach.816 
One referred case, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK, also relied upon in section I.1, 
warrants a separate discussion in view of the purposes of this study. The case, 
concerning the admission at trial of hearsay evidence as the sole or decisive 
evidence, is of special interest, because it is ‘a good example of the judicial 
dialogue between national courts and the European Court on the application of the 
Convention’.817 This dialogue started in response to a chamber judgment, where a 
violation of Article 6 was found in respect of both applicants.818 The UK Supreme 
Court criticised that judgment in Horncastle and Others.819 The Grand Chamber 
subsequently departed from the chamber judgment to some extent: it found a 
violation of Article 6 as regards the second applicant only.820 The dialogue was 
encouraged by the panel deciding on the requests for referral by adjourning its 
consideration of the request pending Horncastle and Others.821 Additionally, it 
admitted the request ‘in part, in order to enable the criticism [...] to be examined’.822 
The Supreme Court’s criticism of the chamber judgment is recounted here in part, 
because it facilitates understanding why the Grand Chamber took a different 
decision, as this was certainly to some extent due to the criticism. One reason 
related to the unifying diversity difficulty.823 The Supreme Court held that although 
it ‘normally’ follows ‘clearly established’ Strasbourg principles, there are ‘rare 
occasions’ where it has concerns as to whether Strasbourg ‘sufficiently appreciates 
or accommodates specific aspects of our domestic process’.824 On such occasions, it 
declines to follow the Court, thus giving it ‘the opportunity to reconsider the 
particular aspect of the decision that is in issue, so that there takes place what may 
prove to be a valuable dialogue’.825 The chamber judgment amounted to such a rare 
occasion, inter alia because the Court’s case law ‘in relation to article 6(3)(d) has 
developed largely in cases relating to civil law rather than common law 
jurisdictions’.826 The Supreme Court’s opposition to the chamber judgment can also 
be connected to the knowledge gap difficulty,827 since it remarked that the 
European case law on the sole or decisive rule ‘appears to have developed without 
                                                        
815  Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland (GC), No. 41615/07, 6 July 2010, para. 151.  
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822  Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. UK (GC), No. 26766/05 et al., 15 December 2011, Concurring Opinion 
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full consideration of the safeguards against an unfair trial that exist under the 
common law procedure’.828 The third ground for not following the Court was that 
the chamber’s ruling was ‘altogether less clear’ than the reasoning of the Court on 
another occasion, where the national judges ‘felt no alternative but to’ follow, 
because Strasbourg ‘expressed an entirely coherent view’.829 Furthermore, as it was 
‘far from certain that Al-Khawaja stands for any absolute principle’, the UKSC 
hoped that the Grand Chamber would clarify the case law on hearsay evidence.830 
In its judgment, the Grand Chamber did not clearly point out whether, why or 
where it departed from the chamber judgment. On the contrary, it seems to 
emphasise the consistency of its approach.831 The Court therefore ‘gives little 
indication that it is backing down’.832 Rather than returning to the chamber 
judgment, the Grand Chamber responds to the ‘four principal grounds’ on which the 
UK, drawing on Horncastle and Others, challenged application of the sole or 
decisive rule by the chamber.833 The different outcome in respect of the first 
applicant is due to the fact that the Grand Chamber considered that the handicap to 
the defence as a result of the admission of hearsay evidence could be 
counterbalanced by certain factors,834 whereas the chamber concluded that these 
factors were not sufficient counterbalances.835 That insufficiency led both 
formations to find a violation of Article 6 in the case of the second applicant.836 
The above discussion shows that there can be, as already announced, a different 
approach by both formations for various reasons. The difference can lay in how the 
Convention and case law requirements should be applied to a case, in how the 
Court’s case law should be interpreted and in the need to examine a complaint. 
Further, as the Al-Khawaja and Tahery saga demonstrates, the difference between a 
chamber and the Grand Chamber judgment does not need to be pronounced, but can 
revolve around subtleties.  
2 APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
This section assesses the dialogicness of the procedural steps in the (pre-)merits 
phase in practice with the help of the indicators for dialogue developed in chapter 
IV. The procedures assessed here were found to have some or clear dialogic 
potential in chapter V. Chapter V is referred to frequently in order to compare the 
situation which exists in practice with the situation ‘on paper’.  
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2.1 Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
The first indicator helps establish which interlocutors can become involved by 
means of which procedures and what the procedures enable the interlocutors to 
achieve or communicate.  
Communication: The Court uses the communication of a case to ask the 
respondent state for factual information and its view on the merits of a case. 
Occasionally, it re-communicates a case if it considers the answers to be 
unsatisfactory. When a case can be decided based on well-established case law, the 
Court sometimes prefers to not ask any questions. If questions are posed, their level 
of detail differs, ranging from questions specifically on the situation of the 
individual applicant to questions of a more general nature, touching on the broader 
problem underlying the alleged individual violation. The questions appearing in the 
communication delineate the scope of a case and signal the problems which a case 
raises in the light of the Convention. Outside the formal process of communication, 
the Court can also, through its Registry, ask questions of a factual or procedural 
nature to the state.  
Some states choose to focus their observations on the Court’s questions and 
therefore use the questions as guidance. This can mean that they do not file any 
observations at all, because the Court did not ask any questions. The observations 
are a means for the states to prevent an adverse judgment or to influence the 
outcome of a judgment otherwise. In order to achieve such effects, the states clarify 
inter alia why no violation took place, why they were not responsible and which 
difficult structural problems they were faced with. They also inform the Court of 
their version of the facts. The observations are therefore an opportunity to persuade 
the Court. States do, however, not always use this opportunity to the fullest, because 
the quality of the observations is poor or because they do not submit relevant 
factual information. The states can also pose factual or procedural questions 
informally to the Registry.  
Friendly settlements: According to chapter V, the Court becomes involved in 
two capacities in friendly settlement proceedings: in that of the Registry, to discuss 
a proposal with the parties, and in that of the judges, to approve a proposal. In 
practice, the picture is more complex, because the Registry also sends ready-made 
friendly settlement proposals to the states directly in cases of well-established case 
law. That body sometimes even develops friendly settlement strategies in 
cooperation with a state to settle groups of cases, something which officially only 
the Court might undertake. The importance of the Registry’s role has therefore 
increased in the area of well-established case law and, with that, the states’ and 
judges’ role has become of less importance in that area. The states no longer have to 
negotiate the terms of a settlement with the applicant. They cannot even negotiate, 
because the Court will close settlement proceedings if one of the parties refutes the 
Registry’s proposal. States do, however, probably not qualify this development as 
problematic, because every successful settlement means that not only an adverse 
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judgment and therefore negative increase in statistics is prevented as was mentioned 
in chapter V, but also that a case is concluded without much ado. As for the judges, 
they do no longer respond in their judgments to a proposal of the parties but to a 
proposal of the Registry agreed to by the parties, which they usually approve 
without much reasoning and which they are unlikely to disapprove as it was put 
forward by the Registry. The Registry’s role regarding routine settlements may 
have increased, its role in face-to-face negotiations has decreased, simply because 
such negotiations with the Registry’s assistance take place less often. The 
opportunity for involvement for the Court on paper to restore a case to its list which 
it struck out based on a friendly settlement remains virtually unused in practice.  
Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions: In practice, the Court indeed uses the 
possibility which it has to raise of its own motion the question whether a case is 
resolved for the purpose of subparagraph b. The Court also uses the other 
possibility for involvement, to assess whether the conditions for striking a case out 
are fulfilled. Its assessments are rather detailed at times, ascertaining whether the 
complaint in question is fully remedied and sometimes analysing the facts of a case 
in the light of the material Convention rights. The Court further employs the power 
which it has to award costs, meaning that the Committee supervises the execution 
of the case. It has not employed its power to restore cases which it struck out.  
The states also raise the question whether a case is resolved for the purpose of 
subparagraph b, thus using this possibility for involvement. Furthermore, because 
the Court also raises this question regardless of whether the respondent state raises 
it, the states apparently take measures warranting the application of subparagraph b.  
Unilateral declarations: It was remarked in chapter V that the Court can only 
approve or refuse a unilateral declaration; it cannot raise the issue whether a case 
can be struck out based on a unilateral declaration. Practice has showed, however, 
that the Court sometimes encourages or instructs states to adopt unilateral 
declarations for repetitive cases dealt with in the context of the PJP. When deciding 
to approve or refuse a unilateral declaration, the Court scrutinises the proposed 
unilateral declaration rather closely, based on an (expandable) list of criteria. 
Nevertheless, because the scope of strike out-decisions is limited, its involvement is 
also limited. The Court virtually never becomes involved by way of restoring a 
decision that was struck out based on a unilateral declaration and it awards costs 
only occasionally, meaning that the Committee only exceptionally supervises the 
execution of a unilateral declaration.  
Chapter V explained that the states must take the initiative for this procedural 
step as it is for them to adopt a unilateral declaration. They do this rather 
successfully in the sense that cases are struck out based on a unilateral declaration a 
couple of hundred times a year, in respect of cases of any subject matter. States use 
the opportunity for involvement provided for by this procedural step for various 
reasons, but may also feel restrained in using it, because they must admit that they 
have committed a violation.  
Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions: The Court indeed uses the possibility to 
raise the issue whether an application can be struck out within the meaning of 
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subparagraph c. It further verifies whether an application can indeed be struck out, a 
decision surrounded by a large measure of discretion. The Court has also stimulated 
states to take steps warranting a strike-out decision in conformity with subparagraph 
c by asking them what practical consequences they would draw from a judgment of 
principle. Again, the Court does not seem to become involved by restoring cases to 
its list. Further, because the Court usually strikes cases out under subparagraph c in 
a decision and does not usually award costs, the Committee is normally not 
competent to supervise the execution of these decisions.  
States as well raise the issue whether an application can be struck out within the 
meaning of subparagraph c. Prior to that, they must have taken measures which, 
unlike in the case of subparagraph b decisions, do not need to live up to specific 
conditions other than the human rights condition.  
Hearings: Hearings are an opportunity for involvement of the Court on paper as 
well as in practice. As the description in this chapter has revealed, the Court 
becomes involved in different ways. It takes the initiative for holding hearings, 
either as a result of its policy to hold hearings in almost all Grand Chamber cases or 
of its choice to organise a chamber hearing. Further, the Court asks questions to the 
parties and, when relevant, third-party interveners at two occasions: in writing prior 
to the hearing and orally at the hearing itself. The Court currently asks questions 
mostly sitting as a Grand Chamber as the number of chamber hearings in particular 
has decreased. The oral questions are both of a factual and a legal nature.  
The respondent state, unlike on paper, cannot request with success the Court to 
organise a hearing in practice. Nor can it comment on the suitability of a case for 
hearing. What the state can do, however, is submitting additional written 
observations in response to the Court’s written questions prior to the hearing and 
making oral observations and providing answers in response to the judges’ 
questions at hearing. Compared to a case for which no hearing is organised, a state 
therefore has more opportunities to explain to the Court the facts and its view on the 
merits. The observations made at hearing are diverse. The states therefore take the 
freedom to address those matters which they consider to be especially important. 
For states other than the respondent state, hearings are an opportunity for 
involvement as well. They become involved exceptionally as third-party interveners 
in cases for which they are also allowed to write a third-party intervention.  
Further, the Commissioner has shown his/her willingness to use his right to 
intervene, although selectively. He only intervenes in cases which have broader 
repercussions and to which he can genuinely contribute by providing information, 
commenting on the national legal framework or submitting other observations not 
touching on the case specifically. Intervening at hearing has not yet been an 
opportunity for involvement of the Assembly.  
Chapter V noted that hearings can be of added value compared to the static 
written exchanges that take place inter alia during communication, because they 
allow for direct interaction and because the Commissioner and the Assembly can 
become involved. In practice, however, this picture is less positive. The 
interviewees indicated that the main reason for holding a hearing is to show the 
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Court’s ‘public face’ and that the substantive added value for the case at hand is 
limited, in particular for legal matters. Moreover, the description of the frequency of 
hearings also calls for a more general observation. The decreased frequency of 
hearings namely means that for each interlocutor who becomes involved by way of 
hearings, this procedural step has become less of an opportunity for involvement in 
quantitative terms over the past few years. Moreover, the Assembly has not become 
involved at all.  
Third-party interventions: The Court rarely invites states to intervene in a 
particular case. An additional opportunity for involvement has become apparent 
when describing practice: the possibility to pose questions to states which were 
given leave to intervene. Based on the information in the judgments, the Court does 
not seem to use this possibility often, although it may be that it posed questions 
without referring to them in the judgment.  
States indeed intervene based on the two grounds for involvement, albeit 
infrequently. Under Article 36(1), they become involved, not so much to enter into 
a dialogue with the Court, but rather to offer protection to one of their nationals 
against another (hostile) state. The right to intervene under the said Article is not 
absolute; it can be curtailed in certain circumstances. Under Article 36(2), the states 
have a de facto right to intervene since the Court approves requests to intervene as a 
matter of course. States are sometimes stimulated to ask leave to intervene by a 
request of a respondent state to that effect. Interventions under the second paragraph 
of Article 36 are supposed to be detached from the facts and the merits of the case 
and are used to communicate to the Court reasons, information, explanations and 
questions, often concerning sensitive matters. It is thus inter alia tried to prevent the 
finding of a violation or to argue why a previous judgment was incorrect.  
The Commissioner has intervened as a third party, both on his own initiative and 
at the request of the Court in four cases only. His interventions address general 
problems and matters which have his special interest. According to chapter V, 
Assembly members or committees can try to submit a third-party intervention. 
However, practice has demonstrated that they have never actually intervened. The 
Court may even rule out this possibility completely.  
Judgments: In practice, the observation in chapter V holds that judgments only 
permit the Court’s involvement. In fact, the Court becomes involved in two 
capacities in many cases of importance: as the majority by way of its judgments and 
as the minority or concurring part of the majority by way of separate opinions. 
Separate opinions should, however, not be overstated as an opportunity for 
involvement to communicate with the respondent state; the opinions are mostly 
internally oriented. Although the Court often relies on other interlocutors for 
establishing the facts and the merits, this does not mean that the others thus become 
involved considering that it is for the Court to rely on them and to decide the weight 
it attaches to their observations, if any at all.  
Referral: As was described in chapter V, referral is an opportunity for the panel 
of the Grand Chamber to decide whether a case should be referred. The panel plays 
an important filtering role in practice, because it only accepts about five percent of 
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all requests for referral. Subsequently, the Grand Chamber has the opportunity on 
paper to reconsider a chamber judgment completely, which it also does in practice, 
although it stayed more or less with the chamber judgment in the majority of cases 
discussed above. Quantitatively, this opportunity for involvement arises seldom, as 
the Grand Chamber issued judgment in referral cases only about ten times a year 
over the past eleven years. Qualitatively, however, the opportunity is of great 
importance to the Court and the respondent state, because the panel only accepts 
high-profile cases of (general) importance, which potentially change a strand of the 
Court’s case law.  
The states have in practice, as they do on paper, the possibility to request 
referral, which they do unsuccessfully in the overwhelming majority of cases. A 
request can be filed for a variety of reasons. As noted in chapter V, states also have 
the opportunity to convince the Grand Chamber why a chamber judgment was 
incorrect. This is opportunity is real, considering that in the sample of 32 cases, the 
operative provisions of a chamber judgment differed from that of the Grand 
Chamber in fifteen cases. Regardless of whether this was a result of the state’s 
observations, it demonstrates that the Court is open to changing is position. The 
state’s pleadings before the Grand Chamber are limited in scope as compared to its 
pleadings before a chamber because it is estopped from radically changing its 
position and from raising certain admissibility issues. These limitations do, 
however, not significantly curtail this opportunity for involvement.  
2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
This indicator helps to scrutinise (elements of) the procedures in order to establish 
whether they make possible and stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as 
envisaged by the Convention, that is, in conformity with the principle of 
subsidiarity, and as such.  
Communication: As was noted in chapter V, this procedural step can help share 
responsibilities in accordance with the Convention prescriptions because it enables 
the state to submit factual information and its view on the merits. In practice, the 
procedure is indeed used for this purpose, although, as was also noted with 
reference to indicator 1, states do not always submit observations which are up to 
scratch. Practice has also shown that the Court can guide the state in its answers by 
asking questions of a certain level of detail and by referring to its own case law.  
Friendly settlements: It was observed in chapter V that strike-out procedures 
generally encourage sharing responsibilities in accordance with the subsidiarity 
principle. Further, friendly settlements were said to have dialogic potential in 
particular because the Registry can assist in negotiations. In practice however, the 
Registry is not usually involved in negotiations, but becomes more often involved 
by way of sending ready-made friendly settlement proposals. This not only means 
that friendly settlements are often not particularly dialogic, but also that 
responsibilities are not really shared in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, 
considering that the Registry takes the initiative and determines the content of the 
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proposal. Moreover, although the state must agree with the proposal, it cannot 
suggest changes. Friendly settlements therefore contribute less to sharing 
responsibilities in areas of well-established case law than they generally were 
thought to do on paper. This can be explained by the fact that friendly settlements 
have also become a means to deal with the Court’s case-load problem, in addition a 
means to promote respect for the subsidiarity principle.  
Other strike-out procedures: The finding in chapter V that the other 
procedural steps of Article 37 are beneficial to sharing responsibilities in 
conformity with the Convention also applies in practice. The Court verifies in its 
decisions, based on certain criteria, whether the states have indeed fulfilled their 
primary responsibility. In the case of unilateral declarations it, for example, 
establishes whether the state has offered adequate redress. When the Court can 
adopt subparagraph c strike-out decisions because states have taken measures in 
response to a judgment of principle, it is especially clear that responsibilities are 
shared in conformity the principle of subsidiarity. It is namely not the Court’s task 
to deliver continually ‘individual decisions in cases where there is no longer any 
live Convention issue’.837 Nor is its task ‘necessarily best achieved by repeating the 
same findings in a large series of cases’.838  
Hearings: Chapter V elucidated that and why hearings potentially promote the 
sharing of responsibilities as such and in conformity with the Convention. In 
practice, this potential materialises to some extent. To illustrate, respondent states 
have cast light on domestic judgments, amplified their observations and expanded 
on the factual background to the case at hearing. Also, third parties have had the 
opportunity to comment on more general themes set on the agenda by a case. 
Nevertheless, hearings have been demonstrated to have little substantive added 
value. Therefore, their added value to the sharing of responsibilities mostly exists 
out of clarifying the facts of the case, if these were not already clear from the 
written observations.  
Third-party interventions: Chapter V described why interventions by states 
parties, the Commissioner and the Assembly can contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities as such. This scenario also unfolds in practice by way of 
interventions of the first two interlocutors. States contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities when they intervene under Article 36(2) in particular, because this 
type of interventions requires them to comment on aspects of a case other than 
those directly relating to the situation of the applicant, something on which the 
respondent state already focuses. Intervening states have, for example, argued why 
a situation is not in violation of the Convention and expounded how certain legal 
systems function and how the Convention system is supposed to function. The 
interventions of the Commissioner also relate to more general matters which may 
otherwise remain unaddressed or would at least require the Court to engage in 
                                                        
837  E.G. and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50425/99, 23 September 2008, para. 27. 
838  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 127.  
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additional research. Chapter V also remarked that the Court can stimulate the 
sharing of responsibilities through third-party interventions by asking other 
interlocutors to intervene. It has done so with regard to the Commissioner three 
times, but seems to virtually never ask other interlocutors to intervene.  
Judgments: Although judgments themselves do not stimulate sharing 
responsibilities, as was also noted in chapter V, they can describe how 
responsibilities were shared between the Court and the states parties in a 
subsidiarity manner. In practice, the Court indeed emphasises that it is first and 
foremost for domestic authorities to establish the facts of a case and it can be 
derived from its judgments that it attaches great importance to domestic courts’ 
views on the merits. Furthermore, the Court does normally not substitute its own 
view of the facts for that of the state party and nor does it readily depart from 
domestic courts’ findings regarding the merits.  
Chapter V added that the Court can describe in a judgment how it relies on other 
interlocutors’ fact-finding or standard-setting efforts. In practice, the Court does so, 
although the influence of the standard-setting documents varies from case to case 
and is determined by the Court. However, as also remarked in chapter V, because 
the Court’s reliance is not the consequence of any sort of communication, this type 
of sharing of responsibilities is not particularly relevant to this study.  
Referral: It was concluded in chapter V that referral does not contribute to 
sharing responsibilities in conformity with the Convention’s principles. The way the 
procedure functions in practice does not call for a different conclusion.  
2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding 
This indicator concerns the question whether a procedure contributes to 
understanding between the European interlocutors and the states parties. More 
specifically, it leads to the question whether the national authorities’ understanding 
of the Convention system and, in the (pre-)merits phase, the Court’s understanding 
of national issues relating to internal and external tension increases. 
Communication: As was noted in chapter V, communication is mostly about 
increasing the Court’s understanding of the situation in the state, and less about 
increasing the state’s understanding of the Convention system. In practice, the 
questions posed by the Court often relate to the situation of the individual applicant 
and if the states focus their observations on the questions, this mean that the Court’s 
understanding of the domestic system more generally does not increase. Further, 
when the state’s observations are of insufficient quality this neither increases the 
Court’s understanding. It was also observed in chapter V that states are probably 
less inclined to inform the Court of issues relating to external tension, but from 
practice it appears that the Court sometimes stimulates this by asking questions of a 
more general nature. The state’s understanding likely increases when the Court 
asks, as it sometimes does, to submit observations in the light of previous 
judgments or when it refers to relevant case law in its communication.  
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Strike-out procedures: In chapter V, it was observed that strike-out procedures 
do not contribute to mutual understanding. The practice of friendly settlements does 
not give reasons for concluding otherwise. On the contrary, when a routine 
settlement is concluded, which is the case in the majority of settlements, the 
respondent state does not even need to know which proposals suffice to justify a 
strike-out decision. Moreover, increasing the state’s understanding may not even be 
necessary when a friendly settlement proposal or unilateral declaration is approved, 
because the existence of already existing case law is an indication in favour of 
approving the document. Nevertheless, the states may learn something about which 
requirements are in place when fulfilling their primary responsibility, because the 
Court reasons its decisions relating to Article 37(1)(b) and unilateral declarations 
relatively elaborately. Such learning can also take place when the Court contacts 
states to inquire how they will respond to a judgment of principle. In these 
circumstances, the Court emphasises and points out to the states that responding to 
such a judgment and thereby remedying a domestic problem is their task and that it 
is not the Court’s task to repeat comparable findings numerous times.  
Hearings: As was outlined in chapter V, hearings can contribute to mutual 
understanding and in particular to understanding by the Court of the factual and 
legal situation in a state. The description of practice clarified that respondent states 
have the opportunity to create such understanding at two occasions: orally at 
hearing and before that in writing. States take this opportunity and, for example, 
underline the difficult situation in which they finds themselves, point out relevant 
(pending) reform and clarify the functioning of the domestic criminal system. 
However, it is unlikely that the Court’s understanding increases significantly, 
compared to the understanding which it gains as a result from the process of 
communication, considering that hearings are of limited added value content-wise. 
In practice, the Court’s understanding of the background to the case also increases 
when third parties intervene, which they do exceptionally. The respondent state’s 
understanding of the Convention system unlikely increases as a result of the Court’s 
questions, because the questions sometimes only relate to the facts and when they 
do relate to the merits they are succinct, without many references to the Court’s 
case law or underlying Convention principles.  
Third-party interventions: Chapter V described the potential of third-party 
interventions to increase the Court’s understanding of the situation in or opinion of 
non-respondent states and of the background to an individual violation. Regarding 
the first point, states in fact use interventions to ventilate their opinion, arguing why 
a violation should not be found in situations comparable to that of the applicant, 
why the Court adopted a wrong approach previously or why the Court would 
overstep the boundaries of its task if it were to find a violation. As for the second 
point, states have provided information to the Court about, for example, a particular 
aspect of their domestic legal system. The Commissioner gives information too, 
which (s)he may base on reports and visits. The potential of third-party 
interventions under indicator 3 therefore materialises, as was confirmed by the 
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interviewees who considered them to be of added value, although only in a limited 
number of cases due to the low number of state and Commissioner interventions.  
Judgments: Chapter V explained that judgments are a dialogic opportunity for 
the Court to increase the states parties’ understanding of the Convention system if it 
explains clearly why it took certain decision in its judgments. Additionally, the 
requirement on the Court to reason its judgments was said to ensure that this 
potential exists in all judgments. In practice and on a positive note, this potential 
materialises due to the generally high quality and explicative method of reasoning. 
On a more negative note, however, a large portion of the Court’s judgment is hardly 
reasoned, some judgments have been criticised for a lack of consistency and clarity 
and other judgments apparently lack an ‘execution perspective’. These points 
clearly diminish the potential of judgments to increase the state’s understanding. 
The picture that emerges is therefore mixed, but not overly negative, in particular 
because the criticism does not seem to concern the majority of judgments. 
Moreover, the judgments which are hardly reasoned are usually those issued in 
areas of well-established case law, areas which can be understood based on 
previous judgments. The scope of the judgments is also instrumental to the states’ 
understanding as the scope is often not limited to the situation of the individual 
applicant, but broader, including, for example, a reiteration of the applicable main 
principles and a discussion of precedents. The Court has confirmed that the 
judgments, in particular Grand Chamber judgments, also serve to elucidate the rules 
instituted by the Convention.  
Referral: According to chapter V, referral can contribute to understanding by 
the Court of the situation in the states and to the states’ understanding of the 
Convention system. Practice does not suggest the contrary. However, the state’s 
understanding increases more than the Court’s understanding as referral is mostly 
about adjudicating cases which are of importance from the perspective of the 
Convention system. The lesser importance of referral to the situation in the 
respondent state is confirmed by a reason to refuse referral, which is that the case 
does not raise an issue of importance to the states parties generally.  
2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Indicator 4 helps establish whether the procedural steps in the (pre-)merits phase 
contribute to balanced judgments in the sense that the Court, in its judgments and 
through the procedures, pays due regard to the difficulties at the root of internal 
tension. 
Communication: It was noted in chapter V that communication potentially 
contributes to balanced decision-making by the Court, because it allows the 
respondent state to communicate its views to the Court. The description of practice 
gives no clues to assume that states cannot and do not use this procedural step in the 
said manner. The states, however, do not always make use of the possibility to the 
fullest. This is problematic, not only because it means they do not avail themselves 
of a possibility to make a judgment more balanced from their perspective, but also 
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because the result may be that the Court’s judgment is less balanced in their 
opinion. To illustrate, if the factual information in the state’s observations is not up 
to scratch, the Court can draw adverse inferences and can find a violation of Article 
38. The foregoing does not mean that the procedure itself does not stimulate 
balanced decision-making, but underlines that, if the procedure is not used fully, the 
opposite result may be reached.  
Strike-out procedures: Chapter V proposed that the question whether striking a 
case out contributes to balanced decision-making does not need to be answered, 
since the adoption of a strike-out decision means that the Court is precluded from 
adopting a potentially unbalanced decision altogether. Practice confirms the validity 
of this proposal. Two aspects of the practice of sending ready-made friendly 
settlement proposals may, however, result in an unbalanced decision, namely not 
allowing for friendly settlement negotiations and basing such settlements wholly on 
the applicant’s submissions. Nevertheless, these disadvantages are probably offset 
by the several advantages of such proposals.  
Hearings: It was clarified in chapter V that hearings can have the effect on 
paper of stimulating the Court to take balanced decisions, not only due to the 
observations put forward by the respondent state, but also due to those of third 
parties. This effect can also materialise in practice. Nevertheless, this effect is not 
considerable because hearings are considered to be predominantly of added value to 
clarifying the facts of the case and to showing the Court’s public face.  
Third-party interventions: Chapter V concluded that third-party interventions 
can enhance the ‘balancedness’ of the Court’s decisions because they are a means 
for the states to communicate their concerns to the Court. As has been recalled with 
reference to the other indicators already, in practice states indeed use third-party 
interventions for this purpose. These communications, due to their content, 
stimulate the Court to take into account perspectives other than just those of the 
respondent state, including perspectives on particularly sensitive cases and on issues 
connected to the three difficulties at the root of internal tension.  
Judgments: As was noted in chapter V, judgments can contribute to balanced 
decision-making if the Court uses arguments relating to the three difficulties 
submitted by the states through other procedural steps and, in particular, if it shows 
respect for national competences, views and concerns. The Court contributes to 
balanced-decision making in such manners in practice, considering that it normally 
avoids establishing the facts itself if they have already been established by the 
national authorities. Furthermore, it relies clearly and expressly on especially the 
findings of domestic courts when determining the merits.  
Chapter V also explained that separate opinions can be instrumental in 
demonstrating that the arguments of the respondent state were duly considered and 
that this is only relevant to this study if an opinion returns to the arguments made by 
the states parties. However, although the judges add separate opinions frequently, 
the opinions are mostly oriented towards the (other part of the) majority and do not 
mainly react to other interlocutors. Separate opinions do therefore not significantly 
contribute to balanced decision-making.  
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase 
 
 
365 
Referral: In chapter V it was indicated that referral only stimulates balanced 
decision-giving to some extent. The description of the functioning of the procedure 
in practice does not refute this premise.  
2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 establishes whether and, if so, how the procedural steps in the (pre-) 
merits phase stimulate and make it possible for the interlocutors to engage in 
reason-giving (embedded in the Convention system) for their decisions. Reasons are 
particularly important when the decision of one interlocutor negatively affects 
another interlocutor, which means in this phase that the Court issues an adverse 
judgment. 
Communication: Chapter V advanced that communication gives respondent 
states the possibility to give (external) reasons and stimulates them to do so because 
otherwise the Court may find a violation. The description of practice confirms that 
reason-giving is important to prevent the finding of a violation, in particular when 
the burden of proof is constructed in such a manner that the state must prove that no 
violation took place. Reason-giving by the state is sometimes also important to 
preventing the Court from declaring a case admissible, because the Court does not 
raise this point of its own motion. The states not only give reasons because the 
Court may otherwise find a violation or declare a case inadmissible, but also 
because the Court poses questions to them when communicating a case. Thus, the 
Court stimulates them to, for example, comment on issues relating to external 
tension or to give reasons which are embedded in the Convention system by 
referring to its case law in the questions. Further, by asking rather precise questions, 
the Court encourages states to give more precise answers, which may increase the 
not always equally high quality of the observations. Communication also indirectly 
stimulates the Court to give reasons, because if the observations of the state are of 
great quality, this can positively influence the quality of the Court’s reasoning. 
Moreover, if the reasoning of the state is highly persuasive, it is harder for the Court 
to find a violation, implying that, if the Court finds a violation nevertheless, its 
reasoning must be quite persuasive.  
Strike-out procedures: As regards friendly settlements, the Court does usually 
not expound on the human rights condition. Further, when it refuses a proposed 
settlement, this is not apparent from its judgments, meaning that the reason-giving 
as regards refusals cannot be analysed. Strike-out decisions taken under 
subparagraph b are consistently reasoned with reference to two criteria and the 
Court may even analyse a case in the light of the Convention. Its reasoning is not 
limited to formulas, but relates to the case of the applicant. Similarly, when the 
Court strikes a case out based on a unilateral declaration, it reasons its decisions, 
both by relying on Rule 61A, although it does not usually refer to the Rule itself, 
and on the Tahsin Acar factors. The Court does not always apply each condition 
and factor, and nor does it give reasons for this, but it at least establishes the nature 
of the admission, the amount of compensation and whether case law already exists 
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on the alleged violation. The Court also reasons its strike-out decisions under 
subparagraph c, but does usually not elaborate on the human rights condition. It 
does, however, explain in varying levels of detail which domestic developments 
justify its strike-out decisions.  
Hearings: Hearings do not only contribute to reason-giving on paper, but also in 
practice. As the result of a hearing, the state is namely asked questions at two extra 
occasions in comparison to cases for which no hearing is organised. Nevertheless, if 
the judges pose no questions or if they ask factual questions to which the answer 
may be found in written observations, the states are not really stimulated to engage 
in additional reason-giving. Furthermore, the respondent states are given three extra 
opportunities to give answers, namely in their written observations prior to the 
hearing, during their oral pleadings and in answer to the judges’ oral questions. 
However, to the extent that, as some interviewees indicated, the oral observations 
are a repetition of the written observations, hearings contribute little to the reason-
giving in which states are already engaged in by way of communication.  
Third-party interventions: Chapter V held that third-party interventions 
potentially stimulate the Court to engage in external reason-giving. The 
interviewees also mentioned that the interventions can enrich the Court’s thinking, 
because the interventions show that there is not only a problem in the case of the 
individual application, but a broader problem as well. Further, based on the subject 
matter of interventions submitted by the states under in particular Article 36(2), it 
can be said that these interventions indeed stimulate reason-giving, although the 
extent to which the Court’s reason-giving in its judgment indeed is a reaction to the 
interventions goes beyond the scope of this research. Nevertheless, the importance 
of the matters touched upon in the interventions, such as, the Court’s jurisdiction, 
the margin of appreciation doctrine and reasons why a violation did not take place, 
make it unlikely that the Court will simply ignore interventions without taking them 
into consideration in one way or the other when reasoning its judgment. Further, the 
practice of some states to request clarification in their interventions also stimulates 
reason-giving by the Court.  
As for internal reason-giving, it was noted in chapter V that states must submit a 
‘duly reasoned’ request if they wish to intervene under paragraph 2 of Article 36. 
However, in none of the cases examined section IX.1, it appeared that the Court 
refused a request because it was not duly reasoned. On the contrary, it is highly 
implausible that a request would not be granted, decreasing the importance of 
internal reason-giving. In the exceptional case that the Court refuses a request, it 
reasons its decision and thus engages in internal reason-giving.  
Judgments: Judgments, chapter V explained, potentially stimulate reason-
giving due to the mere fact that they must be reasoned and this potential is enhanced 
by the possibility to add separate opinions, as these opinions direct attention inter 
alia to the reasons on which the Court did not rely. It was added that not only the 
fact that that the judgments must be reasoned is of relevance but also the quality of 
the reasoning. The quality of the Court’s reasoning is generally considered to be 
high, although also a large portion of the judgments is hardly reasoned and although 
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the judgments have sometimes been criticised for a lack of consistency and clarity. 
A lack of reason-giving does not need to be problematic when a case relates to well-
established case law, as the reasons can be found in this case law. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that the foregoing does not apply and to the extent that reason-giving 
suffers from a lack of clarity or consistency, the Court’s judgments cannot always 
be evaluated positively under indicator 5. Further, as regards separate opinions, they 
are often added to the Court’s judgments, in particular to Grand Chamber 
judgments. Because they are very much oriented towards (dis)agreement with the 
majority and a reaction to the majority’s reasoning, they indeed strengthen the 
Court’s reason-giving if read in conjunction with the judgment.  
Referral: In practice, the observation also applies that it is largely irrelevant 
from the perspective of external reason-giving whether a chamber or, upon referral, 
the Grand Chamber decides a case, because both engage in reason-giving. The 
conclusion in chapter V that the procedure does not stimulate internal reason-giving 
by the Court because the panel is not required to give reasons also holds for the 
practical operation of the procedure. For the purposes of this indicator, which aims 
to establish whether reasons are given for each individual decision, the report on the 
panel’s practice does not repair the lack of internal reason-giving. The document 
does namely not enable the parties to anticipate the panel’s decision highly 
precisely, let alone to know what the reasons were for refusing a specific request for 
referral. Therefore, the procedure contributes neither to external nor to internal 
reason-giving in practice.  
2.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response  
Indicator 6 facilitates analysing whether one interlocutor can respond to a decision 
made or a procedural step set by another interlocutor. The question whether the 
(pre-)merits phase provides room for an external response in practice is mostly 
answered in chapter X, because the interlocutors usually give their response to a 
judgment in the execution phase. The indicator also poses the less broad question 
whether internal room for a response exists, namely the possibility to respond to 
decisions, if any, taken within the confines of a procedure.  
Communication: As was noted in chapter V, communication provides internal 
room for a response. States can respond to the decision of the Court to communicate 
a case, the questions posed, the facts presented and the applicant’s allegations. The 
description of practice does not suggest otherwise, although the states do not always 
use the possibility to respond fully. Furthermore, sometimes, namely in cases 
relating to well-established case law, the states do not have the possibility to 
respond to questions posed by the Court, simply because the Court does not pose 
questions. The description of practice has also revealed that the procedure gives the 
Court the possibility to respond to the state’s observations not only in the judgment, 
but also by re-communicating a case, which signals to the state that its first 
observations were insufficient.  
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Strike-out procedures: Strike-out decisions give states, as described in chapter 
V, external room to respond to the communication of a case, including the questions 
posed therein and, depending on the stage of proceedings in which a case is struck 
out, an admissibility decision or judgment. This also holds in practice. However, to 
the extent that a ready-made friendly settlement is proposed by the Registry which 
the parties cannot amend, friendly settlements are less a response by the state and 
more a response by the Registry to the Court’s case-load. Unilateral declarations 
are, compared to friendly settlements, really a response of the state, as they are the 
state’s unilateral proposal. Such decisions are sometimes a response to a judgment 
of principle issued by the Court, a response which the Court can stimulate by asking 
the states what consequences they will draw from the judgment.  
Hearings: Hearings do in practice, as on paper, provide additional room for a 
response for the states. They submit extra written and oral observations and answer 
the judge’s oral questions. Practice also confirms that states do not have internal 
room for a response since they cannot object to the decision to hold a hearing.  
Third-party interventions: Due to the nature of Article 36(1) interventions, 
which are meant to support the applicant’s case, they are not of great relevance to 
the current indicator. However, states indeed use third-party interventions under 
Article 36(2), as was proposed they could in chapter V, to respond (externally) to 
the Court’s judgments. Their response can take two forms: they can give reasons to 
motivate why a previous judgment was incorrect or they can ask the Court to 
further clarify a line of case law, thus responding to apparently insufficiently clear 
judgments.  
Judgments: Judgments provide, according to chapter V, an opportunity for the 
Court to respond to the arguments and information provided to it by the other 
interlocutors through the other procedural steps. Nothing in the description of the 
Court’s practice, which clarifies that the Court responds especially to the states 
parties, suggests that judgments do not offer this opportunity.  
Referral: Referral not only gives respondent states external room to respond to 
a judgment of the Court if the state’s requests for referral are accepted, as was noted 
in chapter V, but also the mere possibility of requesting referral is a possibility to 
respond. As some interviewees indicated, a request may be submitted even though 
it will probably not be honoured, in order to respond simply to a judgment finding a 
violation or, more specifically, a judgment which, in the opinion of the state, went 
‘too far’, overstepped the margin of appreciation or should be looked at a second 
time. Neither on paper, nor in practice do states have internal room to respond to the 
decision to refer. For the Court, as was noted in chapter V, referral offers room to 
respond to the arguments of the state made in response to a chamber judgment. 
Considering that the state cannot radically depart from its position before the 
chamber, the procedural step also offers the Court room to respond to the state’s 
arguments put to it for a second time.  
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2.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
The questions of this indicator, namely whether the procedural steps prevent the 
escalation of internal tension into conflict or help mitigate or end already existing 
conflict, is in part answered based on the findings made under indicators 2-5. These 
findings point to features of procedures that reduce the likelihood that internal 
tension develops into conflict. The discussion in this section is only a partial 
answer; whether conflict develops also depends on whether judgments offer room 
for a response in the execution phase as is discussed in chapter X.  
Communication: As was concluded with regard to the dialogic potential of the 
procedure, it can also be concluded that communication in practice generally 
minimises conflict. This observation holds, because communication can help 
achieve the effects envisaged by the previous four indicators to a greater or lesser 
extent and for reasons provided in chapter V. For example, because communication 
provides internal room for a response, states can communicate to the Court which 
difficulties they have with its case law, in response to which the Court can explain 
its case law another time or perhaps modify it, thus decreasing the chance that 
conflict develops.  
Strike-out procedures: As was explained under indicator 4, the Court is 
prevented from making an unbalanced decision which may cause conflict if it issues 
a strike-out decision. Conflict is thus prevented altogether, as was also explained in 
chapter V. The description of practice does not warrant a different conclusion. It 
should nevertheless be added that the practice to issue ready-made friendly 
settlement proposals has some potential, albeit limited, to cause conflict because it 
means that states cannot negotiate with the applicant but have to leave or take the 
proposal and because the proposals may be based wholly on the applicant’s 
observations.  
Hearings: Hearings are organised in cases raising a serious question affecting 
the interpretation or application of the Convention or cases that risk having a result 
inconsistent with a previous judgment. In practice, several hearing touched on 
sensitive matters. It is likely that cases with these subject matters are particularly 
prone to causing conflict. Because hearings are organised in such cases, their 
potential to contribute to channelling tension in the right direction is even clearer 
than could be observed in chapter V. This potential, however, does not come to full 
bloom in practice, because, as was noted previously, their added value regarding 
legal matters is considered to be limited, which, moreover, means that from the 
perspective of some indicators they do not add much compared to the procedural 
step of communication.  
Third-party interventions: As was established in chapter V, it can be 
concluded here that third-party interventions help prevent or mitigate conflict with 
both the respondent state and other (intervening) states, because they contribute to 
achieving the effects envisaged by the previous five indicators. The interviews also 
confirmed that third-party interventions are instrumental to preventing unexpected 
collateral damage. Moreover, the conclusion holds because third-party interventions 
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under Article 36(2) are submitted mostly in sensitive cases and cases on the Court’s 
jurisdiction, cases which potentially fuel conflict, and because they aim to explain 
why a violation should not have been found in a previous case, a matter which can 
help mitigate conflict if listened to by the Court.  
Judgments: Because judgments contribute in practice to mutual understanding, 
balanced decision-making and reason-giving and because they provide for room for 
a response, they also help mitigate conflict. However, to the extent that the quality 
of the judgments is not up to scratch, the effect of balanced decision-making and 
reason-giving is compromised. Some features of the judgments underscore that 
judgments are directed towards mitigating conflict, namely the Court’s practice to 
normally not depart from the findings of fact by domestic authorities and the great 
importance which it attaches to the domestic courts’ views on the merits. Also its 
practice to avoid offending sensibilities even if it disagrees with a respondent state 
is relevant in this respect.  
Referral: As was explained in chapter V, referral can contribute to handling 
conflict, although whether it does so depends on the outcome of the Grand Chamber 
judgment. The current chapter confirms this explanation for mainly two reasons. 
The first reason is related to why a respondent states requests referral, which 
includes that the Court allegedly overstepped its task or that it should have a second 
look at a certain issue. If a case is indeed referred or if the Grand Chamber sets a 
step back compared to a chamber or reassess an issue, conflict can be mitigated. 
The second reason is related to the reasons for accepting a request. Requests for 
referral are accepted mainly in cases departing from existing case law, where a 
clarification of a strand of case law is needed, to scrutinise new developments or to 
adjudicate sensitive, high profile or generally important cases. All of these matters 
can be a source of tension and possibly conflict when the Court does not address 
them. Because the referral procedure is designed to ensure that the Court addresses 
these matters a second time, the conflict preventing or mitigating potential of this 
procedure certainly materialises in practice.  
3 CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGICNESS OF PROCEDURES IN THE (PRE-) 
MERITS PHASE  
As can be recalled from section III.5.5, in drawing conclusions about the 
dialogicness of procedural steps, indicators 2 and 7 take up a special position 
because their relative weight is not identical to that of others; these two indicators 
contribute relatively much to making dialogue of added value to the Convention 
system. When conclusions are drawn below, relatively much importance is 
therefore attached to the findings regarding to these two indicators. In the same 
section it was also explained that the procedures are labelled as being limitedly, 
somewhat or clearly dialogic.  
Communication: Communication is an opportunity for involvement of the 
Court and the respondent state. The Court does, however, not always avail itself of 
this opportunity when a case pertains to well-established case law. Neither do the 
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states always use the opportunity fully since the quality of their observations 
sometimes leaves a lot to be desired, an observation which has a negative impact on 
the findings made under all indicators. Besides the formal process of 
communication, these two interlocutors can interact informally. Through 
communication, the Court and the states share responsibilities and increase each 
other’s understanding, albeit with some limitations. Communication furthermore 
contributes to balanced decision-making by the Court, provided the state indeed 
submits observations of a certain standard. Further, the procedural step stimulates 
the states to engage in external reason-giving in different ways and, though 
indirectly, the Court to engage in reason-giving as well. The states are also given 
internal room to respond to different matters and the Court responds to the states’ 
observations by way of re-communicating a case. Finally, communication is 
conducive to preventing conflict. In conclusion, this procedural step is clearly 
dialogic.  
Friendly settlements: Friendly settlements are an opportunity for the Court to 
become involved by way of approving friendly settlement proposals. Further, the 
Registry becomes involved through sending ready-made settlement proposals in 
areas of well-established case law, developing settlement strategies and assisting in 
negotiations. Respondent states can also become involved by means of this 
procedural step, although less so when a ready-made proposal is involved. By way 
of friendly settlements, responsibilities are shared in conformity with the 
Convention, but not when it comes to ready-made settlements. Friendly settlements 
do not contribute to mutual understanding generally and even less so if a ready-
made settlement is approved and nor do they stimulate the Court to engage in 
extensive reason-giving. They provide external room for a response for the states, 
provided the settlement is question is not ready-made. Further, friendly settlements 
generally prevent conflict. However, the practice of sending ready-made proposals 
may stir tension. The conclusion regarding the dialogicness of friendly settlements 
in practice must be twofold. Friendly settlements which are the product of 
negotiations between the parties, possibly with the assistance of the Registry, are 
clearly dialogic in practice. However, friendly settlements concluded based on a 
ready-made proposal of the Registry, resulting in a routine friendly settlement, are 
limitedly dialogic because they are a static, linear process which is, moreover, 
initiated by the Registry and not the parties. As routine settlements currently 
outnumber non-paper settlements, the majority of friendly settlements do not 
greatly contribute to dialogue.  
Subparagraph b strike-out decisions: The Court becomes involved through 
subparagraph b strike-out decisions because it sometimes proposes to strike a case 
out and assesses in some detail whether a case can be struck out. These decisions 
are also an opportunity for the states to become involved, by proposing that a case 
is struck out and by taking measures to back that proposal. When these 
opportunities are employed, responsibilities are shared in conformity with the 
Convention. Only one aspect of these strike-out decisions contributes to the 
respondent state’s understanding, namely the Court’s reasoning of such decisions. 
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Further, the procedural step spurs reason-giving as the Court consistently reasons its 
decisions and it also gives external room for a response and prevents conflict 
altogether. Considering the foregoing, Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions are 
clearly dialogic in practice.  
Unilateral declarations: Unilateral declarations are an opportunity for 
involvement of the Court as it must approve declarations and can stimulate their 
conclusion in the context of the PJP. States also become involved because they 
adopt the declaration. As a result of this procedural step, the Court and the states 
share responsibilities and the state’s understanding of the Convention system 
increases due to the Court’s rather elaborate scrutiny of unilateral declarations and 
reasoning of its strike-out decisions. The foregoing means that the unilateral 
declarations also stimulate reason-giving by the Court. The documents further 
provide respondent states room for a response and prevent conflict. These 
observations lead to the conclusion that this procedural step is clearly dialogic in 
practice.  
Subparagraph c strike-out decisions: By way of subparagraph c strike-out 
decisions, the Court and the states parties become involved. The former because it 
raises the question whether an application can be struck out and because it must 
answer this question; the latter because they also raise this question, prior to which 
they have taken measures justifying raising the question. Further, the Court 
stimulates states to take such measures by asking them what consequences they 
would draw from a judgment of principle. Responsibilities are shared through this 
procedural step and this is particularly clear when a judgment of principle is issued 
and states take steps in response thereto. Mutual understanding is normally not 
increased, but the understanding of the state is enhanced if the Court contacts states 
to inquire how they will react to a judgment of principle. The Court also engages in 
reason-giving, although in varying levels of detail, but it does not elaborately reason 
why respect for human rights does not require it to continue examining an 
application. Subparagraph c strike-out decisions furthermore provide external room 
for a response to the states and prevent conflict from developing. Clearly, this 
procedural step is dialogic, in spite of the fact that the Court does not always 
elaborately reason its subparagraph c strike-out decisions.  
Hearings: Hearings are an opportunity for the Court to become involved 
because it takes the initiative for organising hearings and asks questions at hearing. 
States become involved by answering the Court’s questions and making additional 
observations orally and in writing and exceptionally they participate as third-party 
interveners. Intervening is also a possibility for involvement by the Commissioner, 
but not for the Assembly. These opportunities for involvement have decreased 
quantitatively together with the decrease in the number of hearings. For the 
respondent state and the third-party interveners, hearings are an instrument to share 
responsibilities with the Court. Hearings further contribute to understanding by the 
Court of inter alia the situation and views in the states and they also enhance the 
balancedness of the Court’s decisions, external reason-giving by the respondent 
states and give states room for a response. Moreover, this procedural step is 
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beneficial to dealing with conflict. Each finding, except those relating to 
opportunities for involvement and room for a response, is negatively affected by the 
finding that hearings are considered to be of limited added value from a substantive 
perspective. This addition combined with the other findings leads to the conclusion 
that hearings are only somewhat dialogic in practice.  
Third-party interventions: By way of third-party interventions, the Court 
hardly becomes involved: it rarely invites states to intervene and nor does it seem to 
ask interveners specific questions. States do become involved based on paragraphs 
1 and 2 of Article 36, albeit infrequently. Under the first paragraph they have a de 
jure right to intervene and under the second a de facto right. Their involvement is 
sometimes requested by the respondent state. The Commissioner has also 
intervened, but the Assembly has not. The interventions enable the Commissioner 
and the states, especially when the latter use their de facto right, to share 
responsibilities with the Court. They furthermore contribute to the Court’s 
understanding of the situations and views in the states parties and to balanced 
decision-making and reason-giving by the Court. States do not have to engage in 
internal reason-giving however. Interventions made under paragraph 2 furthermore 
give states room for a response and are instrumental to handling conflict. 
Considering all of these observations, the conclusion is that third-party 
interventions are clearly dialogic in practice.  
Judgments: Judgments only permit the Court’s involvement, in the capacity of 
the majority and through separate opinions. They do not stimulate sharing 
responsibilities with the other interlocutors, although they do outline how 
responsibilities have been shared with them through other procedural steps and how 
the Court has relied of its own motion on factual and standard-setting documents 
published by them. Judgments contribute to the states’ understanding of the 
Convention system, although this effect is restrained when a judgment lacks quality, 
as some judgments allegedly do, or when a judgment is hardly reasoned, which 
happens in areas of well-established case law in particular. Balanced decision-
making by the Court is stimulated, something which applies to judgments, but not 
so much to separate opinions. Generally, the Court engages in reason-giving in its 
judgments, which is encouraged by separate opinions, but which is clearly less the 
case if a judgment lacks quality or reasoning. Judgments further give the Court 
external room for a response, help mitigate conflict, as some features of the 
judgments underline, although this positive result is compromised if the quality of a 
judgment is not up to scratch. Judgments are overall somewhat dialogic in practice, 
but not clearly so, in particular because they do not contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities.  
Referral: In consequence of an approved request for referral, the Court becomes 
involved as the panel approving the request and as the Grand Chamber 
reconsidering a chamber judgment. Respondent states become involved because 
they request referral and submit new observations to the Grand Chamber. Referral 
does not contribute to sharing responsibilities or to reason-giving and it stimulates 
balanced decision-making only to some extent. This procedural step further 
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enhances understanding by the respondent state of the Convention system, provides 
respondent states room for a response and is beneficial to dealing with conflict. The 
foregoing means that referral is somewhat dialogic in practice, considering in 
particular that it does not contribute to the sharing responsibilities and considering 
that it neither contributes clearly to the effects envisaged by some other the 
indicators.  
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CHAPTER X 
THE DIALOGICNESS OF PROCEDURES IN THE 
EXECUTION PHASE 
 
 
 
As was already explained in chapter VI, this study is not limited to formal 
Committee procedures, but extends to other procedural opportunities for 
involvement in the execution phase. One of these opportunities, namely Article 46-
indications, was not assessed in chapter VI, because the power of the Court to make 
such indications is not laid down ‘on paper’. Instead, it is a product of the Court’s 
practice, and is therefore exclusively discussed in this chapter, which concerns the 
dialogicness of Convention-related procedures in practice. Prior to addressing 
individually the functioning of the procedures in practice (section X.2) and their 
dialogicness in the light of the indicators for dialogue (section X.3), a more general 
introduction is given to the practice of execution (section X.1).  
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PRACTICE OF THE EXECUTION  
Before starting to describe the way in which the procedures function in practice, it 
is useful to briefly describe two assisting bodies which are of great importance to 
the Committee: its Secretariat and the Execution Department. It is impossible to just 
refer to the work of the Committee without introducing these bodies when 
discussing the practice of execution. This holds in particular for the Execution 
Department, because, as is explained below, the Committee relies heavily on that 
institution. Additionally, the introduction outlines certain aspects of the supervisory 
execution process.  
1.1 The Secretariat  
The Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers (Secretariat) is an administrative 
entity comprising 25 persons, 3 of whom belong to the human rights team.1 Its task 
is to ensure that the DH meetings run smoothly, which entails inter alia distributing 
relevant documents (e.g. the order of business) to the deputies.2 Further, the 
Secretariat performs a language check on these documents, which are submitted to 
it by the Execution Department. Occasionally, it makes a suggestion concerning the 
                                                        
1  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 229.  
2  Ibid., Part II para. 232; Execution interview 10.  
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content of the documents3 and it has some influence on the cases selected for the 
order of business as proposed by the Execution Department.4 However, when 
compared to the Execution Department, it does little work with respect to the 
substance of the execution process.5 The Secretariat rather functions as an 
intermediary between the deputies and the Execution Department.6 Probably for 
that reason, the deputies refer to the ‘Secretariat’ also when they actually mean to 
refer to the work of the Execution Department.7  
1.2 The Execution Department  
The Execution Department for the Execution of the Judgments of the Court 
(Execution Department) is established within the Directorate General of Human 
Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe. Of the five divisions composing 
the Execution Department, two are legal.8 The lawyers working for the two legal 
divisions are of about sixteen different nationalities.9 This limited number of 
nationalities, as compared to the Court and its Registry, means, that the lawyers 
jointly do not master the language of each state party.10  
The work of the Execution Department can be compared to that of an 
‘“advocate” of Convention interests’,11 aiming as it does to ensure the ‘even-handed 
and impartial implementation of Court judgments’.12 Therefore, ‘even if not 
institutionally part of the Court, [the Execution Department: operates as [its] ‘long 
arm’’ into the execution phase.13 The Execution Department has also been 
characterised as ‘an interface between the Committee and respondent states, 
ensuring an information flow sufficient to enable the Committee to follow the 
progress of the judgment execution process’ and acting ‘as an adviser and facilitator 
to both the Committee and the national authorities’.14 It translates what the states do 
in terms of execution to what the Committee understands15 and makes it possible 
for the Committee to exercise permanent supervision on the execution of the 
                                                        
3  Execution interview 5. 
4  Execution interview 2.  
5  Idem.  
6  Idem.  
7  Çalı and Koch (2014), 304; As an interviewee indicated, the deputies seem to think that only the 
Secretariat exists, for them the Secretariat and the Execution Department are the same thing 
(Execution interview 2). 
8  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 164. 
9  Ibid., Part II para. 169. 
10  Execution interview 10.  
11  Sundberg (2009), 470-471. 
12  Çalı and Koch (2014), 314. 
13  Idem. 
14  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 163; Comparable characterisation made in: Execution interview 
10. 
15  Execution interview 9.  
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Court’s judgments.16 Considering the foregoing, the institution is of great 
importance to the realisation by the states of their obligation under Article 46(1) and 
by the Committee of its task under Article 46(2). The role of the Execution 
Department is not only twofold in the sense that it assists both the Committee and 
the respondent states,17 but also because it is both a ‘traditional record keeping 
administrative’ institution and a ‘norm guardian’ or ‘auditing’ institution’.18 It can 
be typified as a record-keeping institution because it keeps track of the state of play 
in execution, including the payment of just satisfaction.19 It has, however, also 
become increasingly an auditing institution, as it has ‘taken on an interpretive role 
in assessing how appropriate measures taken by states compare with previous 
practices of implementation’.20 
More concretely, the lawyers of the Execution Department assist the Committee 
by evaluating action plans/reports21 and by following up on decisions and interim 
resolutions adopted by the Committee. They also make proposals, to be adopted by 
the Committee, to, for example, transfer a case from enhanced to standard 
supervision and prepare documents for the DH meetings,22 such as, draft decisions 
and resolutions.23 The respondent states are assisted ‘by maintaining a permanent 
active dialogue with them’ in the form of, in particular, bilateral consultations.24 
This dialogue remains largely unseen and starts well before a case is discussed at a 
DH meeting.25 The lawyers can advise the states on execution measures and on 
problems which they may face when implementing these measures prior to the 
submission of the final action report.26 Indeed, the Committee expects the 
respondent states ‘to enter into consultations with the [Execution Department] on 
the appropriateness of measures proposed’ before they submit these documents.27 
The Execution Department can also assist the states with drafting action plans/ 
reports.28 Further, they can be supported by the Execution Department with the 
actual preparation of execution measures, such as, drafting a law.29  
As the foregoing suggests, the Committee has delegated various important 
interpretative and monitoring tasks to the Execution Department, although, 
formally, the Committee of course remains the final decision-maker.30 The deputies 
                                                        
16  Execution interview 10.  
17  Committee (2015), 13. 
18  Çalı and Koch (2014), 315. 
19  Idem. 
20  Idem.  
21  See for more information about these documents: section X.2.2.  
22  Execution interview 5.  
23  Committee (2013c), Part II paras. 163, 165.  
24  Ibid., Part II paras. 166. 
25  Execution interview 8.  
26  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 166; Execution interview 5; Execution interview 13. 
27  Çalı and Koch (2014), 315-316.  
28  Execution interview 2; Execution interview 12. 
29  Execution interview 9.  
30  Çalı and Koch (2014), 314. 
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are willing to delegate these tasks, because they see the institution as an ‘expert 
authority’ to which assessment they are prepared to defer.31 Furthermore, there is 
‘widespread acceptance amongst [the deputies] that they prefer to be guided by the 
[Execution Department], both in high-profile cases and in those with little political 
interest’.32 This willingness to delegate, defer and follow finds expression in, for 
example, the fact that Execution Department drafts decisions and resolutions for the 
Committee and that the Committee rarely rejects the drafts.33 The willingness also 
expresses itself in the reliance of the Committee on the Execution Department for 
the assessment of action plans/reports, containing proposed and implemented 
execution measures,34 and the ‘high degree of delegation to the [Execution 
Department] in solving interpretive disputes about compliance steps’.35 Indeed, the 
Execution Department must even ‘informally agree to the measures proposed by 
individual states before [the deputies] formally accept their action plans’.36 As these 
examples demonstrate, the delegation of responsibilities to the Execution 
Department concerns both, to a rather large extent, the supervision of the execution 
process and the ‘interpretation of compliance requirements’.37  
1.3 Outline of Certain Aspects of the Supervisory Process  
1.3.1 Procedure  
The Execution Department waits in principle for the respondent state to submit 
information in action plans/reports, prior to reaching out to it, as it is for the state to 
set the first step. Only once the state has submitted the information and the 
Execution Department has assessed it, the latter contacts the former to indicate 
whether it thinks additional execution measures are required.38 It will always do so, 
in the sense that it evaluates each action plan/report before forwarding it to the 
Committee, regardless of whether a case is under standard or enhanced 
supervision.39 The Execution Department can ask the state, as it often does, to 
improve the action plan/report.40 Once the process of assessment has started, the 
Execution Department may be constantly in touch with the respondent state.41  
                                                        
31  Ibid., 318. 
32  Ibid., 322; Confirmed by: Execution interview 2 and Execution interview 9; It was, however, also 
noted that, when a case is politically sensitive, the deputies may be less inclined to listen to the 
Execution Department (Execution interview 5). 
33  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 234; Execution interview 2; Execution interview 5. 
34  Execution interview 3.  
35  Çalı and Koch (2014), 311. 
36  Ibid., 316. 
37  Ibid., 314. 
38  Execution interview 2; Execution interview 5; Execution interview 9. 
39  Committee (2014), 21; Execution interview 2; Execution interview 10; Execution interview 12; 
Execution interview 13.  
40  Execution interview 2; Execution interview 12. 
41  Execution interview 12.  
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The preparation of the assessment, however, already begins prior to the state’s 
first submission. It is the Execution Department’s practice, after the judgment is 
issued and prior to the first submission by the state, to define which execution 
measures would be required and to identify the source of a violation in an internal 
document, which is not communicated to the state. When the action plan/report 
arrives, the respondent state’s proposals are compared with the findings in the 
internal document.42 Based on its own assessment, the Execution Department can, 
for example, ask the state to execute measures of a general nature, even if the state 
did not propose this itself in the action plan/report and even if the judgment 
concerned the situation of the individual applicant only. It is open to the respondent 
state to challenge the Execution Department’s conclusion as to the required 
execution measures during, for example, bilateral meetings.43 However, in practice, 
this appears to happen only rarely and even if it does happen, it is normally a matter 
of time before any disagreement is solved.44 As Execution Department staff have 
highlighted, ‘common understanding of what a judgment requires is often easy to 
reach through ‘consultations’’.45 When disagreement between the respondent state 
and the Execution Department nevertheless remains, the latter will defend its 
position at a DH meeting and ‘even though it is procedurally possible, it is not an 
appropriate form of conduct to challenge the [Execution Department] on action 
plans and reports’.46 It is, in sum, due to ‘a culture of deference to the [Execution 
Department] difficult for states to have the Committee approve action plans that are 
not supported by the [Execution Department]’.47 
When the state thinks supervision by the Committee can be closed because a 
judgment has been executed, it submits a final action report making a proposal to 
that effect. From that moment onward, the other states have six months to comment 
on or submit questions about the report. If the evaluation by the Execution 
Department of the report also leads to the conclusion that the supervision can be 
closed, a draft final resolution will be forwarded by the Execution Department for 
the Committee to adopt. If the Execution Department does not agree with the state’s 
proposal, it is for the Committee to decide on the matter at a DH meeting.48 
1.3.2 Grouping Cases Together  
The Execution Department approaches the large number of (repetitive) cases before 
the Committee by focusing on resolving the dysfunction and thus on tackling the 
                                                        
42  Execution interview 13.  
43  Çalı and Koch (2014), 316; See also: Committee, ‘Information Document’, 
CM/Inf/DH(2009)29rev, 3 June 2009.  
44  Çalı and Koch (2014), 316.  
45  Idem.  
46  Idem.  
47  Idem.  
48  Committee (2014), 22.  
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problem at the root of a group of cases, rather than dealing with repetitive cases in 
isolation. Repetitive cases are grouped together around one leading case to that 
end.49 A leading case is a case identified by the Court or the Committee as 
‘revealing a new structural / general problem in a respondent State, and which thus 
[requires] the adoption of new general measures’.50 Some groups may only exist out 
of few cases, but this ‘does not lessen the importance of underlying structural 
problems, in particular in view of their potential to generate repetitive cases and /or 
because of the general importance of the problem at issue (i.e. the excessive length 
of judicial proceedings)’.51  
1.3.3 Standards for Evaluation  
The execution measures described in an action plan/report are assessed by the 
Execution Department in the light of the Court’s findings in the relevant judgment, 
which are considered in the light of earlier and new case law.52 The staff at the 
Execution Department cannot expect more than what can be required by virtue of 
the judgment.53 The judgment therefore provides an evaluative framework.54  
Another evaluative framework is the Committee’s practice, as established by the 
final resolutions of the Committee in which it closes its supervision of the execution 
of a case, meaning the respondent state has discharged its obligation under Article 
46(1).55 The Execution Department assesses whether the execution measures for 
new cases are consistent with this practice. For this reason, it is important that 
action plans/reports are clear and self-explanatory; they are at the source of the 
Committee’s practice, as the final resolutions are adopted based on the reports.56 To 
assess the proposed or implemented measures, the lawyers of the Execution 
Department may also rely on recommendations and guidelines of the Committee.57 
These documents are used to ensure that the Execution Department, which deals 
with 47 states and is divided into 2 legal divisions, takes a uniform approach to 
evaluating action plans/reports.58 
1.3.4 Sources for Evaluation  
In carrying out its assessment of the execution measures, the Execution Department 
relies on different pieces of information. It first of all relies on the information 
                                                        
49  Ibid., 33.  
50  Idem. 
51  Ibid., 42. 
52  Ibid., 17; Çalı and Koch (2014), 316; Execution interview 12. 
53  Execution interview 5.  
54  Execution interview 9.  
55  Committee (2014), 17; Çalı and Koch (2014), 316; Execution interview 12.  
56  Execution interview 13.  
57  Execution interview 2.  
58  Idem.  
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submitted by the respondent state in its action plans/reports. This information is 
compared with and supplemented by information submitted under Rule 9 of the 
Committee’s Rules.59 This Rule allows the applicant to submit to the Committee 
information with regard to the payment of just satisfaction and individual measures. 
Besides, NGOs and national human rights institutions can submit any information 
regarding the execution of a judgment. The submissions made under Rule 9 are 
forwarded to the respondent state for its comments. Subsequently, the submissions, 
together with the state’s comments, are forwarded to the Committee.60  
In the context of the assessment of the general measures taken in response to a 
judgment, the conclusions of other monitoring bodies can be taken into account by 
the Committee (e.g. reports of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) 
regarding detention conditions). The Execution Department collects these 
conclusions of its own motion.61 One of the duties of the lawyers working at the 
Execution Department is to collect this information.62 One lawyer explained that 
this was only done for cases under enhanced supervision63 and another mentioned 
that the external information is primarily collected when there is an indication that a 
general problem exists, but that they also try to collect relevant information for the 
more isolated cases.64 For one staff member, the most important documents were 
those of the CPT and the Venice Commission,65 and indeed it is established practice 
for staff of the Execution Department to use CPT reports.66 Also, reports of the 
Commissioner and the Assembly may be relied upon. It has even occurred that, 
because the Execution Department knew that the Commissioner was about to issue 
a relevant report, it decided to suspend informally its supervision so it could take 
the report into account.67 Another interviewee, however, noted that the Execution 
Department relies on the reports of the Commissioner and the Assembly less than 
those of, for example, the CPT. (S)he at least had never relied on the reports of the 
Commissioner, nor on those of the Assembly.68 However, although Assembly and 
Commissioner documents are not always relied upon, the Execution Department 
does not seem to be unwilling to consider these documents. At the same time, it is 
clear that its reliance on these external sources of information, except for documents 
issued by the Committee, may lead to resistance by the states, because they are not 
mentioned under Rule 9. States may, for example, remind the Execution 
                                                        
59  Çalı and Koch (2014), 317; Amat (2009).  
60  Rule 9(3) for the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly 
Settlements; Amat (2009) 
61  Amat (2009); Execution interview 2; Execution interview 3. 
62  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 3. 
63  Execution interview 2. 
64  Execution interview 11.  
65  Execution interview 2. 
66  Execution interview 11.  
67  Idem.  
68  Execution interview 5.  
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Department staff of the non-binding nature of reports of the CPT.69 Furthermore, 
this approach can lead to discussions with the respondent state about the scope of a 
judgment70 and the respondent state may wonder whether the Execution 
Department sometimes goes too far in what it asks from it.71 This reaction could be 
avoided if the assessment demonstrates that the information falls within the scope 
of the execution of the judgment concerned. It should also be noted, in that respect, 
that the Court itself relies on findings by other monitoring bodies to conclude a 
violation.72 The conclusions of the other monitoring bodies can also be useful in the 
sense that the Committee may decide on the closure of a case when the state 
concerned commits to implementing recommendations of relevant monitoring 
bodies.73 
Lastly, the Court can be a source of information to the Execution Department.74 
The exchange of information with the Court is conducted through the ‘virtually’ 
daily contacts between the Registry and the Execution Department and in particular 
‘through exchanges of information between lawyers from the two entities’.75 The 
lawyers, for example, point out to each other relevant background information, such 
as, a new Supreme Court judgment or an academic article. Lawyers of the 
Execution Department can also ask for clarification of the judgment for the purpose 
of execution.76 It may, for example, be unclear from the judgment whether the 
applicant was released from detention.77 Further, Registry lawyers may be 
contacted for information on the situation in the respondent state where they were 
trained. As can be recalled from section X.1.2, unlike the Registry, the Execution 
Department does not have staff from all 47 states parties and may therefore lack 
certain knowledge.78 Another reason to contact the Registry can be to ask whether 
any new cases about a certain subject are in the pipeline. Such information can help 
establish whether the implemented general execution measures suffice.79 
Information which can also be retrieved by contacting the Registry is whether the 
Court has declared any cases inadmissible, which it postponed dealing with in a 
pilot judgment. Such information is not publicly available (through HUDOC) if the 
cases are declared inadmissible by a single judge, but can be important to the 
Execution Department, because it can contribute to establishing whether already 
                                                        
69  Execution interview 1.  
70  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 11.  
71  Execution interview 3.  
72  Execution interview 1.  
73  Idem.; See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Siliadin v. France’, ResDH(2011)210, 2 
December 2011; Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Ghavtadze and Others v. Georgia’, 
ResDH(2014)209, 12 November 2014. 
74  Execution interview 11. 
75  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 227.  
76  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 11. 
77  Execution interview 2.  
78  Idem.  
79  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 11; Execution interview 12; Registry interview 8.  
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implemented general execution measure are up to scratch.80 The just described 
exchange of questions and information between the Execution Department and the 
Registry of the Court is not institutionalised. Rather, it depends on whether persons 
at the Execution Department and the Registry know each other and whether they are 
in a good working relation.81 Such a relation can be developed as the result of 
contacts established during seminars or missions to the state parties and of the 
mobility of the Council of Europe staff, as some lawyers move between, for 
example, the Execution Department and the Registry.82 There is, however, also 
some more institutionalised contact between the Registry and the Execution 
Department. In 2014, the Court invited representatives of the Execution Department 
‘in order to discuss with judges a number of current issues concerning the execution 
of judgments’. According to the Court, these discussions were ‘very useful, 
allowing for an exchange of information and perspectives’ and the Court is ‘open to 
the prospect of holding them on a periodic basis’. 83 
2  THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PROCEDURES IN PRACTICE  
2.1 Article 46-indications 
Chapter VI assessed the dialogic potential of procedures enabling the interlocutors 
to influence the course of execution and thus the output of a judgment. Although 
Article 46-indications are one such procedure, they were not discussed in that 
chapter, because chapter VI only concerned the dialogic potential of these 
procedures on paper.84 The power of the Court to make Article 46- indications is 
nowhere explicitly laid down in the Convention.85 On the contrary, a draft article 
giving the Court the power to order remedial measures did not make it to the 
Convention in 1950 and, as is explained below as well, the Court itself refused to 
make suggestions as regards such measures for a long time.86 It is therefore 
appropriate to discuss this procedural step only in this chapter on the dialogicness of 
procedures in practice.  
Compared with Article 41, there can, according to the Court, ‘be no doubt of the 
greater importance of Article 46’, as the states are under the latter Article not only 
obliged to pay sums awarded by way of just satisfaction, but also to select, where 
appropriate, general and individual measures to execute the judgment.87 
                                                        
80  Execution interview 2.  
81  Execution interview 3; Execution interview 11; Registry interview 8. 
82  Execution interview 2; Execution interview 3; Execution interview 5; Execution interview 11; 
Registry interview 8. 
83  ECtHR (2015e), para. 19; See also: Committee (2015), 13.  
84  Article 46-indications were, however, shortly mentioned in section II.2.4.3 as a manifestation of the 
effectiveness principle.  
85  See for possible legal bases: Cremer (2014), 52-57; Sicilianos (2014), 306-313.  
86  Robertson (1975), 300, 302; See also: Cremer (2014), 40. 
87  Salah v. the Netherlands, No. 8196/02, 6 July 2006, para. 71.  
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Nevertheless, until the 1990s, the Court categorically refused making any indication 
as to the required execution measures.88 This refusal probably stemmed in part from 
the fact that the Convention is silent on the power of the Court to indicate any other 
measure than that of just satisfaction under Article 41.89 This fact, combined with 
the subsidiarity principle, easily leads to the conclusion that the choice for 
execution measures belongs to the states’ discretion alone. In spite of the foregoing, 
the Court has started to make Article 46-indications, mainly for purposes of 
clarification. The first indications concerned individual measures required to 
remedy a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 because of expropriation or 
nationalisation.90 The Court made its very first indication in the case of 
Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece, where it held that Greece had to return to 
the applicant an area of land of over 100,000 square meters, including the buildings 
on it, and that, failing such restitution, it had to pay the applicants over 
5,551,000,000 drachmas.91 From the mid-zeroes, the Court has indicated, and 
sometimes repeated in the operative provisions of a judgment, individual measures 
in other contexts as well, as is illustrated below. Additionally, after its first pilot 
judgment in 2004, the Court started to indicate execution measures of a general 
nature in non-pilot judgments, normally without repeating them in the operative 
provisions. In a case against Turkey, the Court for example stated that ‘the 
respondent state should bring its legislation in line with the principles set out in [...] 
the European Prison Rules’.92 The Court has currently ‘effectively taken to 
prescribing the acceptable parameters of remedies (and proscribing unacceptable 
ones) in a manner and at a level of detail which would not have been conceivable in 
earlier periods’.93  
Taking account of the different nature of individual and the general measures, 
the discussion of Article 46-indications is, where appropriate, divided along the 
lines of these two types of measures. Since general measures are often ordered in 
the course of the PJP, which practice is discussed separately in chapter XI, this 
section does not address general measures indicated in that context.94 
After this more general introduction to Article 46-indications, this section 
outlines their frequency and areas of use. The other three parts of the section 
address the reasons for the Court to make an indication, the content of the 
indications and the influence of the indications on the discussions between the 
Execution Department and the respondent state.  
                                                        
88  See, e.g.: Dudgeon v. UK (Art. 41), No. 7525/76, 24 February 1983, para. 15.  
89  Harris et. al. (2014), 163; Van Dijk et al. (2006), 275; See also: Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 9 
January 2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Yudkivska.  
90  Colandrea (2007), 398.  
91  The Court made its first indication in Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Art. 41), No. 
14556/89, 31 October 1995.  
92  Gülmez v. Turkey, No. 16330/02, 20 May 2008, para. 63. 
93  Harmsen (2011), 136; See also: 163-165; Colandrea (2007), 398; Helfer (2008), 147; Leach (2009), 
731; Harris et. al. (2014).  
94  Nor does it draw on examples of general measures in pilot judgments.  
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2.1.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
According to the Committee, the Court issued in 2013 sixteen judgments and in 
2014 24 judgments ‘with a special part on Article 46 containing indications/ 
recommendations relevant for the execution’.95 These numbers can be compared 
with 3661 and 2388 applications decided by judgment in 2013 and 2014 
respectively.96 Clearly therefore, an Article 46-indication is an exceptional 
occurrence, which is probably the result of the normally declaratory nature of the 
Court’s judgments and the principle that the obligation to execute is one of result.  
As explained above, the Court made its first Article 46-indications as regards 
individual measures in case of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1 due to 
nationalisation or expropriation. In this first category of cases, the Court indicates 
that the state should return the nationalised or expropriated property to the applicant 
or should, if that is impossible, give the applicant a sum of money by way of just 
satisfaction. The Court normally repeats such indications in the operative provisions 
of its judgment.97 Further, in several cases in which it found a violation of Article 6 
the Court has considered that ‘where an individual [...] has been convicted by a 
court that did not meet the Convention requirements of independence and 
impartiality, a retrial or reopening of the case, if requested, represents in principle 
an appropriate way of redressing the violation’.98 The Court has, however, 
emphasised that it cannot ‘indicate how any new trial [...] is to proceed and what 
form it is to take’, because ‘[t]he respondent state remains free, subject to the 
monitoring by the [Committee] to choose the means by which it will discharge its 
obligation to put the applicant, as far as possible, in the position he would have been 
in had the requirements of the Convention not been disregarded’.99 Additionally, 
the Grand Chamber has stressed that ‘[w]ith regard in particular to the reopening of 
proceedings, the Court clearly does not have jurisdiction to order such measures’.100 
However, more recently, the Court has noted that ‘in doing so [i.e. holding that the 
most appropriate form of reparation for the violation found could be the reopening 
of domestic proceedings] the Court has specified this measure in the operative part 
of the judgment’.101 Another category of cases where the Court has indicated 
individual measures are Article 6 cases warranting the enforcement of a domestic 
                                                        
95  Committee (2015), 12 (emphasis in original; this number includes pilot judgments). 
96  ECtHR (2015a), 165.  
97  See, e.g.: Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Art. 41), No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, 
para. 2 operative provisions; Brumărescu v. Romania (GC) (Art. 41), No. 28342/95, 23 January 
2001, para. 1 operative provisions; Vasiliu v. Romania, No. 29407/95, 21 May 2002, para. 4 
operative provisions. 
98  Öcalan v. Turkey (GC), No. 46221/99, 12 May 2005, para. 210.  
99  Sejdovic v. Italy (GC), No. 56581/00, 1 March 2006, para. 127.  
100  VGT v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 89.  
101  Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, para. 206; The Court mentions as examples: 
Lungoci v. Romania, No. 62710/00, 26 January 2006 and Ajdarić v. Croatia, No. 20883/09, 13 
December 2011.  
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(judicial) decision.102 Further, the Court has required the state in the dictum of its 
judgment to release the applicant, as it for instance did in Assanidze v. Georgia.103 
Yet another category is cases where the Court has indicated that the respondent 
state should improve the conditions of detention in which the applicant finds 
himself.104 Further, the Court has indicated individual measures in cases where the 
applicants’ rights were violated by their removal from the area protected by the 
Convention.105 As can be expected, however, not all Article 46-indications 
concerning individual measures fall into the above categories.106 
The categories of non-pilot cases in which the Court outlines general measures 
are in part comparable to the categories of individual measures. One group of 
general measures are indicated in Article 1 of Protocol 1 cases about nationalisation 
or pension-related problems. The finding of a violation of the said Article is thereby 
often joined by the finding of a violation of Article 6 due to the length of 
procedures or Article 13 because there is no effective domestic remedy available.107 
The category of detention-related cases also applies to general measures, both in 
cases brought under Articles 3108 and 5.109 Two other categories are cases 
concerning non-execution of domestic judgments110 and the length of domestic 
judicial proceedings,111 although, as in the case of individual measures, not all 
general measures fall in the categories just discussed. 
                                                        
102  See, e.g.: Ilić v. Serbia, No. 30132/04, 9 October 2007, para. 112; Kostić t. Servië, No. 41760/04, 
25 November 2008, para. 80.  
103  No. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, para. 14 operative provisions; See also: Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova 
and Russia (GC), No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para. 22 operative provisions; Del Rio Prada v. Spain 
(GC), No. 42750/09, 21 October 2013, para. 5 operative provisions.  
104  See, e.g.: Dybeku v. Albania, No. 41153/06, 18 December 2007, para. 64; Sławomir Musiał v. 
Poland, No. 28300/06, 20 January 2009, para. 108; Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), No. 36760/06, 17 
January 2012, para. 257.  
104  Colandrea (2007), 398.  
105  See, e.g.: Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, paras. 252-255. 
106  See, e.g.: Maestri v. Italy (GC), No. 39748/88, 17 February 2004; Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 
9 January 2013.  
107  See, e.g.: Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006; Driza v. Albania, No. 
33771/02, 13 November 2007; Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07, 31 July 2012.  
108  See, e.g.: Dybeku v. Albania, No. 41153/06, 18 December 2007, para. 64; Orchowski v. Poland, 
No. 17885/04, 22 October 2009, paras. 153-154; Mandić and Jović v. Slovenia, No. 5774/10 et al., 
20 October 2011, paras. 127-128.  
109  See, e.g.: Kauczor v. Poland, No. 45219/06, 3 February 2009, para. 62; Cahit Demirel v. Turkey, 
No. 18623/03, 7 July 2009, para. 48; Kharchenko v. Ukraine, No. 40107/02, 10 February 2011, 
para. 101.  
110  Ramadhi and Others v. Albania, No. 38222/02, 13 November 2007, paras. 90-94; Eltari v. Albania, 
No. 16530/06, 8 March 2011, paras. 97-100; Fondation Foyers des élèves de l’Église réformée et 
Stanomirescu v. Romania, No. 2699/03, 7 January 2014, para. 84.  
111  Lukenda v. Slovenia, No. 23032/02, 6 October 2005, para. 98; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 
36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 240; Riccardi Pizzati v. Italy (GC), No. 62361/00, 29 March 2006, 
para. 127. 
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2.1.2 Reasons to Make an Article 46-indication  
Different reasons, which can be derived from the Court’s judgments, appear to 
motivate the Court to indicate measures under Article 46. Regardless of the type of 
measure that it considers, the Court has reiterated that ‘its purpose in giving 
indications under Article 46 is to aid or encourage the national authorities in taking 
the steps required to execute a judgment’.112 
Regarding individual measures specifically, the Court sometimes refers to the 
particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to end a violation,113 which 
means the seriousness of a violation plays a role. Other reasons to make an 
indication are the need for the applicant not to unnecessarily prolong the procedure 
to obtain just satisfaction114 and the nature of the violation, if it does not ‘leave any 
real choice as to the measures required to remedy it’.115 A consideration which can 
play a role in the background, as one of the interviewees explained, is that 
individual measures may help empower the individual applicant vis-à-vis the 
domestic authorities in the execution phase by giving him more than just the general 
applicability of Article 46 to rely upon, but also an indication by the very Court 
which judgment they must execute.116 Likewise, a finding of the Court under 
Article 46 can be relied upon and referred to as a justification by the domestic 
authorities themselves when they must take an execution measure which is 
unpopular with the general public.117 For example, in Del Rio Prada v. Spain, the 
Court, after having held that the applicant’s detention had not been ‘lawful’ within 
the meaning of Article 5(1), ordered the respondent state to ensure her release at the 
earliest possible date.118 Even though releasing the applicant – a convicted ETA 
member – was no doubt an unpopular measure, she was freed the day after the 
judgment was issued.119 This would probably not have happened so swiftly, had 
there not been an indication in the judgment.120  
                                                        
112  ECtHR (2015e), para. 14; See also: Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 
2009, para. 148; Stanev v. Bulgaria (GC), No. 36760/06, 17 January 2012, para. 255; Del Rio 
Prada v. Spain (GC), No. 42750/09, 21 October 2013, para. 138.  
113  See, e.g.: Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. UK, No. 61498/08, 2 March 2010, para. 171; M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece (GC), No. 30696/09 , 21 January 2011, para. 402; Gluhaković v. Croatia, No. 
21188/09, 12 April 2011, para. 89.  
114  See, e.g.: De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (Art. 41), No. 2832/66 et al., 10 March 1972, 
para. 16; Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain (Art. 41), No. 10588/83, 13 June 1994, para. 17; 
Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Art. 41), No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, para. 40.  
115  Assanidze v. Georgia (GC), No. 71503/01, 8 April 2004, para. 202; Aleksanyan v. Russia, No. 
46468/06, 22 December 2008, para. 236; Sławomir Musiał v. Poland, No. 28300/06, 20 January 
2009, para. 107.  
116  Judge interview 6.  
117  Execution interview 6; Judge interview 3. 
118  Del Rio Prada v. Spain (GC), No. 42750/09, 21 October 2013, para. 3 operative provisions.  
119  France 14, ‘Spain Frees ETA Prisoner after European Court Ruling’, 22 October 2013 
(<www.france24.com/en/20131022-spain-frees-eta-basque-prisoner-european-court-human-
rights/>).  
120  Judge interview 3.  
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A reason for the Court to indicate a general measure is the identification in the 
judgment of the existence of a systemic domestic problem.121 Indeed, it has been 
said that the Court’s case law has thus taken ‘a systemic turn’, which ‘refers to a 
trend within Strasbourg jurisprudence whereby increasingly explicit attention is 
being paid to underlying or systemic problems of human rights protection’.122 From 
this perspective, the indication of general measures is understandable, as it helps 
emphasise that an individual violation should be placed in a larger perspective. To 
illustrate, in one judgment, when noting that the respondent state should take 
appropriate legislative and/or other general measures, the Court noted that, whilst it 
had ‘primarily focused on the particular circumstances of the applicant’s case, [...] 
the problem underlying that [individual] violation concerns the legislation itself and 
[...] its findings extend beyond the sole interests of the applicant in the instant 
case’.123 The foregoing inevitably means that, if the respondent state has already set 
up a remedy that deals with the root cause of a systemic problem, the Court will 
consider it unnecessary to indicate any general measures.124 Pragmatic reasons 
probably also play a role in the Court’s decision to indicate a general measure, as it 
sometimes refers to the large number of applicants or persons affected125 and the 
need to remedy a systemic defect in order to prevent the Convention system from 
being compromised by a large number of applications arising out of the same 
cause.126 Indicating general measures is therefore also a way to prevent repetitive 
cases.127 Related to this, it was noted in the interviews that the indication of a 
general measure in a non-pilot judgment can be a trailblazer for the Court should it 
want to apply the PJP in the future if, in spite of the indication, similar cases reach 
the Court.128 Finally, Committee resolutions can have a bearing on the Court’s 
decision to order general measures.129 This is apparent from Article 46-indications 
referring to resolutions and decisions of the Committee. To illustrate, the Court 
noted in one judgment that ‘the Committee [...] recently expressed its concern about 
investigative delay [...] as regards four of the above-cited six judgments concerning 
Northern Ireland’ and that ‘[a]lmost twelve years after those four judgments were 
delivered, the [Committee] continues to supervise individual measures of execution 
                                                        
121  Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 236; Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 
21722/11, 9 January 2013, paras. 199-200; Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 
2013 para. 256.  
122  Harmsen (2007), 41; See also: Glas (2014), 674-680.  
123  Statileo v. Croatia, No. 12027/10, 10 July 2014, para. 165.  
124  Sürmeli v. Germany (GC), No. 75529/01, 8 June 2006, paras. 138-139.  
125  Grudić v. Serbia, No. 31925/08, 17 April 2012, para. 99; Barta and Drajkó v. Hungary, No. 
35729/12, 17 December 2013, para. 47; Bittó and Others v. Slovakia, No. 30255/09, 28 January 
2014, para. 133.  
126  Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, para. 236.  
127  Judge interview 6.  
128  Registry interview 2.  
129  Idem.  
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concerning investigative delay’.130 After making these remarks, the Court indicated 
that Ireland should take ‘all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure [...] that 
the procedural requirements of Article 2 are complied with expeditiously’.131  
It is clear that different reasons move the Court to give an indication. However, 
it often remains difficult to establish why a certain indication was made or why the 
Court makes an indication in one case, but not in another, and why it applies the 
PJP to one case and indicates general measures without applying that procedure in 
another.132 In the area of Article 46, the Court therefore seems to be making 
decisions on a case-by-case basis, without being wholly consistent.133 
2.1.3 Content  
The discussion now moves from reasons to make an Article 46-indication to the 
content of these indications. It is not so much a discussion of the content of the 
execution measures, because the content necessarily varies per case as the facts of 
the cases usually differ. Furthermore, examples of execution measures ordered 
under Article 46 were already mentioned when discussing the areas of use above. 
Instead, the discussion is centred on the means by which the Court can vary the 
preciseness of the indications. In addition to that, it is described how the Court can 
also use Article 46-indications to clarify what the execution of a judgment does not 
require.  
Regarding individual measures, the Court’s considerations are rather precise 
when the very nature of a violation does not leave any real choice as to the measure 
required, which may, for example, lead the Court to order the respondent state to 
reinstate the applicant in the post of judge of the Supreme Court.134 On the other 
hand, when the Court concludes, for example, that ‘[g]iven the variety of means 
available [...] and the nature of the issues involved’, it cannot assess the specific 
measures to be taken, the respondent state has more discretion.135 Quite some 
discretion also applied when the Court found that the applicant did not have a fair 
trial and ordered a retrial, without specifying what the outcome of the trial should 
be.136 Nevertheless, in such Article 6 cases, the Court may indicate what the ‘most 
natural execution of its judgment’ would be, ‘which best corresponds to the 
principle of restitutio in integrum’.137 This clearly decreases the state’s discretion. 
                                                        
130  McCaughey and Others v. UK, No. 43098/09, 16 July 2013, para. 144; See also: Aslakhanova and 
Others v. Russia, No. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, para. 221; Zornić v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 3681/06, 15 July 2014, paras. 41-42.  
131  McCaughey and Others v. UK, No. 43098/09, 16 July 2013, para. 145.  
132  Execution interview 3.  
133  Execution interview 12; Judge interview 1; Registry interview 2.  
134  Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11, 9 January 2013, para. 208.  
135  Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013 para. 255.  
136  See for an exception: Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) (GC), No. 10249/03, 17 September 2009, para. 154. 
137  Maširević v. Serbia, No. 30671/08, 11 February 2014, para. 58; See also: Youth Initiative for 
Human Rights v. Serbia, No. 48135/06, 25 June 2013, para. 32.  
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The foregoing may lead the Court to, for example, ask the respondent state to 
ensure ‘with diligence, through appropriate procedure and if the applicant so 
requests, that his appeal on points of law receives an examination on the merits in 
accordance with’ the Convention requirements.138 In addition to the foregoing, the 
Court can vary the preciseness of its indications by giving the state the choice 
between two measures, although it usually clarifies which one it prefers.139 The 
Court appears to do so when it is unlikely that the state executes the preferred 
measure.  
As concerns general measures, the Court can, rather imprecisely, only indicate 
that a general measure should be executed, thus leaving it to the state, under the 
supervision of the Committee, to determine what the measure will entail.140 To 
illustrate, the Court explained in Aslakhanova and Others v. Russia that ‘[g]iven the 
scope and nature of the problems involved, [it] is not in a position to order the exact 
general and individual measures’; it fell to the Committee ‘to address the issue of 
what – in practical terms – may be required of the respondent State by way of 
compliance, and when’.141 The Court nevertheless provided rather elaborate 
guidance on the measures that should be taken.142 It may also remark that ‘a 
thorough assessment of [avenues for adoption of general measures] goes beyond the 
Court’s judicial function in view of the numerous legal, administrative, practical 
and security issues involved’.143 Somewhat more precisely, the Court can indicate 
that ‘whatever the specific modalities chosen, this must involve the State taking, as 
a matter of some priority, all necessary and appropriate measures to ensure [...] that 
the procedural requirements of Article 2 are complied with expeditiously’.144 
Alternatively, the Court can define more clearly the content or desired output of a 
measure.145  
The Court may also use the Article 46-considerations to explain what should not 
be derived from the judgment. Article 46 can therefore be used in a ‘negative’ 
manner.146 According to the Court, indicating in the judgment ‘that apart from the 
payment of just any just satisfaction awarded, no other measure [...] is required’ is 
‘one possibility for bringing greater clarity to the execution stage of 
                                                        
138  Maširević v. Serbia, No. 30671/08, 11 February 2014, para. 58.  
139  See, e.g.: Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Art. 41), No. 14556/89, 31 October 1995, 
paras. 38-39; Bijelić v. Montenegro and Serbia, No. 11890/05, 28 April 2000, paras. 94-95; 
Yordanova and Others v. Bulgaria, No. 25446/06, 24 April 2012, para. 167.  
140  See e.g.: Kauczor v. Poland, No. 45219/06, 3 February 2009, para. 62; Vyerentsov v. Ukraine, No. 
20372/11, 11 April 2013, para. 95.  
141  No. 2944/06 et al., 18 December 2012, para. 220.  
142  Ibid., paras. 221-238.  
143  Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, para. 264.  
144  McCaughey and Others v. UK, No. 43098/09, 16 July 2013, para. 145.  
145  See, e.g.: Driza v. Albania, No. 33771/02, 13 November 2007, paras. 124-126; Savriddin 
Dzhurayev v. Russia, No. 71386/10, 25 April 2013, paras. 256-264; Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 
21722/11, 9 January 2013, paras. 199-202. 
146  The Court also issues ‘negative’ case law, see: Myjer and Kempees (2015).  
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proceedings’.147 In, for example, S.J. v. Belgium, after requiring Belgium to 
introduce an appeal with suspensive effect, the Court clarified that the indication 
‘ne concerne pas les cas où, avant la délivrance de l’ordre de quitter le territoire, 
l’étranger a pu faire examiner l’ensemble de ses griefs tirés de l’article 3 de la 
Convention par une juridiction au terme d’une procédure répondant aux exigences 
de l’article 13 de la Convention’.148 This addition, as well as the indication itself, 
clarified the scope of the obligations under Article 46, as the judgment could 
potentially lead to different interpretations of that scope. Comparably, in a judgment 
against Hungary, the Court first observed that ‘a reform [...] of the system of review 
of whole life sentences’149 was required and then added that ‘review of whole life 
sentences must not necessarily lead to the release of the prisoner in question’.150 It 
thus also clarified the scope of the Article 46 obligation. In addition to clarifying the 
scope of the obligation in this ‘negative’ manner, the Court may also clarify that no 
particular action is needed at all. In a judgment against Romania, the only indication 
of the Court was negative: it held that ‘[g]iven the special circumstances of the 
present case, in particular, the subsequent developments in the children’s and their 
family’s situation, the Court does not consider that its judgment should imply the 
return of the applicant’s children to the U.S.’151 The Court made this negative 
indication in spite of the fact that it had found a violation of Article 8. This Article 
had been violated because the decision-making process under domestic law 
regarding the applicant’s complaint under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction did not satisfy the procedural 
requirements in Article 8.152 
2.1.4 Place of the Indication  
Besides by varying the content of its indications, the Court can also attain variation 
in judgments containing an Article 46-indication by (not) repeating the measure in 
the operative provisions. This possibility only exists for individual measures 
however, because the Court does normally not repeat the recommended general 
measures in the operative provisions of a non-pilot judgment as was explained 
above. Compared to pilot judgments, the Court’s position is therefore ‘drafted in a 
less imperative manner’ and its indications, ‘while not entirely void of legally 
binding authority, display features more typical of recommendations or appeals’.153 
According to a Judge, general measures not reappearing in the operative part 
                                                        
147  ECtHR (2015e), para. 18.  
148  S.J. v. Belgium, No. 70055/10, 27 February 2014, para. 153 (emphasis added).  
149  László Magyar v. Hungary, No. 73593/10 , 20 May 2014, para. 71. 
150  Ibid., para. 72.  
151  Blaga v. Romania, No. 54443/10, 1 July 2014, para. 107 (emphasis added).  
152  Ibid., paras. 90-91; See for another example (in a pilot judgment): Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 
147.  
153  Garlicki (2007), 191.  
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‘indicate the necessity of general measures and warn the State that, as long as such 
measures are not in place, the Court will continue to examine applications of similar 
nature and to find violations in all such cases’.154 As stated, the Court sometimes 
recommends an individual measures only in the merits,155 but may also repeat it in 
the operative provisions of a judgment.156 In the former case, the respondent state 
has legal room to refuse to follow the Court’s indication. Whether this also means 
that the state can refuse to follow the Court in practice is questionable, because the 
Committee will probably not close its supervision of a case and thus approve the 
execution of a judgment when the state refused to follow the Court’s indication, 
even when it only concerned a recommendation.157 Moreover, for the Execution 
Department and the Committee there is no major material difference in terms of the 
execution measures required depending on whether or not Article 46-indications 
reappear in the operative provisions.158 
2.1.5 Effects of the Indication  
When the Court makes an Article 46-indication, it becomes clearer what the state 
needs to do and what the Execution Department can require of it in the execution 
phase.159 In other words, these indications strengthen the evaluative framework 
based on which the Execution Department assess the action plans/reports.160 More 
practically speaking, Article 46-indications help avoid lengthy discussions with the 
state and help save time because it is comparably clear what a judgment requires.161 
This practical effect is strengthened if the measures reappear in the operative 
provisions, because states often argue about points not in the operative 
provisions.162 However, also in the absence of an Article 46-indication, may the 
Execution Department require the implementation of certain execution measures 
and also if the Court suggests a measure without repeating it in the operative 
provisions, such measures are demanded, as was noted above.163  
A side effect of Article 46-indications is that states, in their discussions with the 
Execution Department, may sometimes rely on a contrario-reasoning. They then 
                                                        
154  Idem.  
155  See, e.g.: Daneshpayeh v. Turkey, No. 21086/04, 16 July 2000, para. 51.  
156  See. e.g.: Mužević v. Croatia, No. 39299/02, 16 November 2006, para. 3(a) operative provisions. 
157  See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 2; Cases against Albania’, 1164th meeting, 7 March 
2013, para. 4. It decided inter alia about the execution of Laska and Lika v. Albania, No. 12315/04 
et al., 20 April 2010. It repeated that the individual measures proposed by the Court (not repeated in 
the operative provisions) had to be executed. 
158  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 2; Execution interview 5; Execution interview 9; 
Execution interview 12; Execution interview 13.  
159  Execution interview 5.  
160  See for more information about the evaluative framework: section X.1.3.3.  
161  Execution interview 3.  
162  Execution interview 6.  
163  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 2; Execution interview 5; Execution interview 9; 
Execution interview 12; Execution interview 13.  
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use the fact that the Court did not make an indication as an excuse for not having to 
do anything at all, or as proof that there does not exist a structural problem, because 
the Court did not identify it.164 Similarly, if the Court has suggested a measure and 
the Execution Department has proposed that the states goes beyond that, the state 
may reply that there is no need for such a measure because it is not in the judgment. 
Therefore, the more explicit the judgment of the Court, the more narrow execution 
becomes in the sense that the state will likely not be willing to go beyond what the 
Court explicitly demanded.165 
2.2 Action Plans/Reports  
As can be recalled from section VI.1, action plans/reports are documents submitted 
by the respondent state to the Committee that set out the execution measures which 
the state intends to take or has already taken after an adverse judgment has become 
final. During the interviews, it was emphasised that action plans/reports are 
extremely important; they are vital to facilitating the execution process.166 They 
facilitate, for example, making a global analysis of what is required by virtue of 
Article 46 in a group of cases, as cases are often grouped together based on the 
structural problem by which they are caused.167 The current working methods, 
which include the use of consolidated action plans/reports presenting the whole 
picture of the state of execution, compare positively with the previous working 
methods under which the states sent different pieces of raw information on 
execution at different moments in time.168  
This section, after addressing which information was relied on to describe the 
practice of action plans/reports, deals with the question whether action plans/reports 
are submitted at all and on time. The bulk and of this section is taken up with a 
description of the content and the quality of the documents.  
2.2.1 Methodology  
One piece of information relied upon to describe the content of action plans/reports, 
are the documents listed on a part of the Committee’s website named ‘Action plans 
received from respondent States’ and ‘Action reports received from respondent 
States’.169 On 6 March 2014, 50 action plans were selected from the in total 540 
action plans available online. At least one action plan was looked at in respect of 
each respondent state, and in respect of some respondent states two action plans 
were looked at, until the number of 50 was reached. On the same date, a selection of 
                                                        
164  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 3; Execution interview 6. 
165  Execution interview 2.  
166  Execution interview 3; Execution interview 9; Execution interview 11.  
167  Execution interview 1; See also: section X.1.3.2. 
168  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 3; Execution interview 13. 
169  See: www.coe.int/t/cm, under Human Rights (DH) meetings (Execution of judgments). 
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50 action reports was made by going through the content of 50 reports of the in total 
948 listed on the website. The website listed the reports from the youngest to the 
oldest and the 50 ‘youngest’ reports were looked at. This selection yielded reports 
from 22 different states.  
2.2.2 Submissions  
Action plans are normally duly submitted; in 2012, for example, ‘no case has 
necessitated special [...] attention because of the absence of an action plan’.170 
Moreover, the ‘reactivity’ of respondent states has increased as the number of 
action plans/reports submitted in 2014 almost doubled since 2012.171 However, the 
submissions are sometimes delayed. If the states cannot or do not submit an action 
plan on time, the Execution Department expects them to at least present a time 
table.172 If they do not meet the first deadline, they are sent a reminder and are 
given a new deadline of three months.173 In addition to delays, the decisions of the 
Committee evidence that incomplete submissions sometimes are a problem.174 
The question has been raised what the appropriate response would be if the 
respondent state fails to submit a document.175 In response to this question, the 
deputies decided that, if a state does not submit anything after a reminder and a new 
deadline of three months and ‘does not provide any explanation for this state of 
affairs’, the Secretariat proposes that the case be examined under the enhanced 
procedure.176 The Committee will then adopt a decision at the first DH meeting 
following the expiry of the new deadline ‘inviting the member state concerned to 
provide an action plan/report without any further delay’.177 However, in the 
deliberations preceding the adoption of this decision, some deputies ‘indicated that 
they did not feel that [the failure to submit an action plan/report] in itself warranted 
[...] enhanced supervision’.178 They felt that ‘[o]nly in case of persistent failure 
from the authorities [...] would the case be proposed for enhanced supervision’.179 
Furthermore, as an interviewee explained, if the enhanced procedure would be used 
as a threat in case a state delays a submission, it would put at risk the effectiveness 
of the enhanced procedure, because there are already many cases under enhanced 
                                                        
170  Committee (2013a), 13.  
171  Committee (2015), 10.  
172  Execution interview 5.  
173  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45 final, 7 December 2010, paras. 12, 27; 
Execution interview 12; Execution interview 13. 
174  See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 3; Cases against Albania’, 1164th meeting, 7 March 
2013; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 3; Cases against Azerbaijan’, 1172nd meeting, 6 June 
2013; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 9; Case against Hungary’, 1179th meeting, 26 
September 2013.  
175  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45 final, 7 December 2010, para. 18.  
176  Ibid., para. 27.  
177  Ibid., para. 28.  
178  Ibid., para. 18. 
179  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45 final, 7 December 2010, para. 18. 
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supervision. Besides that, putting a case under enhanced supervision requires a lot 
of paperwork.180 When looking at the annotated order of business of the most recent 
four DH meetings at the time of writing,181 it seems that cases are indeed not put 
under enhanced supervision because of a lack of a submission. None of the proposal 
from the chair for action required in respect of the cases discussed at the meetings 
concern the transfer of a case to the enhanced procedure in response to delays in the 
submission of an action plan/report. Other measures are used to put pressure on the 
state, such as a letter signed at the right level or bilateral meetings.182 Further, as the 
discussion of decisions and interim resolutions in section X.2.9 will demonstrate, 
these documents are used to point out delayed and incomplete submissions and to 
call on the states to provide required information. 
The states keep the Committee up to date about relevant developments on the 
domestic level by way of changing, revising and updating action plans/report after 
their first submission. A state may, for example, change proposed execution 
measures.183 Additionally, the states keep the Committee up to date through 
communications.184 The UK for example submitted a report of a parliamentary 
committee that undertook ‘pre-legislative scrutiny’ of draft legislative proposals on 
voting eligibility for prisoners,185 Greece forwarded the ‘Greek Action Plan on 
Asylum and Migration Management’,186 and the Czech Republic sent information 
about the result of an analysis of the diagnostic tools used for pupils from different 
socio-cultural environments as pertaining to Roma children.187 
2.2.3 Content  
The documents constituting the action plan first describe the judgment in the case 
under examination and give an account of the individual and general measures 
which have been or will be taken to execute the judgment. These descriptions differ 
in length, with particularly lengthy descriptions when a structural problem was 
found or when multiple cases are grouped together for the purposes of execution. 
                                                        
180  Execution interview 13; As another interviewee explained, the Department aims to prevent that a 
case is transferred to enhanced supervision (Execution interview 10). 
181  3-5 December 2013, 4-6 March 2014, 3-5 June 2014 and 23-25 September 2014. 
182  Execution interview 13.  
183  For action plans: Execution interview 5; See, e.g.: Cyprs, ‘Updated Action Plan on Michael 
Theodossiou Ltd, DH-DD(2013)439, 24 April 2013; Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Updated Action 
Plan on Ðokic’, DH-DD(2014)93, 20 January 2014; Turkey, ‘Revised Action Plan on Haluk 
Özmen’, DH-DD(2014)237, 14 February 2014; For action reports: Execution interview 12; See, 
e.g.: Poland, ‘Updated Action Report on Tysiac’, DH-DD(2014)104, 21 January 2014; Lithuania, 
‘Revised Action Report on Esertas’, DH-DD(2014)234, 14 February 2014; Italy, ‘Action Report on 
the Bracci group of cases’, DH-DD(2014)256, 19 February 2014.  
184  This information is made available online under Rule 8(2)(a) for the Supervision of the Execution 
of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements.  
185  UK, ‘Comm. on Hirst No. 2 and Greens and MT’, DH-DD(2013)1366, 18 December 2013.  
186  Greece, ‘Comm. on M.S.S.’, DH-DD(2013)711rev, 29 October 2013. 
187  Czech Republic, ‘Comm. on D.H. and Others’,DH-DD(2010)583E, 19 November 2010.  
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Individual measures are normally subdivided into the payment of just satisfaction 
and, where appropriate, other individual measures, such as the re-opening of 
proceedings or the release of the applicant from prison. A standard heading as 
regards general measures (and therefore a standard execution measure) is the 
dissemination and publication of the (translated) judgment. In addition to the 
judgment, the respondent state may choose to disseminate a decision or interim 
resolution of the Committee to certain domestic authorities, such as, courts or 
ministers.188 Other general measures include, for example, the introduction of 
legislation or the training of state agents. In this context, the state can also direct the 
Committee’s attention towards the direct effect of the Court’s judgments in the 
domestic legal order189 or highlight that domestic courts take into consideration 
relevant case law of the Court.190 Alternatively, the respondent state can explain 
that, in view of the isolated nature of the violation, no general measures are required 
besides the dissemination and publication of the judgment.191 Some action plans 
end with a conclusion stating, for example, that ‘the need for further individual and 
general measures is currently being assessed’,192 that ‘[t]he respondent state shall 
inform the [Committee] on further developments regarding the execution of 
individual measures’193 or that ‘necessity for further measures [...] needs to be 
evaluated against the expected Court’s decision on just satisfaction’.194 Action 
reports normally result in the conclusion that the respondent state considers that it 
has taken all measures necessary to execute a judgment and that, therefore, the 
Committee should close its supervision of the case. To support that conclusion, the 
respondent state may rely on general follow-up judgments195 of the Court196 or on a 
separate judgment on the question of just satisfaction in the case under 
supervision.197 Further, the state may find support for its conclusions in a 
Committee resolution in another case: in one report, France noted that the 
                                                        
188  Poland, ‘Action Report on the Trzaska Group of Cases’, DH-DD(2014)106, 21 January 2014, 4-5; 
Bulgaria, ‘Action Report on the Case of Lyubenova’, DH-DD(2014)170, 5 February 2014, 3.  
189  See, e.g.: Finland, ‘Action Plan/Action Report on Suuripää’, DH-DD(2012)189, 17 February 2012, 
2; Albania, ‘Action Plan on Berhani’, DH-DD(2013)1032, 7 October 2013, 2; Albania, ‘Action 
Plan on Caka’, DH-DD(2013)1033, 7 October 2013, 3; Latvia, ‘Action Report on Mihailovs’, DH-
DD(2014)200, 10 February 2014, 4.  
190  UK, ‘Action Report on Aswat’, DH-DD(2014)231, 14 February 2014, 1; Sweden, ‘Action Report 
on Andersson’, DH-DD(2014)192, 7 February 2014, 1.  
191  See, e.g.: Andorra, ‘Action Plan on Ute Saur Vallnett’, DH-DD(2013)438, 23 April 2013, 3; 
Croatia, ‘Action Plan on Bjedov’, DH-DD(2013)791, 10 July 2013, 3; Georgia, ‘Revised Action 
Report on Tchitchinadze’, DH-DD(2014)188, 7 February 2014, 2; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
‘Action Report on Milisavljević and Đukić’, DH-DD(2014)101, 21 January 2014, 3; France, 
‘Action Report on K.K.’, DH-DD(2014)111, 21 January 2014, 1; Moldova, ‘Action Plan on 
Levinta (no. 2)’, DH-DD(2014)232, 14 February 2014, 3. 
192  Bulgaria, ‘Action Plan on the Velikova Group of Cases’, DH-DD(2014)233, 14 February 2014 10.  
193  Croatia, ‘Action Plan on Bjedov’, DH-DD(2013)791, 10 July 2013, 3.  
194  Austria, ‘Action Plan on Klein’, DH-DD(2012)399, 12 April 2012, 2.  
195  See also: section X.2.11.  
196  See, e.g.: Latvia, ‘Action Report on Shannon’, DH-DD(2014)199, 10 February 2014, 3.  
197  Greece, ‘Revised Action Repont on Melis’, DH-DD(2014)189, 7 February 2014, 2. 
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implemented general measures were similar to those required by virtue of another 
judgment, which had been considered as sufficient by the Committee in a 
resolution.198 
The content of action plans/reports is factual and neutral. They contain a concise 
enumeration of planned or already implemented execution measures and their effect 
and scope. The states neither openly wrestle with the question which execution 
measures exactly must be taken, nor explain clearly why they have opted for a 
certain measure and how their choice relates to the Court’s findings. From the 
reports it therefore would seem to appear that execution is a largely straightforward 
and uncontroversial process.  
Exceptionally, the states refer to practical difficulties encountered in the 
execution process, but they do not refer to any difficulties relating to internal 
tension.199 The applicant may, for example, try ‘by all means to avoid the 
execution’200 or ‘continue de refuser toute collaboration’.201 Further, a state may 
warn the Committee that the execution process may take relatively long, ‘given the 
complexity of the issues to be dealt with in the forthcoming legislative process’202 
or it may clarify that ‘considering that the violation found resulted from insufficient 
coordination and cooperation of competent bodies and lack of action of general 
nature […], the identification and execution of general measures is a complex 
matter requiring coordination of a number of bodies’.203 Another example of a 
reference to practical difficulties is Bosnia and Herzegovina’s remark in a case 
about housing that ‘the full implementation of the general measures […] is possible 
only after the relevant authorities of the Republic of Serbia submit […] all data 
about the housing status of former occupancy rights holders’.204 In view of this 
difficulty, the state requested the Committee to ‘invite […] Serbia to provide all 
data necessary for the implementation of general measures in this case and to 
perform full cooperation with the relevant institutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’.205  
In line with the factual and neutral nature of the reports, the respondent states do 
not show criticism of the judgment which they are to execute. At most, a state 
explained, whilst emphasising that it ‘appreciates fully […] the ruling of the Court’, 
why the measures suggested by the Court may be hard to implement206 or why the 
violation found by the Court did not result primarily from legislation, as suggested 
by the Court, but from practice.207 Further, Ukraine noted once that the Court had 
                                                        
198  France, ‘Revised Action Report on of El Shennawy’, DH-DD(2014)112, 21 January 2014, 3.  
199  See also: section IV.2.  
200  Andorra, ‘Action Plan on Ute Saur Vallnett’, DH-DD(2013)438, 23 April 2013, 2.  
201  Belgium, ‘Action Plan on the L.B. Group of Cases’, DH-DD(2014)208, 11 February 2014, 3.  
202  Norway, ‘Action Plan on Lindheim and Others’, DH-DD(2013)501, 3 May 2013, 4. 
203  Croatia, ‘Updated Action Plan on Ðurđević’, DH-DD(2013)573, 22 May 2013, 2.  
204  Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘Updated Action Plan on Đokić’, DH-DD(2014)93, 20 January 2014, 3.  
205  Ibid., 3. 
206  Serbia, ‘Action Plan on Zorica Jovanovic’, DH-DD(2014)273, 27 February 2014, p. 2.  
207  Hungary, ‘Action Plan on Horvath and Kiss’, DH-DD(2014)186, 7 February 2014, 1.  
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challenged not only the section of a law which dealt specifically with the type of 
information at issue, namely information collected by the former Romanian 
intelligence services before 1989, but also with other provisions of the same law 
which were applicable to ongoing intelligence activities. The Ukrainian government 
nevertheless considered ‘that for the purposes of the execution of this case the scope 
of the violations found cannot be disassociated from the particular circumstances of 
the case namely the fact that it deals specifically with the processing of information 
collected […] before 1989, as opposed to ongoing intelligence collecting 
activities’.208 
2.2.4 Quality  
The quality of the documents varies from state to state,209 and sometimes from 
report to report of the same state.210 Also, it may happen that the structure is of high 
quality, but not the content.211 At times, the quality is so poor that lawyers of the 
Execution Department characterise the documents as incomprehensible.212 
Moreover, a state may simply state, but fail to explain, why no changes to domestic 
legislation are required. Such a lack of explanation is problematic, because it should 
be clear to other states and to the Execution Department why domestic legislation is 
in conformity with the Convention standards.213 Another issue may be that the case 
description is not properly drafted.214 Further, language problems may undermine 
the quality of the documents,215 including the translation of the document into 
French or English.216 The question of quality is partially one of domestic 
resources217 – some states are simply more willing than others to reserve resources 
for drafting high-quality documents,218 and of setting priorities – some states may, 
for example, prioritise making representations before the Court.219 The quality may 
also be compromised when not one specific person is responsible for execution on 
the domestic level220 or when that person does exist, but only stays in charge for a 
short period, meaning that knowledge is lost easily.221 
                                                        
208  Romania, ‘Action Report on Rotaru’, DH-DD(2014)137, DH-DD(2014)137, 2.  
209  Execution interview 9; Execution interview 10; Execution interview 11; Execution interview 12. 
210  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 10. 
211  Execution interview 9.  
212  Execution interview 9; Execution interview 12. 
213  Execution interview 2. 
214  Idem..  
215  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 10; Execution interview 12.  
216  Execution interview 12.  
217  Execution interview 10; Execution interview 12. 
218  Execution interview 2; Execution interview 12. 
219  Execution interview 11.  
220  Execution interview 9; Execution interview 11.  
221  Execution interview 10.  
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2.3 DH Meetings 
This section first shortly addresses the frequency of the DH meetings and their 
preparation and then outlines how cases are selected for debate. Subsequently, the 
attendees of the meetings and the meetings themselves are described. For the last 
description, three perspectives are used: matters relating to individual cases that can 
be deliberated on, general matters that can be taken up and the relevance of the 
principles and characteristics of execution for these meetings.  
2.3.1 Frequency  
DH meetings take place on a regular basis, four times a year, each time for three 
days in a row. As explained in chapter VI, all cases under the Committee’s 
supervision are placed on the agenda of each meeting. However, considering that 
there are only twelve days per year in total to discuss all cases and to adopt 
decisions and resolutions, in practice not all cases are dealt with. Indeed, ‘only a 
small fraction of cases are actually discussed – 20-30 cases from an agenda which 
includes as many as 2,000-3,000 cases for every meeting’.222 To illustrate, the list of 
cases for the meeting of 4-6 March 2014 proposed 28 items for ‘more detailed 
examination’, although each item consisted of one or more groups of similar 
cases.223 For the next meeting, 25 items were proposed.224 Of the cases selected, the 
discussion of one or two can take up a lot of time, meaning that even fewer cases 
are examined in some detail.225  
2.3.2 Preparation  
The states have the right to request that a case is put on the order of business, but 
this has never happened.226 As an Ambassador clarified: 
 
We trust that the [Execution Department] will make the right decision on singling out 
cases. Even though we can, we do not propose cases for oral debates ourselves.227 
 
                                                        
222  Cojocariu (2010), 12 ; Another source mentions that there are around 40 cases selected for debate, 
see: Committee (2013c), Part II para. 194.  
223  Committee, ‘Committee of Ministers to Examine Implementation of Human Rights Judgments’, 7 
February 2014, (<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/News/CP-07.02.2014_en.asp>); 
Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1193E, 7 
March 2014.  
224  Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1201, 6 
June 2014. 
225  Execution interview 8. 
226  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 195; Execution interview 9. 
227  Çalı and Koch (2014), 318 (Ambassador from Western Europe).  
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In practice, the deputies have therefore delegated the power to set the agenda to the 
Execution Department.228 During the selection process, the Execution Department 
informs the relevant domestic authorities of its intention to select a case for the 
order of business and consults with them about ‘the degree of maturity’ of the case 
that will be likely selected.229 
2.3.3 Selection  
Cases are selected for debate if ‘a collective debate would be beneficial to the 
process of execution, either for individual cases or in the interest of the execution 
process as a whole’.230 The interviews held at the Execution Department confirm 
that the decision to put a case on the order of business of a specific meeting means 
that the Committee intends to put pressure on the state concerned when there is a 
blockage in the execution process and, where necessary, support and encourage the 
measures taken at the national level.231 This tool is not lightly used, however, 
because there are many cases which potentially qualify for discussion.232 
Furthermore, other tools exist which can be used to move a state to execute a 
judgment.233 Another tool is, for example, a letter of the Committee to attract the 
attention of high level actors in the respondent state, such as the minister of foreign 
affairs, towards execution issues.234  
The Committee has adopted a non-exhaustive list of criteria, in the form of 
guidelines, for the chair conducting the DH meetings to propose which cases arise 
for debate, a proposal which is made by the Execution Department in practice. This 
list includes the two factors already referred to, namely ‘[t]here is a difference of 
appreciation between the [Execution Department] and the respondent state 
concerning the measures to be taken’ and ‘[t]here is a significant delay in execution 
[…]’.235 As was apparent from the interviews, these two factors carry relatively 
heavy weight. The other factors are: 
1. The applicant’s situation, because of the violation, warrants special supervision; 
2. The case marks a new departure in case law; 
3. The case discloses a potential systemic problem which is anticipated to give rise 
to similar cases in future; 
4. The case is between Contracting parties; and 
                                                        
228  Çalı and Koch (2014), 317; Execution interview 12. 
229  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 195. 
230  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2004)8 Final, 7 April 2004, Appendix II, para. 1(1). 
231  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 197; Execution interview 1; Execution interview 11; Execution 
interview 12; Execution interview 13; As noted by interviewee 1, it emerges from the spirit of the 
new twin-track system that the issues to be proposed for debate are closely linked to the progress in 
the execution process.  
232  Execution interview 12.  
233  Execution interview 10.  
234  Leach (2006b), 448; CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, paras. 32-33.  
235  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2004)8 Final, 7 April 2004, Appendix I, para. 1(1). 
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5. The case is requested for debate by a delegation or the Secretariat, subject to the 
provision that if the State Parties concerned and the Secretariat object there shall 
be no debate.236 
 
Moreover, it has occurred that the decision to select a case for debate was informed 
by ‘previous decisions of the [Committee], the existence of a deadline set by the 
Court for the adoption of measures, developments in the process at national level, 
the need for a reaction by the [Committee] to action taken at national level [and] the 
attitude of the authorities concerned’.237 
In addition, the Execution Department aims to avoid solely ‘blacklisting 
countries’, meaning that cases are also selected which allow the deputies to 
‘highlight good practices’ and which can show that a balance is sought between 
cases from different states.238 To illustrate, of the in total 86 cases placed on the 
order of business in 2011, 22 originated from different states, amongst which 11 
from EU member states. Further, the list included both states with a high and states 
with a low caseload and only four states had cases listed for each meeting.239 The 
interviews made clear that making positive remarks is not only about avoiding 
blacklisting, however: such remarks may also be necessary if the bilateral procedure 
does not work. The deputies then may see reason to send an encouraging message 
to the respondent state and to welcome publicly the measures which it has already 
taken.240  
The result of the selection process is that normally only cases under enhanced 
supervision are debated and that the same cases can reappear at multiple 
meetings.241 At the meeting of 4-6 March 2014, for example, all groups of cases, 
except for two, were categorised under the enhanced procedure. A case under 
standard supervision appears to be discussed only exceptionally, namely ‘if the 
situation should require some form of specific intervention’ on the part of the 
Committee. 242  
The Committee, in sum, discusses and supervises only the tip of the iceberg of 
all cases which are formally under its permanent supervision. The tip is especially 
problematic or politically sensitive cases where the Execution Department deems 
debate is necessary for and beneficial to the execution process. The permanent 
supervision of all cases is delegated to the Execution Department.243  
                                                        
236  Idem.  
237  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 194.  
238  Ibid., Part II, para. 197; See also: Çalı and Koch (2014), 321-322. 
239  Çalı and Koch (2014), 321.  
240  Execution interview 1.  
241  Execution interview 8.  
242  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 180.  
243  Çalı and Koch (2014), 316; Government agent interview 3.  
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2.3.4 Attendees  
As explained in chapter II, the decision-makers at the DH meetings are often legal 
experts or government agents, not usually ambassadors who function as deputies to 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and who formally from the Committee.244 The 
deputies are therefore free go themselves or to send a representative.245 When a 
politically sensitive case is on the agenda, the deputy may for example attend the 
meeting himself.246 Regardless of who attends the meeting, the decision-makers 
present at the DH meetings are referred to as ‘deputies’. These deputies are the 
decision-makers at the DH meetings; they have the right to vote.  
In addition to the deputies, other representatives of or persons working for the 
respondent state may attend the meetings, for example those responsible for 
drafting the action plans/reports.247 This is done more and more often and is 
encouraged by the Execution Department as the presence of these representatives 
can help increase their understanding of what the Committee requires.248 Further, 
representatives of authorities responsible for execution may come.249 In this way, 
they directly hear the criticism of the deputies.250 At the meeting of 4-6 March 
2014, also 26 government experts who were invited from the capitals attended the 
meeting.251 Further, in 2013, responsible ministers attended the meetings ‘on 
several occasions’ and explained, meaning they are allowed speak, the reforms 
which they were undertaking and the problems which they had encountered.252 In 
an annual report of the Committee, it was concluded on inter alia this basis that the 
‘dialogue with the government has continued to improve’.253 Furthermore, the 
ministers’ attendance was described as ‘a sign of their Government’s commitment 
to an effective execution process’.254 An interviewee of the Execution Department 
also noted that the attendance of, for example, a minister of justice or of education 
shows a high level of engagement.255 The decisions adopted during the meetings 
may therefore welcome the presence of a minister as a token of the authorities’ 
‘commitment and determination [...] to execute this judgment’.256 The staff of the 
                                                        
244  Ibid., 308.  
245  Execution interview 7; Execution interview 9; Execution interview 11.  
246  Lambert Abdelgawad (2002), 48.  
247  Execution interview 11.  
248  Execution interview 10; Idem. 
249  Execution interview 5. 
250  Execution interview 7.  
251  Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’ CM/Del/Dec(2014)1193, 7 
March 2014’. 
252  Committee (2014), 7.  
253  Idem.  
254  Idem; See also: Committee (2015), 7.  
255  Execution interview 9.  
256  Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 9; Case against the Czech Republic’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 1; See also: Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 1; Cases against Albania’, 
1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, para. 1.  
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Execution Department can also attend the DH meetings if they are involved in a 
case which is debated. They may take the floor to, for example, answer questions. 
The higher the management level of the lawyer, the more meetings are attended.257 
Staff of the Court’s Registry is allowed to attend a DH meeting as observers,258 but 
during the interviews it was noted that, in practice, they are now no longer 
present.259 Indeed, it was mentioned that their attendance is something which 
should not and therefore would not be proposed by the Court. 260 
2.3.5 The Meeting  
The deliberations of the deputies at the DH meetings are confidential,261 and 
although the output of the meetings in the form of decisions and resolutions is 
published, the ‘dense and formal language of its resolutions does not provide insight 
into the processes […] that lead to’ this output.262 Nevertheless, an attempt is made 
here to give some insight into discussions at the meetings from three perspectives. 
First, the type of action required in respect of the items put up for deliberation as 
outlined on the publicly available order of business is described. This description 
can give an indication of which issues pertaining to the cases are deliberated. Then, 
the possibility that the discussion takes a more general turn is explored, based on a 
report of the CDDH. Lastly, some principles and characteristics of the execution 
phase and their relevance for the DH meetings are examined, with the aim of 
clarifying the focus of and approach taken during these meetings.  
To take one meeting as an example, for the meeting of 4-6 March 2014 roughly 
four types of action were required in respect of the 28 items, that is, cases or groups 
of cases, selected for discussion. First of all, the meeting had to follow up on 
decisions and interim resolutions adopted previously. Further, it was necessary to 
evaluate the progress achieved in the execution of the judgments discussed, and 
more specifically, for example, to evaluate an updated action plan and the 
application of a certain law. It was also proposed to urge or invite some states to 
submit an action plan or additional information on the situation of the detained 
applicant, to comply with the indications given by the Court under Article 46 or to 
adopt the recommendation of a domestic parliamentary committee, which was to 
introduce a legislative proposal to implement a judgment. Finally, the deputies had 
to examine different matters, including the possibility of closing a case, a draft 
resolution, an amendment proposed by a respondent state and the payment of just 
satisfaction. The foregoing shows that the DH meetings are used for various 
                                                        
257  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 6; Execution interview 9.  
258  Committee (2013c), Part II para. 227.  
259  Execution interview 6.   
260  Registry interview 7.  
261  Art. 21 Council of Europe Statute. 
262  Çalı and Koch (2014), 311. 
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purposes: to follow up, to evaluate, to request information, to exercise peer pressure 
and to examine various documents and proposals.  
The debate is not necessarily related to an individual case or group of cases from 
the same state, but may also be a general, thematic discussion of a topic that 
regularly reappears, such as, that of individual measures in parental rights cases.263 
A more general discussion can also take place at the ordinary meetings of the 
Committee. The president of the Court goes to these meetings twice a year to speak 
about the latest Convention news and problems, including execution problems not 
related to an individual case.264  
Such general discussions allow the deputies to elaborate on principles that steer 
the Committee’s practice and, in this manner, guide national authorities in solving 
complex execution problems.265 Therefore, even though general discussions do not 
preclude the need to assess individual cases, they are useful because they can 
inspire both the Committee and the states.266 Indeed, the CDDH has explained that 
such debates offer ‘a unique perspective: the issues raised today in a given case are 
examined on the basis of the extensive experience of other States who are or have 
been confronted with similar issues/problems’ and the ‘solutions found by others 
can serve as inspiration and suggest possible solutions’.267 Not only the experience 
and solutions shared during such debates may be of help to other states, but also the 
insight that different states struggle with the same problem and all think a solution 
should be found. As an interviewee explained, executing judgments on inadequate 
prison conditions, for example, is often a domestically sensitive matter due to inter 
alia the high costs involved. Consensus at the DH meetings about the need to solve 
this problem can help the deputies persuade the authorities in the capitals that 
something needs to be done and that implementing financially burdensome 
measures is inevitable.268  
One of the guiding principles for the discussion of a case is the subsidiarity 
principle.269 The principle dictates that the states always remain primarily 
responsible for execution.270 They have ‘freedom of choice as regards the means to 
be employed in order to meet their [Convention] obligations’.271 As was confirmed 
by the staff of the Execution Department, to which much of the responsibility to 
supervise is delegated,272 it is indeed first for the state to present measures in an 
                                                        
263  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 23.  
264  Execution interview 7; Judge interview 5; Registry interview 7.  
265  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 23. 
266  Ibid., Appendix VI, paras. 23-24.  
267  Ibid., Appendix VI, para. 21; See also: Amat (2009) (‘Where the sharing of experience might help 
where also the peer pressure might help’). 
268  Execution interview 10.  
269  See also: section II.2.3. 
270  Committee, ‘Consolidated Document – New Working Methods Twin-track Supervision System’, 
para. 1(1).  
271  Committee (2010), 19.  
272  See: section X.1.2.  
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action plan/report and then for the Execution Department to make an assessment of 
the measures, based on which the deputies discuss the measures.273 For the DH 
meetings, the principle also implies that the respondent states individually, not the 
deputies collectively, in principle identify the measures required to execute a 
judgment. The deputies’ supervision only serves to ‘ensure that this result is 
achieved’.274 The freedom which the states have to indentify execution measures, 
however, ‘goes hand-in-hand with the [Committee’s] control so that in the course of 
its supervision of execution the [Committee] may also, where appropriate, adopt 
decisions or interim resolutions to express concern, encourage and/or make 
suggestions with respect to the execution’.275 Thus, the importance of the 
subsidiarity principle for the execution phase does not prevent the deputies from 
intervening at the DH meetings by way of decisions and interim resolutions. In line 
with the principle, however, the deputies’ decisions do not require the 
implementation of any specific execution measures.276 On the contrary, the states 
are usually merely encouraged to adopt the execution measures which they 
proposed themselves in the action plan/report.277 Comparably, the interim 
resolutions, although written in comparably strong language, do not impose a 
specific course of action on the states. At most, they can call upon them to, for 
example, take all necessary measures ‘so that the applicants benefit from 
proceedings in compliance with the Convention requirements’278 or encourage ‘the 
authorities to continue implementing awareness-raising activities among judges’.279 
Although it cannot be excluded that more specific measures are asked for during the 
deliberations, they at least do not make it into the official documents. The 
subsidiary principle therefore has great practical relevance for the DH meetings. 
Further, the discussion of execution measures during the DH meetings has been 
described as being of ‘a collegial, not an accusatory’ nature.280 In this regard it is 
illustrative that some deputies, when discussing measures to improve the execution 
of the Court’s judgments, have underlined that such measures ‘should not be used 
to stigmatise states or to take punitive measures against them, but rather to 
encourage the execution process’.281 During that discussion, it was added that the 
Committee’s role ‘is primarily to encourage the rapid progress of execution and that 
                                                        
273  Execution interview 5; Execution interview 9; Execution interview 12. 
274  Sundberg (2009), 473-474, 476.  
275  Committee (2010), 19.  
276  This is confirmed by the selection of decisions and interim resolutions relied upon in: section X.2.9.  
277  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 8; Cases against Bulgaria’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 6. 
278  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Bekir-Ousta and Others v. Greece; Emin and Others v. Greece; 
Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis v. Greece’, ResDH(2014)84, 15 June 2014.  
279  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009. 
280  Palmer (2010), 100; See also: Sundberg (2009), 470.  
281  CDDH (2013a), 3.  
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only in exceptional circumstances stronger measures should be used’.282 
Furthermore, an information document of the deputies provides that ‘efforts to 
improve the efficiency of supervision [...] must respect certain basic principles’ one 
of which is that ‘[e]ven if certain summary measures are needed in order to improve 
efficiency, it remains paramount that supervision of execution is treated as a co-
operative task and not an inquisitorial one’.283 This characteristic has translated 
itself into the fact that the deputies rarely must ‘really “enforce” the collective 
guarantees set up by the Convention’.284 The functioning of the DH meetings in a 
collegial manner may also find confirmation in the – so far – total reluctance to use 
the infringement procedure discussed in section X.2.6. The collegial nature of the 
meetings furthermore finds expression in the selection process of cases for 
discussion during which, as was explained above, it is aimed to prevent blacklisting 
certain states repetitively. This ‘can be interpreted as the [Execution Department’s] 
attempt to ensure an atmosphere in which constructive feedback is valued over 
overt critique’.285 Indeed, ‘states largely [describe] the quarterly meetings as 
constructive encounters’.286 Considering all of the above, collegiality is not just 
paid lip service, but appears to be of real importance.  
Another principle which, according to the deputies, must be respected by efforts 
to improve the efficiency of supervision is the ‘collective nature’ of the 
Committee’s role.287 This means that ‘all states are equally responsible for ensuring 
a satisfactory outcome to the cases which are submitted to it’, even though, in line 
with the subsidiarity principle, it must be noted that ‘the first responsibility lies with 
the country directly concerned’.288 Therefore, ‘[c]ases are not a matter for 
respondent states alone’.289 An ‘acute sense of collective responsibility’ has been 
described as particularly important for seeing that ‘judgments on issues with 
political aspects’ are fully executed.290 This collective nature is well in tune with 
the nature of the Convention system. Indeed, the Preamble to the Convention refers 
to the states parties taking ‘the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of 
the rights stated in the Universal Declaration’. The question may be posed whether 
the states in practice indeed collectively try to encourage the execution of the 
Court’s judgments or that they are more strongly influenced by considerations of a 
political nature which prevent them from collectively guaranteeing compliance with 
the Court’s judgments. 
                                                        
282  Ibid., 3.  
283  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2004)8 Final, 7 April 2004, para. 1(3).  
284  Sundberg (2009), 473. 
285  Çalı and Koch (2014), 321.  
286  Ibid., 321.  
287  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2004)8 Final, 7 April 2004, para. 1(3); Palmer 
(2010), 99-100. 
288  Palmer (2010), 99; See also: Imbert (2004), 71.  
289  Palmer (2010), 99. 
290  Imbert (2004), 71 
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of Procedures in the Execution Phase 
 
 
407 
Research into the review carried out at the DH meetings suggests that the states, 
during the DH meetings, indeed give effect to the collective nature of the 
Committee’s role by exercising pressure collectively on states with execution 
problems. The research has namely found that ‘states face real social pressure if 
their cases are singled out for oral debates’.291 As was noted by an Ambassador who 
was interviewed for that research:  
  
When we speak about pressure, you know it is not pleasant for me as an ambassador 
to be at a meeting where a whole 46 other countries discuss your issue and your 
problem. It is not pleasant that you do not have some necessary judicial procedure or 
you don’t have some necessary law in your country. This means pressure. Even an 
oral debate about your country and about a mistake in the system of your country is 
not a pleasant thing for an ambassador.292 
 
Further, as was explained above, the lawyers of the Execution Department see 
selecting a case for debate as a tool to encourage execution, which means they think 
the collective debates work at least for the execution of some cases. They also noted 
in support of the effectiveness of the meetings that the decisions adopted at the 
meetings show that the deputies insist on execution and will ask for information293 
and that real debate takes place, with between 4 to 6 delegations taking the floor 
and in an exceptional case even 37.294 One interviewee even remarked that some 
cases would not be complied with if it were not for the meetings where pressure is 
exercised collectively.295 It was added that the states increasingly participate in the 
discussions, because they realise that the Convention system cannot operate if the 
execution process does not function.296 An example of where the ‘serious execution 
problems [set] in motion the collective guarantee’ are the cases of Stran Greek 
Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece297 and Loizidou v. Turkey.298 With 
regard to these two cases, the deputies ‘took a firm approach to execution and 
exercised important diplomatic and other pressure on the respondent states’, 
resulting in the payment of just satisfaction even though the ‘mere payment [had] 
important political repercussions’.299 The collective exercise of peer pressure was 
also instrumental in stimulating the execution of D.H and Others v. the Czech 
Republic.300 The pressure made that the respondent state accepted the technical 
                                                        
291  Çalı and Koch (2014), 318. 
292  Idem. 
293  Execution interview 12.  
294  Execution interview 3.  
295  Execution interview 11.  
296  Execution interview 12.  
297  No. 13427/87, 09 December 1994.  
298  No. 15318/89, 18 December 1996; Sundberg (2009), 473.  
299  Sundberg (2009), 473. 
300  (GC), No. 57325/00, 13 November 2007.  
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assistance of the Execution Department and adopted and, subsequently, followed an 
action plan.301  
However, other factors undermine the effective working of the collective 
supervision process. The above quoted research found, for example, also that the 
deputies ‘are politically motivated, build alliances [and] have enemies and friends’ 
and that ‘lobbying is alive and present at the Committee’.302 Such factors likely 
motivate states or groups of states to pursue political interests which are not wholly 
in conformity with full Convention compliance through execution, an interest which 
should, ideally, be pursued collectively. The research found that, during the DH 
meetings, the states do not ‘show equal interest in each and every human rights 
case’,303 something which also undermines what should be their collective effort, 
namely ensuring the execution of the Court’s judgments. This effort can also be 
undermined, because politics can lead the deputies to make compromises.304 
Compromises can be in their own interest, because if they set high standards for 
execution now for another state, they may have to live up to these standards 
themselves one day.305 Further, it was remarked by a Registrar of the Court that the 
enforcement procedure ‘has become too much a political procedure’, because ‘there 
is this phenomenon: if you’re not too hard [on] my country, I will not be too hard 
on your country the next time’.306 The deputies have also been criticised for finding 
‘it difficult to muster sufficient collective energy to secure speedy and proper 
execution by recalcitrant governments’.307 As an interviewee noted, it is hard to, for 
example, move the deputies to adopt a decision against the UK because of 
politics.308 In particular the Assembly has stridently criticised the Committee for 
insufficiently using the possibilities available to it to exercise pressure.309 The high 
number of repetitive cases fuels such criticism, which has led to the ‘question 
whether the [Committee] has been sufficiently diligent in ensuring that states take 
appropriate general measures’ since general measures are meant to prevent future, 
repetitive cases.310 The Assembly has called on the Committee to ‘increase pressure 
and take firmer measures in case of dilatory execution and/or continuous non-
compliance with the Court’s judgments’, thus suggesting it has not yet taken 
sufficiently strong measures.311 Especially when the underlying problem is not a 
                                                        
301  Execution interview 9.  
302  Çalı and Koch (2014), 311-312. 
303  Ibid., 311. 
304  Execution interview 2.  
305  Execution interview 3.  
306  Fribergh cited in: Leach et al. (2010), 32-33; See also: Drzemczewski and Gaughan (2010), 242.  
307  Madsen (2011), 113. 
308  Execution interview 9.  
309  Harris et. al. (2014), 885.  
310  Ibid., 878; See also: Leach (2006b), 454.  
311  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(1955)2011, 26 January 2011, 
para. 1(4)-(5); See also: Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(1266)2000, 
28 September 2000, para. 6; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, 
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legal one but a sensitive political one, related to a conflict between states, the 
dialogue at the DH meetings will not advance matters. This applies to cases 
concerning South Ossetia, the division of Cyprus, Nagorno Karabach and 
Transnistria.312 There is ‘intense lobbying carried out by both Turkey and Cyprus 
about which items of their inter-state case should be closed’.313 Voting one way or 
the other also will be seen as taking a political stance314 and in these cases, the 
states acts like blocks, with Russia together with Azerbaijan and Cyprus together 
with Greece for example.315 
The political motivations which certainly influence the deputies are, however, 
constrained by different features of the institutional setting in which the DH 
meetings take place, which contribute to ensuring that the collective nature of the 
supervision process is indeed exercised to some extent and not wholly 
overshadowed by politics.316 The Court’s judgments appear to be one of these 
constraints, as their normative authority prevents states from openly defying 
execution. As was confirmed by an interviewee, states rarely attack a judgment 
during a DH meeting.317 The authority of the judgments, however, does not ensure 
that the execution of each judgment is scrupulously followed and the states may still 
direct their lobbying endeavours towards achieving minimal or delayed 
compliance.318 In practice, the second feature, namely the ‘high degree of 
delegation of post-judgment interpretation and monitoring tasks to the’ Execution 
Department, plays a more important role in limiting the role of politics and 
increasing the efficiency of the collective supervision.319 The delegation of these 
responsibilities counterbalances the states’ endeavours towards minimal or delayed 
compliance and the reluctance of the deputies to monitor each and every case.320 
Third, a number of procedural constraints have been developed to increase the 
power of the Execution Department and improve the predictability of the 
supervisory process.321 These procedural rules have been laid down in Committee 
recommendations to the states on the application of the Convention rights and the 
supervision of the execution of judgments,322 the continuous monitoring of all cases 
by the Execution Department and peer pressure tools available to deputies, such as 
                                                        
Rec(1684)2004, 23 November 2004, para. 1(3); Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of 
the [ECtHR]’, Rec(1764)2006, 2 October 2006, para. 1(5); Leach (2006b), 453.  
312  Execution interview 8.  
313  Çalı and Koch (2014), 318. 
314  Execution interview 8.  
315  Execution interview 5.  
316  Çalı and Koch (2014), 311. 
317  Execution interview 3.  
318  Çalı and Koch (2014), 313. 
319  Idem.  
320  Ibid., 314. 
321  Ibid., 319. 
322  Ibid., 319-320; See also: Committee, ‘Committee of Minister’s Recommendation’, 
(<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/documents/CMRec_en.asp>). 
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interim resolutions.323 Finally, the political nature of the decision-making is 
generally mitigated by factors which themselves are political in nature: the degree 
of political activism differs per state324 and some states have shown themselves not 
impressed by larger states.325 
The question was posed above whether execution is indeed a collective exercise 
or whether the debates during the DH meetings are strongly influenced by 
considerations of a political nature which makes them unable to complete this 
exercise. The discussion that followed shows that both answers hold to a certain 
extent. In practice, the states are indeed influenced by politics, but this does not 
exclude completely the possibility that the collective supervision as exercised at the 
meetings helps stimulate execution. Moreover, the influence of politics on the 
supervisory process has been shown to be limited by several institutional features.  
To sum up, the above discussions led to the conclusion that both subsidiarity and 
collegiality are of considerable importance to the conduct of the deputies at the DH 
meetings. The ‘collective nature principle’, however, seems to reflect less on the 
decision-making in the DH meetings than the other two principles, although it 
certainly has some influence.  
2.4 Bi- and Multilateral Meetings 
Five different aspects of bi- and multilateral meetings will be discussed. The 
discussion starts off with the frequency and preparation of these meetings. The 
other three aspects are the attendees of these meetings, the meetings themselves and 
their effect.  
2.4.1 Frequency  
The number of bilateral meetings, which take place between the state and the 
Execution Department, depends on the state. Some states meet with the Execution 
Department multiple times a year and all states meet with it at least once per 
year.326 One type of bilateral meetings, namely those in the capitals, appears to be 
decreasing, because human resources and time are more and more diverted to the 
organisation of DH meetings during which an increasing number of ever complex 
cases is discussed.327 Most frequently, the meetings now take place in 
Strasbourg.328 Further, the Execution Department aims to organise at least one 
major multilateral activity per year.329  
                                                        
323  Çalı and Koch (2014), 320-322. 
324  Execution interview 5.  
325  Execution interview 8.  
326  Execution interview 11; Execution interview 13. 
327  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 10; Execution interview 12. 
328  Execution interview 10.  
329  Execution interview 12.  
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2.4.2 Preparation  
The respondent state or the Execution Department can take the initiative for a 
bilateral meeting.330 Further, the deputies can decide at a DH meeting that a 
multilateral meeting should be held.331 
2.4.3 Attendees  
For bilateral meetings, the staff of the Execution Department can meet with relevant 
decision-makers in the capitals (although, as was mentioned above, this happens 
less and less often nowadays). If they meet in Strasbourg, the agent representing the 
state before the Court may be present, as well as the delegation representing the 
state at the DH meetings.332 The Execution Department has ‘more and more [...] 
direct contacts with the domestic authorities in charge of the execution question’.333 
Bilateral meetings also can take place at a higher level, with the participation of the 
Director of Monitoring or the Director General for Human Rights and Legal Affairs 
or, for example, between the chairperson of the DH meetings and an ambassador 
and between the chairperson of the Committee and a minister of foreign affairs.334 
Members of the Court’s Registry do not participate in bilateral meetings,335 but 
when the Court has planned a visit to a capital of its own, the Execution Department 
and the Court usually discuss what message they will convey to the authorities, so 
as to ensure that they speak with the same voice.336 
The attendees of multilateral meetings differ. At a high level conference in 
Ankara in 2013, speakers attended from the Execution Department, the Court, the 
Turkish parliament and other institutions. The about 500 participants included 
ambassadors, domestic judges, parliamentarians and representatives of 
ministries.337 Two other multilateral conferences were attended by government 
agents, representatives from ministries, domestic and Strasbourg judges, members 
of the Registry and Execution Department staff.338 The attendees are not necessarily 
high level officials, but often experts from relevant ministries.339  
                                                        
330  Committee (2013a), 27; Execution interview 9. 
331  Committee, ‘Agenda’, CM/Del/OJ/DH(2010)1092 Section/Rubrique 4.3 PUBLIC 29, September 
2010: ‘In accordance with the decision adopted by the Deputies at the 1035th meeting (September 
2008), three sets of bilateral consultations were organised’. 
332  Execution interview 12; CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 17. 
333  Amat (2009).  
334  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, paras. 18, 32; Leach (2011), 100.  
335  Registry interview 7.  
336  Execution interview 10.  
337  Committee, ‘[HLC] on Freedom of Expression and Media Freedom in Turkey (5 February 2013, 
Ankara)’, (<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/themes/hrtf/tables_rondes/conf_ankara_2013 
_EN.asp>).  
338  Execution Department, ‘Effective Domestic Remedies against Non-execution or Delayed 
Execution of Domestic Court Decisions; List of Participants’, 15 March 2010; Execution 
Department, ‘Round Table: Excessive Length of Proceedings – How to Solve an Important 
→ 
 
 
 
 Chapter X 
 
 
412 
2.4.4 Bilateral Meetings  
As was already noted, a bilateral meeting can take place in Strasbourg or in the 
capital of a respondent state, as an extensive form of cooperation.340 In addition to 
that, video conferences are organised, sometimes even on a weekly basis with the 
same state.341 The bilateral meetings referred to include ‘various targeted 
cooperation and assistance activities’, such as, consultancy visits and working 
sessions with the authorities.342 These activities are ‘of particular importance for the 
cases under enhanced supervision’.343 Sometimes, bilateral meeting are organised to 
go through the list of cases pending before the Committee and to point out 
remaining problems.344 Others meeting have a more specific focus. Representatives 
of the Execution Department went for example to Prague for bilateral consultations 
in order to achieve an action plan for the case of D.H. and Others v. the Czech 
Republic that ‘would respond to the Committee’s concerns, including the need to 
clarify the status of different documents submitted in the framework of the case’.345 
The representatives met with inter alia vice-ministers in the ministry of education, 
senior officials of the Office of the Government and the ministry of justice, the 
ombudsman and a representative of the Czech Schools Inspectorate.346 Also, two 
bilateral meetings on the excessive length of judicial proceedings in the Italian legal 
system took place in Rome. During the second meeting, which was attended by the 
highest government authorities and Execution Department staff, a presentation was 
given on already implemented and planned legislative measures and on 
organisational measures undertaken.347 Further, the Execution Department once 
invited the judges of the Albanian Supreme Court to come to Strasbourg for a 
roundtable on the outstanding execution issues.348 Other bilateral meetings were 
used to discuss proposals for a draft action plan, to follow up on the Execution 
Department’s examination of the information submitted by the respondent state,349 
                                                        
Systemic Problem Causing Repetitive Violations of the [ECHR]; List of Participants’, 5 November 
2012.  
339  Execution interview 9; Execution interview 10. 
340  Execution interview 13.  
341  Execution interview 10.  
342  Committee (2013a), 27. 
343  Idem.  
344  Execution interview 9; Execution interview 10; Execution interview 11. 
345  Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’, CM/Del/Dec(2012)1157, 10 
December 2012.  
346  Idem. 
347  Committee, ‘Agenda’, CM/Del/OJ/DH(2010)1100 Section/Rubrique 4.2 PUBLIC, 17 December 
2010.  
348  Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’, CM/Del/Dec(2014)1193, 7 
March 2014. 
349  Idem.  
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to discuss execution steps which had already been taken,350 to present information 
on the execution problem or simply to discuss the issues raised in a judgment.351  
2.4.5 Multilateral Meetings  
Multilateral meetings are organised mainly if there is an execution problem which 
concerns many states.352 In 2005 and 2006, for example, two roundtables took place 
where Russian officials and officials of various Council of Europe bodies met to 
discuss systemic problems in judicial organisation and administration.353 In 2012, a 
roundtable was organised with the title ‘excessive length of proceedings: how to 
resolve a systemic problem in this area, and avoid influx of repetitive applications 
to the European Court in a durable manner’.354 In addition to roundtables, a high 
level conference can be organised on a particular issue, such as freedom of 
expression and media freedom in Turkey.355 Tripartite meetings have also been 
organised. During one such meeting, high level representatives of the Romanian 
government met with representatives of the Execution Department, the Directorate 
General of Human Rights and the Rule of Law and the Registry for ‘in depth 
consultations’ on a draft law prepared by Romania to execute the pilot judgment 
Atanasiu.356 
2.5 Requests for Interpretation 
According to the Explanatory Report to Protocol 14, the Committee should use 
requests for interpretation sparingly.357 In practice, it has used this procedure more 
than sparingly: it has not used the procedure at all. One reason for the lack of 
practice may be that the threshold of a two-thirds majority for making such a 
request is too high. Another possible reason is that it has not yet been necessary to 
use the procedure, because the Court has answered urgent interpretative questions 
regarding execution through its judgments.358 In the case of Scoppola v. Italy (no. 
3), which concerned a ban on prisoners’ voting rights like the Hirst case, for 
example, the Court addressed the question ‘[w]hether the principles set forth in the 
                                                        
350  Committee, ‘Annotated Order of Business and Decisions Adopted’, CM/Del/Dec(2012)1157, 10 
December 2012.  
351  Committee, ‘Agenda’, CM/Del/OJ/DH(2010)1100 Section/Rubrique 4.2 PUBLIC, 17 December 
2010. 
352  Amat (2009).  
353  Committee, ‘Reply to Assembly Recommendation 1764 (2006)’, CM/AS(2007)Rec1764 final, 30 
March 2007, para. 4.  
354  Committee (2013a), 137.  
355  Committee (2015), 22.  
356  Committee, ‘Tripartite Meeting at the Council of Europe on a Draft Law to Reform the Mechanism 
of Compensation or Restitution of Property Nationalised in Romania’ (<www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
monitoring/execution/News/Tripartite_Meeting_Strain_en.asp>).  
357  Explanatory Report to Protocol 15 ECHR, para. 96. 
358  Execution interview 6.  
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Hirst judgment should be confirmed’.359 In answer thereto, the Court concluded that 
‘[i]t does not appear [...] that anything has occurred or changed at the European and 
Convention levels since the Hirst (no. 2) judgment that might lend support to the 
suggestion that the principles set forth in that case should be re-examined’.360 The 
principles set out in Hirst were thus reaffirmed as well as clarified.361  
2.6 Infringement Proceedings  
The Committee has not (yet) used the possibility to instigate infringement 
proceedings either, although applicants have occasionally filed requests to that 
effect.362 The question has been raised whether the Committee will ever instigate 
infringement proceedings.363 This may be ruled out due to the qualified majority 
which is required for doing so; already prior to the ratification of Protocol 14, the 
Court wondered whether the ‘two-thirds majority [would] be achievable’.364 In this 
context, the CDDH noted that ‘[a] possible practical obstacle to the use of the 
provision may be the fact that the delegations in the Committee could be reluctant 
to call for a vote, given the need for a two-thirds majority decision’.365 
Additionally, as the permanent representative of Sweden to the Council of Europe 
noted: ‘[s]ince we are diplomats sitting in the [Committee] there is a special 
sensitivity to expressing open criticism against a Member State which has not done 
its homework’.366 Further, the substantive criteria for starting infringement 
proceedings may be too strict: the Committee should consider that a state ‘refuses to 
abide by a final judgment in a case’,367 ‘i.e. is unwilling (and not unable) to execute 
a judgment or is deliberately obstructing’.368 However, the scope of the provision is 
not so narrow as to only include express refusals as a reason for instigating 
infringement proceedings. As the CDDH has recalled, ‘[i]n order to dispel any 
uncertainty about the exact meaning of the provision [...] the Explanatory Report to 
Protocol No. 14 clarifies that the expression “a High Contracting Party refuses to 
abide” covers refusals whether “expressly or through its conduct”‘.369 A further 
reason why the procedure may not have been applied thus far, in spite of instances 
                                                        
359  Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) (GC), No. 126/05, 22 May 2012, paras. 93-96.  
360  Ibid., para. 95. 
361  Ibid., para. 96. 
362  CDDD (2013e), para. 21; See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Communications from different NGOs (AIRE, 
UNLOCK, PRI, PRT) in the case of Hirst No. 2 against the [UK] ([No.] 74025/01)’, DH-
DD(2010)609E, 1 December 2010; EHRAC, ‘Request for the initiation of Infringement 
Proceedings by the Committee of Ministers in relation to the Judgment of the [ECtHR] in Isayeva 
v. Russia (No. 57950/00, 24 February 2005)’, 30 July 2012.  
363  Lapitskaya (2011), 546; Harris et. al. (2014), 198.  
364  Cited in: Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 58.  
365  CDDH (2013h), para. 21.  
366  Ehrenkrona (2014), 170.  
367  Aricle 46(4) ECHR (emphasis added).  
368  Vandenhole (2005), 120 (emphasis original); See also: Marmo (2008), 250. 
369  CDDH (2013h), para. 21.  
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of delayed execution and in spite of the possibility of a somewhat more lenient 
application of the substantive criterion, may be that using it would be of little if any 
use. In some instances, the political background to the execution problem must be 
solved first to guarantee effective execution, and this cannot be brought about by 
means of infringement proceedings. This, for example, applies to the inter-state 
case of Cyprus v. Turkey.370 Finally, the Committee may be unwilling to use the 
procedure in order to avoid two pitfalls. The first pitfall has to do with the ‘major 
advantage’ of the procedure, which is its preventive effect,371 meaning that the 
procedure’s ‘mere existence, and the threat of using it, should act as an effective 
new incentive to execute the Court’s judgments’.372 One interviewee confirmed that 
the procedural step played a role in the background373 and another that the 
Committee has threatened to use it.374 Once this threat has been used in relation to a 
specific case, the advantage is lost, making it unattractive to actually use the 
procedure. Second, it is ‘unlikely that much additional pressure will result from 
these infringement procedures and that the [Committee] in fact, will be better 
equipped to enforce judgments of the Court’.375 Not only makes this observation the 
instigation of an infringement procedure largely pointless, but it also makes that 
using the procedure is potentially harmful in the sense that when the procedure does 
not have the desired effect, namely execution, the Committee and the Court’s 
powers are openly and directly defied, thus causing damage to their authority. As 
one of the interviewees noted, the Committee is careful, especially, because if the 
procedure is used, and the state does subsequently not execute the judgment, the 
Committee has spoiled the procedure.376 Comparably, the CDDH, although 
‘recognising the potential of the [...] procedure’, also appreciated ‘that its use must 
be considered with especial caution’.377 The Court has not repeated this caution, but 
it has noted that ‘[t]he potential of Article 46 §§ 4-5 to formally involve the Court at 
the execution stage, along with the type of circumstances in which recourse to this 
procedure would be appropriate, deserve in-depth reflection’.378 Comparably, an 
NGO has recommended that the Committee considers ‘holding a debate to discuss 
the appropriate circumstances under which the procedure should be invoked, 
including the possibility of institutionalizing the infringement proceedings to render 
it automatic in specified grave instances’.379 
                                                        
370  Execution interview 8; (GC), No. 25781/94, 10 May 2001.  
371  Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 58.  
372  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 100.  
373  Execution interview 4.  
374  Execution interview 8. 
375  Vandenhole (2005), 120; See also: Marmo (2008), 250.  
376  Execution interview 4. 
377  CDDH (2013h), para. 22.  
378  ECtHR (2015e), para. 16.  
379  Goldstone (Open Society Justice Initiative), ‘Summary of the Main Points’, (<www.coe.int/ 
t/dghl/standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/gt-gdr-f/Goldston.pdf>), 3.  
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2.7 Assembly Questions and Recommendations  
The Assembly’s involvement in execution matters generally commenced in 
response to a report of its Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights (CLAHR) 
that identified a number of ways in which the Assembly could contribute to 
improving the execution record.380 Ever since, the Assembly has felt ‘duty-bound’ 
to contribute.381 This duty extends to stimulating both the execution efforts of the 
states parties and those of the Committee in its capacity as supervisor of the 
execution process, as the questions and recommendations examined in this section 
illustrate. This is also illustrated by a statement of an Assembly rapporteur that the 
Assembly should not only ensure ‘compliance with the collective safeguard 
provided by the Convention’, but that it should also ‘see to it that the [Committee] 
does not satisfy itself with formal information provided by the Government 
concerned but examines itself [...] whether the measures indicated by the 
Government constitute full and effective execution of the judgment’.382  
Part of this duty derives, according to the Assembly, from the fact that it is 
composed of national parliamentarians. They must sometimes play a role in giving 
effect to the Article 46(1) responsibility on the states.383 In this light, a CLAHR 
rapporteur noted that because states are ‘not just governments as represented on the 
[Committee], the [Assembly] should take a much keener interest in the Court’s 
judgments and its members [...] should be able to intercede with the authorities 
when execution difficulties arise’.384 The Committee agrees, it stressed that ‘in their 
capacity as national legislators, members of the [Assembly] have an eminent role to 
play in facilitating the rapid execution of the judgments of the [Court] by promoting 
as a priority the adoption in their respective parliaments of the legislative measures 
needed to bring domestic law in conformity with the Convention’.385  
The Assembly can also deem to be duty-bound to contribute to execution, 
because it is a means to give effect to the Council of Europe Statute. The Statute 
stipulates that the aim of the organisation ‘shall be pursued’ through the Committee 
and the Assembly by inter alia maintaining and further realising human rights and 
                                                        
380  Jurgens (2000), paras. 89-92; The report was followed up by a resolution an recommendation, see: 
Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2000)1226, 28 September 2000; 
Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2000)1477, 28 September 2000; 
Prior to this report, the Assembly was already to a lesser extent concerned with execution, see: 
Jurgens (2000), paras. 9-13; Lambert Abdelgawad (2008), 59; However, until the adoption of the 
report, monitoring the execution of judgments only ‘was a relatively secondary aspect of the 
Assembly’s work’, see: Drzemczewski and Gaughan (2010), 235. 
381  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2006)1516, 2 October 2006, 
para. 4; Assembly ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2011)1787, 26 January 
2011, para. 1; See also: Jurgens (2006), para. 5.  
382  Jurgens (2000), paras. 19-20.  
383  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2000)1226, 28 September 2000, 
para. 6.  
384  Jurgens (2000), para. 18.  
385  Committee, ‘Decisions’, CM/Del/Dec(2005)935, 18 July 2005, Appendix 7, para. 11.  
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fundamental freedoms.386 Clearly, one way to achieve this is by improving the 
execution record. In relation to this aim, the Assembly stated that it has a ‘shared 
responsibility’ with the Committee and that ‘their interaction is essential for the 
efficient fulfilment’ of the organisation’s mission.387 Another motive for the 
Assembly to ‘not meekly accept the premise that the [Committee] has “exclusive 
jurisdiction”‘ on the subject of execution is that ‘[t]he credibility and viability of the 
European system of human rights cannot be left solely in the hands of the executive 
organ’.388  
In spite of this bold statement, an Assembly rapporteur has also noted that the 
Committee ‘has primary responsibility’ in the existing system of supervision.389 
Besides that, the CLAHR ‘recognises that the Convention makes the [Committee] 
responsible for the supervision of decisions, according to Article 46 § 2 of the 
Convention’.390 Accordingly, the Assembly ‘can only apply parliamentary scrutiny 
to the work of the [Committee] and to make recommendations to the [Committee] 
and to member states concerned in specific court decisions’.391  
According to the Assembly, its ‘more prominent role, in promoting compliance 
with the Court’s judgments’, will help the Committee ‘to discharge more speedily 
and effectively its responsibilities in this respect’.392 The Committee has 
acknowledged that execution ‘has greatly benefited in the past and continues to 
benefit’ from the Assembly’s involvement.393 It is moreover of the opinion that the 
concept of ‘shared responsibility’ between the Assembly and itself ‘could be 
extended’ to other fields of activity of ‘clear common interest’, such as monitoring 
the execution of the Court’s judgments.394 Next to the Committee, a President of the 
Court and the Evaluation Group to the Committee on the Court, for example, have 
also welcomed the Assembly’s activities in the area of execution.395 Further, the 
Brussels Conference has encouraged the Assembly to ‘continue to produce reports 
on the execution of judgments, to organise awareness-raising activities for members 
of national parliaments on implementation of the Convention and to encourage 
national parliaments to follow in a regular and efficient manner the execution of 
                                                        
386  Art. 1(b) Council of Europe Statute. 
387  Assembly, ‘The Institutional Balance at the Council of Europe’, Rec(2006)1763, 2 October 2006, 
para. 1; See also: Drzemczewski and Gaughan (2010), 235.  
388  Pourgourides (2010a), para. 212. 
389  Ibid., paras. 5, 208.  
390  Jurgens (2001), para. 3.  
391  Idem. 
392  Ibid., para. 5.  
393  Committee, ‘Reply to Assembly Recommendation 1764 (2006)’, CM/AS(2007)Rec1764final, 30 
March 2007, para. 1.  
394  Committee, ‘Summary of Committee of Ministers’ Reflections on Institutional Matters’, 
CM(2001)72, 7 May 2001, Appendix; See also: Schieder (2006), para. 29; Assembly, ‘The 
Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2006)1516, 2 October 2006, para. 22(8). 
395  Evaluation Group (2001), para. 52; See also: CDDH (2004), para. 26; Drzemczewski and Gaughan 
(2010), 235; Spielmann (2013).  
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judgments’.396 In other words, the states parties seem to agree that the Assembly 
should take an interest in the Court’s judgment and especially in the execution 
thereof.  
As explained in chapter VI, questions and recommendations of the Assembly 
addressed to the Committee are a way for the Assembly to become involved in or to 
at least try to influence execution matters. This chapter looks at the practice of these 
two procedures. There are additional ways for the Assembly to discuss execution 
matters, but these do not allow it to speak directly to the Committee in its capacity 
of supervisor of the execution of the Court’s judgment. These ways are briefly 
discussed for the sake of completeness, but they will not be analysed in the light of 
the indicators for dialogue. 
The Assembly has three ways to speak directly to the states parties and can use 
these ways to speak with them about execution. It can, first, ‘invite the 
parliamentary delegations of the states concerned to do their utmost to bring about 
the quick and efficient execution of a judgment’.397 In addition to that, the 
Assembly can invite a minister of justice, or another competent minister, to give an 
explanation in person about an execution issue.398 The third and more formal means 
is to issue a resolution to urge a state to take certain execution measures.399 If these 
three ways fail to encourage the execution of a judgment, the Assembly envisages 
‘making use of other possibilities, in particular those provided for in its own Rules 
of Procedure and/or of a recommendation to the [Committee] to make use of Article 
8 of the Statute’.400 In this context, a rapporteur proposed that the Assembly could 
suspend the voting rights of national delegations when their parliaments ‘do not 
seriously exercise parliamentary control over the executive in cases of non-
implementation of [the Court’s] judgments’.401 
The remainder of this section starts with a short note on methodology. Then, the 
number of questions asked and recommendations made is detailed. The questions 
are then examined in more detail by discussing their content, the replies of the 
Committee to them and their influence on the Committee’s supervisory exercise. 
The same aspects are also addressed in respect of recommendations. In addition to 
that, the content of the reports, on which the recommendations are based, is 
outlined.  
                                                        
396  HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
C(3)(f).  
397  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2000)1226, 28 September 2000, 
para. 11(3)(5); Jurgens (2000), para. 91. 
398  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2000)1226, 28 September 2000, 
para. 11(3)(6).  
399  See: Rule 25 of Procedure of the Assembly; See, e.g.: Assembly ‘The Implementation of 
Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2011)1787, 26 January 2011, para. 7.  
400  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2000)1226, 28 September 2000, 
para. 11(3)(8).  
401  Pourgourides (2010a), para. 212. 
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2.7.1 Methodology  
Relevant questions addressed by the Assembly to the Committee were found by 
performing a search with the key words ‘written question’ in the search engine of 
the Assembly on 4 April 2014.402 The result of 600 hits included replies of the 
Committee to the questions. All relevant questions, namely those relating to the 
execution of the Court’s judgments, and, not, for example, those asking the 
Committee to interpret the Convention, were added to a database.  
As regards the recommendations, these were found by performing two searches 
in the database of the Assembly on 4 April 2014. One search was performed using 
the key words ‘recommendation’ and ‘European Convention on Human Rights’, 
resulting in 59 hits; for the other search the key words ‘recommendation’ and 
‘European Court of Human Rights’, leading to 326 hits, were employed. All hits 
were assessed and the relevant recommendations were added to a database. 
Relevant recommendations are those in which the Assembly mentions the execution 
of the Court’s judgments or of a specific judgment. Therefore, recommendations 
alluding to the Convention standards generally were not taken into consideration.  
2.7.2 Frequency  
This study found 25 relevant written questions presented by the Assembly to the 
Committee. The first such question was issued on 10 September 1998.403 One 
parliamentarian, Jurgens, sometimes on his own, sometimes together with others, 
submitted 9 out of the 25 questions.404 Jurgens was also the rapporteur who wrote 
four out of the six reports leading to the adoption of a recommendation on the 
execution of the Court’s judgments. His successor, Pourgourides, submitted two 
questions.405 Another four questions were posed by parliamentarians belonging to 
the delegation of the state against which the judgment was issued in respect of 
                                                        
402  The search engine can be found on: http://semantic-pace.net/. 
403  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 378’, Doc. 8186, 10 September 1998. 
404  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 378’, Doc. 8186, 10 September 1998; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 381’, Doc. 8579, 25 October 1999; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 383’, Doc. 
8664, 14 March 2000; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 390’, Doc. 8964, 1 February 2001; 
Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 403’, Doc. 9309, 8 January 2002; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 426’, Doc. 9776, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 427’, Doc. 9777, 10 April 
2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 428’, Doc. 9778, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 476’, Doc. 10710, 5 October 2005.  
405  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 575’, Doc. 12082, 17 November 2009; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 581’, Doc. 12133, 25 January 2010.  
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which the question was posed.406 Further, nineteen relevant recommendations were 
identified.407  
2.7.3 Content of the Questions  
It is not possible to neatly divide the questions into different categories as to their 
subject matter, because they are quite diverse. It is, however, noteworthy that eight 
questions concerned Turkey408 and that in three instances more than one question 
about the same case was submitted: three questions concerned Hakkar v. France,409 
two Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia410 and two A.B.C. v. Ireland.411  
Most questions are of a rather general nature, asking the Committee which 
measures it would take to ensure that the respondent state lives up to the 
Convention requirements.412 The parliamentarians also inquire about the execution 
                                                        
406  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 379’, Doc. 8350, 15 March 1999; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 432’, Doc. 9912, 16 September 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 445’, Doc. 10171, 29 
April 2004; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 620’, Doc. 13076, 26 November 2012.  
407  Two searches were performed on 4 April 2014 in the search engine of the Assembly 
(http://semantic-pace.net/). One with the key words “recommendation” and “European Convention 
on Human Rights”, which resulted in 59 hits and one with the key words “recommendation” and 
“European Court of Human Rights”, which resulted in 326 hits. The author checked each hit and 
added 19 relevant recommendations (i.e. those in which the Assembly mentions the execution of 
the Court’s judgments or of a specific judgment and therefore not those recommendations in which 
the Assembly alludes to Convention standards generally) to a database based on which this section 
was written.  
408  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 378’, Doc. 8186, 10 September 1998; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 390’, Doc. 8964, 1 February 2001; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 402’, Doc. 
9272, 25 October 2001; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 426’, Doc. 9776, 10 April 2003; 
Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 427’, Doc. 9777, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 428’, Doc. 9778, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 488’, Doc. 10879, 10 April 
2006; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 575’, Doc. 12082, 17 November 2009.  
409  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 381’, Doc. 8579, 25 October 1999; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 383’, Doc. 8664, 14 March 2000; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 403’, Doc. 9309, 8 January 
2002.  
410  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 465’, Doc. 10450, 1 February 2005; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 476’, Doc. 10710, 5 October 2005.  
411  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 620’, Doc. 13076, 26 November 2012; Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 622’, Doc. 13090, 15 January 2013. 
412  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 379’, Doc. 8350, 15 March 1999; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 381’, Doc. 8579, 25 October 1999; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 384’, Doc. 8682, 27 
March 2000; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 390’, Doc. 8964, 1 February 2001; Assembly, 
‘Written Question No. 402’, Doc. 9272, 25 October 2001; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 445’, 
Doc. 10171, 29 April 2004; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 465’, Doc. 10450, 1 February 2005; 
Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 547’, Doc. 11614, 22 May 2008; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 581’, Doc. 12133, 25 January 2010; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 617’, Doc. 13026, 18 
September 2012. 
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measures which the respondent state has taken413 and ask whether these measures 
were in compliance with the judgment.414 Some questions were more specific, 
relating to, for example, the time Turkey would be given to settle overdue issues,415 
the situation of the applicant416 or the appropriateness for Russia to take up the 
Committee’s chairmanship in view of its ‘protracted refusal’ to execute Ilaşcu and 
Others.417 The questions were not limited to cases pending before the Committee. It 
was, for example, asked whether the Committee ‘is willing to reopen its 
consideration of the case, now that France has not done what it promised to do 
when the case was closed’.418 Further, all questions except for one concerned a 
specific case or group of cases rather than the execution generally. In the one 
exception, the parliamentarian asked whether the Committee ‘could indicate in 
which cases the compensation decided by the [Court] has not or not yet been paid 
after a delay of six months [...] and what are the reasons for this non-payment or 
delay in payment’.419 As can be derived from the foregoing, the questions usually 
depart from the parliamentarian’s wish that the judgment is executed swiftly. One 
question was atypical in that respect, because it did not seem to depart from that 
wish. The parliamentarian namely asked why the Committee decided to give 
precedence to monitoring the execution of A.B.C v. Ireland.420  
2.7.4 The Committee’s Reply to Questions  
The Committee replied, according to the information available on the website of the 
Assembly, to all questions except two.421 Its answers were sometimes delayed to 
the extent that a parliamentarian asked why it had not yet responded.422 Some 
replies only include information which is publicly available online. In these replies, 
the Committee explains that it continues to examine the state of execution, mentions 
                                                        
413  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 428’, Doc. 9778, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 432’, Doc. 9912, 16 September 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 598’, Doc. 12601, 19 
April 2010; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 620’, Doc. 13076, 26 November 2012.  
414  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 426’, Doc. 9776, 10 April 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 432’, Doc. 9912, 16 September 2003; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 488’, Doc. 10879, 10 
April 2006.  
415  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 427’, Doc. 9777, 10 April 2003.  
416  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 403’, Doc. 9309, 8 January 2002.  
417  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 476’, Doc. 10710, 5 October 2005; See for other specific 
questions: Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 575’, Doc. 12082, 17 November 2009; Assembly, 
‘Written Question No. 598’, Doc. 10710, 5 October 2005; Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 378’, 
Doc. 8186, 10 September 1998. 
418  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 403’, Doc. 9309, 8 January 2002; See also: Assembly, ‘Written 
Question No. 379’, Doc. 8350, 15 March 1999.  
419  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 362’, Doc. 7429, 21 November 1995.  
420  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 622’, Doc. 13090, 15 January 2013.  
421  Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 547’, Doc. 11614, 22 May 2008; Assembly, ‘Written Question 
No. 617’, Doc. 13026, 18 September 2012.  
422  See, e.g.: Assembly, ‘Written Question No. 383’, Doc. 8664, 14 March 2000.  
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when it last examined a case,423 or refers to a reply to a previous question.424 An 
answer may also be found in a decision adopted by the Committee at a DH meeting. 
The Committee may reproduce this decision in its reply425 or may simply provide a 
hyperlink to the decision.426 In other replies, the question posed is not really 
answered. One reasons for not answering is, for example, that the Committee still 
has to decide how to proceed on a certain issue.427 Further, the Committee 
sometimes has not responded directly to a question. An example was the question, 
mentioned above, whether it would be appropriate for Russia to take up the 
chairmanship of the Committee. Instead of answering this question, it described the 
measures taken to urge Russia to execute Ilaşcu and Others.428 Another example is 
the statement, in response to the question how the Committee evaluated new 
domestic legislation, that it closed its supervision of the case.429  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Committee sometimes gives rather elaborate 
or detailed information in reply to a question.430 It, for example, has given 
information that it requested from the respondent state, which gives insight into the 
situation of the applicant and into individual and general measures.431 The 
Committee may also outline the statements made by the respondent state at a DH 
meeting.432 Further, in answer to the general question referred to above, it presented 
a table with information about the delayed or non-payment of just satisfaction.433 
2.7.5 Influence of the Questions  
It is unlikely that the questions raised by the Assembly have any real effect on the 
Committee’s supervisory exercise. The first reason for this is the nature of the 
procedure, which enables Assembly members to ask for information, not to state 
which action they deem desirable. Further, only few questions, namely 25, have 
been addressed to the Committee since the first question was posed in 1998. The 
                                                        
423  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 622’, Doc. 13145, 18 March 2013.  
424  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 426’, Doc. 9899, 12 September 2003. 
425  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 581’, Doc. 12209, 19 April 2010; Committee, ‘Reply 
to Written Question No. 598’, Doc. 12707, 15 September 2011; Committee, ‘Reply to Written 
Question No. 620’, Doc. 13102, 21 January 2013. 
426  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 575’, Doc. 12259, 11 May 2010. 
427  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 427’, Doc. 9905, 12 September 2003.  
428  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 476’, Doc. 10740, 10 November 2005. 
429  Committee, ‘Joint Reply to Written Questions No. 487 and 488’, Doc. 11224, 26 March 2007; See 
a for comparable situation: Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 379’, Doc. 8428, 31 May 
1999. 
430  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 378,’ Doc. 8253, 29 October 1998; Committee, ‘Reply 
to Written Question No. 384, Doc. 8764, 7 June 2000; Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 
390’, Doc. 9206, 18 September 2001; Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 402’, Doc. 9327, 
21 January 2002; Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 428’, Doc. 9900, 12 September 2003.  
431  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 403’, Doc. 9496, 24 June 2002; Committee, ‘Reply to 
Written Question No. 432’, Doc. 10042, 26 January 2004.  
432  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Questions No. 381 and 383’, Doc. 8692, 3 April 2000.  
433  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 362’, Doc. 7457, 17 January 1996.  
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total number of individual (groups of) cases pending before the Committee touched 
upon by a question is even lower, considering that not all questions related to cases 
still under the Committee’s supervision and that some concerned the same case and 
one a general matter. From the way in which the Committee deals with the 
questions, it can also be derived that it does not consider the questions to be of any 
real importance. It sometimes does not answer the questions or answers them with a 
delay, it has evaded answering some questions and sometimes it has answered 
questions by merely copy-pasting a decision or a hyperlink.  
2.7.6 Content of the Recommendations  
Six out of the nineteen relevant Assembly recommendations specifically concern 
the execution of the Court’s judgments. The latest recommendation at the time of 
writing434 of this series of six was entitled ‘Ensuring the Viability of the Strasbourg 
Court: Structural Deficiencies in the States Parties’;435 its five predecessors were 
entitled ‘Implementation of the Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights’.436 The recommendations have the same title as the reports on which they 
are based. These recommendations were issued about every two years from 2000 
onwards. The Committee was recommended to take different sorts of action: to 
prioritise judgments revealing structural problems,437 to improve its communication 
policy438 and to call on the states to inter alia establish mechanisms for the 
execution of the Court’s judgments.439 Further, it was proposed that the Committee 
put more pressure on the states parties and that it takes firmer measures, such as, 
seeking recourse to Article 8 of the Council of Europe Statute.440 Another 
                                                        
434  April 2014.  
435  Assembly, ‘Ensuring the Viability of the Strasbourg Court: Structural Deficiencies in 
States Parties’, Rec(2013)2007, 22 January 2013.  
436  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2000)1477, 28 September 2000; 
Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2002)1546, on 22 
January 2002; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, 
Rec(2004)1684, 23 November 2004; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the 
[ECtHR]’, Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the 
[ECtHR]’, Rec(2011)1955, 26 January 2011.  
437  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006, 
para. 1; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2011)1955, 26 
January 2011, para. 1(1); Assembly, ‘Ensuring the Viability of the Strasbourg Court: 
Structural Deficiencies in States Parties’, Rec(2013)2007, 22 January 2013, para. 1(2).  
438  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006, 
para. 1(3).  
439  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006, 
para. 1(4); Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2011)1955, 26 
January 2011, paras. 1(2)-(3).  
440  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2000)1477, 28 September 2000, 
para. 4(b); Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2004)1684, 
23 November 2004, para. 3; Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, 
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recommendation was to cooperate more with the Assembly441 and to ensure co-
ordination between different Council of Europe bodies.442 Finally, the Committee 
was urged to develop a wider range of measures in case states fail to abide by the 
Council of Europe human rights standards443 and to amend the Convention to 
introduce a system of astreintes.444 
Another eight recommendations targeted specific states. Four of these concerned 
Turkey, in particular its honouring of obligations and commitments,445 its execution 
of the Court’s judgments,446 the humanitarian situation of the displaced Kurdish 
population447 and the colonisation by Turkish settlers of the occupied part of 
Cyprus.448 The remaining recommendations dealt with the investigation of certain 
crimes in Ukraine449 and the functioning of democratic institutions in both Bosnia 
and Herzegovina450 and in Moldova.451 Only the recommendation on Turkey’s 
execution of judgments was exclusively dedicated to execution;452 in the other 
recommendations, stimulating the execution of judgments was one of the many 
measures which the Assembly urged the Committee to take. The Assembly referred 
                                                        
Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006, para. 1(5); Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the 
[ECtHR]’, Rec(2011)1955, 26 January 2011, paras. 1(4)-(5).  
441  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2011)1955, 26 January 2011, 
para. 1(4). 
442  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2006)1764, 2 October 2006, 
para. 2. 
443  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2002)1546, on 22 
January 2002.  
444  Assembly, ‘The Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2000)1477, 28 September 2000, 
para. 2; Astreintes are daily fines for a delay in the performance of a legal obligation.  
445  Assembly, ‘The Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Turkey’, Rec(2001)1529, 28 June 
2001.  
446  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR] by Turkey’, Rec(2002)1576, 23 
September 2002. 
447  Assembly, ‘The Humanitarian Situation of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey’, 
Rec(2002)1563, 29 May 2002. 
448  Assembly, ‘The the Colonisation by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus’, 
Rec(2003)1608, 24 June 2003.  
449  Assembly, ‘The Investigation of Crimes Allegedly Committed by High Officials during the 
Kuchma Rule in Ukraine’, Rec(2009)1856, 27 January 2009. 
450  Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
Rec(2013)2025, 2 October 2013.  
451  Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Moldova’, Rec(2002)1554, 24 April 
2002; Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Moldova’, Rec(2005)1721, 4 
October 2005.  
452  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR] by Turkey’, Rec(2002)1576, 23 
September 2002. 
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to the Court’s rulings generally,453 to a group of judgments454 or to one judgment in 
particular.455  
Three recommendations concerned specific regions: the former countries of 
Yugoslavia, the north Caucasus and central and Eastern Europe.456 As to the first 
region, the Assembly called upon the Committee to ensure the full and rapid 
execution of Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina.457 It further invited the 
Committee, ‘in enforcing the judgments of the [Court] concerning [the north 
Caucasus], to emphasise the prompt and complete elucidation of the cases in which 
the Court has ascertained an absence of effective investigation.458 Finally, regarding 
the last region, the Committee should, according to the Assembly, press Moldova to 
execute a ruling.459 Again, the execution was one of the many measures the 
Assembly deemed should be implemented. 
The two remaining recommendations did not relate to execution specifically, nor 
to a specific country or region, but rather to a theme, namely discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity,460 and discrimination based on 
religion.461 In these documents, the Assembly appealed to the Committee to ensure 
that relevant judgments were effectively implemented without delay.  
2.7.7 Content of the Reports  
As chapter VI explained, the recommendations of the Assembly are based on a 
report. The reports underlying the six recommendations referred to above, which 
were solely devoted to execution, were written by rapporteurs of the LAHRC. The 
rapporteurs used inter alia information about the execution of judgments which they  
                                                        
453  Assembly, ‘The Humanitarian Situation of the Displaced Kurdish Population in Turkey’, 
Rec(2002)1563, 29 May 2002.  
454  Assembly, ‘The Colonisation by Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus’, Rec(2003)1608, 
24 June 2003. 
455  Assembly, ‘The Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Turkey’, Rec(2001)1529, 28 June 
2001; Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Moldova’, Rec(2002)1554, 24 
April 2002; Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Moldova’, Rec(2005)1721, 
4 October 2005; Assembly, ‘The Functioning of Democratic Institutions in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Rec(2013)2025, 2 October 2013.  
456  Assembly, ‘Religion and Change in Central Eastern Europe’, Rec(2002)1556, 24 April 2002; 
Assembly, ‘Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations in the North Caucasus Region’, 
Rec(2010)1922, 22 June 2010; Assembly, ‘Reconciliation and Political Dialogue between the 
Countries of Former Yugoslavia’, Rec(2011)1954, 26 January 2011.  
457  Assembly, ‘Reconciliation and Political Dialogue between the Countries of Former Yugoslavia’, 
Rec(2011)1954, 26 January 2011, para. 3(6).  
458  Assembly, ‘Legal Remedies for Human Rights Violations in the North Caucasus Region’, 
Rec(2010)1922, 22 June 2010, para. 2(2). 
459  Assembly, ‘Religion and Change in Central Eastern Europe’, Rec(2002)1556, 24 April 2002.  
460  Assembly, ‘Tackling Discrimination on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, 
Rec(2013)2021, 27 June 2013.  
461  Assembly, ‘Combating all Forms of Discrimination Based on Religion, Rec(2011)1987, 25 
November 2011.  
 
 
 
 Chapter X 
 
 
426 
had requested from the relevant delegations to the Assembly. Additionally, in 
preparation of the fourth and the fifth reports, the rapporteur made fact-finding 
visits after the Assembly had endorsed his suggestion to that effect in 2005. The 
rapporteur had suggested to make in situ visits to states where ‘the most numerous 
and/or important implementation issues arise’,462 because such visits were ‘notably 
expected to increase the Assembly’s ability to reach directly decision-makers in 
parliaments, governments and state administrators to discuss possible solutions to 
outstanding problems’.463 The rapporteur met with, amongst others, persons 
working for different ministries, judges, prosecutor generals, government agents 
before the Court, delegations to the Assembly and civil society representatives.464 
During such a meeting, the rapporteur, for example, may convey concerns at the 
existence of structural problems, stress the need to create domestic remedies and 
make suggestions accordingly.465  
In the latest and sixth report, on the viability of the Court, the rapporteur strived 
to define the terms structural/systemic deficiency, leading case and clone/repetitive 
case, as well as aimed to identify measures taken to eliminate structural deficiencies 
by states parties discussed in a previous report.466 He also recommended measures 
to ensure that such deficiencies are dealt with on the domestic level.467 The second 
to the fifth report gave an overview of substantial implementation problems in 
selected states and assessed the state of execution of certain judgments, including 
the problems that remained and the progress that was booked. The judgments 
selected for discussion in the reports had not been fully executed for a relatively 
long time and raised important execution issues.468 The Assembly further stated that 
it would prioritise ‘the examination of major structural problems concerning cases 
in which extremely worrying delays in implementation have arisen’.469 The first 
report outlined the causes of and possible solutions for execution problems.470 
The content of the reports that stood at the basis of the recommendations on a 
specific region, theme or state, is not discussed here, because these reports do not 
primarily concern the execution of Strasbourg judgments, although they sometimes 
refer to the execution of the Court’s judgments471 or even dedicate a special 
subchapter to this subject.472 Other reports do not refer to these matters at all.  
                                                        
462  Jurgens (2006), para. 10.  
463  Idem.  
464  Jurgens (2006), Appendix X; Pourgourides (2010a), Appendix II.  
465  Jurgens (2006), para. 87.  
466  Kivalov, para. 3.  
467  Idem.  
468  Jurgens (2004), para. 8; Jurgens (2006), para. 6; Pourgourides (2010a), para. 5.  
469  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2011)1787, 26 January 2011, 
para. 3. 
470  Jurgens (2000).  
471  Bársony and Zierer (2001), para. 27; Connor (2002), para. 50; Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger (2008), 
paras. 38, 124. 
471  Woldseth and Vareikis (2013), para. 82.  
472  Durrieu (2002), paras. 130-141; Marty (2010), paras. 28-33; Panțîru (2011), para. 28.  
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2.7.8 The Committee’s Reply to Recommendations  
The Committee has replied to each Assembly recommendation. As in the case of 
the questions, the replies are sometimes delayed. These delays materialise in spite 
of the introduction by the deputies of a target time limit for a reply as from the time 
when recommendations are communicated in 1998.473 In response to one delay, the 
Assembly stated that it ‘regrets that, one year later, the [Committee] has still not 
replied to the recommendation’.474 It therefore reiterated its previous 
recommendation in a fresh recommendation.475 Generally, the replies are rather 
elaborate and the Committee usually responds to the different parts of a 
recommendation in turn. In addition to individual answers to individual 
recommendations, the Committee communicates to the Assembly its annual review 
of action on recommendations.476  
In the recommendations dealing with execution specifically, the Committee 
often assures that it welcomes the Assembly’s proposals and states that it shares its 
views, concerns or satisfaction.477 In addition to that, it may point out what it has 
already done or is doing to ensure the rapid and full execution of a judgment.478 It 
may also shed light on domestic developments or execution measures.479 By 
contrast, the Committee did not indicate whether it deemed the amendment of the 
Convention to allow for the imposition of astreintes being a fruitful idea.480 
The other recommendations are rather specific, and therefore the replies to them 
are rather diverse. The Committee has used the replies, for example, to mention 
new supervisory procedures481 or to inform the Assembly that reflections are under 
way designed to improve and speed up the execution of judgments.482 Also rather 
generally, the Committee once stated that it ‘has consistently insisted on full 
compliance with the judgments and assures the Assembly that this will continue to 
be its approach’.483  
                                                        
473  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 418’, Doc. 9654, 16 January 2003, para. 3. 
474  See, e.g.: Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Decisions of the [ECtHR]’, Rec(2002)1546, 22 
January 2002, para. 3. 
475  See, e.g.: Ibid., para. 4.  
476  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 418’, Doc. 9654, 16 January 2003, para. 1.  
477  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2004)1684’, Doc. 10651, 26 July 2005, para. 1; Committee, ‘Reply to 
Rec. (2006)1764’, Doc. 11230, 2 April 2007, paras. 2-3, 5; Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. 
(2011)1955’, Doc. 12801, 23 November 2011, para. 2; Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2013)2007’, 
Doc. 13166, 10 April 2013, paras. 4-5.  
478  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2004)1684’, Doc. 10651, 26 July 2005, para. 5; Committee, ‘Reply to 
Rec. (2006)1764’, Doc. 11230, 2 April 2007, paras. 4,8; Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2011)1955’, 
Doc. 12801, 23 November 2011, paras. 3-7. 
479  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2000)1477’, Doc. 9311, 14 January 2002; Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. 
(2004)1684’, Doc. 10651, 26 July 2005, para. 6.  
480  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2002)1546’, Doc. 9375, 18 February 2002.  
481  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2011)1987’, Doc. 13033, 29 September 2012.  
482  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2002)1676’, Doc. 9754, 31 March 2003, para. 9.  
483  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2003)1608’, Doc. 10372, 15 December 2004, para. 5.  
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Regarding recommendations on individual execution measures, the Committee 
may welcome these,484 explain which steps the respondent state should take or 
intends to take485 and regret that there have not yet been positive developments.486 
The Committee may also assure the Assembly that the steps undertaken by the 
respondent state will contribute to the execution of a judgment,487 that it will 
continue to follow a case488 or that it is fully aware of its responsibilities under 
Article 46(2).489 As to a specific judgment, it may remind the Assembly that it has 
been ‘closely supervising’ the execution process,490 that it examined a case at a DH 
meeting491 or that it has adopted various interim resolutions.492 
2.7.9 Influence of the Recommendations  
It is nearly impossible to establish whether the Committee has allowed the general 
recommendations to influence the execution process in a manner that influenced the 
supervision of individual judgments, if they are allowed to be of influence at all. 
This is, however, unlikely due to their limited number (six) and because of their 
general nature, which makes it improbable that the execution of specific cases is 
affected in any noticeable manner. Further, the more targeted recommendations, 
regarding a specific state, region or theme, do normally not solely consider the 
execution of a judgment but various issues, amongst which execution. It is therefore 
unlikely that they significantly influence the supervision of individual (groups of) 
cases. Both the general and more targeted recommendations therefore seem to be of 
very limited influence although the Committee responds to the recommendations 
much more elaborately than to the Assembly’s questions. Their limited influence 
finds confirmation in the fact that only two interim resolutions adopted at a DH 
meeting refer to an Assembly recommendation.493  
                                                        
484  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2001)1529’, Doc. 9323, 21 January 2002, para. 2.  
485  Idem.  
486  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2011)1954’, Doc. 12709, 15 September 2011, para. 8.  
487  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2002)1676’, Doc. 9754, 31 March 2003, para. 9.  
488  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2009)1856’, Doc. 11988, 8 July 2009, para. 3.  
489  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2002)1563’, Doc. 9547, 18 September 2002. 
490  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2002)1554’, Doc. 9554, 21 September 2002, para. 2; Committee, 
‘Reply to Rec. (2009)1856’, Doc. 11988, 8 July 2009, para. 1. 
491  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2001)1529’, Doc. 9323, 21 January 2002, para. 6; Committee, ‘Reply 
to Rec. (2009)1856’, Doc. 11988, 8 July 2009, para. 2.  
492  Committee, ‘Reply to Rec. (2005)1721’, Doc. 10931, 12 May 2006, para. 17; Committee, ‘Reply to 
Rec. (2010)1922’, Doc. 12480, 24 January 2011, para. 4.  
493  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 2183 Cases v. Italy’, ResDH(2005)114, 30 November 2005; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
ResDH(2013)259, 5 December 2013; The recommendations referred to were assessed in this 
section. Search performed on 12 August 2014 in the ‘Resolutions’ collection on HUDOC with the 
search terms “Assembly recommendation”. In the Appendix to two final resolutions, reference was 
made to an Assembly recommendation, see: Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Cases relating to 
Actions of Police Forces in Cyprus ‘, ResDH(2006)13, 12 April 2006; Committee, ‘Final 
Resolution on Dorigo v. Italy’, CM/ResDH(2007)83, 20 June 2007. 
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2.8 Commissioner Country Visits and Reports  
In the view of Commissioner Muižnieks, all his work is ‘related some way to the 
work of the Court’.494 This relation is born of the mandate, which is ‘to promote 
education in, awareness of and respect for human rights, as embodied in the human 
rights instruments of the Council of Europe’.495 Additionally, his involvement with 
the Court stems from his wish that his work ‘be useful in addressing the systematic 
failure to implement the Convention’ and of his resolve to ‘continue to draw the 
authorities’ attention to the need for prompt implementation of judgments issued by 
the Court’.496 Prior to assuming office, Commissioner Muižnieks even announced 
that ‘one priority would be to work with those states that generate the most cases 
before the [Court] and seek to address the structural causes leading to the 
complaints’.497 Likewise, during his term of office, he emphasised that he places 
‘great importance on the [Court] and the European Convention as the centrepieces 
of the broader human rights architecture in Europe’.498 He added to this that he is 
‘convinced that the Commissioner’s office, along with other bodies of the Council 
of Europe, must do everything possible to assist the Court and to ensure that its 
judgments are promptly and effectively executed by the member states’.499 
Moreover, on another occasion, he stated that he believed that his office ‘can play a 
critical role in assisting member states in improving their judiciaries and by 
addressing systemic problems leading to many applications before the [Court]’.500 
As explained in chapter VI, the Commissioner can contribute to promoting 
execution by taking two types of action: country visits and, connected to that, 
reports. The resolution instituting the office thereby requires the Commissioner to 
complement rather than to duplicate the work of the Court and the Committee, and 
it obliges him/her to respect their competences and fulfil other functions.501  
Against this backdrop, this section will first describe the frequency and areas of 
use of the Commissioner’s visits/reports. The second part of the section outlines the 
content of the discussions during states visits and of the reports.  
2.8.1 Frequency and Areas of use  
The Commissioner makes frequent visits to the states parties and, on top of that, 
undertakes shorter missions. To illustrate, in 2013, Commissioner Muižnieks visited 
                                                        
494  Muižnieks (2012a).  
495  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Art. 1(1); See also: Art. 3 ibid.  
496  Muižnieks (2012a). 
497  Ibid., 3.  
498  Idem.  
499  Idem.  
500  Muižnieks (2013c).  
501  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Arts. 1(2), 3(e).  
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nine states and undertook ten missions. Each visit paid in that year resulted in a 
report. In total, seventeen letters and country reports were published in that year.502 
For the purposes of this study, the frequency of the country visits/reports is not of 
any great relevance. More important is the answer to the question whether the 
Commissioner, when making a visit or writing a report, takes account of the 
execution of the Court’s judgments. This question is answered when discussing the 
content of the visits/reports.  
The Commissioner’s mandate, which prohibits the office from taking up 
individual complaints, leaves it no choice but to focus on general measures required 
to end and prevent systemic problems.503 This focus also accords with one of the 
tasks assigned to the Commissioner, which is to: 
 
identify possible shortcoming in the law and practice of the member States 
concerning the compliance with human rights as embodied in the instruments of the 
[Council of Europe], promote the effective implementation of these standards by 
member States and assist them [...] in their efforts to remedy such shortcomings.504 
 
Commissioner Muižnieks is of the view that, ‘especially in cases of gross or 
systemic problems, [...] [his] Office can play an important role in ensuring that the 
Convention system remains effective’.505 Further, one of his priorities is to help 
member states to address the ‘structural causes’ in domestic legal systems which 
generate most cases before the Court.506  
The Commissioner’s activities are by and large centred on a number of themes. 
In 2013, for example, these themes were: the effects of austerity measures on 
human rights, freedom of expression and media freedom and human rights, racist 
extremism, conduct of law enforcement officials, secret surveillance and the right to 
private life, and transitional justice. Furthermore, attention was paid to the 
following groups: immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, Roma, LGTBI persons, 
children and persons with disabilities.507 As can be expected and as the content of 
the reports confirms, the Court’s case law, including the execution of the Court’s 
judgments, is relevant to these themes. The case law namely includes standards 
based on which the Commissioner can evaluate the human rights situation in a state.  
                                                        
502  Muižnieks (2013c). 
503  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Arts. 1(2).  
504  Ibid., Arts. 3(e).  
505  Muižnieks (2012a). 
506  Muižnieks (2013b), 4. 
507  Muižnieks (2014). 
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2.8.2 Content  
The country visits have enabled the Commissioner to establish a ‘serious human 
rights dialogue at a high level with all member States of the Council of Europe’.508 
As part of the dialogue, the Commissioner discusses the execution of the Strasbourg 
judgments, especially the question of general measures necessary to remedy 
structural problems.509 To illustrate, the rationale for focussing on the efficiency of 
the judiciary during a visit to Italy was the priority which the Commissioner had 
given to working with the states that generate the most cases before the Court.510 
Commissioner Gil-Robles felt that, although he may take action on his own 
initiative, ‘there are even more grounds to take action in relation to problems the 
Court has pinpointed in its judgments’.511 During his visits, the Commissioner both 
seeks to assist states to address the structural causes behind repetitive complaints 
and focuses on ‘implementation gaps’.512 For the latter purpose, Commissioner 
Muižnieks, for example, ‘organised a country visit to the Czech Republic to 
coincide with the 5th anniversary of the landmark D.H. and others v. the Czech 
Republic’.513  
The content of the reports, which is discussed below, demonstrates that the 
Commissioner is concerned with and deeply aware of instances of delayed or 
incomplete execution and the need to address such instances. Information in the 
Commissioner’s annual and periodical activity reports confirms that execution 
problems are raised frequently with the domestic authorities. For example, when 
visiting Greece, Romania and Poland in 2002, the Commissioner set on the agenda 
the question of general measures required to execute judgments and made proposals 
and recommendations to this effect.514 During a visit to Turkey, Commissioner 
Muižnieks ‘stressed that Turkey needed independent, impartial, adequate and 
effective investigations into all allegations of police misconduct, notably in order to 
re-establish trust in security forces’.515 As he noted in his report, ‘[t]he case law of 
the [Court] demonstrated grave structural problems affecting such investigations, 
which Turkey needed to remedy by taking serious steps to improve transparency 
and accountability’.516 Further, in Albania, the Commissioner ‘welcomed the 
                                                        
508  Sivonen (2012), 28; The Commissioner’s attachment to this dialogue becomes clear when reading 
the letters sent to authorities and the references to dialogue (s)he makes in these letters, see, e.g.: 
Commissioner, ‘Letter to Mrs Paula Teixeira da Cruz (Ministers of Justice of Portuga)’, 
CommHR/FK/sf 088-2012, 8 June 2012: ‘Looking forward to receiving more information on the 
progress of the legal reform under way and continuing our constructive dialogue’.  
509  Gil-Robles (2003), 23; Sivonen (2012), 34.  
510  Muižnieks (2012b), 3.  
511  Gil-Robles (2003), 22.  
512  Muižnieks (2013a), 3.  
513  Idem.  
514  Gil-Robles (2003), 22.  
515  Muižnieks (2013d).  
516  Idem. 
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government’s commitment to fully executing the judgments of the [Court], notably 
the Manushaqe Puto pilot judgment’.517 As a final illustration, when paying a visit 
and on a mission to Russia, the Commissioner ‘paid particular attention to [...] the 
ongoing work to address the structural problems identified in the case law of the 
[Court]’518 and discussed the ‘administration of justice, including as regards the 
execution of judgments of the [Court]’ with the minister of justice, the deputy 
minister of the interior, the prosecutor general, the head of the investigative 
committee and members of the federal assembly.519 
Based on his visits, the Commissioner draws up reports in which (s)he describes 
factual information, presents conclusions and makes recommendations.520 In 
addition to these reports, (s)he may send letters to domestic authorities, by means of 
which (s)he involves in direct communication with the states parties and which may 
follow-up to both country visits/reports. As an example, the seventeen reports and 
letters listed in the Activity Report 2013 may be mentioned. Each report and some 
letters refer to the execution of the Court’s judgments, and they confirm what was 
mentioned above: that the Commissioner is very much aware of and concerned with 
execution problems. The concerns not only relate to the execution of specific 
judgments, but extend, more generally, to the Convention as interpreted by the 
Court. This larger concern, as is illustrated below, may also mean that the 
Commissioner warns against incompatibilities with Convention standards. In this 
way, (s)he potentially prevents the Court from having to find future violations.  
More specifically, the Commissioner sometimes reviews, usually rather 
critically, the general measures taken to execute a judgment, such as a national 
action plan or legislative amendment.521 When reporting about Azerbaijan, for 
example, Commissioner Muižnieks noted that, in his opinion, the reform 
undertaken to bring defamation law in line with the Convention was ‘difficult to 
reconcile [...] with the adoption by the Azerbaijani Parliament [...] of amendments 
aimed at facilitating the application of defamation provisions to online 
expression’.522 He therefore called – in vain – on the President to not sign the 
amendments into law.523 When reviewing execution measures and providing 
recommendations as regards appropriate execution measures, the Commissioner 
may provide information about the execution measures taken so far, for example, 
                                                        
517  Idem.  
518  Idem. 
519  Muižnieks (2013b), 12; See also: Muižnieks (2013a), 5; Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to 
Azerbaijan’, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, paras. 67, 87.  
520  Commissioner, ‘Press Release; Azerbaijan: Greater Freedom of Expression and Assembly Urgently 
Needed’, CommDH014(2013), 27 May 2013.  
521  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to the Czech Republic’, CommDH(2013)1, 21 February 2013, 
paras. 44-50; Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Estonia’, CommDH(2013)12, 20 June 2013, paras. 
34-37.  
522  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Azerbaijan’, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, para. 26.  
523  Idem.  
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about what the domestic authorities said about these measures during a meeting.524 
In addition to assessing execution measures, the Commissioner sometimes 
expresses concerns about issues identified by the Court and about ‘implementation 
gaps’.525 The Commissioner also makes recommendations as to the measures which 
should be implemented to ensure the full execution of a judgment. In respect of the 
D.H. judgment, mentioned above, the Commissioner explained, for instance, that 
and why a ‘paradigm shift’ was necessary in the educations system, something 
which would require the ‘government’s will and sustained commitment’.526 In 
respect of the same judgment, the Commissioner recommended that the Czech 
Republic would accompany the already existing action plan with a detailed 
schedule including clear targets and indicators for monitoring and funding.527 The 
Commissioner may also simply urge the authorities to give effect to the judgments 
of the Court or,528 more generally, to clarify the legal framework in line with the 
Court’s case law when undertaking domestic legal reform.529 The latter point 
potentially contributes to preventing future Convention violations. On other 
occasions as well, the Commissioner directs the attention of the domestic 
authorities to matters which may lead to adverse Strasbourg judgments in a way that 
can be favourable to reducing the Court’s future case-load. For example, the 
Commissioner stated about a new Spanish bill which inter alia criminalised the 
dissemination of messages inciting to disturbances of the public order, that ‘the 
vague nature of this provision might in fact lead to sanctioning declarations and 
opinions expressed prior to public disturbances, which would be incompatible with 
international standards of freedom of expression and the case law of the [Court]’.530 
In a report on Turkey, the Commissioner wrote that ‘the failure to conduct 
independent, adequate, prompt and effective investigations into all these allegations 
would [...] result in a large number of cases being brought to the ECtHR and add to 
the already large substantial caseload of the Court concerning the respect of the 
                                                        
524  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Azerbaijan’, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, para. 15; See 
also: Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Moldova’, CommDH(2013)19, 30 September 2013, para. 
44. 
525  Commissioner, ‘Letter to Mr Janez Janša (Prime Minister of Slovenia)’, CommDH(2013)3, 10 
January 2013; Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to the Czech Republic’, CommDH(2013)1, 21 
February 2013, para. 44. 
526  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to the Czech Republic’, CommDH(2013)1, 21 February 2013, 
para. 51.  
527  Ibid., para. 56; See also: paras. 62-66; See for another example of recommendations: 
Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Russia’, CommDH(2013)21, 12 November 2013, paras. 148-
153 
528  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Greece’, CommDH(2013)6, 16 April 2013, para. 101.  
529  Commissioner, ‘Letter to Mr Arsen Bauk (Minister of Public Administration)’, CommHR/LS/sf 
006-2013, 5 April 2013; See for a comparable letter: Commissioner, ‘Letter to Ms Nansi Tireli 
(Chairperson of the Gender Equality Committee, Croatian Parliament)’, CommDH(2013)7, 11 
April 2013.  
530  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Spain’, CommDH(2013)18, 09 October 2013, para. 130. 
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right to freedom of assembly by Turkey’.531 In this connection, he ‘trusts that the 
Constitutional Court will continue fulfilling its crucial role of ensuring compliance 
of the Turkish judiciary with the standards’.532  
In the reports, the Commissioner frequently cites the Court’s case law in 
different ways, without necessarily mentioning the execution of the Court’s 
judgments. The Commissioner refers first of all to standards established by the 
Court. For example, Commissioner Muižnieks has noted that ‘measures which 
restrict access to information on the internet must be based on a law that is precise 
enough to clearly regulate the scope of the ban and that offers sufficient 
opportunities for judicial review’533 and that the national authorities must in case of 
an enforced disappearance ‘ensure, thorough prompt and effective investigations, 
accountability for cases of enforced disappearances and clarify the fate of those 
who remain missing’.534 The Commissioner, secondly, can rely on Strasbourg case 
law to support a point he is making. As regards the excessive length of judicial 
proceedings in Estonia, for instance, the same Commissioner stated that the Court 
‘has repeatedly ruled against Estonia in such cases in the past’535 and, with regard to 
Turkey, that the Court ‘found on many occasions that Turkey had violated Article 3 
[...], both in its substantive and procedural aspects’.536 In a report on Russia, he 
even dedicated a separate chapter to issues identified by the Court.537 A third way 
for the Commissioner to touch upon the Court’s judgments is to refer to the large 
numbers of cases concerning a particular problem pending before the Court. This is 
illustrated by his remark that ‘out of the 662 judgments delivered against Greece 
[...] 438 concerned excessive length of judicial proceedings’538 and by his reference 
to the ‘number of cases relating to the expropriations and demolitions pending 
before the Court’ against Azerbaijan, which led him to urge ‘the authorities to 
ensure that an effective remedy exists at national level, instead of awaiting the 
outcome of these cases’.539  
                                                        
531  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Turkey’, CommDH(2013)24, 26 November 2013, para. 143.  
532  Idem; See also: Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Spain’, CommDH(2013)18, 09 October 2013, 
para. 144. 
533  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Azerbaijan’, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, para. 50. 
534  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to the Czech Republic’, CommDH(2013)1, 21 February 2013, 
para. 40; Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to the FYROM’, CommDH(2013)4, 9 April 2013, para. 
41; Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Spain’, CommDH(2013)18, 09 October 2013, para. 23. 
535  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Estonia’, CommDH(2013)12, 20 June 2013, para. 33.  
536  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Turkey’, CommDH(2013)24, 26 November 2013, para. 36; See 
also: Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Turkey’, CommDH(2013)24, 26 November 2013, paras. 
28, 39-40.  
537  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Russia’, CommDH(2013)21, 12 November 2013, paras. 110-
147. 
538  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Greece’, CommDH(2013)6, 16 April 2013, para. 85.  
539  Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Azerbaijan’, CommDH(2013)14, 6 August 2013, para. 110; See 
also: Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Greece’, CommDH(2013)6, 16 April 2013, para. 106; 
Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Russia’, CommDH(2013)21, 12 November 2013, para. 12; 
Commissioner, ‘Report on Visit to Turkey’, CommDH(2013)24, 26 November 2013, para. 69.  
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2.9 Decisions and Interim Resolutions  
This section first comments, under the heading ‘methodology’, shortly on the 
sample of decisions and interim resolutions drawn on. After this, the discussion of 
the use of decisions and interim resolutions in practice commences with a 
description of their frequency and the process of their preparation. In addition to 
that, the content of the documents is outlined.  
2.9.1 Methodology  
For the purposes of analysing the practice in relation to decisions, the frequency 
with which decisions were adopted was established by looking at the decisions 
adopted at all DH meetings of the most recent three years at the time of writing 
(2011-2013). The period of three years should be sufficiently representative for the 
purpose of establishing the average number of decisions per meeting. To establish 
against how many different states a decision was issued, only the most recent year 
at the time of writing was looked at (2013). The period of one year made it possible 
to demonstrate that, even in a rather short period, already many different states were 
addressed. For the description of the content of the decisions, the in total 24 
decisions adopted at the most recent meeting at the time of writing were used (3-5 
December 2013). 
The frequency of interim resolutions and the states against which they were 
issued are described with reference to a document entitled ‘Collection of Interim 
Resolutions 2009-2013 (by Country)’540 and a similar document which collected all 
interim resolutions issued from 1988-2008.541 Both documents make it possible to 
establish the frequency and number of different states addressed in the two periods. 
To give some insight into the content of the interim resolutions, only the former 
document was used because it was the most recent. These resolutions hereafter are 
not discussed in great detail; rather an overview is given of the main elements 
which reoccur regularly in the preamble and the operative clauses.  
2.9.2 Frequency  
From 2011-2013, in total 316 decisions were adopted in different groups of cases, 
which comes down to an average of about 26 decisions per meeting and 105 per 
                                                        
540  Because this document is regularly updated, the document covering only the period 2009-2013 is 
no longer available online; The latest document available online at the time of reviewing this text 
was: Execution Department, ‘Collection of Interim Resolutions 2009-2014 (by Country)’, 
H/Exec(2014)2, October 2014.  
541  Execution Department, ‘Collection of Interim Resolutions 1988-2008 (by Country)’, 
H/Exec(2008)1, 13 October 2008.  
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year (at four DH meetings).542 As regards interim resolutions, 38 were issued from 
2009-2013 and 89 from 1988-2008. In the first period, on average 4.3 interim 
resolutions were issued per year and, in the second period, 7.6 per year. Considering 
that there are about 11,000 cases pending before the Committee, these figures 
clearly show that, even though the average number of interim resolutions has 
increased, only in few cases an interim resolution or decision is adopted. However, 
because decisions and interim resolutions often concern a group of cases, rather 
than an individual case, more cases are addressed than just 38 and 86 from 1988-
2013.  
The states addressed by a decision or interim resolution are quite diverse, as the 
114 decisions issued in 2013 demonstrate. In that year, 26 different states were 
addressed, with most decisions concerning Ukraine (15), Greece (10) and Russia 
(10). In respect of seven states, only one decision was adopted. The 38 interim 
resolutions referred to above, were issued in respect of 12 different states. Most 
interim resolutions were issued against Russia (6), Ukraine (5) and Turkey (4).543 
The 86 interim resolutions issued from 1998-2008, concerned 18 different states, 
with Turkey (22), Italy (18) and the UK (9) in the top three.544  
2.9.3 Preparation  
The Execution Department is responsible for drafting the decisions and interim 
resolutions-to-be. The drafts are usually proposed by the Execution Department 
itself, on the basis of its assessment of the case and in the light of the action 
plans/reports and previous practice. Sometimes, as a result of a debate at a DH 
meeting, the deputies ask the Execution Department to draft a decision of interim 
resolution.545 Interim resolutions may also be adopted at the request of the 
delegation concerned,546 which happens sometimes.547 The draft document is first 
sent to the respondent state, which can suggest amendments, and does so in 
practice.548 Practice shows that the deputies follow the Execution Department’s 
assessment, although active lobbying by the respondent states, which takes place 
                                                        
542  Date of meeting and number of decisions adopted: 8-10 March 2011 (21); 7-8 June 2011 (29); 13-
14 September 2011 (16); 29 November-2 December 2011 (24); 6-8 March 2012 (24); 4-6 June 
2012 (30); 24-26 September 2012 (28); 4-6 December 2012 (30); 5-7 March 2013 (35); 4-6 June 
2013 (29); 24-26 September 2013 (26); 3-5 December 2013 (24). 
543  Execution Department, ‘Collection of Interim Resolutions 2009-2014 (by Country)’, 
H/Exec(2014)2, October 2014. 
544  Execution Department, ‘Collection of Interim Resolutions 1988-2008 (by Country)’, 
H/Exec(2008)1, 13 October 2008. 
545  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 9; Execution interview 11; Execution interview 13; See 
also: Çalı and Koch (2014), 318. 
546  CDDH (2008b), para. 29. 
547  Idem. 
548  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 9; Execution interview 11.  
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only rarely, can mean that a certain items of a case remain open even though the 
Execution Department wants to close them.549  
2.9.4 Content  
In the decisions, the Committee frequently asks the respondent state to clarify 
certain matters and to provide information as regards the state of execution.550 
Furthermore, it expresses satisfaction and welcomes developments on the domestic 
level which are beneficial to the execution or the judgment.551 It also encourages 
the authorities to, for example, rapidly take the measures envisaged in the action 
plan,552 accelerate the implementation of the outstanding measures553 and take due 
account of its own recommendations and those of the CPT.554 Sometimes, the 
Committee also expresses regret or concern about the lack of adequate execution 
measures or information demonstrating that these measures have been taken.555 In a 
stronger manner, it may urge states to rapidly comply with a judgment.556 In 
conclusion, the decisions contain information about the way the Committee plans to 
proceed, for example by resuming its consideration of the case at the next DH 
meeting,557 expanding its focus of its forthcoming examination,558 closing the 
                                                        
549  Çalı and Koch (2014), 318.  
550  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 2; Cases against Armenia’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
paras. 1-2; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 3: Cases against Azerbaijan’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 5; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 5; Case against Belgium and Greece, 
1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, para. 1.  
551  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 1; Case against Albania’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
paras. 1, 4; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 2; Cases against Armenia’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 1; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 11; Cases against Greece’, 1186th 
meeting, 5 December 2013, para. 2.  
552  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 8; Cases against Bulgaria’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 6.  
553  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 9; Cases against the Czech Republic’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 5.  
554  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 12; Cases against Moldova’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 
2013, para. 8.  
555  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 1; Case against Albania’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 2; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 8; Cases against Bulgaria’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 3; Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 16; Case against Russia’, 1186th 
meeting, 5 December 2013, para. 2; Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 22; Case against Ukraine,’ 
1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, para. 1.  
556  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 24; Cases against the UK’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 23. Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 3: Cases against Azerbaijan’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 2.  
557  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 3: Cases against Azerbaijan’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 
2013, para. 6.  
558  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 5; Case against Belgium and Greece’, 1186th meeting, 5 
December 2013, para. 5.  
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supervision of the individual measures559 or transferring the case from enhanced 
supervision to standard supervision.560 
Interim resolutions are different from decisions in that they contain a preamble, 
in the first part of which the Committee gives information about the relevant 
judgment, recalling, for example, the long-standing structural nature of the problem 
underlying the case or the fact that the Court adopted a pilot judgment.561 Besides 
that and where relevant, it describes already adopted execution measures562 or the 
execution measures which the Committee considers to be necessary.563 
Additionally, the preamble includes references to what the Committee and others 
have stated about the execution of a case or the problems revealed by a case on 
other occasions. As regards its own statements, the Committee refers to, for 
example, previous interim resolutions or, more generally, its recommendations to 
the states parties.564 The Committee furthermore may mention that the respondent 
state acknowledged the need to take certain measures,565 it may point to statements 
made by, for example, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe566 or the 
Assembly567 and it may refer to judgments of domestic courts and of the European 
Court issued after the judgment under examination was adopted.568 It also can use 
the preamble to remind the state that certain unresolved problems represent a grave 
danger to the rule of law, the effectiveness of the Convention system and the 
                                                        
559  Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 14; Case against Poland’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 1.  
560  Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 18; Case against Slovenia’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 2013, 
para. 5; Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 19; Case against Spain’, 1186th meeting, 5 December 
2013, para. 4.  
561  See, e.g: Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Pilot Judgment Puto and 11 other Judgments’, 
ResDH(2013)115, 6 June 2013.  
562  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases against Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010.  
563  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 145 Cases against Russia’, ResDH(2009)43, 19 March 2009; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2012)233, 6 December 2012.  
564  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 31 Cases v. Russia’, ResDH(2010)35, 2 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in 84 Cases v. 
Bulgaria’, ResDH(2010)223, 2 December 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive 
Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, ResDH(2010)224, 2 December 2010; Committee, ‘Interim 
Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 v. Russia’, ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011. 
565  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 31 Cases v. Russia’, ResDH(2010)35, 2 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 v. Russia’, ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011. 
566  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
ResDH(2012)233, 6 December 2012. 
567  Idem.  
568  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, 
ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 v. Russia’, 
ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011. 
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authority of the Court and that all states are obliged by virtue of Article 46 to abide 
by the final judgments to which they are a party.569 Such a reminder may follow the 
observation that the state has failed to implement appropriate execution measures, 
to submit an action plan, to respond to a letter sent by the Committee’s chairman or 
to provide information at all or on time.570 Further, the Committee often uses the 
preamble to welcome relevant domestic developments, such as legislative 
reforms,571 or the regular and close co-operation through bilateral meetings.572 It 
also notes at times with satisfaction the continuing political commitment of the 
authorities and their determination to solve a structural problem.573 
Subsequently, the operative provisions are used to call upon or urge the 
domestic authorities to do what the Committee observed they failed to do as 
described in the preamble. Thus, the Committee may require them to give the 
highest priority to the preparation of an action plan,574 to take all necessary 
measures575 and to submit relevant information or to draw up a time table.576 
Further, it may call on the authorities to accelerate the domestic proceedings aiming 
                                                        
569  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2010)224, 2 December 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ivanov v. Ukraine and the 
Zhovner group of 389 Cases v. Ukraine’, ResDH(2012)234, 6 December 2012; Committee, 
‘Interim Resolution on the Pilot Judgment Puto and 11 other Judgments’, ResDH(2013)115, 6 June 
2013; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Garabayev Group of Cases v. Russia’, 
ResDH(2013)200, 26 September 2013. 
570  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey’, ResDH(2010)33, 4 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2010)224, 2 December 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Pilot Judgment Puto 
and 11 other Judgments’, ResDH(2013)115, 6 June 2013; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 
Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan and Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan’, ResDH(2013)199, 26 
September 2013; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Garabayev Group of Cases v. Russia’, 
ResDH(2013)200, 26 September 2013.  
571  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in 84 Cases v. 
Bulgaria’, ResDH(2010)223, 2 December 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 
v. Russia’, ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011.  
572  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009.  
573  Idem. 
574  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Pilot Judgment Puto and 11 other Judgments’, 
ResDH(2013)115, 6 June 2013.  
575  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ben Khemais v. Italy’, ResDH(2010)83, 3 June 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan and Fatullayev v. 
Azerbaijan’, ResDH(2013)199, 26 September 2013; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Garabayev 
Group of Cases v. Russia’, ResDH(2013)200, 26 September 2013. 
576  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Mahmudov and Agazade v. Azerbaijan and Fatullayev v. 
Azerbaijan’, ResDH(2013)199, 26 September 2013; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and 
Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011; Committee, ‘Interim 
Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 
2009; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010.  
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to execute a judgment.577 In addition to calling upon the state, the Committee 
sometimes expresses concern that the measures taken so far are insufficient578 or 
recalls the obligations under Article 46.579 On a more positive note, it can 
encourage the states to continue or enhance their execution efforts.580 More 
specifically, for example, the Committee may encourage the state to consider 
amending a law581 or to make increasing use of unilateral declarations and friendly 
settlements in order to resolve the problem of cases pending before the Court.582 
Connected to an encouragement, the Committee at times invites the authorities to, 
for example, assess the effects of the measures adopted.583 Additionally, something 
which was not immediately apparent from the sample of 38 interim resolutions, is 
that interim resolutions have also been used to threaten a state with measures other 
than an interim resolution if it persisted in its failure to abide by a judgment.584 
Finally, the Committee can make various decisions in the operative provisions 
of its interim resolutions: to examine the case at each DH meeting until the 
necessary measures are achieved,585 to close its examination of some execution 
measures,586 or to resume its consideration of execution at another DH meeting.587  
In addition to the above, if a systemic or individual problem continues to exist in 
defiance of a resolution, the Committee can adopt multiple resolutions to urge the 
state to take execution measures and,588 eventually, it may adopt ‘a very strongly 
worded interim resolution recalling the unconditional nature of the obligation to 
                                                        
577  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in 84 Cases v. 
Bulgaria’, ResDH(2010)223, 2 December 2010.  
578  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 31 Cases v. Russia’, ResDH(2010)35, 2 March 2010; 
Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011.  
579  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ülke v. Turkey’, ResDH(2009)45, 19 March 2009; Committee, 
‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2012)233, 6 
December 2012. 
580  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Gongadze v. Ukraine’, 
ResDH(2009)74, 16 September 2009; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 31 Cases v. Russia’, 
ResDH(2010)35, 2 March 2010; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, ResDH(2011)291, 2 December 2011. 
581  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009. 
582  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ivanov v. Ukraine and the Zhovner group of 389 Cases v. 
Ukraine’, ResDH(2012)234, 6 December 2012.  
583  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010.  
584  See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Loizidou v. Turkey’, ResDH(2003)174, 12 November 
2003. 
585  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ülke v. Turkey’, ResDH(2009)45, 19 March 2009; Committee, 
‘Interim Resolution on Ben Khemais v. Italy’, ResDH(2010)83, 3 June 2010; Committee, ‘Interim 
Resolution on Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2012)233, 6 December 2012.  
586  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 v. Russia’, ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011.  
587  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov No. 2 v. Russia’, ResDH(2009)158, 3 December 2009.  
588  Leach (2011), 100-101.  
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comply with the Court’s judgments, stressing that compliance is a condition of 
membership of the Council of Europe, and possibly even calling upon the member 
states to take all actions they deem appropriate in order to assist in ensuring 
execution’.589  
In sum, the operative provisions generally are used to urge the states to take 
execution measures, to express concern, to recall more generally the obligation to 
execute, to encourage and to welcome developments and to make decisions.590 
Compared to decisions, the wording in interim resolutions is stronger, with a greater 
emphasis on the failures in the process of execution and the need to remedy those 
failures. Further, interim resolutions are comparably elaborate, while decisions are 
more neutral and positive and focus often on requesting information from the 
respondent state. 
2.10 Individual Follow-up Cases 
As can be recalled from chapter VI, in an individual follow-up case, an applicant 
complains about the (lack of) individual measure(s) implemented to execute a 
previous judgment to which he was a party. Such a case is only admissible when 
either the impugned execution measure, implemented to execute the first judgment, 
gives rise to a new Convention issue or when the applicant complains of a 
continuing violation. It was therefore observed in chapter VI that this procedure 
does not permit the Court to comment on execution measures directly, but only on 
their consequences. This section deals inter alia with the question whether this 
observation holds in practice based on the content of individual follow-up cases. 
Before addressing their content, the frequency and areas of use of the individual 
follow-up cases are discussed, after which a matter of particular relevance to these 
cases is touched upon, namely the practical conditions for their admissibility. The 
content of the cases is described based on judgments rendered by the new Court, so 
cases decided from November 1998 onward. This section finishes with an account 
of the Committee’s reliance on individual follow-up cases, so as to give some 
insight into any dialogue between the Committee and the Court that may result from 
individual follow-up cases.  
2.10.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
It is difficult to determine the exact number of individual follow-up cases which 
come before the Court.591 It is nevertheless possible to observe that there are very 
                                                        
589  Ibid., 102; See also: Leach (2006b), 448.  
590  See also: Committee (2012), 18; Leach (2006b), 448; Amat (2009).  
591  Relevant follow-up cases to this chapter are only those cases in which the applicant complains of 
(the consequences of) an execution measures or a continuing violation. Relevant follow-up cases 
are therefore not cases brought by the same applicant about a different issue than complained of by 
the applicant in a case it brought previously.  
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few such cases and even fewer follow-up cases which are declared admissible. A 
plausible explanation for the rare occurrence of these cases is the generally 
adequate level of execution in the individual case, which is related to the fact that 
oftentimes no individual measure is required other than the payment of just 
satisfaction.592 Another explanation may be that the applicants are not inclined to 
lodge a second complaint because of the burden this imposes on them, a burden 
which is especially heavy when considering that they usually have already gone 
through at least two sets of domestic proceedings.  
Several examples of admissible follow-up cases raising a new Convention issue 
concerned Article 10. Under this article, the applicants complained about a renewed 
prohibition on broadcasting a television commercial,593 an only partially annulled 
ban on the dissemination of research findings594 and two sets of proceedings which 
a political party brought in vain to register its party.595 Outside the context of the 
freedom of expression, some follow-up cases were brought as a reaction to the 
alleged failure of the authorities to end the interference with the applicant’s Article 
8 right596 and as a reaction to domestic proceedings which were reopened after the 
Court found a violation of Article 6 in its first judgment.597 Other admissible 
follow-up cases alleging a continuing violation related to the applicant’s 
detention,598 the non-enforcement of a domestic judgment599 and the length of 
domestic proceedings.600  
2.10.2 Conditions  
In practice, in line with the procedural rules set out in chapter VI, the Court only 
declares follow-up cases admissible when the applicant complains of a continuing 
violation or of what constitutes, according to the Court, a fresh violation. Therefore, 
several cases were declared inadmissible ratione materiae because the applicant 
complained ‘plainly that the Government have failed to execute the [...] judgment 
concerning his previous application’.601 To illustrate, when the applicant complains 
about the refusal of the domestic courts to open a new trial or to quash a conviction, 
the Court explained that ‘it cannot find a State to be in breach of the Convention on 
                                                        
592  See: section II.3.7.  
593  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009.  
594  Hertel v. Switzerland (Dec.), 53440/99, 17 January 2002. 
595  UMO Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (No. 2), No. 41561/07 et al., 18 October 2011.  
596  Mehemi v. France (no. 2), No. 53470/99, 10 April 2003; Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 5056/10, 
11 October 2011.  
597  Hakkar v. France (Dec.), No. 43580/04, 7 April 2009.  
598  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011; Öcalan v. Turkey, 
No. 24069/03 et al., 18 March 2014.  
599  Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), No. 21071/05, 10 April 2008.  
600  Rongoni v. Italy, No. 44531/98, 25 October 2001.  
601  Kafkaris v. Cyprus (Dec.), No. 9644/09, 21 June 2011, para. 76; See also, e.g.: Öcalan v. Turkey 
(Dec.), No. 5980/07, 6 July 2010; Schelling v. Austria (no. 2) (Dec.), No. 46128/07, 16 September 
2010; Moldovan v. Romania, No. 8229/04 et al., 15 February 2011, para. 127.  
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account of its failure to take either of these courses of action when faced with the 
execution of one of its judgments’.602  
It is not a condition for the Court’s examination of the follow-up complaint, as 
the Court expressly acknowledged, that the Committee has already closed it 
supervision of the first judgment’s execution.603 This logically follows from the 
Court’s viewpoint that new or continuing violations dating from after its first 
judgment do not ‘form part of the measures adopted in pursuance of the Court’s 
initial judgment and thus fall outside the scope of the supervision exercised by the 
[Committee]’,604 meaning they potentially fall within the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
opposite also holds: when an execution question does not raise a new issue, but 
remains ‘a matter of ongoing discussion between the [Committee] and the 
respondent Government,’ the question falls ‘within the scope of the supervision 
exercised by the [Committee] and outside the scope of supervision exercised by the 
Court’.605  
The foregoing does, however, not mean that the existence of a final Committee 
resolution plays no role at all in the Court’s reasoning. If a final resolution is 
available, it is the Court’s practice to verify whether the Committee has had the 
possibility to take full account of all relevant developments and facts, such as a 
fresh domestic decision, when adopting the document.606 The Committee being 
unaware of a new domestic decision is a factor contributing to the finding that such 
a decision ‘constitutes a new fact’, which the Court must examine in order to 
prevent that the decision ‘would escape all scrutiny under the Convention’.607  
2.10.3 Content  
Regarding the content of follow-up cases, it is noteworthy that, thus far, the Court 
refuses to find a violation of Article 46(1) alone. The reason for this is that such a 
finding would make it hard to believe that the Court does indeed not supervise 
                                                        
602  Lyons and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 15227/03, 8 July 2003.  
603  The Court expressly acknowledges this in: Liu v. Russia (no. 2), No. 29157/09, 26 July 2011, para. 
65; See also: VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009 (admissible; final 
resolution by Committee); Steck-Risch and Others v. Lichtenstein (Dec.), No. 29061/08, 11 May 
2010 (inadmissible; the Committee had adopted final resolution); Schelling v. Austria (no. 2) 
(Dec.), No. 46128/07, 16 September 2010 (inadmissible; no final resolution by Committee); 
Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011 (admissible; no final 
resolution by Committee). 
604  Wasserman v. Russia (no. 2), No. 21071/05, 10 April 2008, para. 37.  
605  Moldovan v. Romania, No. 8229/04 et al., 15 February 2011, paras. 125-128; See also: Lyons and 
Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 15227/03, 8 July 2003.  
606  Hakkar v. France (Dec.), No. 43580/04, 7 April 2009; Öcalan v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 5980/07, 6 
July 2010; Dowsett v. UK (no. 2) (Dec.), No. 8559/08, 4 January 2011; Sampani and Others v. 
Greece, No. 59608/09, 11 December 2012, paras. 112-113.  
607  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 67; See also: Wasserman v. 
Russia (no. 2), No. 21071/05, 10 April 2008, para. 37; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 95. 
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execution or encroach on the Committee’s powers. Indeed, the Court has observed 
‘that it is very doubtful whether Article 46 § 1 may be regarded as conferring upon 
an applicant a right that can be asserted in proceedings originating in an individual 
application’608 and the ‘new paragraphs 4 and 5, added to Article 46 by [...] 
Protocol No. 14 [...], seem to confirm that as well’.609 When the Court scrutinises 
admissible follow-up cases it therefore does always do so with reference to the 
substantive provisions of the Convention.610 This can be seen, for example, in the 
case of Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, which – in part – followed up to 
Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia. In the latter judgment the Court had 
made an Article 46-indication to the effect that the ‘respondent States must take 
every measure to put an end to the arbitrary detention of the applicants still detained 
and to secure their release’.611 Further, it considered ‘that any continuation of [...] 
detention [...] would necessarily entail a serious prolongation of the violation of 
Article 5 [...] and a breach of the respondent State’s obligation under Article 46 § 
1.’612 In the follow-up judgment, the Court did not find a violation of Article 46, in 
spite of both its strong statement to that effect in Ilaşcu and Others and the 
continued detention of the applicants in violation of Article 5, which it considered 
to be of a ‘particularly grave nature’.613  
Considering the foregoing, it is striking that the Court sometimes asks the 
parties, in its communication of a case, whether there has been a violation of a 
substantive Convention article alone or in conjunction with Article 46.614 All the 
more striking is the follow-up case Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2) in which the Court 
found a violation of that Article (in conjunction with Article 8) for the first, and, as 
far as the author is aware, only time so far.615  
Another element of the content of follow-up cases discussed here concerns the 
Court’s statement, referred to above, that it has in principle no jurisdiction to 
engage in reviewing the measures adopted in the execution process of the first 
judgment.616 In follow-up cases raising a new Convention issue, the Court seems to 
aim to prevent itself from doing so by only reviewing new issues which were not 
decided upon in the first judgment and which were brought about by the execution 
measures.617 In practice, however, the theoretical distinction made between, on the 
                                                        
608  UMO Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (No. 2), No. 41561/07 et al., 18 October 2011, para. 
66.  
609  Idem.  
610  Ibid., para. 67; See also: Aydın v. Turkey, No. 23178/94 , 25 September 1997, para. 120; Johansen 
v. Norway (Dec.), No. 12750/02, 10 October 2002. 
611  Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia (GC), No. 48787/99, 8 July 2004, para. 490. 
612  Idem. 
613  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 134.  
614  See, e.g.: UMO Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (Comm.), No. 41561/07 et al., 20 October 
2008; Egmez v. Cyprus (Comm.), No. 12214/07, 20 September 2010; Kudeshkina v. Russia 
(Comm.), No. 28727/11, 3 October 2011.  
615  Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 5056/10, 11 October 2011, para. 77.  
616  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 91.  
617  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 67.  
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one hand, the execution measures, and, on the other hand, their consequences, 
seems to be too formalistic to ensure that the Court indeed does not review 
execution measures.618 Two examples help demonstrate this point.  
The case of Mehemi v. France (no. 2) illustrates that the Court sometimes 
reviews execution activities. In the first judgment, the Court found that the 
permanent exclusion order on the applicant from French territory violated Article 
8.619 In reaction to that finding, the authorities reduced the exclusion order to ten 
years and allowed the applicant to return to France under a compulsory residence 
order. The Court observed in the follow-up judgment that the first judgment 
‘required the State to enable [the applicant] to return by taking measures to reunite 
the family in France’.620 It therefore determined whether the national authorities 
‘quickly took all the necessary steps which they ought reasonably to have taken in 
the circumstances’.621 It found that the ‘relevant authorities made reasonable efforts 
to facilitate the applicant’s rapid return and did therefore not interfere with his right 
to private and family life’.622 When the reduction in the exclusion order is regarded 
as the measure taken to execute the first judgment, it must be concluded that the 
Court engaged in reviewing that judgment’s execution.  
It may also be contended that the Court engages in reviewing execution 
measures when adjudicating follow-up judgments concerning a continuing 
violation. The continued violation is the direct consequence of the lack or 
inadequateness of execution measures and since this process can also exist out of a 
lack of execution, the Court unavoidably supervises the execution process. To 
illustrate, in the follow-up case Ivanţoc and Others, the Court examined the 
continued detention of the applicants, who had not been released in response to the 
first judgment of the Court, in which it had found a violation of Article 5. The Court 
ascertained whether between the date of its first judgment and the applicants’ 
eventual release (which occurred because they had finished their sentence, not in 
response to the Court’s Article 46-indication), the respondent states had committed 
violations. Moldova had discharged its positive obligation to secure to the 
applicants their Convention rights.623 In respect of Russia, the Court found inter alia 
a violation of Article 3, which was aggravated due to the failure to abide by the 
Article 46-indication,624 and of Article 5, as the applicants were detained based on 
the same conviction and sentence as a result of which it found violations 
previously.625 
                                                        
618  See also: Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, No. 50421/08 et al., 10 April 2003, Concurring 
Opinion of Judge Keller para. 8.  
619  Mehemi v. France (no. 2), No. 53470/99, 10 April 2003, para. 41.  
620  Ibid., para. 46.  
621  Ibid., para. 47.  
622  Ibid., para. 50.  
623  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 111.  
624  Ibid., para. 126. 
625  Ibid., paras. 132-134.  
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2.10.4 Role of the Interlocutors  
An element which reappears in most follow-up judgments is that the Court takes 
great care to elucidate its own role in these judgments. In particular, it tends to 
explain rather elaborately that and why, when fulfilling its role, it respects the 
competences of the Committee and the respondent state. Regarding its own role, the 
Court once acknowledged ‘at the outset that it has in principle no jurisdiction to 
review the general and/or individual measures, if any, adopted by the respondent 
state to secure the rights of the applicants which [it] found to be violated’ 
previously.626 It recalled that this is ‘a matter for the [Committee]’.627 Likewise, the 
Court has often emphasised ‘that it does not have jurisdiction to verify whether a 
Contracting Party has complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of [its] 
judgments’.628 Therefore, it has ‘refused to examine complaints concerning the 
failure by the States to execute its judgments, declaring such complaints 
inadmissible ratione materiae.629 In view of inter alia the foregoing, the Court has 
stated that it ‘cannot assume any role in [the] dialogue’ between the respondent 
state and the Committee as to, for example, the measures necessary to afford 
restitutio in integrum.630  
The Court also regularly emphasises its own competences by recalling that 
Article 32(2) provides that ‘in the event of dispute as to whether the Court has 
jurisdiction, the Court shall decide’.631 It has moreover stressed that it cannot be 
said that ‘measures taken by a respondent State in the post-judgment phase to afford 
redress to an applicant for the violation [...] found fall outside [its] jurisdiction’.632 
‘On the contrary’, the Court has added, it ‘has acknowledged a certain degree of 
competence to examine such complaints’ and the Committee’s ‘role in this sphere 
does not prevent this’.633 In relation to the Committee specifically, the Court 
endeavours to explain that when it declares a follow-up complaint admissible and 
deals ‘with new information in the context of a fresh application’, ‘the powers 
assigned to the [Committee] are not being encroached on’.634  
In respect of the respondent state, the Court has acknowledged repeatedly that 
subject to monitoring by the Committee, the respondent state remains free to choose 
                                                        
626  Ibid., para. 91; See also: Mehemi v. France (no. 2), No. 53470/99, 10 April 2003, para. 43.  
627  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 91.  
628  Kafkaris v. Cyprus (Dec.), No. 9644/09, 21 June 2011, para. 74.  
629  Idem.; See also: Öcalan v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 5980/07, 6 July 2010.  
630  Lyons and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 15227/03, 8 July 2003. 
631  Liu v. Russia (no. 2), No. 29157/09, 26 July 2011, para. 64; Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 
5056/10, 11 October 2011, para. 39; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 
November 2011, para. 94. 
632  Kafkaris v. Cyprus (Dec.), No. 9644/09, 21 June 2011, para. 75; See also: VgT v. Switzerland (no. 
2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 62.  
633  Kafkaris v. Cyprus (Dec.), No. 9644/09, 21 June 2011, para. 75. 
634  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 67; Liu v. Russia (no. 2), No. 
29157/09, 26 July 2011, para. 65; Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 5056/10, 11 October 2011, para. 
39; Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 86. 
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the means by which it will discharge its legal obligation under Article 46, provided 
that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the judgment.635  
Another noteworthy element in Emre (no. 2), a case referred to above, is that the 
Court and the Committee seemed to have divergent expectations of the 
Committee’s role during the execution phase. The Committee supervised Emre (no. 
1) under the standard procedure and had, before the Court issued Emre (no. 2), 
examined the first judgment at a DH meeting, where it established that the 
assessment of information regarding individual measures was in progress and that 
no other general measures than the measures already taken appeared to be 
necessary.636 In Emre (no. 2), the Court, however, observed that the Committee had 
not yet started its task of supervising Emre (no. 1) by taking concrete measures, as it 
had not yet adopted a single resolution, not even an interim resolution.637 This 
observation was incorrect, however, because the Committee had already examined 
the case, even though it had not adopted any concrete decisions or resolutions. 
Moreover, the Court could not have really expected the Committee to adopt an 
interim resolution as the case was under standard supervision, meaning that it is 
unlikely that the Committee adopts an interim resolution.  
The Court also seemed to have different expectations than the Committee of the 
Committee’s role during standard supervision in the follow-up case Verein gegen 
Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2). The Committee closed its 
supervision of VgT (no. 1), noting that ‘[a]s regards individual measures, the 
judgment was transmitted to the applicant, who was entitled to request the revision 
of the Federal Court’s judgment’.638 The Committee, therefore, in the words of the 
Court, ‘merely note[d] the existence of a reopening procedure without awaiting its 
outcome’,639 while the Committee seemed to consider it unnecessary to await the 
outcome of the request for revision. The Court, on the contrary, held that the 
reopening procedure was ‘not an end in itself; it is simply a means – albeit a key 
means – that may be used for a particular purpose, namely the full and proper 
execution of the Court’s judgments’.640 Presumably therefore, the Court and the 
Committee had different expectations. It was the Court’s view that the Committee 
should have awaited and examined the outcome of the procedure. This opinion is, 
                                                        
635  Lyons and Others v. UK (Dec.), No. 15227/03, 8 July 2003; Öcalan v. Turkey (Dec.), No. 5980/07, 
6 July 2010; Schelling v. Austria (no. 2) (Dec.), No. 46128/07, 16 September 2010. 
636  Committee (2011), 127-128.  
637  Emre v. Switzerland (no. 2), No. 5056/10, 11 October 2011, para. 42. 
638  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on VgT v. Switzerland’, ResDH(2003)125, 22 July 2003, Appendix.  
639  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 90; See for other of cases in 
which the Committee issued a final resolution without awaiting the outcome of new domestic 
proceedings or in which the state merely notes the possibility of requesting the reopening of 
domestic proceedings in its action report (see also the annexes): Committee, ‘Final Resolution on 
Prikyan and Angelova v. Bulgaria’, ResDH(2011)4, 10 March 2011; Committee, ‘Final Resolution 
on DMD group, A.S v. Slovakia’, ResDH(2012)51, 8 March 2012; Committee, ‘Final Resolution 
on Leas v. Estonia’, ResDH(2013)10, 7 March 2013.  
640  VgT v. Switzerland (no. 2) (GC), No. 32772/02, 30 June 2009, para. 90.  
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however, different from how the Committee views its supervisory task under the 
standard procedure,641 when its involvement is formal and limited to verifying that 
the state presented an action plan and report.642 It is therefore improbable that the 
Committee would scrutinise the content of an execution measure in the manner 
envisaged by the Court in VgT (no. 2). The question is now whether the Court had a 
different view from the Committee on the Committee’s role only in Emre (no. 2) 
and in VgT (no. 2), or whether its view is different in general.  
2.10.5 The Committee’s Reliance on Individual Follow-up Judgments  
The Committee shows itself to be aware of the possibility of follow-up cases being 
brought when it is still supervising the execution of the first judgment. The 
Committee namely sometimes recalls in its final resolutions in respect of the first 
case that ‘the [Committee’s] decision under Article [46(2)] in no way prejudges the 
Court’s examination of the new complaints’.643 Two examples can be mentioned 
where the lodging of a follow-up case influenced the Committee’s decision-making. 
First, in a case where the Court already gave a decision in the follow-up case prior 
to the Committee’s adoption of a final resolution, the Committee noted in the 
Appendix to that resolution that ‘no other individual measure was required by the 
[Committee]’ in the circumstances that the Court rejected the applicant’s arguments 
in the follow-up case as incompatible ratione materiae.644 The Committee therefore 
allowed the follow-up judgment to influence its own decision. Second, the effect of 
the lodging of the follow-up case Ivanţoc and Others was that the Committee 
decided to suspend its examination of the first judgment and to resume it after the 
final determination of the follow-up case by the Court.645 Based on inter alia this 
decision, the Court decided that the issue raised in the follow-up case fell within its 
jurisdiction.646 The Committee thus allowed the Court’s judgment to influence its 
decisions in the execution phase.  
                                                        
641  When the Committee adopted its final resolution in respect of VgT (no. 1), No. 24699/94 , 28 June 
2001, it had not yet adopted the twin-track system of supervision. However, had the system been in 
place, the Committee would probably have dealt with VgT (no. 1) under the standard procedure. 
642  See: section VI.1.  
643  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Öcalan v. Turkey’, ResDH(2007)1, 14 February 2007; 
Committee, ‘Final Resolution on FC Mretebi v. Georgia’, ResDH(2010)163, 2 December 2010; 
Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Schelling and 6 Other Cases v. Austria’, ResDH(2011)187, 2 
December 2011.  
644  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Kafkaris v. Cyprus’, ResDH(2011)197, 2 December 2011.  
645  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia’, ResDH(2007)106, 
12 July 2007.  
646  Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, No. 23687/05, 15 November 2011, para. 95.  
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2.11 General Follow-up Cases  
As was discussed in chapter VI, next to individual follow-up cases, there may be 
general follow-up cases, in which the applicant complains about general execution 
measures taken to execute a previous judgment. Six examples of such cases have 
been selected as basis for analysing the Court’s practice in relation to general 
follow-up cases. The subject matter of these cases is diverse and the general 
measures taken prior to the Court’s adjudication of the follow-up cases relate to 
both legislative change and to modifications of domestic courts to their case law. 
Furthermore, some general measures met with the Court’s approval, while in other 
cases the Court found a violation in spite of the general measures taken. Thus, an 
examination of these cases can be expected to give a somewhat representative 
insight into the practice of general follow-up cases. Prior to this examination, the 
follow-up case and the judgment which preceded it, hereafter called the ‘first 
judgment’, are shortly introduced.  
In Xenides-Arestis, the Court concluded that Turkey had breached the rights of 
the applicant protected by Articles 8 and 1 of Protocol 1, because her ‘respect for 
her home’ and ‘peaceful enjoyment of her possessions’ had been unjustifiably 
interfered with.647 Under Article 46, the Court required Turkey to ‘introduce a 
remedy which secures genuinely effective redress for the [breaches] in relation to 
the present application as well as in respect of all similar applications pending 
before it’.648 The Court had the opportunity to review the newly created remedy in 
the follow-up decision Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey,649 where it held that the 
remedy ‘provides an accessible and effective framework of redress’. Because the 
applicants had not sought recourse to that framework, the Court found that their 
applications were inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.650 
The Court found a violation of Article 8 in Connors v. UK, because the eviction 
of a Roma family from their caravans ‘was not attended by the requisite procedural 
safeguards, namely the requirement to establish proper justification for the serious 
interference with his rights’.651 In the light of inter alia this judgment, the UK 
House of Lords (now the Supreme Court of the UK) revisited its own case law in 
Kay v. Lambeth and considered it had thus brought its case law in line with that of 
the Court.652 This revision may be qualified as the general measure which would 
help execute the judgment. When Kay v. UK, one of the follow-up cases to 
                                                        
647  Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, No. 46347/99, 22 December 2005, paras. 22, 32. 
648  Ibid., para. 40.  
649  (GC) (Dec.), No. 46113/99, 1 March 2010.  
650  Ibid., paras. 127-129.  
651  No. 66746/01, 27 May 2004, para. 95.  
652  [2006] UKHL 10; Kay and Others v. UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010, paras. 19-20.  
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Connors, reached Strasbourg, however, the Court concluded that Article 8 had been 
violated, in spite of the efforts of the House of Lords.653  
A series of cases, including general follow-up cases, was brought in relation to 
preventive detention in Germany. In the case of M., the applicant’s placement in 
preventive detention beyond the maximum period at the time of his placement was 
held to interfere with Article 5 and the retrospective and unlimited extension of his 
preventive detention with Article 7.654 In spite of some initial domestic 
opposition,655 the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) endeavoured to bring 
domestic law in conformity with Strasbourg case law by finding that all provisions 
on the retrospective prolongation of preventive detention and on the retrospective 
order of such detention were incompatible with the Basic Law.656 In arriving at this 
judgment, the FCC relied on the Court’s interpretation of the Convention in M.657 
The most relevant follow-up case to M. is O.H. O.H.’s preventative detention was 
reviewed by a regional court following the judgment of the FCC, but this review did 
not result in his release.658 When assessing the complaint under Article 5, the Court 
noted that ‘[t]he present application is [...] a follow-up case [...] to the application of 
M. [...]’, and that it, ‘sees no reason to depart from its findings in that judgment’.659 
It therefore found a violation of the Article.660 In respect Article 7, the Court also 
held that the applicant’s case was similar to that of the applicant in M. and the 
application of its findings in M. led it to find a violation of that Article.661 
Another follow-up case can be found amongst cases concerning the excessive 
length of proceedings in Italy, a protracted problem which has caused many 
breaches of Article 6. The Court found one such breach in Bottazzi.662 In that 
judgment, the Court also observed that ‘such breaches reflect a continuing situation 
that has not yet been remedied and in respect of which litigants have no domestic 
remedy’.663 These circumstances constituted ‘a practice that is incompatible with 
the Convention’.664 The Italian legislature responded to Bottazzi and many 
comparable judgments by creating a domestic remedy for excessive length of 
proceedings cases. This remedy was laid down in the Pinto Law. Subsequently, the 
                                                        
653  Kay and Others v. UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010, paras. 73-74; As the Court had 
disapproved of the majority’s interpretation of Connors, a new domestic decision was necessary to 
modify the law as the House of Lords had set out in Kay. The Supreme Court realised this in 
Pinnock, where it conformed itself to the European Court’s finding, see: [2010] UKSC 45, para. 49. 
654  M. v. Germany, No. 19359/04, 17 December 2009, paras. 105, 137; See also: Haidn v. Germany, 
No. 6587/04, 13 January 2011, paras. 96-97.  
655  Merkel (2011), 975-976; See also: section IV.2.6.  
656  O.H. v. Germany, No. 4646/08, 24 November 2011, paras. 51, 55. 
657  Ibid., para. 54. 
658  Ibid., paras. 38, 39.  
659  Ibid., para. 82.  
660  Ibid., para. 94.  
661  Ibid., paras. 105, 108.  
662  Bottazzi v. Italy, No. 34884/97, 28 July 1999, para. 23.  
663  Ibid., para. 22.  
664  Idem.  
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case of Gaglione and Others was brought by 475 persons who had made use of the 
remedy created by the Pinto Law and who complained about the length of the Pinto 
proceedings. They complained that the remedy created for excessive length of 
proceedings cases lasted itself also excessively long. In Gaglione, the Court 
consequently found a new violation of Article 6 because of the delay in enforcing 
Pinto decisions, as well as a violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.665  
Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) followed up to the similarly named ‘number 
one’ case. Although brought by the same applicant, the second case can be qualified 
as a general follow-up case, because the Court reviewed the changes made by the 
domestic courts to their case law following the first judgment more generally. In the 
first judgment, the Court found a violation of Article 8, because the domestic courts 
had decided to dismiss the first applicant’s claims to prevent the publication of two 
series of pictures of her. The second case concerned three different pictures, in 
respect of only two of which the domestic courts granted an injunction banning 
their further publication. Due to the changes of the domestic courts, the Court did 
not find a violation in the follow-up case.666 
Lastly, in Chassagnou and Others, a French law was at issue obliging 
landowners to transfer their hunting rights to an approved hunters’ association 
unless their land exceeded a certain threshold. The application of this law resulted 
in a violation of inter alia Article 1 of Protocol 1 because the Court considered it a 
disproportionate burden to small landowners to compel them to transfer hunting 
rights over their land so that others could make use of them in a way which was 
incompatible with their beliefs.667 France had also violated the same article in 
conjunction with Article 14, because the difference in treatment between small and 
large landowners meant only the latter had the right to use their land in accordance 
with their conscience.668 Following the judgment, the French legislature amended 
the criticised law to admit conscientious objections to hunting, a general measure 
which the Committee approved.669 The applicant in the follow-up case Chabauty 
opposed hunting for non-ethical reasons. Although his case presented the Court 
with the opportunity to review the measures taken to execute Chassagnou and 
Others, this time it found no violation, ‘as the applicant is not opposed to hunting 
on ethical grounds’.670 Thus, it distinguished the cases on the facts and did not 
elaborately deal with the conformity of the amended legislation with the 
Convention. 
                                                        
665  Gaglione and Others v. Italy, No. 45867/07, 21 December 2010, paras. 40, 45. 
666  Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012, paras. 124-126.  
667  Chassagnou and Others v. France (GC), No. 25088/94 et al., 29 April 1999, para. 85.  
668  Ibid., para. 95; In addition to that, the Court found a violation of Art. 11 on its own and in 
conjunction with Art. 14, See: ibid., paras. 117, 121. 
669  Commitee, ‘Final Resolution on Chassagnou and Others v. France’, ResDH(2005)26, 25 April 
2005.  
670  Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012, para. 57. 
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This section will, based on these six examples, discuss the frequency, areas of 
use and content of general follow-up cases. In addition to that, it sheds some light 
on the Committee’s reliance on general follow-up judgments.  
2.11.1 Frequency and Areas of Use  
As was stated in respect of individual-follow-up cases as well, it is difficult to 
establish how many general follow-up cases have come before the Court. It is, 
however, likely that general follow-up cases outnumber their individual 
counterparts, because the former can be brought by any persons affected by a 
general execution measure, while individual follow-up cases can only be brought, 
under a limited set of circumstances, by the individual who also brought the first 
case.  
General follow-up cases can have a wide variety of subject matters, as the above 
six examples illustrate. In a very general sense, however, it holds true that all 
general follow-up cases concern general execution measures. They therefore 
concern changes, or a lack thereof, in domestic legislation, policy or case law.  
2.11.2 Content  
The content of the six follow-up cases is presented here from two perspectives, both 
related to dialogue. The first is that of the extent to which the Court relies on 
relevant Committee materials and pays attention to the task division between them. 
Second, the manner of the Court’s review of the implemented general measures in 
between the first case and the general follow-up case is discussed.  
As regards the first perspective, in three follow-up cases, the Court made no 
reference to the Committee’s involvement in supervising the first case at all.671 In 
Gaglione and Others, however, the Court did mention the Committee when it 
recalled that the Registry had sent a letter to the Committee to inform it of the 
communication of the case. In this letter, the Registry had also advocated the urgent 
need for action by the Italian authorities to put in place the budgetary resources 
required to prevent that the Court would need to pronounce itself again about the 
problem of the length of domestic proceedings. In this letter, the Registry referred 
inter alia to a relevant interim resolution of the Committee.672 In Von Hannover, the 
Court reproduced a Committee resolution in which the Committee closed its 
supervision of the first case.673 Further, it noted that that ‘it is not its task in the 
present case to examine whether Germany has satisfied the obligations under 
                                                        
671  Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (GC) (Dec.), No. 46113/99, 1 March 2010; Kay and Others v. 
UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010; O.H. v. Germany, No. 4646/08, 24 November 2011; 
References made to the Committee in the context of Article 46-considerations were not taken into 
consideration as they do not relate to the supervision of the first case.  
672  Gaglione and Others v. Italy, No. 45867/07, 21 December 2010, para. 57.  
673  Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 February 2012, para. 72.  
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Article 46 [...] regarding the execution of the Von Hannover [no 1 judgment], as 
that task is the responsibility of the [Committee]’.674 It added that ‘[t]he present 
applications concern only new proceedings instituted by the applicants following 
the Von Hannover judgment and relating to the publication of other photos of 
them’.675 Finally, in its follow-up judgment in Chabauty, the Court included the 
Committee’s final resolution in Chassagnou and Others and observed that what it 
inferred from the first case was also ‘what the French legislature and the 
[Committee] inferred from the [...] judgment’.676 The Court also mentioned the 
reasons which led the Committee to end its supervision of the case.677  
It is difficult to draw any general conclusions, but what the follow-up cases 
allow to conclude is that the Court seems to concentrate less on the Committee and 
its task in the execution phase in general follow-up cases than it their individual 
cousins. Unlike in individual follow-up cases, the content of the Committee’s final 
resolutions hardly plays a role in the Court’s considerations. Also, the Court does 
not, as it does in individual follow-up cases, seem to be as much inclined to 
elucidate its own role and to explain that and why, when fulfilling its role, it 
respects the competences of the Committee and the respondent state. This 
conclusion is largely unsurprising when considering that the Court in the general 
follow-up case, and the Committee when supervising the first case, engage in a 
different exercise. The Committee approves the design of (proposed) general 
measure in abstracto and ‘usually presupposes that adopted laws are also 
implemented’.678 The Court on its turn assesses both whether the laws and other 
execution measures are indeed implemented and establishes their practical effects in 
an individual case, as the Court seemed to emphasise in Von Hannover (no. 2). It 
has even been suggested that the Court, as a judicial institution, may be ‘better 
equipped’ to analyse whether general measures meet a state’s Article 46 obligation, 
because the analysis is open-ended and prospective.679 The Committee, on the other 
hand, ‘is not so well equipped to supervise the real effect of norms enacted’ and its 
dependency on information submitted by the states possibly hampers its ability to 
supervise some aspects of execution.680  
As explained previously, it is difficult to draw general conclusions based on 
only six cases. The cases nevertheless to illustrate what the Court can do in a 
general follow-up case. Most generally, it has become apparent that the Court can 
become involved in the execution process by reviewing general measures. It 
reviews these measures on differing levels of detail,681 and the measures can be 
                                                        
674  Ibid., para. 94.  
675  Idem. 
676  Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012, para. 45.  
677  Idem. 
678  Sundberg (2009), 477-478.  
679  Harris et. al. (2014), 197. 
680  Sundberg (2009), 478. 
681  See for a rather detailed review: Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (GC) (Dec.), No. 46113/99, 1 
March 2010.  
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both changes to domestic case law by the judiciary682 or legislative changes.683 This 
review can be of an explicit684 or implicit685 nature and the Court may examine a 
general measure even when this is not strictly necessary to decide the applicant’s 
case.686 In the course of its examination, the Court can give its approval to relevant 
domestic judgments.687 In addition to reviewing execution measures, the Court also 
can use general follow-up cases to endorse or to clarify its own case law688 or to 
make an Article 46-indication.689 
2.11.3 The Committee’s Reliance on General Follow-up Judgments  
The six examples cannot shed any light on the Committee’s reliance on general 
follow-up judgments when supervising the execution of the first judgment. In five 
out of the six examples, the Committee had namely already closed its supervisory 
exercise before the Court issued the follow-up judgment. Further, the Committee 
adopted a final resolution in respect of M. jointly with O.H., but did not refer to 
O.H.690 The information collected for section X.2.9, on the Committee’s decisions 
and interim resolutions, does, however, demonstrate that the Committee may rely 
on a general follow-up judgment when available. For example, in an interim 
resolution concerning the excessive length of judicial proceedings in Italy, the 
Committee recalled: 
 
that in several judgments concerning the remedy against the excessive length of 
proceedings [i.e. the Pinto Law], the European Court found that the late payment of 
compensation to the applicant did not afford adequate redress and considered the 
applicant continued to a victim of a breach of the ‘reasonable-time’ requirement and 
that the statistics provided by the government show an increase in the length of 
                                                        
682  See, e.g.: Kay and Others v. UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010; O.H. v. Germany, No. 
4646/08, 24 November 2011; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 
February 2012.  
683  See, e.g.: Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012; Gaglione and Others v. Italy, 
No. 45867/07, 21 December 2010.  
684  See, e.g.: O.H. v. Germany, No. 4646/08, 24 November 2011, para. 118 (‘by its judgment, the 
[FCC] implemented this Court’s findings in its above-mentioned judgments on German preventive 
detention in the domestic legal order’). 
685  See, e.g.: Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 57412/08, 4 October 2012. 
686  See, e.g.: O.H. v. Germany, No. 4646/08, 24 November 2011, where the FCC’s judgment, the 
execution measure which the Court reviewed, due to its scope, did not redress the applicant’s 
complaint.  
687  See, e.g.: Kay and Others v. UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010; O.H. v. Germany, No. 
4646/08, 24 November 2011; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) (GC), No. 40660/08 et al., 7 
February 2012.  
688  See, e.g.: Kay and Others v. UK, No. 37341/06, 21 September 2010; Chabauty v. France (GC), No. 
57412/08, 4 October 2012. 
689  See, e.g.: Gaglione and Others v. Italy, No. 45867/07, 21 December 2010.  
690  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on M. and 12 other Cases v. Germany’, ResDH(2014)290, 17 
December 2014.  
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proceedings before the courts of appeal competent to deal with ‘Pinto Law’ 
appeals.691 
 
Although the Committee did not refer to any case in particular, it clearly referred to 
the predecessors of Gaglione and Others. Another example from section X.2.9 is an 
interim resolution in 25 cases against Portugal, also relating to the excessive length 
of proceedings. In this resolution, the Committee referred to the judgment Martins 
Castro and Alves Correia de Castro v. Portugal, in which the Court found that ‘the 
action for extra-contractual civil responsibility of the state will not offer an effective 
remedy under Article 13 [...], as long as the case law of the Supreme Administrative 
Court [...] – which is in line with the case law of the European Court [...] – is not 
consolidated in the Portuguese legal order through the harmonisation of the 
jurisprudential discrepancies which may be observed’.692 Echoing the Court, the 
Committee, in the operative provisions of the interim resolution, encouraged ‘the 
authorities to pursue their efforts to introduce the remedy for harmonisation of the 
domestic courts’ case law as soon as possible’.693 These two examples demonstrate 
that the Committee is willing to take into consideration general follow-up cases. 
This is confirmed by the Committee’s statement that ‘[i]n certain situations, it may 
be necessary to await further decisions by the Court clarifying outstanding issues 
(e.g. decisions declaring new, similar complaints inadmissible as general reforms 
adopted are found to be effective or decisions concluding that the applicant 
continues to suffer the violation established or its consequences)’.694 Indeed, the 
length of time which it takes to execute a judgment can sometimes be explained by 
‘the fact that it can be justified, in certain specific circumstances, to await the 
outcome of other similar cases still pending before the organs of the Convention in 
order further to clarify the requirements of the Convention [...] and thus facilitate 
the adoption of appropriate measures in execution of the judgments’.695 
3 APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
This section examines the dialogicness of the procedurals steps as they were 
described in the previous section, using the indicators for dialogue developed in 
chapter IV. The procedures which are examined here were found to have some or 
clear dialogic potential in chapter VIII. In order to compare the situation in practice 
with that ‘on paper’, the findings in chapter VI are quoted often. Individual and 
general follow-up cases are, where possible, discussed jointly.  
                                                        
691  Committee, ‘Interim Resoltion on the Excessive Length of Judicial Proceedings in Italy’, 
ResDH(2009)42, 19 March 2009.  
692  Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on 25 Cases v. Portugal’, ResDH(2010)34, 4 March 2010.  
693  Idem.  
694  Committee (2012), 17.  
695  Committee, ‘Reply to Written Question No. 378’, Doc. 8253, 29 October 1998.  
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Although requests for interpretation and infringement proceedings have clear 
and some dialogic potential respectively, they are not examined here, simply 
because they have not yet been employed. Assembly questions and 
recommendations are discussed neither, their clear dialogic potential 
notwithstanding. These procedural steps have so little practical effect on the 
execution process of individual (groups of) cases as supervised by the Committee, 
that it is not possible to establish whether they have any of the effects the which 
indicators seek to establish, something which is anyhow unlikely.  
3.1 Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
This indicator helps determine which interlocutors can become involved through 
which procedures in execution phase in practice. When an opportunity for 
involvement exists, the indicator facilitates establishing what a procedure permits 
an interlocutor to achieve and which information it can convey to which 
interlocutor.  
Article 46-indications: Judgments are, as was explained in chapters V and IX, 
an opportunity for involvement by the Court only. This also applies to Article 46-
indications since they form part of a judgment. The Court uses this opportunity 
exceptionally to present its view on how a respondent state should execute a 
judgment. It does so in varying degrees of preciseness and in different areas of case 
law. The addition of an indication means that the Court goes beyond deciding the 
merits and casts a look to the future. In the case of individual measures, the Court 
sometimes takes another step by imposing a measure in the operative provisions of 
a judgment. An indication equips the Court to speak to the state, the interlocutor 
responsible for executing a judgment, but also the Committee, the interlocutor 
responsible for supervising execution. The Committee, as assisted by the Execution 
Department, feels addressed by the indications considering that the indications 
become part of the evaluative framework based on which the execution record is 
assessed, regardless of whether they reappear in the operative provisions.  
Action plans/reports: Respondent states indeed use action plans/reports, as 
chapter VI remarked they could, as an opportunity to explain which measures they 
have taken and intend to take and to communicate when they think the Committee’s 
supervision can be closed. They do generally not use their submissions to explain 
which practical difficulties they have encountered or to criticise the judgment which 
they must execute. Although action plans/reports are normally dully submitted, the 
states do not always employ this possibility for involvement to the fullest, as the 
submissions are sometimes incomplete, delayed or of poor quality.  
In practice, action plans/reports do not really offer an opportunity for 
involvement of the Committee, unlike as proposed in chapter VI. The Execution 
Department, not the Committee, evaluates each document and the Committee relies 
greatly on the Execution Department’s evaluation, in the sense that it is unlikely 
that the Committee approves a submission if the Execution Department has not. 
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This procedural step therefore is rather an opportunity for involvement of the 
Execution Department, made possible because the Committee has delegated various 
important interpretative and monitoring tasks to the Execution Department. In 
addition to assessing the submissions, the Execution Department also plays a more 
proactive role when asking the state to execute measures of a general nature, even 
though the state did not propose such measures and even though the Court did not 
ask for them. The Execution Department can furthermore assist the states with 
drafting action plans/reports. An opportunity for involvement of states other than 
the respondent state also exists. They can comment on and ask questions about the 
final action report.  
DH meetings: DH meetings are, as chapter VI submitted, an opportunity for 
involvement of the Committee and the respondent state to discuss execution matters 
and structural problems in a confidential setting. The respondent states are 
represented by different officials, including relevant ministers. During these 
meetings, the Committee follows up, evaluates, requests information and examines 
various documents and proposals. The respondent states do not use the possibility 
for involvement that exists on paper to request that a case is selected for debate; 
they leave it to the Execution Department to make a selection. In addition to 
contributing to the meetings by selecting cases, staff of the Execution Department 
sometimes also attends the meetings. This is not the case for staff of the Court’s 
Registry, meaning that the Court is not represented. The opportunities for 
involvement arise not often and in respect of only few cases.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bilateral meetings are, unlike what was 
mentioned in chapter VI, not an opportunity for involvement of the Committee, but 
more correctly for the Execution Department. The Execution Department engages 
in these meetings together with a respondent state, which is represented by different 
persons. These persons are more frequently than in case of DH meetings persons 
who make and implement domestic decisions affecting the execution process.696 
Both interlocutors can initiate a meeting and the number of meetings varies per state 
from once a year to once a week in some periods. Multilateral meetings are 
organised less frequently, on the initiative of the Committee. Different persons 
attend these meetings, including state representatives, members of the Registry, 
judges of the Court as well as representatives of other Council of Europe bodies. 
Multilateral meeting usually have a broader, sometimes thematic, focus than their 
bilateral counterparts which concentrate on a group of cases originating from the 
same state. 
Commissioner country visits/reports: In practice, the Commissioner indeed 
uses country visits/reports to provide information and to make recommendations on 
execution. (S)he therefore has an opportunity to become involved in execution 
matters and to speak about these matters with the states in practice, albeit not within 
the boundaries of the formal execution process as supervised by the Committee. 
                                                        
696  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 40; Sundberg (2009), 481; Execution interview 12. 
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The Commissioner uses the opportunity rather frequently: Commissioner 
Muižnieks went on nineteen missions/visits and published seventeen letters/reports 
in only one year. The Execution Department occasionally relies on the reports as a 
source for evaluating action plans/reports, but the reports are relied on of the 
Execution Department’s own motion, not because the Commissioner has brought 
them to its attention. Therefore, the Commissioner cannot become involved in this 
way. 
Decisions and interim resolutions: Decisions/interim resolutions are, as was 
suggested in chapter VI, an opportunity for involvement of the Committee to make 
comments and suggestions and to urge the states to take action. In practice, the 
Execution Department drafts the documents, normally on its initiative, and the 
deputies usually accept the drafts. The deputies only sometimes propose the 
adoption of a document, which the Execution Department then drafts. The 
addressed state becomes involved as well because it can and does comment on the 
draft, suggesting amendments. The state can thus influence the draft’s content.  
Individual follow-up cases: Chapter VI presented individual follow-up cases as 
an opportunity for involvement of the Court which does not allow it to directly 
comment on individual execution measures, but only on their consequences. This 
chapter has demonstrated that the distinction between execution measures and their 
consequences is rather theoretical. In effect, the Court therefore also comments on 
the measures themselves. This opportunity arises in few cases and, as was noted in 
chapter VI, only if an applicant brings an admissible follow-up complaint. 
Scrutinising the complaint, the Court speaks to the respondent state, in the capacity 
of implementer of execution measures, and the Committee, in the capacity of 
supervisor of execution measures which (consequences) caused a violation. It 
therefore indeed holds, as remarked in chapter VI, that the finding of a violation by 
the Court can be interpreted as a reprimand addressed to the Committee. This is also 
illustrated by VgT (no. 2) in which the Court seemed to criticise the Committee for 
closing supervision without awaiting the effect of an execution measure. Because 
other interlocutors can become involved in an individual follow-up case as in any 
other case, no special attention is given to them here. 
General follow-up cases: General follow-up cases give the Court an 
opportunity for involvement in the execution phase which allows it to comment on 
general execution measures, provided an individual brings such a case. This 
opportunity exists both on paper and in practice, in practice even if the examination 
of general measures is not strictly necessary to decide the applicant’s case. The 
same applies here to the other interlocutors as what was just explained when 
discussing individual follow-up cases applies.   
3.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
This indicator scrutinises the procedures in order to establish whether they make 
possible and stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the 
Convention (in conformity with the subsidiarity principle) and stimulate sharing 
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responsibilities as such. More than in the (pre-)merits phase, the question whether a 
procedure ensures and enhances respect by the Court and the Committee for the 
procedural task division between them is relevant, because the Court, unlike the 
Committee in the (pre-)merits phase, can become involved in execution matters.  
Article 46-indications: When discussing the question whether Article 46-
indications contribute to the sharing of responsibilities, it is important to distinguish 
between the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention and as 
such.  
As was explained in section IV.5.5, sharing responsibilities in conformity with 
the Convention encompasses inter alia that the respondent state can choose how it 
executes a judgment. Clearly, the freedom of choice decreases with the imposition 
of an Article 46-indication, especially if repeated in the merits. This is probably 
only different if the Court makes an indication because the nature of the violation 
does not leave any real choice as to the measure required. The freedom of choice is 
then inherently limited, not mainly because of the indication, but due to the 
violation’s nature. Sharing responsibilities in conformity with the Convention 
furthermore implies that the Convention’s division of labour between the Court and 
the Committee is respected. Such respect is not paid, as the indication is made by 
the Court whilst the Convention makes the Committee responsible for supervising 
the execution of judgments. In sum, Article 46-indications do not contribute to the 
sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention but have the opposite 
effect, which is why the Court refused making any such indications in the first 
place. The intensity with which the indications have this effect depends on the 
preciseness of the indication and whether it is made in the merits or operative 
provisions of a judgment.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion of an Article 46-indication can be seen as a way to 
share responsibilities as such. The Court can be said to help the state in choosing 
the right execution measures and thereby also the Committee in its supervisory task. 
This holds in particular for negative indications delineating the scope of the 
obligation to execute in a concrete case. As the Committee has written, ‘[s]ince a 
number of years the Court has [...] more and more frequently started to assist the 
execution process in a number of ways, e.g. by providing also itself guidance as to 
relevant execution measures in its judgments’.697 The reliance of the Committee, as 
assisted by the Execution Department, on the indications implies that the 
indications are indeed of assistance. The Court also seems to regard its indications 
thus. However, because other reasons can also play a role in the decision to make an 
Article 46-indication, providing assistance is not necessarily the Court’s major 
concern in each case. Further, in a very practical sense, indications are of assistance 
to the Execution Department because they can help avoid lengthy discussions with 
                                                        
697  Committee (2012) 21 (emphasis added); See also: Committee (2013a), 16, 28; Committee (2015), 
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the respondent state. Considering the foregoing, Article 46-indications can be said 
to contribute to the sharing of responsibilities as such.  
Action plans/reports: As was noted in chapter VI, action plans/reports are a 
means for the respondent state to communicate to the Committee how it has 
fulfilled its primary responsibility for executing the Court’s judgments, something 
which contributes to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention. Indeed, the documents have been described as ‘the practical expression 
of the principle of subsidiarity’.698 This also holds in practice, in particular because 
it is for the state to set the first step: the Execution Department will only reach out 
to it and make comments and proposals after the submission of the first plan. The 
primary responsibility of the respondent state for executing a judgment is thus 
respected. Additionally, responsibilities are shared as such between the Execution 
Department and the states, considering that the Execution Department sometimes 
assists states in writing the action plan/report and in other manners.  
DH meetings: DH meetings contribute to the sharing of responsibilities in 
conformity with the Convention because the subsidiarity principle is of great 
practical relevance to the meetings. The respondent state, not the Committee, 
identifies the execution measures and the Committee does not require the 
implementation of any specific measures. Responsibilities are also shared as such, 
because the supervisory process as exercised at the meetings is of a collective 
nature, which signifies that the states collectively bear responsibility for 
ascertaining that a judgment is executed. The collective nature is to a certain extent 
undermined by states putting political considerations before collectively supervising 
the Court’s judgments. The negative influence of such considerations is, however, 
limited by features of the institutional setting in which the meetings take place. It 
therefore still holds that responsibilities are shared, albeit not always across the 
board of all cases selected for discussion and not equally intensely by all states.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Chapter VI explained that, because assistance is 
provided during bi- and multilateral meetings, they can contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities as such with the respondent state or states. In practice, nothing 
seems to stand in the way of attaining this result. Bilateral meetings are indeed used 
to, for example, point out to the state remaining execution problems, to develop an 
action plan and to discuss the requirements which a judgment imposes. Because 
non-compliance with a judgment is more often caused by the ‘varying capacities’ of 
the states parties to execute rather than ‘wilful disobedience’, ‘approaches whereby 
States are provided with technical, financial or other types of assistance in 
implementing their obligations is [...] favoured’, and these approaches are used 
during bilateral meetings, making the meetings of great importance to execution.699 
Further, multilateral meetings are organised in particularly problematic areas of 
execution where assistance is really needed. During these meetings, assistance is 
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not only provided by the Execution Department but also by the states themselves in 
the sense that those responsible for execution have the opportunity to speak to their 
counterparts from other states and can become inspired by solutions found by 
others.700 Additionally, as was noted by the CDDH, ‘[w]hen similar problems arise 
for several different States, it can [...] be extremely useful for those involved to 
share their questions and experience’.701 Further, ‘when states feel that they are not 
alone to face some problem it’s sometimes easier to push several states to go ahead 
rather than one being alone, facing one problem’.702 
Commissioner country visits/reports: As was noted in chapter VI, the 
Commissioner can share responsibilities with the Committee by way of his country 
visits/reports. This is not done, however, in a manner that is highly relevant to this 
study, because the interlocutors do not directly interact by way of these procedural 
steps. In practice, the same finding holds.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: Chapter VI explained that indicator 2 is not 
relevant to decisions/interim resolutions. Practice does not change this observation. 
These procedural steps are therefore not assessed in the light of the indicator.  
Individual follow-up cases: Sharing responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention implies that the respondent state can choose which execution measures 
it takes. As chapter VI found, the Court decreases the discretion of the state in the 
execution phase in a follow-up case, but limitedly because the Court only comments 
on the consequences of the execution measure. In practice, this decrease is more 
extensive, because the Court scrutinises the execution measures themselves as well. 
Additionally, sharing responsibilities in conformity with the Convention requires 
the Court to abstain from assuming the Committee’s supervisory task in the 
execution phase. The Court in effect assumes this task partially and even more so 
than expected in chapter VI, because it examines both the execution measures and 
their consequences, possibly even when the Committee is still supervising a case. 
The Committee, however, does not seem to consider this as problematic since it has 
even suspended its examination of a judgment in anticipation of a follow-up 
judgment. The Committee thus encouraged the Court to exercise jurisdiction. In 
sum, the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention is not 
stimulated but rather contravened, in spite of the Court’s remarks in its judgments 
emphasising that it respects the Committee’s competences and that it has no 
jurisdiction to verify whether a state has complied with the obligations imposed by 
a judgment.  
Exactly because the Court becomes involved in checking execution measures, it 
shares responsibilities as such with the respondent state and the Committee in the 
execution phase, as was also concluded in chapter VI. This also applies when the 
Court declares a follow-up case inadmissible, as this clarifies to the state and the 
                                                        
700  Execution interview 1; Execution interview 9. 
701  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 20; See also: ibid., Appendix VI, para. 40. 
702  Amat (2009).  
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Committee that the implemented execution measures suffice. Indeed, the 
Committee once relied on such an admissibility decision in a final resolution.  
General follow-up cases: It was noted in chapter VI that general follow-up 
cases do not contribute to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention. These cases decrease the state’s discretion and may be interpreted as 
the Court taking on the Committee’s responsibilities, as was explained with 
reference to individual follow-up cases. The foregoing also applies in practice, 
considering that the Court indeed adjudicates general follow-up cases and 
scrutinises the general execution measures. The Court seems to find adjudicating 
general follow-up cases less problematic in this regard than adjudicating individual 
follow-up cases considering that it emphasises that it respects the competences of 
the Committee and the respondent state less in the former than in the latter.  
Responsibilities are shared as such with the states and the Committee as was 
also found in chapter VI because general follow-up cases clarify whether the 
implemented general execution measures sufficiently remedy the problem 
underlying the violation in the first case. This is especially so for the Committee, 
because it approves the execution measures in abstracto, while the Court examines 
them in concreto. The Committee likely indeed sees the general follow-up cases as 
a form of assistance considering that it sometimes relies on a general follow-up 
judgment and that it is willing to await such a judgment before carrying on with its 
own supervisory exercise.  
3.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding 
Indicator 3 examines the execution procedures to establish whether they contribute 
to mutual understanding between interlocutors on the Council of Europe and 
national level. In the context of the execution phase, this mostly concerns the states’ 
understanding of the execution measures required to fulfil their responsibility under 
Article 46. Besides, it concerns the Committee’s understanding of domestic 
problems relating to internal and external tension, as the Committee is the most 
important European interlocutor in this phase. When a procedure is an opportunity 
for the Court’s involvement, the question should also be addressed whether a 
procedure enhances the Court’s understanding of these problems.  
Article 46-indications: Article 46-indications do not enhance the Court’s 
understanding of problems in the states as the states cannot give any input to the 
Court by way of this procedural step specifically. The indications are, however, a 
means for the Court to clarify to the states what is (not) required in the execution 
phase. The Court has, for example, explained that where a conviction by a domestic 
court did not meet the Convention requirements of independence and impartiality, a 
retrial or reopening of the case is an appropriate way of redressing the violation. 
Further, the indication of a general measure is a clear signal to the state that an 
individual problem does not stand on its own and that general remedial measures 
are required to bring the domestic situation in line with the Convention.  
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Action plans/reports: In an action/plan report, the respondent state explains to 
the Execution Department which execution measures it has taken or will take and 
why these measures suffice to execute the judgment. This means that the Execution 
Department learns something about the domestic legal system. The Committee also 
learns, because the documents are forwarded to the Committee after they have been 
approved by the Execution Department. In particular when general measures are 
taken, insight into the domestic level is given. However, the action plans/reports do 
not usually give insight into obstacles existing due to practicalities or the three 
difficulties causing internal tension.  
In the process in between the submission of the first plan and the approval of the 
final report, the Execution Department sometimes assists in drafting and at times 
even in preparing execution measures. The Execution Department also often asks 
the states to improve their submissions and may be constantly in touch with them. 
Such interventions give the Execution Department the possibility to define what is 
required to execute a group of judgments and which steps should be taken to fulfil 
that goal. The knowledge of the respondent state of the requirements of execution 
will therefore also improve. 
DH meetings: DH meetings contribute to mutual understanding, as was 
expected they would in chapter VI. The understanding of the states parties of what 
the Committee requires increases in particular if other representatives or persons 
working for the respondent state attend the meetings in addition to the deputies. 
Also, general, thematic discussions of topics that regularly reappear are conducive 
to increasing the states’ understanding of how complex and structural execution 
problems can be solved. The explanations given by the respondent state at the 
meeting, possibly in response to questions posed at the meeting itself, will increase 
the understanding of the Committee of the situation in that state and of the views of 
that state. 
Bi- and multilateral meetings: As was outlined under indicator 2, during the 
meetings, be they bi- or multilateral, assistance is provided to the respondent states 
in the form of clarifying the execution requirements and helping them to achieve 
these requirements. More specifically, the bilateral meetings can be used to, for 
example, point out decisions taken at DH meetings,703 to explain what the 
Committee does, why information is required and that execution should be an effort 
shared by different authorities and not just the government agent.704 The meetings 
have the added value of raising the understanding of different domestic authorities 
of what execution entails.705  
The Committee’s understanding also increases, or more specifically, the 
Execution Department’s understanding, of which the Committee profits because it 
relies greatly on the Execution Department. By establishing direct contacts with the 
authorities, it is easier for the Execution Department to, for example, obtain 
                                                        
703  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 40; Execution interview 12. 
704  Execution interview 13.  
705  Execution interview 10.  
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information, which is sometimes only submitted after meeting face-to-face.706 
Additionally, from the perspective of the Execution Department, it can become 
clear that a request from their side was not formulated sufficiently clearly or that 
some explanation of ‘Strasbourg jargon’ is needed.707 The Execution Department 
staff can also be helped by the meetings because they can contribute to 
understanding questions which the authorities may have and the difficulties which 
they may face.708 The foregoing is confirmed by a remark of a member of staff of 
the Execution Department, namely that ‘common understanding of what a judgment 
requires is often easy to reach through “consultations”‘.709 
Commissioner country visits/reports: Reports of the Commissioner may 
increase, as chapter VI provided, the understanding held by the Committee of the 
situation in the states parties as regards execution, even though the report is not 
directly addressed to the Committee. In practice, this potential materialises, because 
the Commissioner, for example, critically reviews measures taken to execute a 
judgment and sometimes provides information about the execution measures. 
Importantly, some interviewees at the Execution Department indicated that they 
indeed rely or would be willing to rely on these reports as a source for evaluating 
the action plans/reports. What was not noted in chapter VI is that the state’s 
understanding of what execution requires probably also increases as a result of this 
procedural step, that is, if the states indeed read the Commissioner’s 
communications. The Commissioner namely makes proposals and 
recommendations as to how certain execution problems can be solved. More 
generally, (s)he educates the states about the Convention requirements, for example, 
warning them which problems can lead to many cases before the Court.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: Chapter VI noted that decisions/interim 
resolutions do not contribute to understanding because they do not contain 
comprehensive information or explanations, but mainly serve to put pressure on the 
respondent state to take measures of which it is already clear that they should be 
implemented. The description of the content of the documents in this chapter 
confirms this impression. 
Individual and general follow-up cases: Chapter VI found that both the state’s 
understanding of what execution requires and the Court’s understanding of the 
national level, especially the state’s motivation for selecting certain execution 
measures, can increase by way of a follow-up judgment. There is no reason to 
assume that it does not work in that manner in practice.  
                                                        
706  Execution interview 10; Execution interview 13. 
707  Amat (2009).  
708  Execution interview 10; Execution interview 11. 
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3.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Indicator 4 helps establish whether the procedural steps contribute to balanced 
decision-making by the Committee in the sense that it pays due regard to the 
difficulties at the root of internal tension. Decision-making by the Committee is 
looked at primarily, because the Committee’s decisions are a potential source of 
conflict over internal tension in this phase, something which dialogue aims to 
prevent. Its decisions have this potential, because they can be a public and strong-
worded condemnation of a state for its failure to execute a judgment. Moreover, the 
Committee – not the respondent state – ultimately decides to close the execution 
phase. When the Committee decides to not close the execution phase whilst a state 
is of the opinion that it should do so, this may cause conflict. In addition to the 
Committee, as the findings under indicator 1 underlined, the Court sometimes 
makes important decisions in the execution phase when adopting an Article 46-
indication and issuing an individual or general follow-up case. It must therefore also 
be verified whether the Court is stimulated to make balanced decisions.  
Article 46-indications: The Court is not encouraged to issue a balanced 
decision when making an Article 46-indication. This is a consequence of the fact 
that making an indication means that the Court, rather than showing respect for 
domestic competences and perspectives, disregards them to some extent because it 
tells a state how to react to a judgment. The Court therefore leaves the state 
comparably less freedom to decide itself which can be considered as unbalanced by 
the state.  
Action plans/reports: Chapter VI explained that action plans/reports can 
contribute to balanced-decision making by the Committee, because states can 
communicate difficulties regarding internal tension by way of the documents, which 
the Committee can subsequently take into account, leading to balanced decision-
making. In practice, however, states do not usually go into these difficulties in their 
action plans/reports. Instead, they neutrally outline which execution measures have 
been implemented, meaning that the potential contribution to balanced decision-
making is not realised.  
DH meetings: In chapter VI it was noted that DH meetings contribute to 
balanced decision-making because sensitive matters can be discussed there and 
subsequently taken into consideration by the Committee. In this chapter it can be 
added that the meetings also contribute to balanced decision-making in the eyes of 
the states parties because they function in conformity with the subsidiarity principle 
and are of a collegial rather than an accusatory nature. The political considerations 
influencing the decision-making, however, impact negatively on the foregoing, but 
this addition is not of sufficient weight to alter the finding that the meetings are 
conducive to balanced decision-making. Further, the Execution Department’s 
selection of cases for discussion is also balanced, aiming as it does to avoid solely 
blacklisting countries and to make it possible to underline positive developments.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: During bi- and multilateral meetings, the 
Execution Department, the respondent state and possibly others get together to 
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discuss execution issues and to learn about each other’s views and the requirements 
of execution more generally. It can therefore be assumed that these meetings 
contribute to balanced decision-making. This also applies to bilateral meetings, 
even though the major decision-maker in the execution phase, the Committee, is not 
present, because the Execution Department is present and prepares the decisions 
made by the Committee, determining the content of the decision-making to a large 
extent. 
Commissioner country visits/reports: Chapter VI described that a report of the 
Commissioner has some potential to contribute to the Committee’s understanding 
when it delves into issues relating to internal tension experienced by the domestic 
authorities. In practice, however, the reports do generally not delve into such 
matters. They rather encourage the states to improve their execution record. The 
reports can therefore not contribute to balanced decision-making by the Committee 
in practice. 
Decisions and interim resolutions: In chapter VI, it remained unclear whether 
decisions and interim resolutions contribute to balanced decision-making. These 
documents are used to criticise a respondent state, meaning they may be considered 
as unbalanced. Nevertheless, it has appeared that the respondent state can give input 
and that the documents do more than cast criticism; they sometimes also ask for 
information and welcome positive developments. These procedural steps are 
therefore not highly unbalanced, but this does not mean that they actually contribute 
to balanced decision-making.  
Individual and general follow-up cases: Chapter VI explained that follow-up 
judgments do not contribute to balanced decision-making any more than other 
judgments do. Moreover, they may even be perceived to contain unbalanced 
decisions, because the Court decides on issues regarding execution, which are for 
the state to decide upon and for the Committee to supervise. In this chapter, similar 
remarks can be made and in respect of individual follow-up cases even more 
convincingly, considering that that the Court in fact also examines the execution 
measures themselves in addition to their consequences.  
3.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 facilitates establishing whether and, if so, how, the procedural steps in 
the execution phase stimulate and make it possible for the interlocutors to give 
reasons for their decisions, preferably reasons which are embedded in the 
Convention system. Reasons are particularly, but not exclusively, important when 
the decision of one interlocutor negatively affects another.  
Article 46-indications: Generally, judgments stimulate reason-giving on paper 
because the Court is required to reason its judgments. As Article 46-indications are 
part of a judgment, they should therefore be reasoned on paper at least. In practice, 
the Court indeed gives different reasons to motivate its decision to make an Article 
46-indication. Still, it remains often unclear why it makes an indication in one case, 
but not in another and why it applies the PJP to one case and only indicates general 
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measures in another. The Court therefore seems to make decisions on a case-by-
case basis without being necessarily consistent. The conclusion is that the Court 
engages in reason-giving, but its reason-giving is not always equally 
comprehensive.  
Action plans/reports: As was expected in chapter VI, action plans/reports 
stimulate the respondent state to engage in reason-giving. They are required for 
each group of cases to explain why the proposed or implemented execution 
measures suffice. Their reason-giving is always evaluated and therefore stimulated 
by the Execution Department, regardless of whether a case falls under standard or 
enhanced supervision. The evaluation stimulates convincing reason-giving in 
particular because it is carried out based on not only the information provided by 
the respondent state, but also on other information, submitted to the Execution 
Department or collected of its own motion. Nevertheless, the states do not 
necessarily engage in convincing reason-giving in practice of their own motion, as 
they are usually given instructions by the Execution Department on how to improve 
their submissions and as the quality of their submissions is not always up to scratch. 
Nor do they explain clearly why they have chosen a certain measure and how their 
choice relates to the Court’s findings. In short, reason-giving is stimulated, but does 
not always come to full bloom.  
DH meetings: Reason-giving is likely stimulated at DH meetings in the way 
chapter VI described it: the respondent state is expected to give reasons for 
execution problems and the Committee informs the state of what is required. The 
state in particular is stimulated to justify delays and its approach towards execution 
because putting a case on the agenda is used as a tool if the execution process does 
not pass off well (between the Execution Department and the respondent state), 
signalling to the state that a problem exists that requires explanation. The selection 
of a case for debate amongst thousands of cases gives a comparable signal. The 
state can be further stimulated to give reasons by the questions asked at the 
meetings and the peer pressure exercised there.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bilateral meetings are organised to discuss 
execution problems with the respondent state or to point out to the state remaining 
problems on the list of cases pending for execution. Due to the focus of these 
meetings, it can be assumed that the state is stimulated to give reasons for problems 
in the execution process. Additionally, the respondent state is stimulated to give 
reasons for the execution measures which it has taken and for why these measures 
suffice, because if the Execution Department cannot be convinced of this during 
bilateral meetings, it is unlikely that it will propose that the Committee adopts a 
final resolution. Because the focus of multilateral meetings is not so much on 
specific cases, they contribute less to reason-giving regarding the pending cases.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: As was noted in chapter VI, the 
Commissioner’s procedural steps do not contribute to reason-giving by the 
Committee. Nothing in the description of practice suggests otherwise, meaning that 
the procedure neither contributes to the effect indicator 4 seeks to establish in 
practice.  
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Decisions and interim resolutions: Chapter VI concluded that decisions/ 
interim resolutions do not contribute to reason-giving by either the respondent state 
or the Committee. The content of the documents described in section X.2.9 does not 
warrant a different conclusion. The states are not encouraged to give reasons for 
delayed and incomplete execution; instead, they are encouraged to step up their 
efforts and to give information on the state of execution. Further, the Committee 
does nowhere explicitly reason its decision to adopt the documents, although these 
reasons can be derived from the documents themselves, in particular from the 
preambles to the interim resolutions.  
Individual and general follow-up cases: It was found in chapter VI that 
follow-up cases potentially stimulate reason-giving by the state and the Court. The 
description of the practice of the procedure does not give clues for finding 
otherwise, meaning that the findings in chapter VI are confirmed.  
3.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response 
Indicator 6 analyses whether one interlocutor can respond to a decision or a 
procedural step of another interlocutor. It is particularly relevant to analyse the 
execution phase through the lens of this indicator, as was already mentioned in 
chapter VI, because the execution measures are the states’ response to a judgment. 
The indicator also poses the less broad question whether internal room for a 
response exists, namely the possibility to respond to any decisions taken within the 
confines of a procedure. 
Article 46-indications: The states cannot respond to an Article 46-indication 
prior to the Court’s indication. From a broader perspective, this procedural step 
neither seems to increase the states’ room for a response. Judgments with an 
indication namely give the state less room for a response than judgments without 
one, although the extent to which the room for a response decreases depends on the 
preciseness of the indication. Although strictly legally speaking, states have room to 
respond to an indication not made in the operative provisions by ignoring it, this is 
not really an option in practice. The Execution Department and Committee namely 
nevertheless require the indication’s implementation. Article 46-indications, 
however, provide the Court room to respond. It can respond to an individual 
violation, in addition to by finding that violation, by expressly requiring the state to 
remedy it. Further, the (protracted) existence of a systemic problem can be 
addressed by indicating a general measure. These remarks regarding the Court are, 
however, of less importance than the observation that the room for a response by 
the states is curtailed. As explained in chapter IV, room for a response is 
particularly important when a decision, such as a judgment, is made that affects 
another interlocutor.  
Action plans/reports: As chapter VI noted, execution measures are the 
response of a state to a judgment and the action plans/reports provide the means to 
present the response to the Committee. Because these documents are so important 
to communicating the response, they also offer room for a response. This also 
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applies in practice. Considering that the description in this chapter was more 
elaborate than in chapter VI, the question can be answered whether possibilities 
exist for other interlocutors to respond to the states’ submissions within this 
procedural step. Indeed it has appeared that the Execution Department can do so. It 
reacts to incomplete submissions by not approving the document and requiring the 
state to make improvements, possibly with its assistance. Further, it handles delayed 
submissions by sending, first, a reminder and, then, imposing a new deadline. If a 
state fails to present an action plan/report, the Committee does not seem to respond 
by bringing the case under enhanced supervision. It rather takes other measures to 
put pressure on the state, such as, sending letters and organising meetings. For the 
Execution Department and the Committee room for a response therefore exists 
within the confines of the procedure.  
DH meetings: DH meetings provide external room for a response to both the 
Committee and the respondent state as was proposed they would in chapter VI. To 
illustrate, the Committee responds to the (lack of) progress in execution and, more 
specifically, to delayed and incomplete execution. It also follows up on decisions 
and interim resolutions. The respondent state, for its part, can use the meetings to 
react to the demands of the Execution Department, in the sense that it can explain to 
the Committee that the demands are too high. This holds in particular because a 
difference of appreciation between the Execution Department and the respondent 
state concerning the measures to be taken militates in favour of putting a case up for 
discussion. Additionally, the state can respond to questions posed by the 
Committee.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Bilateral meetings provide states room for a 
response to explain to the Execution Department why they have taken certain 
execution measures and why they think these measures suffice. Comparably, the 
meetings give the Execution Department the opportunity to discuss with the state 
the progress of execution based on action plans/reports and to respond to the 
progress or a lack thereof in the execution process. For both interlocutors room for a 
response therefore exists when a bilateral meeting is organised. This applies to a 
lesser extent to multilateral meetings as they are more formal with less direct 
exchanges and because they do not necessarily focus on the execution of a certain 
group of cases and will therefore not call for explanations regarding these groups 
specifically.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: Chapter VI explained that the visits and 
reports give the Commissioner a means to respond to the execution efforts 
undertaken by the respondent states. In practice, the Commissioner indeed uses 
these procedural steps in that manner: during the visits and in the reports he 
discusses execution, especially problematic instances and general execution 
measures necessary to remedy structural problems.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: The proposal in chapter VI – that 
decisions/interim resolutions give the Committee external room to respond to the 
execution measures (or lack thereof) – can be confirmed. The Committee uses the 
documents to inter alia welcome certain developments, encourage the states to take 
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measures and to express concern about a lack of progress. Additionally and which 
could not be noted in chapter VI, the addressed respondent state has internal room 
for a response, because it has the opportunity to comment on a draft and suggest 
amendments before the Committee decides on the draft.  
Individual and general follow-up cases: Follow-up cases give the Court room 
for a response, in respect of individual follow-up cases even more clearly than 
could be expected in chapter VI, because it has appeared that the Court cannot only 
respond to the consequences of the execution measures, but also to the measures 
themselves. For the state, internal room for a response exists, because it can employ 
the procedures dealt with in chapters V and IX to respond to the allegations of the 
applicant about the inadequacy of the execution measures.  
3.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
This indicator aims to establish whether the procedures potentially help prevent, 
mitigate or end the escalation of internal tension into conflict or rather create 
conflict in the execution phase or exacerbate any conflict caused in the (pre-)merits 
phase. Such conflict can materialise between the Court and the states and the 
Committee and the states. The examination is partially based on the observations 
made above under the other indicators. The discussion of the extent to which 
procedures discussed in chapter IX help dealing with conflict was only a partial 
answer to the question whether conflict can be prevented more generally. The 
answer depends to a large extent on how the procedures in the execution phase can 
mitigate conflict and, going beyond that, lead tension towards a positive outcome. 
The execution phase is particularly relevant, because a judgment, which forms the 
basis for the execution phase, is both the step that most likely causes conflict and 
the last procedural step in the (pre-)merits phase.  
Article 46-indications: Article 46-indications do not contribute to the handling 
of conflict in any manner. On the contrary, the indications may stir conflict as it 
means that the Court imposes an obligation on the state, even though the 
Convention does not clearly confer the power on the Court to do so. The findings 
made with reference to the other indicators do not warrant a different conclusion, in 
particular not because the procedural step neither contributes to the sharing of 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention nor offers room for a response 
for the state respondent, findings which may incite conflict. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood that conflict indeed materialises over an indication should not be 
overestimated since the Court makes these indications only exceptionally, not 
necessarily in the operative provisions of a judgment, in varying detail and normally 
for good reason. Moreover, the states have not really protested against the 
indications, at least not publicly.  
Action plans/reports: Action plans/reports contribute in practice to the sharing 
of responsibilities, mutual understanding, reason-giving and provide room for a 
response. Therefore, they can also be said to be beneficial to preventing the eruption 
of conflict between the Committee and the respondent state. 
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DH meetings: DH meetings help minimise conflict between the Committee and 
the states parties because they contribute to the results which the foregoing five 
indicators seek to establish. On top of that, the nature of the meetings, which is 
collegial and cooperative rather than accusatory or inquisitorial, probably 
contributes to ensuring that the seed of conflict cannot even be planted.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: It was found above that bi- and multilateral 
meetings contribute to the sharing of responsibilities as such, mutual understanding, 
balanced decision-making and reason-giving. The foregoing means that these 
meetings presumably also help mitigate conflict, also because they help clear up 
misunderstandings.710 The bilateral meetings in particular foster eliminating 
blockages in the execution process by holding open a thorough exchange of views 
regarding the measures needed to execute a judgment and the identification of 
obstacles encountered in this respect.711 Such results can be reached, for example, 
‘by clarifying the requirements resulting from the Court’s judgments and the 
practice of the Committee, and by providing, where appropriate, the national 
authorities with technical assistance in the matter’.712 The mitigation of conflict 
applies not only to conflict between the state and the Execution Department but also 
to conflict between the former and the Committee, because even though the state 
meets with the Execution Department, the latter determines to a large extent how 
the state is approached by the Committee.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: The previous indicators helped to 
establish that Commissioner country visits/reports are a means for the 
Commissioner to share responsibilities with the Committee, contribute to increasing 
the Committee’s and the state’s understanding and give the Commissioner room for 
a response. In view of indicator 7, which seeks to analyse whether conflict between 
in particular the states and the Committee or Court can be handled, only the 
contribution to mutual understanding is relevant, considering that the other two 
results relate more to the Commissioner him/herself. Country visits/reports are 
therefore not conducive to mitigating conflict in any significant manner, but nor do 
they have any negative influence thereupon.  
Decisions and interim resolutions: It can be noted here, as was done in chapter 
VI, that decisions and interim resolutions have no beneficial effect under indicator 
7, but may even cause conflict between the Committee and the state because the 
Committee criticises the state publicly, at times in a strongly worded manner. 
Nevertheless, the conflict-provoking effect is likely muted to some extent by the 
practice to give the respondent state internal room for a response, to also include 
positive remarks and to address diverse states, meaning an attempt is made to not 
always focus on the same states, something which could provoke conflict.  
                                                        
710  Execution interview 1.  
711  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 17; Execution interview 1; See also: Amat (2009): ‘When you 
can discuss with people, face-to-face, it’s much more likely that you will get progress because, 
well, it’s easier to sell what is needed to implement a judgment’.  
712  CDDH (2008a), Appendix VI, para. 17.  
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Individual and general follow-up cases: As chapter VI outlined, follow-up 
cases can be a potential source of conflict because the Court becomes involved in 
execution matters. This potential is especially great regarding general follow-up 
cases because they have comparably broad consequences with a larger impact on 
the respondent state. In practice, the potential to cause conflict also exists and is 
greater than on paper for individual follow-up cases because the Court directly 
scrutinises execution measures. The possibility that the procedures invoke conflict 
is underlined by the finding that follow-up cases do not stimulate balanced 
decision-making or the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention.  
4  CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGICNESS OF PROCEDURES IN THE EXECUTION 
PHASE  
In chapters V, VI and IX conclusions were drawn from the perspective of the 
procedural steps. This exercised is repeated here, but this time regarding the 
functioning in practice of these procedural steps. Thus, the dialogicness of each step 
is established. As has been recalled previously, indicators 2 and 7 are special in the 
sense that they contribute relatively much to making dialogue of use to the 
Convention system. When drawing conclusions, relatively much importance is 
therefore attached to the observations made under these two indicators. In the same 
manner as in chapter IX, the procedures are labelled as being clearly, somewhat or 
limitedly dialogic.  
Article 46-indications: Article 46-indications are the only procedural step 
which could not be derived from paper and which was therefore not described in 
chapter VI to establish its dialogic potential. The indications give the Court the 
possibility to become involved in the execution phase by commenting on how its 
judgments are to be executed. Through an indication, the Court shares 
responsibilities with the Committee and the respondent state. Another beneficial 
effect is that the respondent state’s understanding of execution requirements is 
enhanced. Further, the Court has room for a response and reason-giving is 
stimulated, although the Court’s reasoning is not always equally comprehensive. 
Less positive from the perspective of dialogue is that the indications are contrary to 
the Convention’s division of responsibilities, do not stimulate balanced decision-
making and could stir conflict, although an actual outburst of conflict is unlikely. 
Moreover, unbalanced decision-making could be triggered and the state’s room for 
a response is curtailed. Article 46-indications are dialogic, considering the 
aforementioned beneficial effects. However, in particular because they have 
ambiguous effects under indicators 2 and 6 and because they are not conducive to 
dealing with conflict, they are not clearly, but only somewhat dialogic.  
Action plans/reports: Both the respondent states and the Execution 
Department, in varying degrees of pro-activeness, become involved in the execution 
phase through action plans/reports. The states, however, do not always use this 
opportunity fully because of the quality of some submissions. Neither does their 
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reasoning always come to full bloom, although the documents stimulate them to 
give reasons. The reason-giving by the Court is encouraged as well, as is the 
sharing of responsibilities as such and in conformity with the Convention, mutual 
understanding and the prevention of conflict. Action plans/reports also provide 
room for a response to the state, the Execution Department and the Committee. 
They do, however, not contribute to balanced decision-making. The procedural 
steps are clearly dialogic.  
DH meetings: Through DH meetings, the Committee and the respondent state 
discuss a small amount of cases, on the Execution Department’s proposal. The 
meetings contribute to the effects indicators 2-7 seek to establish: responsibilities 
are shared in both ways, mutual understanding is encouraged as well as balanced 
decision-making by the Committee and reason-giving by the state. In addition to 
that, each involved interlocutor has external room for a response and the meetings 
help prevent conflict. On a negative note, responsibilities are not shared as such 
across the board of all cases and not equally intensely by all states. This addition 
does however not affect the conclusion that DH meetings are clearly dialogic in 
practice.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: The Execution Department engages together 
with the respondent states in bilateral meetings and both can take the initiative for 
such a meeting. Multilateral meetings, organised on the Committee’s initiative, are 
attended by inter alia the aforementioned two interlocutors and representatives of 
the Court and Council of Europe organs. The functioning in practice of the 
meetings was evaluated positively with regard to all indicators. They contribute to 
the sharing of responsibilities because assistance is provided, they increase mutual 
understanding, encourage balanced decision-making by the Committee and provide 
room for a response to both the respondent state and the Execution Department. 
Further, reason-giving by the states is simulated, more by bilateral than multilateral 
meetings, and conflict is dealt with, especially by bilateral but also by multilateral 
meetings. The meetings, in sum, are clearly dialogic.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: Commissioner country visits/reports 
are, as can be expected, an opportunity for the Commissioner’s involvement, which 
(s)he frequently uses but which falls outside the boundaries of the formal execution 
process as supervised by the Committee. These procedural steps help increase the 
understanding of both the Committee and the respondent states and provide the 
Commissioner room to respond to the execution efforts of the states. Further, the 
Commissioner shares responsibilities with the Committee, albeit not as the result of 
communication between them. The opportunities for the Commissioner’s 
involvement neither contribute to balanced decision-making nor to reason-giving by 
the Committee. Further, they do not contribute to mitigating conflict in any 
significant manner. These observations mean that the visits/reports are only 
somewhat dialogic in practice. 
Decisions/interim resolutions: Decisions/interim resolutions are an opportunity 
for involvement of the Committee and the Execution Department, which proposes 
most and drafts all documents. The respondent state which is to be addressed also 
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becomes involved by commenting on the draft. The Committee is provided external 
room to respond to a state’s execution record and the respondent state internal room 
to comment on a draft. Sharing responsibilities, mutual understanding and reason-
giving are not encouraged. Further, the steps may have as a consequence 
unbalanced decision-making and conflict, although the conflict-provoking effect is 
likely muted for different reasons. The foregoing leads to the conclusion that 
decisions/interim resolutions are somewhat dialogic in practice.  
Individual and general follow-up cases: Follow-up cases are an opportunity 
for the Court’s involvement in a few cases, brought on the applicant’s initiative. 
They permit the Court to comment on the execution measures implemented by the 
respondent state, as well as on their consequences. Other interlocutors become 
involved as well, in the same way as they can become involved in any other, non-
follow-up case. On a positive note, the procedures prompt the sharing of 
responsibilities as such. Further, they contribute to mutual understanding of and 
reason-giving by the Court and the respondent state. These interlocutors are 
moreover given room for a response. The follow-up cases are less dialogic in the 
sense that they imply that responsibilities are not shared in conformity with the 
Convention and because they provoke unbalanced decision-making and possibly 
conflict. This mixture of both positive and negative observations from the 
perspective of dialogue makes follow-up cases somewhat dialogic in practice. 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE DIALOGICNESS OF THE PILOT-JUDGMENT 
PROCEDURE 
 
 
1 THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE IN PRACTICE  
After a short note on methodology, the pilot-judgment procedure’s (PJP) 
functioning is delved into by examining, first, the frequency and areas of use of 
these judgments. Thereafter, the same themes are discussed in sections XI.2.3- 
XI.2.5 as in sections VII.1.1-VII.1.3: the run-up to the procedure, the content of the 
pilot judgments and the events taking place after a pilot judgment has been adopted 
by the Court.1  
1.1 Methodology  
The description of the PJP in practice in this chapter is based on all pilot judgments 
which have been issued from 2004, when the first pilot judgment was handed down, 
to July 2014, when the 21st and 22nd pilot judgment were delivered.2 These 22 
judgments are full-blown pilot judgments as defined in chapter VII; ‘quasi’-pilot 
judgments have not been analysed. The three criteria which need to be fulfilled for a 
judgment to qualify as a pilot judgment have been applied strictly. This means, for 
example, that pilot judgments in all but name are not taken into consideration.3 As 
just noted, pilot judgments issued up to and including July 2014 are taken into 
consideration.4 For the description of the involvement of the Court and the 
Committee in supervising the execution of these judgments, this chapter relied upon 
relevant follow-up judgments and decisions of the Court and documents of the 
Committee until October 2014.  
                                                        
1  See also: Glas (2016).  
2  See for an overview of these pilot judgments: Appendix III.  
3  See, e.g.: Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia, No. 21794/08, 26 March 2013.  
4  The end of July 2014 was taken as a cut-off date, because this chapter was written in August 2014 
and because taking into consideration a greater number of pilot judgments would be of little added 
value.  
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1.2 Frequency and Areas of Use  
As mentioned in the previous section, the Court has issued 22 pilot judgments up to 
and including July 2014. After pronouncing its first pilot judgment in 2004, the 
Court only applied the procedure again in 2006. In 2012, the Court used the 
procedure most frequently, namely six times. The number of pilot judgments is 
therefore negligible in quantitative terms when compared to the total number 
applications decided by judgment per year, for example 891 in 2014 (delivered in 
respect of 2,388 applications).5 
The PJP has been applied to a diverse body of cases. Even though most pilot 
judgments concern the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic court decisions and 
the lack of domestic remedies (Articles 6 and 13),6 the excessive length of 
proceedings and the lack of domestic remedies (Articles 6 and 13),7 as well as 
different property-related issues (Article 1 of Protocol 1),8 the Court has also 
adopted a pilot judgment in a private and family life case (Article 8),9 in a right to 
free elections case (Article 3 of Protocol 1)10 and in a cases about prison conditions 
(Article 3).11 The application of the PJP is therefore not limited to certain subject 
areas.  
1.3 Run-up to the Pilot Judgment  
1.3.1 Initiative  
Both the Court and the respondent state may initiate the PJP.12 Although not 
expressly stated, two judgments hint at a request by the respondent state. In 
Atanasiu and Others, Romania ‘saw the so-called “Polish solution” adopted in the 
wake of the Broniowski judgment as a possible working hypothesis’13 and requested 
                                                        
5  ECtHR (2015d), 5.  
6  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009; Olaru and Others v. Moldova, 
No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009; Gerasimov and 
Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014.  
7  See, e.g.: Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010; Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, 
No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 
May 2011; Kaplan v. Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 March 2012; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012; Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 October 2012.  
8  See, e.g.: Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 
(GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006; Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 
November 2009; Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 October 2012; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012.  
9  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012.  
10  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010.  
11  See, e.g.: Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012; Torreggiani and Others 
v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013.  
12  Rule 61(2)(b) of Court.  
13  Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 204.  
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the Court to assist it in tackling the domestic dysfunction ‘by indicating as clearly 
as possible the course of action to be followed’.14 Further, the judgment in the case 
of Puto and Others v. Albania reveals that the respondent state considered that the 
‘case would […] be suitable for the application of the [PJP]’ and that it ‘reserved 
the right to formally request the application of the [PJP] at a later stage’.15 Indeed, 
interviewees confirmed, without specifying the state or exact number of cases, that 
states have asked the Court to apply the PJP, although the Court takes the initiative 
in the majority of cases.16 It can be derived from some judgments that the Court 
indeed took the initiative, since the respondent state opposed the application of the 
procedure in straightforward language.17 In other cases it is uncertain which 
interlocutor took the initiative.18  
1.3.2 Views of the Parties  
Regardless of who has initiated the PJP, the Court asks for the views of the parties 
on the suitability of a case for the PJP and on whether the application results from 
the existence of a structural or systemic problem or dysfunction.19 This question 
precedes the application of the procedure in a judgment. The states have expressed 
their views in various ways: they have admitted20 or denied21 the existence of a 
problem; argued that they have already taken appropriate general measures;22 left 
the decision to the Court;23 and welcomed recommendations of the Court on how to 
solve the problem.24 In other cases they have objected to the application of the 
PJP25 or explained that the effective application of the PJP would be difficult.26 
                                                        
14  Ibid., 206.  
15  Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 101.  
16  Execution interview 8; Registry interview 2; Registry interview 5; Registry interview 7.  
17  See, e.g.: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 77; Suljagić v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009, para. 59; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 
141; M.C and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, para. 107.  
18  Although the Court usually described that it asked the parties the parties whether the PJP would be 
suitable, this does not necessarily mean the Court initiated the process, as the state may have, 
perhaps informally, suggested applying the procedure first. 
19  Rules 61(2)(a) of Court; Registry interview 2. 
20  See, e.g., Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 56.  
21  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 124; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012, para. 56; Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 October 2012, para. 59; 
Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 209.  
22  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, para. 402.  
23  See, e.g.: Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 58.  
24  See, e.g.: Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 110; See also: Dimitrov and 
Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 105.  
25  See, e.g.: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 77; Suljagić v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009, para. 59; M.C and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 
September 2013, para. 107; Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, 
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They apparently feel restraint in genuinely answering the Court’s question when 
they think acknowledging that a case is suitable for the PJP can be interpreted as an 
admission of a violation.27 Only seven times did states expressly consent to the PJP, 
welcome recommendations or did not oppose the procedure’s application.28 Clearly 
therefore, as was also stated by an interviewee, although the opinion of the state 
may be important, it is not usually decisive.29 This is also apparent from the 
application of the PJP in spite of opposition by the respondent state.  
The question remains how influential the respondent state’s views are. 
Explanations of a member of the Registry clarify that more important than these 
views is whether a pilot judgment likely meets with a ‘cooperative stance’ of the 
respondent state in carrying out the remedies ordered.30 The state’s view and 
cooperative stance are not the same, because initial opposition to the application of 
the PJP does not necessarily mean that the pilot judgment will not be abided by 
once adopted and thus meet a cooperative stance. The estimation is grounded in, for 
example, whether the Court can draw on case law of national high courts pointing 
to a Convention violation and to which the other branches did not respond 
adequately.31 Harmsen has qualified this as a political requirement, which is the 
requirement that the ‘State concerned is itself amenable to negotiation—that is, 
willing to engage constructively with the Court in finding a resolution to the 
problem identified, given that the logic of the [PJP] is essentially one, at the more 
general level, of a legally framed negotiation’.32 According to Harmsen, therefore, 
‘[t]his thus, a priori, be thought to exclude many of precisely those Member States 
where the existence of serious systemic problems currently presents the Court with 
                                                        
para. 209; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the 
FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 141 (Serbia and Slovenia objected). 
26  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 104; Ališić and Others v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 
2012, para. 141.  
27  Mijic (Government agent of Bosnia and Herzegovina) in: Warsaw Informal Seminars (2009), 132-
133.  
28  Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 48; Atanasiu and Others, No. 
30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, paras. 204-206; Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, 
para. 110 (not very clear: ‘The Government nonetheless stated that they would welcome any 
recommendation made by the Court with a view to overcoming the issues raised by the case’); 
Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 105 (idem Finger); 
Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 101; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, 
paras. 95, 141 (Only the Serbian and Slovenian Governments objected); Torreggiani and Others v. 
Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013, para. 81 (Le Gouvernement ne s’oppose pas à 
l’application de la procédure de l’arrêt pilote prévue par l’article 46). 
29  Judge interview 2.  
30  Darcy (ECtHR Registry) in: Warsaw Informal Seminars (2009), 134; See also: Buyse (2009), 1902; 
This was also confirmed during the interviews (Registry interview 7). 
31  Darcy (ECtHR Registry) in: Warsaw Informal Seminars (2009), 134; O’Boyle (ECtHR Deputy 
Registrar) and Judge Ziemele amongst others in: Leach et al. (2010), 35-36.  
32  Harmsen (2011), 138.  
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some of its greatest challenges’.33 The question of cooperation is, however, nothing 
more than an ‘exploratory question’; no formal consent is required.34 In the words 
of the Court:  
It is certainly the case that the settlement of groups of applications, and the speedy 
resolution of execution issues, is greatly assisted by the pro-active investment of the 
respondent Government in the procedures. However it should go without saying that 
Contracting States are bound, in any event, to comply with the Court’s judgments, 
whether or not they have been engaged in a dialogue as to their willingness to find 
general solutions to a widespread problem. The Court’s competence to undertake a 
[PJP] in respect of a series of repetitive or clone cases is not conditional on a 
Government’s conduct.35 
 
The Committee also has ‘some influence on the process of selecting a case for the 
[PJP]’.36 When it has found that a violation was systemic or structural in a 
comparable previous case, the respondent state is under greater pressure to accept 
the systemic or structural nature of a problem.37 The Committee does not exercise 
this influence actively,38 but has it because the Court relies of its own motion on 
Committee documents underlining the structural nature of a problem. Such 
influence therefore becomes apparent in references of the Court to documents of the 
Committee. The Court makes these references, for example, when elaborating 
whether there is a practice incompatible with the Convention39 or when discussing 
measures taken previously by the state.40  
1.3.3 Conditions for Applying the Pilot-judgment Procedure  
The Court can – but is not obliged to – apply the procedure if, first a structural or 
systemic problem exists in the respondent state and, second, that problem has 
caused or will cause similar applications.41 
When deciding to apply the PJP, the Court always alludes to the first condition 
in practice, although in one case, the second condition, more specifically the 
number of pending applications (1,850 applications of more than 8,000 applicants 
                                                        
33  Idem.  
34  Darcy (ECtHR Registry) in: Warsaw Informal Seminars (2009), 134; See, e.g., for cases to which 
the PJP was applied even though the state objected: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 
2009, para. 77; Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009, para. 59.  
35  Demopoulos and Others v. Turkey (GC) (Dec.), No. 46113/99, 1 March 2010, para. 81. 
36  Leach et al. (2010), 36.  
37  Ibid., 35-36.  
38  Registry interview 5.  
39  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 132; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 
No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 87.  
40  See, e.g.: Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 117; Ananyev and Others v. 
Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, paras. 193-194.  
41  Rule 61(1) of Court.  
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and ‘many thousands of potential applicants’), seemed to be the only factor 
warranting the PJP’s application.42 To demonstrate the existence of a structural or 
systemic problem, the Court not only refers to the second condition, but it also, for 
example, cites a domestic ruling,43 an acknowledgement of the government of the 
problem,44 or a relevant report of, for example, the Committee.45 Further, the Court 
explained that it ‘pays due regard to the position of the [Committee], which has 
acknowledged that the non-enforcement of domestic judicial decisions constitutes a 
structural problem [...] which remains unresolved’.46 As one interviewee noted, the 
voice of the Committee can be influential in particular if it has stressed that a 
problem is of a structural nature in its resolutions.47 The Court can then build on the 
Committee’s findings to identify a domestic dysfunction, which contributes to the 
suitability of a case for the PJP.48 The discussion of the underlying problem resulted 
in all but six cases49 in the conclusion that a ‘practice incompatible with the 
Convention’ existed.50  
As regards the second condition, the Court is used to point out the number of 
previous judgments if a case comes to be considered ‘after several judgments in 
which the Court has already found a [comparable] violation’.51 It is also possible, 
however, that a case to which the PJP is applied is a case in which ‘the failings in 
the domestic legal order were identified for the first time’.52 In these circumstances, 
                                                        
42  Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 
60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 144 
43  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, para. 189; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 
(GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 237. 
44  Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 56; Ananyev and Others v. 
Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 188; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 
et al., 8 January 2013, para. 87. 
45  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 187; See also: Ananyev and 
Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 186 (reference to a report by the 
Monitoring Committee on the honouring of obligations and commitments by Russia). 
46  Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 87.  
47  Registry interview 2.  
48  Gerards (2012b), 381; See also: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, paras. 
132-133.  
49  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006; Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 
33509/04, 5 January 2009; Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009; 
Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010; Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 
No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, 
Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, 
50  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, paras. 131-135; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009, paras. 83-88; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 
2010, paras. 219-228.  
51  Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 215; See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia 
(no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 129 (some 200 judgments); Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 83 (300 cases in 5 years).  
52  Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 215. 
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the Court mentions the number of similar pending applications.53 Reference to 
previous judgments or pending applications is, however, not always made, because 
‘in the context of systemic, structural or similar violations the potential inflow of 
future cases is also an important consideration in terms of preventing the 
accumulation of such repetitive cases on the Court’s docket’. 54 This means that the 
PJP can also be applied even when there are ‘only a few similar applications’ 
pending before the Court’.55 In line with this approach, the Court may also specify 
the number of persons potentially affected by the problem identified in the pilot 
judgment.56 In order to stress their potentially large number, the Court referred to 
the selection of applications joined in the pilot case Gerasimov and Others v. 
Russia. The selection illustrated the ‘issues the Court has been confronted with over 
the years and those still being raised in incoming cases’ and demonstrated the 
‘variety of situations, the vulnerability of the people affected by them, the vast 
territory of Russia on which the same recurrent problems arise and the persistence 
of those problems in time since almost fifteen years ago’.57 In some cases, the 
group of previous, current or potential applicants forms an identifiable class of 
citizens.58 In Broniowski, for example, this group consisted of claimants who were 
forced to abandon their property in ‘the territories beyond the Bug River’ and were 
repatriated to Poland after the Second World War.59 However, the Court does not 
require that persons in the same situation as the applicant belong to an identifiable 
class of citizens.60  
Generally, the Court does not use many words, other than those required to 
mention the first two factors just outlined, to reason its decision to apply the PJP; it 
does not elaborately motivate its decision to apply the procedure based on the two 
                                                        
53  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 193 (167 applications); 
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 236 (18 applications, one of 
over 200 applicants).  
54  Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012, para. 414. 
55  Idem. 
56  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 193 (nearly 80,000 people); Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 235 (some 100,000 landlords and 
600,000-900,000 tenants); Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 
and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 144 (many thousands of potential 
applicants). 
57  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 213.  
58  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 189; See for an exception: Burdov v. 
Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 129; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 54447/10, 
3 April 2012, paras. 63-64.  
59  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 189; Harmsen called the existence of 
circumstances in which a ‘potentially large, but clearly delimited, group share a common grievance 
amenable to collective resolution’, a practical limitation on the use of the PJP, see: Harmsen 
(2011), 138. 
60  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 129; Athanasiou and Others v. 
Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010, para. 43; Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 
October 2012, para. 66.  
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factors.61 Sometimes, however, it mentions additional factors ‘militating in favour’ 
of applying the PJP.62 These factors are, for example, the recurrent and persistent 
nature of the problem identified, the need to grant the persons liable to be affected 
by the problem redress,63 and a lengthy delay in implementing a previous 
judgment.64 Further, an interviewee explained that the decision to indeed apply the 
procedure may be easier if a domestic court has already noted the existence of a 
structural problem, as was the case in, for example, Broniowski.65 It was also 
explained that the ability of the respondent state to effect the structural changes 
envisaged in the pilot judgment is of relevance.66 If, to illustrate, legislative changes 
or resources are required and if the government has no resources or will likely fall 
in the near future, the Court will think twice before applying the procedure.67  
1.4  Content of the Pilot Judgment  
The content of a pilot judgment is not significantly different from the content of 
other judgments in which the Court finds a violation, to the extent that the Court 
decides the individual case on its merits in much the same fashion as it would do in 
a non-pilot judgment. Only when the Court applies Article 46, the content of the 
judgment becomes different. The discussion in this section is therefore focussed on 
the Court’s considerations under this Article and Article 41. These considerations 
can be divided into five elements, which can be found in virtually each pilot 
judgment: the identification of the nature of the problem necessitating the 
procedure, the indication of remedial measures, the imposition of a time limit, the 
award of just satisfaction and the question what should be done with similar 
applications. Additionally, a sixth element, which can be found in some pilot 
judgments, is discussed, namely comments of the Court on ongoing reform. 
                                                        
61  See, e.g.: Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 81; Rumpf v. Germany, No. 
46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 62; Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, 
para. 109; See for an exception: Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, 
paras. 184-190. 
62  Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 114; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, 
No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 109.  
63  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 130; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 81; Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 
62; Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010, para. 44; Finger v. 
Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 114; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 
48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 109; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012, 
para. 64; Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 109; Gerasimov and 
Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 218. 
64  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 105. 
65  Registry interview 2.  
66  Judge interview 3; Registry interview 2. 
67  Registry interview 2. 
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1.4.1 The Nature of the Problem  
The Rules of Court require the Court to ‘identify […] the nature of the structural or 
systemic problem or other dysfunction’ in its pilot judgment.68 The Court usually 
makes a clear identification to this effect in the operative provisions of a judgment. 
It already did so in its first pilot judgment, years before the requirement was added 
to the Rules of Court. In that judgment, the Court held that the violation ‘has 
originated in a systemic problem connected with the malfunctioning of domestic 
legislation and practice caused by the failure to set up an effective mechanism to 
implement the “right to credit” of Bug River claimants’.69 However, in spite of this 
early practice and the more recent provision in the Rules of Court, it does not 
always identify the dysfunction in the operative provisions.70 The identification of 
the problem does not always entail the Court analysing the problem and its 
causes.71 In practice, this can have the effect that the respondent state thinks it only 
needs to implement a remedy, without having to address the causes necessitating 
the remedy.72 This effect materialises even though the obligation to abide by a 
judgment of the Court and thus to remedy a general problem may well require73 
making fundamental changes at national level to address the roots of violations.74 
The judgment Ananyev and Others v. Russia is an exception to the lack of analysis. 
The Court felt ‘compelled to address the underlying structural problems in greater 
depth [and] to examine the source of those problems’.75 The judgment Gerasimov 
and Others may also be called an exception, because the Court addressed one 
aspect of the underlying problem specifically, that is, the matter of the delayed 
enforcement of judgments ordering the allocation of housing by the state.76 
Moreover, it explained why these delays weakened the bailiffs’ capacity to ensure 
                                                        
68  Rule 61(3) of Court.  
69  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, para. 3 operative provisions. 
70  See: Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010: Ananyev and Others v. Russia, 
No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012; Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012; Kurić 
and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012; Kaplan v. Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 
March 2012; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013; M.C and Others 
v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013.  
71  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 
35014/97, 19 June 2006; Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009; Rumpf v. 
Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 
2010; Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010; Ališić and Others v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 
2012. 
72  Execution interview 1.  
73  As also stressed by the Court in many pilot judgments and other judgments dealing with Article 46.  
74  Execution interview 1.  
75  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 190; See also: Olaru and 
Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, paras. 54, 57.  
76  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 214.  
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enforcement in accordance with the law and why the continuous lack of domestic 
remedies aggravated the structural problems.77  
1.4.2 Remedial Measures  
The Court must identify in the operative provisions the remedial measures which 
the respondent state must take.78 These measures can have a preventive or 
compensatory character. Preventive remedies aim to prevent further violations; 
compensatory remedies provide for damages to persons who already suffered from 
a violation. In cases concerning the prolonged non-enforcement of domestic court 
decisions and a lack of domestic remedies and cases concerning the excessive 
length of proceedings and a lack of domestic remedies, the Court seems to focus 
predominantly on compensatory remedies.79 In the other cases, a preventive remedy 
is usually called for.80 In Broniowski, however, the Court gave the respondent state 
the choice between the two types of remedies81 and in two cases concerning 
conditions of detention, it clarified that both remedies were required.82 To illustrate, 
in one of these two cases, the state had to establish ‘an efficient system of 
detainees’ complaints to the domestic authorities’ (preventive remedy) and it had to 
‘put in place a remedy which can provide redress for the violations [of Article 3] 
that have already occurred’.83  
The description of the measure in the operative provisions remains general; the 
Court does not spell out which measures the state must take. As an interviewee 
noted, the Court gives ideas, not strict messages.84 To illustrate, the Court has 
ordered the implementation of a Convention right,85 a mechanism maintaining a fair 
balance between different interests,86 and an effective domestic remedy or 
                                                        
77  Ibid., para. 215.  
78  Rule 61(3) of Court.  
79  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 6 operative provisions; 
Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 5 operative provisions; Rumpf 
v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 5 dictum; Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, 
No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010, para. 5. dictum.  
80  See, e.g.: Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 4 operative 
provisions; Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009, para. 4 operative 
provisions; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 6 operative 
provisions; Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 6 operative 
provisions.  
81  Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004, para. 4 operative provisions.  
82  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, paras. 7-8 operative provisions; 
Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013, para. 4 operative provisions.  
83  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, paras. 214, 221. 
84  Execution interview 11.  
85  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 4 operative provisions; Atanasiu and 
Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010 para. 6 operative provisions; M.C and Others v. Italy, 
No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, para. 11 operative provisions. 
86  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 4 operative provisions.  
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combination of such remedies capable of securing adequate and sufficient redress.87 
Even more generally, the Court directed the respondent state to ‘produce, in co-
operation with the [Committee] a binding time frame in which to make available a 
combination of effective remedies’88 and to ‘bring forward [...] legislative proposals 
intended to amend’ domestic legislation.89  
The measures ordered in the operative provisions are preceded by directives 
about these measures in the merits. In that part of the judgment, the Court 
sometimes stresses that it ‘will abstain [...] from indicating any specific general 
measures to be taken’, for example because the process of domestic reform ‘raises a 
number of complex legal and practical issues which go, in principle, beyond the 
Court’s judicial function’.90 It furthermore may defer to the Committee, because 
that body ‘is better placed and equipped to monitor’ this process.91 For this reason 
probably, the Court may also refer to measures already indicated by the Committee 
in a similar case when considering which measures a state should take.92 
Comparably, the Court has abstained from indicating any specific measures, 
because the Committee had, in the context of the execution of similar judgments, 
already considered the adoption of these measures and was taking further actions in 
this respect.93 The Court has also noted that ‘[w]hile the [PJP] has been 
instrumental in helping Contracting States to comply with their obligations under 
the Convention, [it] does not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function 
as an international court, to involve itself in reforms of that type in parallel with the 
[Committee] or to order a specific general measure to be adopted in that process by 
the respondent State’.94 Moreover, even ‘not particularly complex’ problems may 
go beyond the Court’s function, which prevents the Court from specifying the 
required measures.95  
The Court’s directives are not only general rather than specific, they also do in 
principle, neither in the operative provisions, nor in the merits, explain how the state 
                                                        
87  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 6 operative provisions; Olaru and 
Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 4 operative provisions; Ivanov v. Ukraine, 
No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 5 operative provisions; Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 
September 2010, para. 5 operative provisions; Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 
December 2010, para. 5 operative provisions. 
88  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 7 operative provisions. 
89  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 6 operative provisions.  
90  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 137 (emphasis added); See also: 
Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 90; Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 
May 2011, para. 120; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 
115. 
91  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 137; See also: Ivanov v. Ukraine, 
No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, paras. 90-92; Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, 
para. 120; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 115; 
Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 220.  
92  Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 127. 
93  See: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 137.  
94  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 194.  
95  Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 57.  
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is to achieve the type of measure identified. The obligation imposed by the Court is 
therefore primarily one of result and not one of means. This is, for example, 
apparent from the frequent use of the word ‘secure’,96 inserted prior to the 
description of the type of measure in the operative provisions, and from the fact that 
the Court added to some early pilot judgments that the measure must be achieved 
‘through appropriate legal measures and administrative practices’, without 
specifying what these are.97 The merits also reflect the result-oriented nature of 
pilot judgments. In one case the Court, emphasising the wide margin of 
appreciation in the area of Article 3 of Protocol 1, was ‘of the view that it is for the 
government [...] to decide in the first instance how to achieve compliance with [that 
article] when introducing legislative proposals’, which ‘will be examined in due 
course by the [Committee]’.98 In another judgment, the Court stated that it ‘is not 
for the Court to specify what would be the most appropriate way of setting up [...] 
remedial procedures’ or how different interests should be balanced.99 This meant 
that the respondent state remained ‘free to choose the means by which it will 
discharge its obligations arising from the execution of the Court’s judgments’.100 
The Court may also leave it to the Committee to determine ‘what would be the most 
appropriate way to tackle the problems’.101 In yet another case, the Court stated that 
it was not its task to ‘advise the respondent Government about such a complex 
reform process [of the improvement of conditions of pre-trial detention in Russia], 
let alone recommend a particular way of organising its penal and penitentiary 
system’.102 The foregoing may lead to the conclusion that respondent states have 
almost unfettered discretion in which general measures they implement and in how 
they ensure their implementation. The image is, however, more nuanced, as the 
Court’s practice does not support this conclusion, mainly for three reasons.  
First, it is clear that the measures must comply with certain minimum standards. 
In a still rather general sense, the Court may hold in the operative provision that the 
remedy must be implemented in accordance with the relevant principles laid down 
in the Convention,103 or, more specifically, in line with the principles established in 
                                                        
96  See, e.g.: Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 4 operative 
provisions; Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 4 operative provisions; 
Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 6 operative provisions; Ivanov v. 
Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 5 operative provisions.  
97  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 4 operative provisions; See also, e.g.: 
Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 4 operative provisions.  
98  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 114 (emphasis added).  
99  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 239; See also: Ananyev and 
Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 232. 
100  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 239.  
101  Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 92. 
102  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 194.  
103  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 4 operative provisions; Hutten-
Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 4 operative provisions; Burdov v. 
Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 6 operative provisions; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 5 operative provisions. 
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its case law104 or judgments.105 By referring to the principles, the Court gives 
substance to the ordered measures, albeit somewhat indirectly. In the merits as well, 
the Court may emphasise that the state must ‘ensure that the remedy or remedies 
comply, both in theory and in practice, with the key criteria set by the Court’.106 
The foregoing is significant in particular because the Court can outline the relevant 
principles in quite some detail in its judgment.107 It has, for instance, described the 
‘key features of an effective compensatory remedy’,108 namely that the remedy 
operates retrospectively and provides redress in respect of delays predating its 
introduction.109 In the same judgment, the Court pointed out, by way of example, 
remedies introduced by other states,110 and summarised measures that address 
delays in domestic criminal proceedings.111 The Court may also refer to standards 
developed by the Committee to which the authorities should have due regard.112 
Furthermore, the Court can give guidance to the respondent state in the 
judgment and in this way flesh out the remedy. It can be derived from its case law 
that it is not as strongly opposed to this as it seems. For example, in Greens and 
M.T., it posed the rhetorical question ‘whether it is now appropriate [...] to provide 
the respondent Government with some guidance as to what is required for the 
proper execution of the current judgment’.113 Although eventually it answered this 
question in the negative, the very posing of this question discloses that the Court is 
not in principle opposed to giving guidance. Nevertheless, the Court generally 
employs careful language when recommending certain action. By way of 
illustration, it once made observations to that effect ‘in passing’114 and in two other 
pilot judgments, it provided guidance on a ‘purely indicative basis’.115 Careful 
                                                        
104  Kaplan v. Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, paras. 69-72; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, 
No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013, para. 4 operative provisions; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012, para. 5 operative provisions; Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 
31 July 2012, para. 6 operative provisions.  
105  Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, para. 5 operative provisions; Dimitrov and 
Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 6 operative provisions; See also: 
Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 7 operative provisions. 
106  Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 73; See also: Athanasiou and Others v. 
Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010, para. 54 Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 
2011, para. 130; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 125. 
107  See, e.g.: Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, paras. 110-118; Kaplan v. 
Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 March 2012, paras. 68-75.  
108  Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, para. 125. 
109  Ibid., 126.  
110  Ibid., 127.  
111  Ibid., paras. 128-130.  
112  Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 94; Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 
September 2010, para. 73; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 229; 
Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013, para. 95.  
113  Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010, para. 112.  
114  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 239.  
115  Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 230; Puto and Others v. Albania, 
No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 118.  
 
 
 
 Chapter XI 
 
 
488 
wording in giving guidance can also be seen in judgments where the Court observed 
that ‘the many options open to the State certainly include the measures indicated by 
the Constitutional Court’116 or that ‘it appears highly unlikely in the light of the 
Court’s conclusions that [...] an effective remedy can be set up without changing the 
domestic legislation on certain specific points’.117 Further, the Court once added 
that ‘general measures at national level are undoubtedly called for’.118  
Lastly, the Court is sometimes more specific in offering guidance. In Ališić and 
Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYRSOM, for 
example, it mentioned that necessary arrangements should be taken ‘so as to allow 
[the applicants] and all others in their position to recover their “old” foreign-
currency savings under the same conditions as those who had such savings in the 
domestic branches of Slovenian banks’, the conditions having been set out in the 
judgment.119 If furthermore added that, ‘no claim [for recovery] should be rejected 
only because of a lack of original contracts or bankbooks [...] provided that the 
persons concerned are able to prove their claims by other means’ and that ‘any and 
all verification decisions must be subject to judicial review’.120 In Gerasimov and 
Others, the Court indicated that there were ‘several avenues’ by which an effective 
remedy could be set up, and although it did not ‘impose any specific option’, it did 
outline some choices for the authorities.121 Furthermore, when outlining these 
choices, the Court noted that any legislative exercise would benefit from domestic 
case law and the Committee’s texts adopted under Article 46 and it stated that it 
would be ‘quite appropriate for the authorities to seek [...] to combine a 
compensatory remedy with an acceleratory one’ .122 The Court’s guidance can also 
relate to the means by which to achieve the result. In a case where the state had to 
ensure the effective protection of the rights guaranteed by Article 6 and Article 1 of 
Protocol 1, it observed that the ‘decision-making process for the type of 
compensation to be awarded requires the utmost transparency and efficiency with a 
view to enhancing public confidence’.123 On another occasion, the Court found that 
‘any substantive mandate’ in the area of Article 3 ‘would go beyond its judicial 
function, given the nature of the issues’ involved.124 This situation was, however, 
‘not the same as regards the violation of Article 13 [...] on account of the lack of 
effective domestic remedies in respect of the applicants’ complaints about 
inadequate conditions of detention’, a provision which requires ‘clear and specific 
                                                        
116  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 239. 
117  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 138.  
118  Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 
60642/08, 6 November 2012, para. 145.  
119  Ibid., para. 146. 
120  Ibid., para. 148. 
121  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 224.  
122  Ibid., para. 224.  
123  Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 114.  
124  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 212.  
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of the Pilot-judgment Procedure 
 
 
489 
changes in the domestic legal system’.125 It therefore, ‘[i]n order to assist the 
authorities in finding the appropriate solutions’, gave ‘further [and rather lengthy] 
consideration’ as to both preventive and compensatory remedies.126 As a final 
example, in Gerasimov and Others, the Court held that in finding a solution for the 
delayed enforcement of domestic judgments, ‘[p]articular attention would have to 
be paid to the bailiffs’ and other authorities’ present incapacity to secure 
enforcement [...] and the need to find appropriate mechanisms to that effect’.127  
As these three points illustrate, respondent states do not have unlimited 
discretion as regards the remedial measures ordered in the pilot judgment. The 
Court can namely make its orders more specific than they may seem at first glance 
by giving minimum standards and guidance in a more or less specific manner.  
1.4.3 Ongoing Reform  
As was explained above, pilot judgments include an indication of general measures 
which the respondent state must take after the delivery of a judgment and therefore 
in the future. The state may, however, already be in the process of taking measures 
to address (part of) the problem identified by the Court. In a pilot judgment, the 
Court may comment on these measures. In Rumpf, for example, the Court noted 
that, in these circumstances, ‘the application of the [PJP] does not lead to an 
assessment by the Court of the adequacy of the ongoing legislative reform’.128 
Nevertheless, the Court may dedicate some words to the reforms implemented so 
far. In Rumpf, the Court noted ‘with satisfaction that the adoption of measures [...] 
has now been addressed by the respondent State by tabling a draft bill’.129 It added 
more critically that it ‘remains currently unclear whether and when this bill will 
enter into force’ and that Germany ‘demonstrated an almost complete reluctance to 
resolve the problems at hand in a timely fashion’.130 In another judgment, Puto and 
Others v. Albania, the Court was also rather critical of the respondent state. It 
observed that the frequent amendment of property legislation ‘as well as the 
inconsistent judicial practice resulting therefrom, will inevitably contribute to a 
general lack of legal certainty’.131 Albania ‘should [therefore] avoid frequent 
changes of the legislation and carefully examine all legal and financial implications 
before introducing further modifications’.132 As a last example, in Finger v. 
Bulgaria, the Court evaluated in some detail the measures already adopted to fight 
the problem of the length of civil proceedings.133 It considered that, although the 
                                                        
125  Idem. 
126  Ibid., para. 213.  
127  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 220.  
128  Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 63 (emphasis original).  
129  Ibid., para. 72.  
130  Idem.  
131  Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 110. 
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133  Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011, paras. 123-127. 
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measures were ‘certainly to be encouraged’, it could not yet conclude that they had 
produced ‘tangible results’.134 It further observed that ‘the introduction of measures 
designed to ensure that the examination of civil cases will not be unduly delayed in 
the future cannot remedy the problems engendered by delays accrued before the 
introduction of such measures’.135 The problem identified could therefore not ‘be 
regarded as having been fully resolved’.136  
1.4.4 Time Limit  
The Court always uses the possibility to direct in the operative provisions that the 
remedial measures must be adopted within a specified time.137 The deadlines range 
between six and eighteen months, except in the first two pilot judgments where it 
only noted that the measures ‘should be adopted within a reasonable time’.138 The 
Court never explains why it imposes such a time limit and why it chooses a certain 
duration, even though the Rules of Court provided that it should bear in mind ‘the 
nature of the measures required and the speed with which the problem which it has 
identified can be remedied’.139 It only dedicated some words to the duration in 
Gerasimov and Others, where the time limit was ‘consistent with the experience of 
the first pilot judgment [on partially the same matter], the nature of the measures to 
be adopted by the respondent State and the domestic legislative initiatives already 
taken to that effect’.140 Some interviewees were critical of the deadlines set by the 
Court, describing them as random,141 unrealistic142 or theoretical.143  
1.4.5 Just Satisfaction  
The Court chooses to award compensation (in part), for example, due to the 
‘particular and personal circumstances of the individual applicant’,144 which 
                                                        
134  Ibid., para. 117.  
135  Ibid., para. 118.  
136  Ibid., para. 119; See also: Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011, 
paras. 111-114; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 91; Olaru and Others v. 
Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 57; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 
October 2010, paras. 222-227; Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, 
paras. 192-194.  
137  Rule 61(4) of Court.  
138  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 198; Hutten-Czapska v. Poland 
(GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 247.  
139  Rule 61(4) of Court.  
140  Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, para. 226.  
141  Execution interview 9.  
142  Execution interview 6.  
143  Execution interview 10.  
144  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 248.  
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includes his age and health and the length of domestic proceedings.145 It has also 
considered that an award was warranted due to the fact that the applicant ‘not only 
asserted her own rights before it but has also taken upon herself the trouble and 
burden of acting – at least to some extent – on behalf of [others] in a similar 
situation’.146 The question of just satisfaction is reserved (in part) when it is ‘not 
ready for decision’. The Court does not explain this decision, but it can instruct the 
state that a subsequent procedure must be fixed, having due regard to any 
agreement which might be reached between the parties and in the light of such 
execution measures as may be taken.147 So far, the Court has reserved the question 
of just satisfaction in whole or in part in five pilot judgments.148 
1.4.6 Similar Applications  
The Court may adjourn the examination of all similar applications pending the 
adoption of the remedial measures.149 The Court has taken different approaches to 
dealing with these applications. Different approaches are possible, because the 
Court may adjourn ‘as appropriate’.150  
The first approach, taken five times,151 is to continue processing all applications. 
This reminds the respondent state regularly of its Convention obligations.152 Instead 
of continuing to process the applications itself, the Court can instruct the state to 
grant ad hoc redress by means of friendly settlements or unilateral declarations 
within a specified time for applications submitted prior to the delivery of the 
                                                        
145  Idem; Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010, para. 253; Puto and Others v. 
Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 125. 
146  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 248; See also: Ališić and 
Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 
November 2012, para. 155.  
147  See, e.g.: Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 247; Burdov v. 
Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 198; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 
26828/06, 26 June 2012, para. 424; M.C and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, para. 
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and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013, para. 129.  
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150  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 235. 
151  Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010; Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 
37346/05, 10 May 2011; Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06 et al., 10 May 2011; 
Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012.  
152  See, e.g.: Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010, para. 75; Athanasiou and Others v. 
Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010, para. 58; Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 
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judgment.153 The instruction can be required ‘not only [...] because of the gravity of 
the applicants’ allegations’, but is also ‘dictated by the principle of subsidiarity’.154  
The Court can also adjourn, as it has done in eight cases,155 the examination of 
all similar applications pending the adoption of remedial measures for a certain 
period. During that period, the applicants must resubmit their grievances to the 
domestic authorities, using the remedy that has been created pursuant to the 
judgment.156 The Court’s decision to adjourn is ‘without prejudice’ to its power at 
any moment to declare the cases inadmissible or to strike them out of its list.157 
Adjourning all, or, for that matter, some, applications matches one of the aims of 
the PJP, namely to ‘allow the speediest possible redress to be granted at the 
domestic level to the [...] people suffering from the structural problem identified’.158  
Further, the Court differentiated its approach eight times, depending on whether 
an application was lodged before or after the delivery of the pilot judgment.159 
Taking this mixed method, the Court continues to examine itself applications 
lodged before the judgment’s delivery160 or requires the domestic authorities to 
provide ad hoc redress in these cases.161 The examination of other applications is 
adjourned for a set period, in the same way as when the second approach is 
followed.162 This approach is warranted if it would be unfair if the first category of 
applicants would need to resubmit their complaints to the domestic authorities.163  
Lastly, a so far unique approach was called for in Greens and M.T., because the 
circumstances were different from those arising in other pilot judgments.164 
Previously, the PJP had been applied to cases involving complaints regarding 
property or the non-enforcement of domestic judgments, where the benefits of 
ordering a remedy offering specific redress in all pending cases were ‘clear’.165 The 
                                                        
153  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, paras. 238-239.  
154  Ibid., para. 238. 
155  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006; Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 
33509/04, 5 January 2009; Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009; 
Atanasiu and Others, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010; Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 
54447/10, 3 April 2012; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012; 
Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 October 2012; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 6 November 2012.  
156  See, e.g.: Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 60.  
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158  Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, para. 142. 
159  Idem; Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009; Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 
40450/04, 15 October 2009; Kaplan v. Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 March 2012; Puto and Others v. 
Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 
January 2013; M.C and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013; Gerasimov and Others v. 
Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014.  
160  See, e.g.: Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012, para. 121.  
161  See also: Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014, paras. 230-232.  
162  See, e.g.: Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509/04, 5 January 2009, paras. 143-146. 
163  Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, paras. 60-61.  
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165  Idem. 
 
 
 
 The Dialogicness of the Pilot-judgment Procedure 
 
 
493 
case at hand was, however, of ‘an entirely different nature’, as there was neither an 
‘individual examination of cases […] required in order to assess the appropriate 
redress’, nor ‘financial compensation […] payable’.166 The finding of a violation 
therefore constituted sufficient redress,167 and the only relevant remedy was 
legislative change.168 The Court discontinued examining all (future) applications 
and proposed to strike the applications out pursuant to Article 37(1)(c) once the UK 
had implemented the legislative change.169  
1.5  After the Pilot Judgment  
As was noted in chapter VII, it is clear when the PJP starts, but the Rules of Court 
do not clarify whether and, if so, how it ends. This must therefore be derived from 
practice, which is done in this section. Practice is described from the perspective of 
the Court and the Committee. This double perspective offers the possibility to 
discuss how the execution of a pilot judgment is supervised, because both 
interlocutors play a role therein. Focusing on these two actors means that the 
perspective of the state is not separately discussed. This choice was made because 
the double perspective already provides enough information about the state. 
Moreover, summarising this information would be too much a duplication of the 
discussion of the procedural opportunities for involvement under indicator 1 in 
section XI.2.1. 
1.5.1 The Court’s Involvement  
Because the steps which the Court has set after it issued a pilot judgment are so 
diverse, they are discussed quite exhaustively. The Court’s involvement is 
discussed per pilot judgment or per group of pilot judgments when possible. The 
PJP’s have roughly followed either of three routes.  
 
The first route, which three PJP’s have followed, is that the Court clearly closed the 
procedure at some point.  
Following the pilot judgment in Broniowski, the Court issued a strike-out 
judgment to approve the friendly settlement that aimed to solve the previously 
reserved Article 41 question. The Court held that, in the context of a PJP, the notion 
of respect for human rights in Article 37(1) ‘necessarily extends beyond the sole 
interests of the individual’, requiring it to examine the case ‘also from the point 
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view of “relevant general measures”‘, which the settlement indeed included.170 The 
Court evaluated the amending legislation and the government’s settlement 
undertakings.171 In finding that the settlement was based on respect for human 
rights, the Court relied on the government’s ‘actual and promised remedial action’ 
to remedy systemic defects as a ‘positive factor’ and on the individual measures 
already taken.172 In two strike-out decisions following the friendly-settlement 
judgment,173 the Court examined the Convention compatibility of the legal 
framework and practice of a compensation scheme introduced to execute the pilot 
judgment.174 Because it was satisfied that the scheme provided the applicants in 
Broniowski’s situation with domestic relief, it considered that its further 
examination of their applications was no longer justified and it struck the two 
applications out.175 It also held that its findings in theses case under Article 37(1)(b) 
would be ‘valid in the context of all subsequent similar cases’.176 Accordingly, 
another 40 similar applications were struck out shortly thereafter.177 Subsequently, 
the Court delivered an extra 110 individual summary decisions.178 The PJP reached 
its final destination when the Court struck the remaining 176 applications out of its 
list and decided in the operative provisions of its decision to formally ‘close the 
[PJP] applied in respect of the Bug River applications in the case of Broniowski’.179 
The Court thereby explained that its task under Article 19 had been fulfilled,180 
although applications continued to be lodged, because delivering, continually, 
‘individual decisions in cases where there is no longer any live Convention issue’ 
was incompatible with its task.181 
The Court also reserved part of the Article 41 question in Hutten-Czapska v. 
Poland.182 In the judgment in which the Court evaluated the friendly settlement that 
was concluded to resolve that question, it examined the individual and general 
measures agreed upon. The general measures, the result of some of which would 
only be seen in the long term, included inter alia the enactment of several laws, the 
introduction of an information and subsidies system and the submission of a bill to 
                                                        
170  Broniowski v. Poland (GC) (Dec.), No. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, paras. 36; The Court did, 
however, not rule out the possibility that it strikes out a pilot application based on a friendly 
settlement prior to the adoption of any general measures.  
171  Broniowski v. Poland (GC) (Dec.), No. 31443/96, 28 September 2005, paras. 39-41.  
172  Ibid., paras. 42-44.  
173  Wolkenberg and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50003/99, 4 December 2007; Witkowska-Toboła v. 
Poland (Dec.), No. 11208/02, 4 December 2007.  
174  Wolkenberg and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50003/99, 4 December 2007, paras. 63-71.  
175  Ibid., para. 77.  
176  Ibid., para. 36.  
177  ECtHR, ‘Press Release; Bug River Cases Resolved’, 912, 12 December 2007.  
178  E.G. and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50425/99, 23 September 2008, para. 26.  
179  Ibid., paras. 1-2 operative provisions.  
180  Ibid., para. 29 (This task is to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High 
Contracting Parties in the Convention’). 
181  E.G. and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50425/99, 23 September 2008, para. 27. 
182  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006, para. 5 operative provisions.  
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parliament by the government. In assessing these measures, the Court relied to a 
large extent on the government’s undertakings and commitments.183 For the same 
reasons as in the Broniowski friendly-settlement judgment, the Court struck the case 
of its list.184 In a strike-out decision, taken after the Court had approved the friendly 
settlement, it expressly closed the PJP and also struck out the 24 remaining 
adjourned applications. In this decision, the Court positively assessed the newly 
introduced legislative amendments, based on its findings in the friendly-settlement 
judgment.185 The Court did not ‘find it necessary [...] to give a ruling as to the 
present or future effects of the Government’s decision on the general adequacy of 
the redress’, as this was a matter for the Committee. For the purpose of its own 
assessment, the Court was satisfied that the compensatory mechanisms offered 
reasonable prospects of recovering compensation.186 It therefore held that, based on 
its assessment of the global solutions and the domestic redress scheme, the matter 
had been resolved within the meaning of Article 37(1)(b).187 
In Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Court resolved the Article 41 
question immediately.188 Only one strike-out decision, which closed the PJP, 
followed. The Court based that decision wholly on the findings of the Committee. 
The Court finally noted that it might strike out the hundreds of similar pending 
applications in the single-judge procedure in accordance with Article 27.189 As 
decisions taken by this formation are not published, it cannot be verified whether 
the Court indeed proceeded in this manner.190  
 
The second route which the procedure has followed is that the Court declares (part 
of the group of) similar applications inadmissible for failure to exhaust the domestic 
remedy created to execute the pilot judgment at some point, which it has done seven 
times.191  
                                                        
183  Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC) (Dec.), No. 35014/97, 28 April 2008, paras. 37-44; See also: 
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Following Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), the Court issued two decisions in 2010 
declaring different applications inadmissible for failure to exhaust the newly created 
domestic remedy for delays in the enforcement of domestic judgments.192 However, 
in a judgment of 2012, it found that the remedy was only effective in respect of 
applicants who had complained about delays in the enforcement of judgments 
imposing a pecuniary obligation on the authorities. A remedy had not been created 
for such complaints regarding judgments imposing an obligation in kind. Strasbourg 
therefore remained for some applicants the only place where they could obtain 
effective redress.193 In 2014, the Court handed down a follow-up pilot judgment, 
Gerasimov and Others, in which it clarified beyond doubt that Russia should also 
create a domestic remedy for delays in the enforcement of domestic judgments 
imposing an obligation in kind.194  
In Olaru and Others v. Moldova, the Court reserved the question of the 
application of Article 41 in respect of all four applicants. Thereafter, two applicants 
reached a friendly settlement with the state, which the Court approved.195 Unlike 
the settlements reached in the context of the PJP of Broniowski and Hutten-
Czapska, this settlement only concerned the situation of the individual applicant. 
The other two did not conclude a settlement. In respect of one, Moldova filed a 
unilateral declaration that gained the Court’s approval,196 and in respect of the 
other, the Court decided to award pecuniary damage under Article 41 eventually.197 
The Court has required the applicants in a similar situation to use the remedy 
created pursuant to the pilot judgment, declaring their applications inadmissible if 
they had not availed themselves of the remedy.198 In this case too, the time limit 
was postponed, both for the implementation of general measures and for the 
disposal of remaining similar applications.199 
The Court postponed the original deadline of eighteen months for the execution 
of the judgment Atanasiu and Others v. Romania twice, first with nine months and 
thereafter with one month.200 The latest deadline expired on 12 May 2013. On 5 
April 2013, representatives of the Romanian government, together with the 
                                                        
192  Fakhretdinov and Others v. Russia (Dec.), No. 26716/09 et al., 23 September 2010 and Nagovitsyn 
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Execution Department and the Registry, carried out ‘in-depth consultations on the 
draft law prepared by the Romanian authorities in response to the pilot 
judgment’.201 During the interviews, it was also mentioned that such consultations 
take place and that they allow the Registry to give its opinion on these measures and 
to clarify which measures may be acceptable to the Court.202 In a decision of 29 
April 2014, similar applications to the applications selected for the pilot judgment 
were examined by the Court for the first time since the delivery of the pilot 
judgment.203 The Court concluded that the new legislation afforded an effective 
remedy in the light of Article 1 of Protocol 1. The applications were therefore 
rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies; the applicants had not sought 
recourse to the new remedy.204 The Court also held, however, that this conclusion 
was not valid with regard to one of the in total eight applications. In that case, there 
were multiple documents of title for the same building and for these circumstances, 
the new law did not provide an effective remedy, resulting in a violation of Article 
1 of Protocol 1.205 The Court held that the state had to secure the right to property 
of the applicants who had filed that case or, failing this, had to pay damages for 
pecuniary damage. The Court also awarded non-pecuniary damage.206  
In the pilot judgment in Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, the Court reserved the 
question of pecuniary damage and adjourned the examination of all similar 
applications pending the adoption of remedial measures.207 In the subsequent 
Article 41 judgment, it noted that it had granted two requests for an extension of the 
time limit as regards the outstanding Article 41 claims so the parties could reach a 
friendly settlement.208 The Court had, however, refused to grant such a request 
regarding the deadline for establishing remedial measures; this ‘should be taken up 
with the [Committee]’.209 In spite of Slovenia’s request for reconsideration, the 
Court stayed with its refusal.210 This stance is remarkable since the Court approved 
extensions in several other PJP’s.211 As was explained during the interviews, an 
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extension by the Court of the time limit, laid down in the operative provisions of the 
pilot judgment, means that the res judicata is changed without any apparent legal 
basis for doing so and without consulting with the Committee.212 Because the 
parties failed to make a concrete proposal for a friendly settlement, the Court ruled 
on the outstanding issues under Article 41.213 After having solved these issues, it 
made an assessment under Article 46. It noted that no compensation scheme had 
been established (the required remedial measure) by the deadline set in the pilot 
judgment, but that afterwards, new legislation had entered into force which would 
become applicable months after the adoption of the judgment.214 It was for the 
Committee to evaluate the general measures and their implementation.215 The Court 
had, as it had ‘consistently ruled’, no ‘jurisdiction to verify, by reference to Article 
46 [...], whether a Contracting Party has complied with the obligations imposed on 
it by one of the Court’s judgments’.216 The only remark of the Court about the 
compensation scheme was that the solution of awarding a lump sum in respect of 
(non-)pecuniary damage ‘appears to be appropriate’.217 This course of action is 
remarkable as the Court assessed to a certain extent the general measure 
implemented to execute the pilot judgment in other procedures. The Secretariat, 
which the Committee instructed to ‘prepare a comprehensive assessment of the 
measures adopted, also in light of the judgment of the European Court to be 
rendered under Article 41’, can therefore not rely on the Court’s judgment for the 
assessment.218 The Court finally noted that, in the light of the 65 similar pending 
applications of more than 1,000 applicants, ‘swift implementation’ of the pilot 
judgment was ‘of the utmost importance’.219  
In the wake of a pilot judgment, comparable decisions are often rendered as 
were rendered in the PJP’s of Olaru and Others and Atanasiu and Others, namely 
to declare comparable applications inadmissible for failure to use the remedy 
created to execute the pilot judgment.220 The Court’s assessment of that remedy can 
be rather elaborate, as the decision Balakchiev and Others v. Bulgaria illustrates. 
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This case followed up on two pilot judgments: Finger, on the length of civil 
proceedings,221 and Dimitrov and Hamanov, on the length of criminal 
proceedings.222 In the decision, the Court examined ‘the availability and 
effectiveness of the two remedies and their compatibility with each of the 
requirements set out in the pilot judgments’.223 In addition to that, it analysed in a 
rather detailed manner the issues of procedural guarantees, costs and speediness, the 
promptness of the payment of compensation and the scope and retrospective effect 
of the remedies.224 The conclusion was that the remedies could be ‘regarded as 
effective domestic remedies’.225 In most other inadmissibility decisions that follow 
up on a pilot judgment, the Court examines the effectiveness of the remedy in less 
detail. In these cases, the Court seems to attach particular importance to the 
existence of the requirement on domestic courts to apply Convention criteria as 
established in its case law when dealing with requests of the applicants filed under 
the new remedy.226 The Court examines the effectiveness of the remedy on paper, 
because it can conclude that a remedy is effective and that the applicants must use it 
even though there has been no or little practice established yet with regard to the 
remedy.227 The Court’s refusal to examine ‘every single provision’ of the 
legislation creating the remedy in abstracto ‘when it has no reason to assume that 
the [legislation] will not attain the purposes for which it had been enacted’ is also 
exemplar of its no so detailed review.228  
 The Court sometimes adds, when concluding that a remedy is effective, that it 
found ‘it significant that [the respondent state] has passed the legal reform 
introducing the new domestic remedy in response to the [...] pilot judgment under 
the supervision of the [Committee]’.229 This remark is made against the background 
of one of the aims of the PJP, which is ‘precisely to allow the speediest possible 
redress to be granted at the domestic level to the large numbers of people suffering 
from the [same] structural problem’.230 The Court may then state that, considering 
the foregoing, it would ‘require, as a matter of principle, that all new cases 
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introduced after the pilot judgment and falling under [the new legislation] be 
submitted in the first place to the national courts’.231 This position may, however, 
‘be subject to review in the future depending, in particular, on the domestic courts’ 
capacity to establish consistent case law’ under the new remedy.232 
 
The last route or rather destination of the PJP is provided for in the Rules of Court, 
which provide that ‘[s]ubject to any decisions to the contrary, in the event of failure 
[...] to comply with the operative provisions of a pilot judgment, the Court shall 
resume its examination of the applications which have been adjourned’.233 So far, 
the Court has taken this course of action twice.  
In the pilot judgment in the case of Ivanov v. Ukraine the Court imposed a 
deadline of one year for the implementation of the remedial measures.234 The Court 
subsequently extended the deadline.235 The Registry informed the Committee of 
this and its decision to formally adjourn adversarial proceedings in similar cases 
until the new deadline and to communicate some further 450 cases.236 One day 
before the expiry of the deadline, Ukraine requested a further extension, which the 
Court refused, inter alia because the situation had not improved and because no 
settlement had been proposed in about 1,000 communicated cases.237 The judgment 
Kharuk and Others and a press release reveal that the Court decided to resume the 
examination of the adjourned applications because the measures ordered in the pilot 
judgment had not been adopted.238 This decision followed the Court’s assertion in 
its first pilot judgment that, when the ‘the respondent State delays the 
implementation of general measures beyond a reasonable time’, it ‘will have no 
choice but to examine and take to judgment the remaining applications pending 
before it in order to trigger the execution process before the [Committee] and to 
ensure the observance of the Convention at domestic level’.239 In the follow-up 
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judgment, the Court first found similar violations as in the pilot judgment.240 It then 
noted that ‘its principal task is to secure the respect for human rights, rather than 
compensate applicants’ losses minutely and exhaustively’.241 A unified approach to 
just satisfaction was therefore warranted.242 Applicants who had been waiting for 
more than three years to have their favourable judgments executed received 3,000 
Euros and others 1,500 Euros.243 The Court invited Ukraine to issue unilateral 
declarations based on these awards in similar applications. An expedited and 
simplified process of communication followed: the Registry collected only the key 
facts, did not compile individual factual summaries and did not communicate 
information about the individual applications to the state. The Court also held that it 
would give judgment if no unilateral declaration would be issued within six months 
after communication.244 The Court further decided to stay involved in another way: 
representatives of the Registry participated in high level consultations in Kyiv to 
discuss solutions for outstanding problems.245 
The Court extended the deadline for the execution of the pilot judgment Greens 
and M.T. v. UK pending proceedings before the Grand Chamber in the case 
Scoppola v. Italy (no. 3) with six months, because the outcome in that case was 
relevant for the execution of the pilot judgment. In Scoppola (no. 3), the Court, 
under the heading ‘whether the principles set forth in the Hirst judgment should be 
confirmed’ made the judgment not only relevant to Italy, but also to the UK. 
Therefore, the UK could no longer postpone executing Greens and M.T. and a 
comparable judgment.246 In the corresponding press release, it was noted the 
delivery of the judgment in Scoppola (no. 3) means that ‘the six month period 
referred to in Greens and M.T. begins to run’ on the day of the delivery of the 
judgment.247 In a case similar to the pilot case issued thereafter, the Court held that 
‘there was nothing to be gained from examining applications concerning future 
elections’.248 Moreover, the complaint was premature, because the UK had not yet 
implemented the required general measures. The Court therefore declared the case 
inadmissible.249 It, however, added that, if ‘amending legislation is not brought into 
force prior to any future elections to the “legislature”, it will be open to applicants 
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to lodge [...] a new application’.250 Nevertheless, the Court adjourned its 
consideration of pending similar applications another time. In the meantime, it 
‘invited the [Committee] to keep it regularly informed of progress’.251 After the 
latest adjournment, the Court considered the 2,281 pending similar applications in 
order to determine their future. It would not further adjourn Convention 
proceedings and communicated to the Committee that it ‘will process the 
applications in due course’, without giving a reason for its decision in the 
communication.252 On 27 May 2014, the Court communicated ten applications to 
the UK.253 This led to a judgment finding a violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 for 
the same reason as in Greens and M.T., ‘[g]iven that the impugned legislation 
remains unamended’.254 This judgment was issued over three and a half years after 
the pilot judgment’s delivery. The Court communicated another 1,015 cases 
subsequently.255  
1.5.2 The Committee’s Involvement  
In scholarly literature, the Committee’s role in the PJP has been described as being 
of ‘crucial importance’.256 The future of the procedure may even be in its hands 
‘since it is the successful enforcement of [pilot judgments] that will validate the 
Court’s continued recourse to them’.257 Although the Committee plays an important 
role, on paper it supervises pilot cases by virtue of Article 46(2) and can employ the 
procedures and procedural steps discussed in chapter X, as it would do in any other 
non-pilot case. However, because a pilot judgment has certain special features and 
is part of a special procedure before the Court, differences may exist in practice in 
how the Committee fulfils its task with regard to a pilot judgment as compared to 
how it deals with the majority of the other judgments, especially those not under 
enhanced supervision. The following discussion examines the influence of the fact 
that a judgment is a pilot judgment on the Committee’s supervisory role.  
As was set out in section VI.1, a pilot judgment is usually supervised under the 
enhanced procedure. It is therefore supervised more intensively and regularly than 
under the standard procedure. However, considering that in 2014, 62 percent of the 
total number of cases classified received enhanced supervision, the Committee’s 
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involvement is not different from many non-pilot judgments in this regard.258 This 
high figure can be explained by the fact that also non-pilot cases are often grouped 
and repetitive cases ‘follow’ the case to which they are attached. Additionally, cases 
connected to a pilot judgment are not always entirely supervised under the 
enhanced procedure. The Committee can transfer a case to the standard procedure, 
for example, because the Court has closed the PJP259 or because the Court has 
approved the effectiveness of a remedy created to execute the judgment.260  
Further, the interviewees noted that the treatment of a pilot case at a DH meeting 
does not differ a lot from other cases in the enhanced procedure.261 Also, the role of 
the Execution Department, on which the Committee relies heavily, as explained 
previously, as regards pilot judgment is comparable to its role as regards other cases 
under enhanced supervision.262 An important difference of degree exists, however, 
as to the intensity of supervision and assistance, which is stepped up due to the time 
limit set in the pilot judgment. For example, the case is discussed at more DH 
meetings, the number of bilateral meetings is stepped up,263 and the Committee 
relatively frequently issues interim resolutions when supervising a pilot 
judgment.264 Additionally, the respondent state may ask for more assistance of the 
Execution Department because the time limit puts it under comparably high 
pressure.265 Pilot judgments are thus a means to prioritise for the Execution 
Department and the Committee.266 However, this does not make the way pilot 
judgments are dealt with substantially different. They are just followed more 
closely and, ideally, executed comparably swiftly in light of the time limit. 
In addition, unlike in other cases, in pilot cases it is clear beyond any doubt that 
execution requires at the minimum the implementation of certain remedial 
measures. This, too, might imply a practical difference in the Committee’s 
supervision, borne of the fact that it is clear in general terms beforehand what is 
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required of the state under Article 46(1). The Committee does therefore not have to 
establish this in cooperation with the state, something which it would do for non-
pilot cases. However, in section XI.3.3 it was established that the Court does not 
give a detailed description of the measures. It may even acknowledge that the 
Committee ‘is better placed and equipped to monitor the necessary reforms to be 
adopted’.267 Likewise, the Court has stated that it is not ‘appropriate to its function 
as an international court, to involve itself in reforms of that type in parallel with the 
[Committee]’.268 As was also explained, the Court does normally not specify how 
the measures are to be achieved. Instead, it may leave it to Committee to determine 
‘what would be the most appropriate way to tackle the problems’.269 Furthermore, it 
was noted that even if the Court gives some guidance regarding the remedy, it does 
not give orders, but makes suggestions in careful language. In sum, although the 
Court, unlike in other judgments, indicates that a general measures must be 
implemented, it leaves much room for the Committee to flesh out the measures 
together with the state. It does therefore not hold that, in practice, the Court’s 
indication of remedial measures makes a significant difference to the Committee’s 
role. This does, however, not exclude the possibility that the Committee relies on 
indications of the Court. To illustrate, in its interim resolutions, the Committee may 
expressly refer to a pilot judgment. It has, for example, encouraged and urged the 
authorities ‘to adopt without further delay the legislative reform required by the 
pilot judgment’,270 ‘to bring the legislative process to an end without any further 
delay given that the deadline set by the Court has expired’,271 and ‘to ensure that the 
draft law [...] meets the principles in the Convention [...] in order to constitute an 
appropriate response to the pilot judgment’.272 
Also unlike in most other cases, the Committee is not the only interlocutor 
supervising the execution phase, because the Court’s involvement continues into the 
execution phase. This is certainly different from most other non-follow-up cases, 
where the Court has nothing to do with the execution phase. However, this 
difference does not make the role of the Committee significantly different from that 
in non-pilot cases for two reasons.  
First, even though it is not just the Committee evaluating the effectiveness of 
general measures implemented to execute the pilot judgment, the Court’s evaluation 
is different from that of the Committee. The Committee’s task in the execution 
phase when the PJP applies is therefore not taken over by the Court and changed. 
As was outlined above, the Court’s establishes globally, not strictly, the 
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effectiveness of a measure on paper. In addition to that, the Court’s review is 
usually deferential to the Committee. To illustrate, in the only follow-up ruling to 
Suljagić, Court based its assessment of the remedy wholly on the Committee’s 
findings. Further, in a follow-up case to Hutten-Czapska, the Court did not consider 
it necessary to give a ruling on the effect of the government’s choice on the general 
adequacy of the redress, because this was a matter for the Committee. As a last 
example, the Court held in a follow-up ruling to Kurić and Others that it was for the 
Committee to evaluate the remedial measure. The Committee alone therefore 
examines the details and the practical effectiveness of a measure and is given room 
by the Court to do so. In the execution phase, the Committee takes over the ‘Court’s 
role in the conversation with the respondent government’,273 during which it ‘may 
actively think along with the national authorities and provide concrete suggestions 
for reform’.274 This is well illustrated by an inadmissibility decision in respect of 
the pilot judgments Dimitrov and Hamanov and Finger. The Court held in that 
decision that, even though it was ‘true that no long-term practice of domestic 
authorities and courts applying [the remedies had] been established’ at the time of 
the Court’s decision, filing an application for compensation and damages under the 
new legislation ‘can be regarded as effective domestic remedies’.275 The Committee 
took note of the Court’s positive evaluation and invited the state to ‘keep [it] 
informed of the development of domestic practice in this area, in line with the 
requirements of the Convention’.276 On other occasions as well it becomes clear 
that the Committee, unlike the Court, aims to determine whether the remedy is 
effective in practice. It, for example, asks for information on developments in 
domestic case law, on the impact of the measure, on the functioning of a 
compensatory remedy and on compliance with deadlines for awarding 
compensation. It may, furthermore, request comparative statistical data, statistical 
data on the amounts of compensation awarded and examples of domestic decisions 
taken in respect of the remedy.277  
Second, not only the content of the Court’s review is different from that by the 
Committee, but also the extent of its review, as the Committee’s supervision of a 
pilot judgment and connected cases continues after the Court is no longer involved. 
This reveals that the Committee stays involved independently of whether the Court 
is involved, or, put differently, that it continues to carry out its task irrespective of 
whether an important feature of the PJP, that is, the Court’s involvement in the 
execution phase, still applies. To illustrate, the only three times that the Committee 
                                                        
273  Gerards (2012b), 385.  
274  Ibid., 386.  
275  Valcheva and Abrashev v. Bulgaria (Dec.), No. 6194/11 et al., 18 June 2013, paras. 118-119.  
276  Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 7; Cases against Bulgaria’, 1179th meeting, 26 September 
2013, para. 3.  
277  Committee, ‘Decisions on Cases No. 31; Cases against Turkey’, 1164th meeting, 7 March 2013, 
para. 5; Committee, ‘Decisions on Cases No. 8; Cases against Greece’, 1193rd meeting, 6 March 
2014, paras. 2-3.  
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ended is supervisory exercise in respect of a pilot judgment during the period 
looked at in this chapter, it adopted its final resolution after the Court’s express 
closure of the procedure, as was the case with Broniowski and Suljagić,278 or about 
a year and a half after the Court had declared cases similar to the pilot case 
inadmissible for failure to exhaust the new remedy for the first time,279 as was the 
case with Rumpf.280 When formally closing the PJP in respect of Broniowski, the 
Court foresaw that the Committee would stay involved. Its own task had been 
fulfilled, but it still remained ‘for the [Committee] to supervise [...] the execution of 
the Broniowski merits and friendly-settlement judgments’.281 Further, the 
Committee continued supervising Hutten-Czapska, even though the Court had 
formally closed the PJP. Regarding that case, the Committee noted that the Court, 
when closing the procedure, observed that the remedy was only open to a certain 
category of applicants and that it was for the Committee to assess the impact of the 
general measure on the execution of the pilot judgment. It therefore continued to 
supervise.282 Also in cases where the Court has positively evaluated the 
effectiveness of the newly created domestic remedy (without formally closing the 
PJP), the Committee has stayed involved.283 The Court’s findings dating from after 
the pilot judgment do, however, not leave the Committee’s decisions completely 
unaffected. The Committee may, for example, decide to transfer a case to the 
standard procedure in reaction to the Court’s positive evaluation of a remedy. 
Further, the Committee may refer to the rulings of the Court on the effectiveness of 
a remedy in its decisions, interim and final resolutions.284  
The above discussion has demonstrated that there is a difference in degree, 
rather than an essential difference, when the Committee supervises a pilot judgment 
as compared to when it supervises a non-pilot judgment. The difference in degree is 
mainly that the Committee’s supervision is comparably intense, due to the time 
limit provided for in a pilot judgment, which makes such a judgment a vehicle for 
prioritisation. Also, the Committee may rely on findings of the Court, made when 
issuing the pilot judgment and when supervising the execution of a judgment.  
                                                        
278  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Suljagic v. Bosina and Herzegovina’, ResDH(2011)44, 8 June 
2011. 
279  These first cases were: Taron v. German (Dec.), No. 53126/07, 29 May 2012 and Garcia Cancio v. 
Germany (Dec.), No. 19488/09, 29 May 2012; Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Rumpf and 70 
Others v. Germany’, ResDH(2013)244, 5 December 2013. 
280  Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Rumpf and 70 Others v. Germany’, ResDH(2013)244, 5 
December 2013. 
281  E.G. and Others v. Poland (Dec.), No. 50425/99, 23 September 2008, para. 29.  
282  Committee, ‘Decision on Case No. 17; Case against Poland’, 1115th meeting, 8 June 2011. 
283  See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 7; Cases against Greece’, 1193rd meeting, 6 March 
2014; Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 15; Cases against Moldova’, 1136th meeting, 8 March 
2012.  
284  See, e.g.: Committee, ‘Final Resolution on Broniowski v. Poland’, ResDH(2009)89, 30 September 
2009; Committee, ‘Interim Resolution on Burdov v. Russia’, ResDH(2011)293, 2 December 2011; 
Committee, ‘Decision on Cases No. 7; Cases against Greece’, 1193rd meeting, 6 March 2014.  
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2  APPLYING THE INDICATORS OF DIALOGUE  
2.1  Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
This indicator helps determine which interlocutors can become involved through 
which procedures in the PJP. Further, the indicator facilitates establishing what they 
can achieve by way of the procedure and with which interlocutors they can 
communicate.  
As was the case in chapter VII, the discussion here concerns opportunities for 
involvement which the interlocutors only have in the course of the PJP. Therefore, 
opportunities existing in non-pilot and pilot procedures alike are not discussed, 
meaning that opportunities for involvement of the Commissioner and the Assembly 
are left aside.  
2.1.1 The Court  
Chapter VII enumerated five opportunities for involvement of the Court. These 
opportunities are examined in the light of the functioning of the PJP in practice. 
Further, one new opportunity for involvement is introduced here. 
 The first five opportunities for involvement arise when the Court adjudicates a 
pilot case. The first opportunity identified in chapter VII is the Court’s decision to 
apply the PJP. Clearly, it makes this decision in practice, as it applied the procedure 
22 times in ten years in cases of any subject matter. Second, the Court must identify 
the problem which is to be addressed by the PJP. It usually makes a clear indication 
to this effect in the operative provision of the judgment. In this way, the Court 
signals its concern about a problem to the respondent state, as was also noted in 
chapter VII. The new opportunity for involvement is the Court’s practice to 
sometimes comment on relevant ongoing domestic reform. Further, the Court 
indicates, according to chapter VII, remedial measures and possibly a deadline in its 
pilot judgment. In practice, the Court makes orders to that effect in the operative 
provisions of each judgment. These orders remain general and do not stipulate how 
the result is to be achieved and become more precise when the Court refers to or 
outlines the standards which must be taken into consideration and when it gives 
guidance to the respondent state. The Court always imposes a deadline in practice. 
As a fifth opportunity for involvement, the Court can decide to (not) adjourn 
comparable applications. It decided to adjourn all cases eight times and took a 
mixed approach in the same number of cases. 
The last opportunity for involvement – to evaluate the implemented remedial 
measures – emerges after the adoption of a pilot judgment. In part 2, it was noted 
that the Court expects to become involved both by evaluating the implemented 
remedial measures (or a lack thereof) and by taking action if no such measures are 
implemented. The description in this chapter has clarified that roughly three 
elements determine in what form the Court becomes involved in execution matters. 
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The first element is the content of a judgment. When the question of just 
satisfaction is reserved, the possibility opens up for the Registry to assist in 
reaching a friendly settlement, which may include negotiations regarding remedial 
general measures. Subsequently, the Court approves the friendly settlement in a 
strike-out decision or it may have to rule on a unilateral declaration or on the 
question of just satisfaction if no settlement is reached. Second, the respondent 
state’s response to the pilot judgment determines to some extent what the Court can 
do. In case of a failure to implement the required remedial measures, the Court 
starts examining previously adjourned applications at some point. Further, if the 
state requests an extension of the time limit, the Court needs to decide thereupon. 
Until Kurić and Others, the Court seemed to be rather willing to grant requests to 
that effect and to inform the Committee accordingly. The Court, or more precisely 
the Registry, may also engage in consultations about the ordered measures with the 
respondent state if the state is open to that, in conjunction with the Execution 
Department. Third, the form of the Court’s involvement seems to depend on its own 
preferences. The Court decided to formally close the PJP in respect of some (early) 
pilot judgments. In other PJP’s, it took no such decision, although it did approve the 
remedy created at some point and started declaring comparable applications 
inadmissible for that reason.  
Except in Kurić and Others, the Court does generally not shy away from 
reviewing the remedial measures produced to execute the pilot judgment. This 
applies to cases where the Court concludes that no or no sufficiently effective 
remedy has been created, but becomes even more clear when the Court analyses a 
remedy and concludes that it is an effective domestic remedy of which applicants 
should avail themselves under penalty of inadmissibility. The Court’s review is, 
however, limited, because it does normally not demand detailed or elaborate plans 
which find their basis in legislation and in respect of which consistent and extensive 
practice has already developed. A remedy can be approved, for example, based on 
promises, commitments and undertakings of the respondent state. It therefore 
sometimes evaluates the remedy positively even when no or little practice exists or 
when the results of the remedy will only be seen in the long term. The limitedness 
of the Court’s review also derives from the Court’s refusal to examine separate 
provisions of a new law in abstracto if there is no immediate reason for doing so. 
Exceptionally, however, the Court’s review is more elaborate as was shown.  
In sum, the Court uses each opportunity for involvement enumerated in chapter 
VII. In addition to that, it sometimes comments on ongoing reform in the 
respondent state, thus creating an additional opportunity for involvement in 
practice.  
2.1.2 The Respondent State  
It is now examined whether the four opportunities for involvement of the 
respondent state specified in chapter VII are used in practice.  
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The respondent states employ the opportunity to request the Court to initiate the 
PJP seldom; the Court took the initiative for the PJP in the majority of pilot cases. 
They do, however, always use their right to give their views on the suitability of 
processing an application in accordance with the PJP, which resulted in clear 
consent seven times. These views are, however, not of overriding importance, as the 
Court has applied the procedure in spite of (initial) opposition. Further, the 
respondent state had the opportunity in respect of sixteen PJP’s to take domestic 
measures regarding similar cases, because their examination was adjourned by the 
Court, and to subsequently request the Court to strike these applications out of its 
list. States usually employ, albeit not always completely successfully, this 
opportunity to solve these cases domestically and to thus prevent adverse 
Strasbourg judgments. The last opportunity for involvement outlined in chapter VII 
was that the respondent state can reach a friendly settlement regarding the question 
of Article 41 with the applicant and inform the Court by way of this document of 
the remedial measures which it will implement. In practice, this opportunity does 
not arise often as the Court has only reserved that question in whole or in part in 
five pilot judgments. Moreover, in the context of only two of these judgments, a 
friendly settlement including remedial measures eventually gained the Court’s 
approval.285  
In addition to these four opportunities for involvement, which were also 
described in chapter VII, the Court granted a request for an extension of the time 
limit set in the judgment for the implementation of the remedial measures several 
times. This possibility is, however, not boundless, as the follow-up judgment in the 
case of Kurić and Others and other refusals to extend the time limit (more than 
once) have demonstrated.  
As a general note, it was added in chapter VII that the respondent state has little 
control over whether it can become involved and over whether its involvement has 
any influence. This also holds in practice.  
2.1.3 The Committee  
Chapter VII concluded that the Committee’s involvement in supervising the 
execution of a pilot judgment does not differ significantly from when it supervises 
non-pilot judgments. It can now be established whether this conclusion holds in 
practice. This is indeed the case. The conclusion, however, holds less firmly in 
practice than in chapter VII, because two differences of degree exist. First, the 
intensity of supervision and assistance of the Committee and the Execution 
Department is stepped up in the context of the PJP. Second, the Court’s 
                                                        
285  As was explained above, this happened in the context of the PJP of Broniowski and Hutten-
Czapska; In the PJP of Olaru and Others, only two applicants reached friendly settlements, which 
did not concern general measures. Further, after the Court issued the pilot judgment Kurić and 
Others, no friendly settlement was reached and at the time of writing it was not yet known whether 
a pilot judgment would be reached in the case of M.C and Others.  
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involvement in the execution phase makes a difference, as it, for example, means 
that the Committee can rely on findings of the Court regarding execution measures.  
2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
This indicator inquires into the PJP in order to establish whether it makes possible 
and stimulates the sharing of responsibilities as envisaged by the Convention, that 
is, in conformity with the subsidiarity principle, and stimulates sharing 
responsibilities as such.  
Chapter VII made some assumptions regarding the sharing of responsibilities in 
the PJP. This section establishes whether the assumptions can be solidified or 
perhaps nuanced based on the functioning of the procedure in practice.  
2.2.1 Court – Respondent State  
Chapter VII observed that, by ordering remedial measures and by being involved in 
supervising the implementation of these measures, the Court’s involvement in the 
PJP is detrimental to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity the subsidiarity 
principle. The functioning of the PJP in practice on the one hand confirms this 
image, because the Court orders measures and supervises their execution. What is 
more, the Court always sets a time limit, thus making the obligation which it 
imposes more stringent. The Court’s propensity to comment on ongoing reform 
when relevant also runs counter to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with 
the Convention. Nevertheless, practice also nuances this image, considering that the 
Court is usually not very specific in the orders or how they are to be implemented. 
Moreover, its review is limited in different regards. The Court, for example, does 
not require detailed plans. Therefore, although the Court imposes demands on the 
states parties and verifies whether they are abided by, the demands are not very 
specific and nor is the Court’s review highly intrusive.  
Additionally, Chapter VII noted that the PJP at the same time potentially 
enhances sharing responsibilities in conformity with the Convention, provided it 
leads the respondent state to resume fulfilling its primary responsibility. This, in 
turn, permits the Court to stick to its subsidiarity task. Such a result would be 
particularly visible, it was remarked, when the Court adjourns adjudicating 
comparable applications. To verify whether the foregoing holds in practice is to 
inquire into the successes of the PJP; only if the procedure moves the respondent 
state to implement the required remedial measures effectively, can it achieve the 
results foreseen in chapter VII. It seems that the procedure enhances sharing 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention in practice, because it has been 
fairly successful. The Court has closed three PJP’s officially and it has declared 
numerous applications inadmissible for a failure to exhaust the remedy created to 
execute the pilot judgment, albeit sometimes only after a delay in the sense that the 
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deadline in the pilot judgment was not met (and extended). Furthermore, the Court 
has resumed adjudicating previously adjourned applications only twice so far.286 
Additionally, the Court has stimulated sharing responsibilities in conformity with 
the Convention by adjourning (in part) the examination of comparable applications 
in 18 out of the 22 pilot judgments. In one such case, the Court noted that ‘[o]nce 
[...] a domestic compensatory remedy has been introduced, it becomes particularly 
important for such complaints to be considered in the first place [...] by the national 
authorities, which are better placed and equipped to establish the relevant facts and 
to calculate monetary compensation’.287 It added that it ‘attaches particular 
importance to the fact that’ the remedy was introduced to execute the pilot 
judgment and also that ‘its task, as defined by Article 19 [...], would neither be best 
achieved by taking such cases to judgment in the place of domestic courts, nor by 
considering them in parallel with the domestic proceedings’.288 In this way, the 
Court clearly points out how responsibilities should be shared in the Convention 
system and facilitates sharing responsibilities accordingly. 
As stated in chapter VII, the PJP potentially enhances sharing responsibilities as 
such because the Court assists the states in fulfilling their responsibility under 
Article 46 when identifying the problem causing the need for the application of the 
PJP and when proposing remedial measures. Some states probably see it this way as 
they have exceptionally requested the Court to apply the PJP or welcomed 
recommendations of the Court on how to solve the problem. It is, however, 
questionable whether the identification of the problem indeed helps the state, 
considering that the Court’s identification of the problem is not usually coupled 
with an analysis of the problem and its causes. Further, the generality of the Court’s 
language when indicating remedial measures and its refusal to outline how these 
measures need to be implemented may also mean that the indication is not of any 
great help. Nevertheless, when the Court outlines minimum standards for the 
measures and when it gives (more or less specific) guidance regarding measures, it 
is of assistance.  
The conclusion regarding the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and 
the states parties in the context of the PJP must be that the procedure is in one sense 
conducive and in another sense contrary to the sharing of responsibilities in 
conformity with the principle of subsidiarity. The PJP also enhances the sharing of 
responsibilities as such, but limitedly. 
2.2.2 Court – Committee  
Chapter VII found that the Court’s involvement in the PJP disregards the task 
division between the Committee and itself as envisaged by the Convention, because 
the Court becomes involved in execution matters. The description in this chapter 
                                                        
286  See also: Committee (2015), 7.  
287  Taron v. German (Dec.), No. 53126/07, 29 May 2012, para. 43.  
288  Idem.  
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confirms this finding, as the Court imposes remedial measures and supervises them. 
Moreover, the Court becomes engaged in the execution phase by extending time 
limits set in its pilot judgments. As the Court remarked in Kurić and Others, this is a 
matter which may have to be taken up with the Committee acting under Article 
46(2). Confirmation of the finding in chapter VII can also be found in the Court’s 
practice to comment on the implementation of ongoing reform measures if these 
measures are taken to execute a previous judgment which is still under the 
Committee’s supervision.  
The image just presented must, however, be nuanced. The nuance stems 
generally from the Court’s disposition to pay due regard to the position of the 
Committee and to leave room for the Committee’s involvement. This is apparent 
from, for example, the influence which the Court permits the Committee to have on 
the process of selecting a case for the PJP and the Court’s consideration of the 
Committee’s position when verifying whether a structural or systemic problem 
exists. Further, when the Court orders remedial measures, deference exists in 
different regards, which leaves the Committee room flesh out the measures together 
with the respondent state. Also when reviewing the measures, the Court is normally 
deferential to the Committee, sometimes even to the extent that it bases its review 
wholly on that of the Committee. Moreover, the standards of the Court’s evaluation 
are different from those of the Committee, as well as the extent of its assessment. 
Considering the foregoing, it can perhaps even be concluded – as the Court has 
noted itself – that ‘the application of the [PJP] does not run counter to the division 
of functions between the Convention institutions’,289 or at least not to a great extent, 
and that the PJP is ‘pursued with due respect for the Convention organs’ respective 
functions’.290 At least the drafters of the Interlaken, Izmir, Brighton and Brussels 
Declarations seem to agree with this conclusion as they expressed support in 
different ways for the PJP and called upon the Committee to ensure that the states 
parties quickly and effectively implement pilot judgments.291 If the Court would not 
be respecting the Committee’s functions, it would be unlikely that such support 
would be expressed. The Committee itself also seems to welcome the PJP, as a 
major aim of the reform of the Committee’s task under Article 46(2) has been ‘to 
ensure that [its] attention can concentrate on those cases which really deserve 
special [...] attention’ – notably [...] pilot judgments’.292 These reforms resulted in 
                                                        
289  Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009, para. 82.  
290  Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 181; Olaru and Others v. 
Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009, para. 50.  
291  HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Interlaken Declaration’, 19 February 2010, Action Plan para. 7; 
HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Izmir Declaration’, 27 April 2011, Follow-up Plan para. E(5); 
HLC on the Future of the ECtHR, ‘Brighton Declaration’, 20 April 2012, paras. 20(c), 27; HLC on 
the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan para. 
A(2)(a). 
292  Committee (2011), 7; See also: Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2010)28 revised, 24 
June 2010, para. 3.  
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the twin-track system for supervision where pilot judgments, amongst other 
judgments, receive enhanced supervision.293  
Another conclusion in chapter VII was that the PJP potentially contributes to the 
sharing of responsibilities as such and thus relieves the task of the Committee, 
because the Court identifies the problem causing the need for the implementation of 
remedial measures. Although the Court indeed sets this step, the added value 
thereof to the Committee is probably limited, because its orders are not very 
specific. Another way in which the Court may relieve the task of the Committee is 
by ordering binding remedial measures, which it does in practice. The Court at least 
points out that its involvement serves to ‘[assist] the [Committee] in its role of 
ensuring that each judgment of the Court is properly executed’.294 The Committee 
seems to agree with the Court, as it wrote that ‘[s]ince a number of years the Court 
has thus more and more frequently started to assist the execution process in a 
number of ways’.295 One such way is to apply the PJP ‘to support more complex 
execution processes generating important risks of repetitive cases in order to 
emphasise the obligation to rapidly set up effective domestic remedies and to find 
solutions for already pending cases’.296 Also according to the chairs of the 
Committee’s meetings, ‘the efficient interaction between the [Committee] and the 
Court, in particular in the context of pilot judgments, have helped ensure that 
significant numbers of repetitive applications have been resolved by member 
states’.297 The same chairs welcome [t]his improved interaction between the Court 
and the [Committee]’ and encourage ‘further initiatives to ensure all possible 
synergies between the two Convention organs’.298 
The PJP, in sum, at first sight seems to be contrary to how the Convention 
envisages that responsibilities are divided between the Court and the Committee. 
The Court’s involvement in the procedure in practice however nuances this image, 
possibly even to the extent that the PJP does not run contrary to the Convention in 
this regard. Additionally, the procedure advances the sharing of responsibilities as 
such between the two aforementioned interlocutors.  
2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding 
Indicator 3 examines the PJP to establish whether it contributes to mutual 
understanding between interlocutors functioning on the European and the domestic 
                                                        
293  Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf/DH(2010)45 final, 7 December 2010, para. I(10).  
294  ECtHR, ‘The [PJP]; Information Note Issued by the Registrar’, (<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf >), para. 4; See also: Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 
42525/07, 10 January 2012, para. 190.  
295  Committee (2012) 21 (emphasis added).  
296  Idem.  
297  Ibid., 10.  
298  Committee (2011), 8; See also: Committee, ‘Information Document’, CM/Inf(2010)28 revised, 24 
June 2010, para. 21; Director General of the CoE Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of 
Law in: Committee (2011), 13-14.  
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level. In the context of the PJP, this mostly concerns the national authorities’ 
understanding of the required remedial measures. It also concerns the Committee’s 
understanding of domestic problems relating to internal and external tension. 
Additionally and considering the Court’s involvement, it is also relevant whether 
the PJP enhances this interlocutor’s understanding of these problems.  
Chapter VII assumed that the PJP can enhance understanding by both the Court 
and the Committee of the domestic problem warranting the application of the PJP, 
because these interlocutors must acquire such understanding if they are to 
contribute to solving the problem. The findings in this chapter support that 
assumption and this becomes particularly clear when the Court identifies the said 
problem and gives guidance as to the required remedial measures. Other support 
can be found in the in-depth consultations which sometimes take place between the 
Court (represented by the Registry), the Committee (represented by the Execution 
Department) and the state to find a solution for a problem. The Court’s practice to 
not elaborately analyse the domestic problem and its causes in the pilot judgment 
undermine the findings just outlined, although not completely, because it means that 
the Court does not present its knowledge fully or does not gain a deep 
understanding of the problem.  
Chapter VII also proposed that the PJP potentially enhances the understanding 
by the respondent state of the Convention system, because the application of the 
procedure is a clear signal that the state must resume its primary responsibility, thus 
reminding it how the Convention system is supposed to function. The findings in 
this chapter corroborate the proposal. The signal to the respondent state is indeed 
clear, because the problem warranting the application of the PJP is usually 
identified in the operative provisions, as well as the remedial measures which are to 
be implemented. The understanding increases in particular if the Court, as it 
sometimes does, explains with which minimum standards the measures have to 
comply or gives guidance regarding the measures. Comments of the Court on 
already ongoing reform have this effect as well and this also holds for the Court’s 
choice to continue processing comparable applications, serving as it does to 
regularly remind the state of its Convention obligations. In the phase of execution, 
the state’s understanding of appropriate execution measures also increases by way 
of the follow-up judgments issued by the Court in which it verifies – albeit not 
always equally strictly – whether the execution measures suffice in the light of the 
Convention. The understanding of the respondent state of its obligations under 
Article 46(1) therefore increases more than in non-pilot cases because the Court 
does not usually become involved in the execution phase of the latter category of 
cases, but only the Committee. The effect of follow-up cases on the understanding 
of the respondent state is, however, minimal if the Court relies wholly on the 
Committee’s findings as it did in a follow-up case to Suljagić, or when it refuses to 
scrutinise execution measures, as it did in a follow-up case to Kurić and Others. 
Also when the Court resumes the examination of previously adjourned applications, 
the respondent state’s understanding increases, as the resumption is a clear reminder 
as to how the Convention system is not supposed to function.  
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The previously mentioned follow-up cases to Kurić and Others is an exception 
to the foregoing in the sense that it potentially causes confusion with the states 
because the Court interpreted its role in the PJP differently from how it used to 
interpret its role. Unlike in other rulings following up to a pilot judgment, the Court 
neither verified whether the proposed remedial measures were appropriate, nor 
extended the deadline for the implementation of these measures. Thus, the Court 
probably caused confusion as to what respondent states can expect from it in the 
execution phase of a pilot judgment and as to whether its approach in Kurić and 
Others was a one-time difference or a permanent shift.  
2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
Indicator 4 helps establish whether the PJP contributes to balanced decision-making 
by the Committee in the sense that it pays due regard to the difficulties at the root of 
internal tension. Due to the Court’s involvement, it must also be verified whether 
balanced decision-making by this interlocutor is stimulated.  
Chapter VII explained that pilot (follow-up) rulings can be perceived as 
unbalanced inter alia because of the imposition of binding orders, possibly 
accompanied by a deadline, and the review by the Court of the execution measures 
thereafter. In practice, the Court indeed imposes these orders with a deadline and 
reviews the execution measures. The PJP can therefore be characterised as 
unbalanced in practice as well. However, the procedure is exceptionally applied on 
the request of the respondent state or with the sanctioning of that state when it 
expresses its views on the suitability of a case for the PJP. If these circumstances 
apply, the PJP cannot be characterised as unbalanced from the perspective of the 
state. Moreover, various counterbalancing factors exist mitigating the 
unbalancedness. One such factor is that the Court can demonstrate its understanding 
of the domestic problem and listens to the respondent state’s view on the suitability 
of a case for treatment under the PJP. In practice, the Court indeed does this. 
However, because the procedure is often applied against the will of the respondent 
state, this factor is insignificant in the majority of cases. A weightier 
counterbalancing factor is the finding that the Court’s review of the execution 
measures is oftentimes limited and deferential to the Committee, thus making its 
review less intense than it could be potentially and thereby more balanced. Another 
counterbalancing factor is that the measures imposed by the Court are generally 
rather unspecific. A final factor is the Court’s practice to adjourn dealing with all 
repetitive applications or part thereof, which it did in the majority of PJP’s. This 
makes this procedure more balanced in the eyes of the respondent state, because it 
is then possible for the state to handle comparable applications itself, provided it 
implements the ordered remedial measures successfully. It was added in chapter VII 
that the extent to which the procedure is unbalanced can be justified because the 
application of the procedure is required only because the states have failed to fulfil 
their primary responsibility. This also applies in practice. 
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2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Indicator 5 serves to establish whether and, if so, how the PJP stimulates and makes 
it possible for the interlocutors to give reasons for their decisions. This is 
particularly important when the decision of one interlocutor negatively affects 
another. Chapter VII underscored the importance of reason-giving by the Court 
when deciding to apply the PJP due to the major implications of the procedure’s 
application for the respondent state. It is therefore established whether reason-
giving by the Court is stimulated.  
Chapter VII established that internal reason-giving is encouraged because 
Article 45 requires the Court to reason its judgments, meaning the Court must 
reason its decision to apply the PJP, identify a problem and order remedial 
measures. In practice, the Court indeed reasons its pilot judgments, although its 
reasoning is limited in three regards. As was already noted, the Court does normally 
not analyse the problem causing the need for the application of the PJP in any 
extensive manner. Further, even though the Court always alludes to the two 
conditions for the application of the PJP, it does usually not use many words, other 
than those required to mention the conditions, to reason its decision to apply the 
PJP. It does therefore not elaborately motivate its decision to apply the procedure to 
a certain case based on the two conditions. Finally, it motivates neither the 
imposition of a time limit, nor the duration of that time limit, in spite of a provision 
in the Rules of Court explaining which factors the Court should bear in mind when 
setting the time limit.  
More generally, it has been proposed by some that the Court’s reasoning does 
not always make it possible to establish why the procedure is applied ‘to some 
systemic situations, and not others’299 and nor is it always clear why one particular 
application, rather than another, is selected for treatment under the PJP from a 
usually large pool of applications, as the Court does not motivate its selection. 
When this means that the Court does not always select the most representative case, 
the risk arises, according to the Assembly, that the PJP is conducted ‘in respect of 
certain complex systemic problems on the basis of a single case which may not 
reveal the different aspects of the systemic problem involved’.300  
The Court also reasons follow-up decision approving a friendly settlement, even 
rather elaborately. Other follow-up cases are reasoned in the same manner. The 
Court, for example justifies its decision to declare comparable applications 
inadmissible or to resume examining previously adjourned applications.  
                                                        
299  Leach et al. (2010), 173; See, e.g.: Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) (GC), No. 36813/97, 29 March 2006, 
paras. 229-240. 
300  Assembly, ‘The Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Res(2006)1516, 2 October 2006, 
para. 21; See also: Leach et al. (2010), 34.  
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2.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response 
Indicator 6 analyses whether one interlocutor can respond to a decision made or a 
procedural step set by another. It is particularly relevant to analyse the PJP from this 
perspective, because the Court imposes binding remedial measures in its pilot 
judgments, thereby seemingly curtailing the room for a response of the respondent 
state. Further, the indicator poses the question whether internal room for a response 
exists, that is, the possibility to respond to decisions taken within the confines of the 
PJP.  
2.6.1 The Court  
Chapter VII qualified the application of the PJP as the Court’s response to a 
domestic problem. In practice, this is indeed the case, as the Court always identifies 
that problem in its pilot judgments and because the procedure is normally applied 
on the Court’s initiative. Its response takes, more precisely, the form of the 
imposition of remedial measures, which the Court can make more specific in 
different ways and which are always accompanied by a deadline. If the Court does 
not adjourn the examination of all comparable applications, it continues to respond 
to the problem also after the adoption of the pilot judgment by finding violations 
caused by the problem identified in the pilot judgment. The adoption of a pilot 
judgment can also be seen as a reaction to a failure to execute previous judgments 
in practice, as was suggested in chapter VII. This characterisation applies in 
practice when the Court adopts a pilot judgment after it has adopted several 
judgments concerning the same problem already, which happens regularly and is 
pointed out by the Court.  
Chapter VII added that the PJP gives the Court the possibility to react to 
execution measures taken in the course of the procedure. Practice validates this 
proposition. The Court indeed always adopts a follow-up judgment at some point, 
in which it responds to the execution measures taken or a lack thereof. However, as 
was remarked under indicator 1, its review is not strict but rather limited and, 
whenever possible, aligned with that of the Committee. The form of the Court’s 
reply depends on its assessment of the execution measures. If the Court approves of 
these measures, it responds by declaring similar applications inadmissible for a 
failure of the applicants to use these measures. In spite of its initial approval, the 
Court often keeps the door ajar for another response by adding that its positions 
may be subject to review in the future depending on, for example, the domestic 
courts’ capacity to establish consistent case law. This allows it to respond to 
developments bringing to light that the execution measures do not function well in 
practice or have a more limited scope than expected. If the Court concludes that no 
remedial measures have been implemented, that they are insufficient or that they do 
not function properly in practice, it reacts by continuing to examine, when relevant, 
previously adjourned applications. Prior to that reaction, it sometimes replies to the 
difficulties experienced by the respondent state in implementing the required 
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measures by granting a request for the extension of a time limit or by entering in 
consultations with the respondent state. The Court also once responded to the 
incomplete execution of a judgment (Burdov (no. 2)) by inter alia adopting a 
follow-up pilot judgment (Gerasimov and Others). In the latter judgment, it 
clarified the required scope of the remedial measures. Additionally and as was not 
submitted in chapter VII, the Court sometimes also uses the pilot judgment to 
comment on measures which the respondent state is already taking to solve the 
problem identified. 
2.6.2 The Respondent State  
On paper, the respondent state has some internal room for a response to the decision 
to apply the PJP by answering the Court’s question about the suitability of a case 
for treatment under the PJP. This possibility exists in practice as well, although, as 
was also noted in chapter VII, the Court does not need to follow the state’s opinion 
and does not do so in practice. More important than the state’s view beforehand 
seems to be the likelihood of a cooperative stance afterwards. Internal room for a 
response therefore exists, but is not of great relevance.  
Chapter VII noted further that respondent state has generally less external room 
for a response if the PJP is applied than outside the context of that procedure for 
three reasons. The question is now whether these reasons also in apply in practice. 
The first reason was that general measures are imposed by the Court, possibly with 
a time limit. This reason applies in practice as the Court always orders measures 
and a time limit. Nevertheless, the extent to which this decreases the state’s room 
for a response should not be overestimated. For one thing, the Court has often 
extended the deadline on the request of the respondent state. Besides that, the Court 
does not always analyse the problem necessitating the PJP extensively, thus 
opening up room for interpretation as to the scope of the required remedy. 
Moreover, the Court does not usually describe the remedial measures and how they 
are to be achieved in much detail, although this does not mean that the respondent 
state is left unfettered discretion. The second reason provided in chapter VII why 
room for a response is curtailed in the context of the PJP was that the Committee 
places pilot judgments under enhanced, and therefore comparably close, 
supervision. However, because the majority of cases is supervised under the 
enhanced procedure in practice, room for a response is not really curtailed more 
than outside the context of the PJP. Apart from that, pilot judgments are in practice 
not entirely supervised under the enhanced procedure. The third reason was that 
both the Committee and the Court engage in supervision. As was already noted, the 
Court indeed supervises pilot judgments alongside the Committee, meaning that the 
execution of a pilot judgment is supervised comparable intensely and room for a 
response therefore likely decreases. However, because the Court’s supervision is 
not very detailed and, more importantly, often deferential to the Committee, this 
reason should not be overestimated either. In conclusion, in practice, like on paper, 
the respondent state has, on the whole, less external room for a response in the 
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course of a PJP than otherwise. However, this difference is less in practice than was 
expected in part 2.  
2.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict  
This indicator aims to establish whether the PJP potentially helps to prevent, 
mitigate or end the escalation of internal tension into conflict or, on the contrary, 
stirs conflict between the respondent state and the Court/Committee. The 
examination is partially based on the observations regarding the other indicators.  
Chapter VII concluded that the PJP has more potential to cause conflict than to 
prevent, mitigate or end it. This potential derives from the Court’s order of binding 
remedial measures with a deadline and its review of the implementation of these 
measures, especially if the respondent state disagrees with the orders. It additionally 
derives from the finding that the procedure is detrimental to the sharing of 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention. More positive findings for the 
purposes of indicator 7, including that the procedure contributes to the sharing of 
responsibilities in some ways and to mutual understanding, did not offset this 
potential, although they mitigated it.   
In practice, however, it seems to be the case that the potential to cause conflict is 
indeed offset in the majority of cases, simply because the procedure has been fairly 
successful and can only be successful if no conflict arises, at least not to the extent 
that the respondent state refuses to abide by a judgment. Conflict between the Court 
and the respondent state erupted only following Greens and M.T. Other factors 
connected to the procedure – apart from the mitigating factors identified in chapter 
VII – also explain the lack of conflict. These factors relate to the functioning of the 
procedure in practice and encompass the Court’s generally modest stance, both 
regarding describing the measures which must be taken and regarding reviewing 
their implementation. Further, when deciding to (not) apply the procedure, the 
Court attaches much importance to whether a pilot judgment likely meets with a 
cooperative stance of the respondent state in carrying out the remedies ordered. 
Although this is not a sine qua non of the procedure’s application, if it prevents the 
Court from applying the procedure when it is clear beforehand that the ordered 
measures will not be executed satisfactorily, conflict is prevented. Further, the 
Court’s flexibility is a relevant factor, since it does not start examining previously 
adjourned applications immediately when it transpires that the respondent state did 
not meet the time limit, but is more accommodating. Another factor may be the 
subject matter of the pilot applications. The applications mostly concern prison 
conditions, non-enforcement of domestic decisions, excessive length of proceedings 
and structural property problems. Even though solving these issues is a demanding 
exercise and disagreement may arise as to how they are best solved, the PJP’s 
application is not very controversial and the states do not usually deny that an issue, 
once identified, is problematic and should be solved. This is probably reinforced by 
the magnitude of the issues that makes such denials seem unfounded. All of the 
factors just enumerated help explain why the PJP hardly causes outright conflict, 
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except for in one case, in spite of the fact that on paper, some potential for conflict 
was identified.  
3 CONCLUSION: THE DIALOGICNESS OF THE PILOT-JUDGMENT 
PROCEDURE  
This conclusion results in a qualification of the dialogicness of the PJP as being 
limitedly, somewhat or clearly dialogic in practice. It can be recalled from chapter 
IV that the findings under indicators 2 and 7 are relatively important to making 
dialogue of added value to Convention dialogue. When drawing conclusions, 
comparably much importance is therefore attached to these findings.  
Indicator 1 helped demonstrate that the PJP clearly offers various possibilities 
for involvement to the Court and the respondent state, which they only have in pilot 
cases. This means inter alia that the Court plays a role in supervising the execution 
of the pilot judgments. The respondent state, although it becomes involved in 
different ways, is not a very influential player. The Committee’s role is that of 
Convention-appointed supervisor of the execution phase and its involvement differs 
in degree from its involvement in non-pilot cases. As for the indicators carrying 
most weight, indicators 2 and 7, the PJP does not contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities or to handling conflict. However, the effects are not highly 
problematic in the light of these two indicators. The procedure does have positive 
effects on mutual understanding and reason-giving. Further, in respect of indicator 
6, only the Court, not the state, clearly has room for a response. These findings 
taken together lead to the conclusion that the PJP is somewhat dialogic in practice. 
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CHAPTER XII 
CONCLUSIONS: THE DIALOGICNESS 
OF CONVENTION-RELATED PROCEDURES 
 
 
 
Chapter XII is the last and concluding chapter of part 3 which aimed to establish the 
dialogicness in practice of Convention-related procedures with some or clear 
dialogic potential on paper. The chapter brings together the findings made with the 
help of the seven indicators of dialogue in chapters IX-XI as regards the (pre-
)merits phase, the execution phase and the PJP. It thus answers one of the questions 
posed in chapter IV, namely whether procedures with dialogic potential on paper 
allow dialogue between the interlocutors to develop in practice. In the last section, 
an overview is presented of the level of dialogicness of the procedures.  
1 INDICATOR 1: PROCEDURAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR INVOLVEMENT OF 
ALL INTERLOCUTORS  
Based on the findings of the chapters on the practice of various Convention-related 
procedures, it can be concluded, first of all, that these procedures in practice allow 
each interlocutor but the Assembly to become involved. Although it was found in 
chapter VI that there are some opportunities for involvement on paper of the 
Assembly, they have not materialised in practice: the Assembly has not yet 
intervened in writing or at hearing and nor can it play a role effectively through 
Assembly questions/recommendations.  
In practice, the states become involved most often as a respondent state, but also 
sometimes without being a party to a case, for example through third-party 
interventions. Respondent states use most of the various procedural opportunities 
for involvement which were also described in part 2. Additionally, it turned out in 
part 3 that the respondent state can take part through informal exchanges with the 
Court both prior to and after the communication of a case and can request an 
extension of the deadline set in a pilot judgment. On a more negative note, their 
involvement is rather limited in the course of a routine friendly settlement; they 
cannot request successfully a hearing, do not request debates for DH meetings and 
have not yet become involved through infringement proceedings. Further, 
respondent states do not always use the possibility to submit observations fully in 
response to the communication of a case, nor do they always use the procedural step 
of action plans/reports to the fullest. Non-respondent states play a role through 
hearings and third-party interventions in the (pre-)merits phase and by commenting 
on and asking questions about action plans/reports in the execution phase. As for 
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the PJP, a state can take part on paper and in practice in four ways; additionally, it 
has turned out that a state may request an extension of the time limit set in the pilot 
judgment in practice. Of the different ways available, only the opportunity to deal 
with adjourned applications domestically is of any importance. This possibility 
arose (in part) in sixteen judgments. The other opportunities were of less 
significance: the Court has been requested seldom to initiate the PJP, the respondent 
state’s views on the suitability of an application for the PJP are not of overriding 
importance and friendly settlements including remedial measures have only been 
concluded twice so far.  
The Court plays its most important role in the (pre-)merits phase and in the PJP. 
Its involvement is not only formal, however, as established in part 2, but it may also 
be informal. Such involvement may result from exchanges with the respondent state 
before and after the communication of a case. Further, the Court has the possibility 
to recommunicate a case. Other opportunities, which have presented themselves in 
practice, are encouraging states to adopt unilateral declarations in the course of the 
PJP, asking states for their reaction to a judgment of principle, asking questions in 
writing prior to a hearing, giving Article 46-indications and commenting on 
ongoing domestic reform in the course of the PJP. On the other hand, it also has 
turned out that the Court does not always use each procedural possibility for 
involvement described in part 2. It does not always pose questions to the parties 
when communicating a case,1 hardly ever restores cases which were struck out and 
virtually never invites states to intervene. Other opportunities for the Court’s 
involvement have not yet been used at all: infringement proceedings and requests 
for interpretation. In addition to the Court, the Registry plays an important role in 
friendly settlements proceedings, in particular when sending ready-made 
settlements and developing settlement strategies with a state. Importantly, although 
the Court has different opportunities for involvement in the execution phase 
(multilateral meetings, Article 46-indications and follow-up cases), these 
opportunities are only used and only arise on an exceptional basis. Article 46-
indications permit the Court to comment on future execution measures and follow-
up cases on whether already implemented measures suffice. The PJP gives the 
Court the possibility to comment on already implemented and desirable execution 
measures. More specifically, the Court has six opportunities for involvement when 
adjudicating a pilot judgment and it evaluates the execution of a pilot judgment.  
The Committee does not play a role in the (pre-)merits phase. Its lack of 
involvement is the logical consequence, as was also noted in part 2, of its task 
description in Article 46(2). The Committee does become involved in the execution 
phase, through DH and multilateral meetings and discussing and deciding on 
decisions and interim resolutions, and in the PJP. Opportunities for involvement 
which do not exist in practice are again infringement proceedings and requests for 
interpretation. The involvement of the Committee is sparse now that DH meetings 
                                                        
1  When a case can be solved based on well-established case law.  
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take place only four times a year, multilateral meetings are rare and only about  100 
decisions and 8 interim resolutions are adopted per year. If the Committee 
participates, it leans heavily on the Execution Department, as the latter proposes 
most interim resolutions and decisions and drafts them all. Furthermore, the 
Execution Department selects cases for discussion at the DH meetings. Another 
actor therefore determines the content of the Committee’s involvement to a large 
extent. Further, the Committee has left the one-to-one meetings with the states on 
the basis of action plans/reports in the form of bilateral meetings to the Execution 
Department; it only engages in collective supervision. In sum, the Committee’s 
involvement can be characterised as sparse, reliant on the Execution Department 
and collective. The Committee’s involvement in the PJP, or of the Execution 
Department for that matter, is only different in degree from when it supervises non-
pilot judgments.  
The Commissioner becomes involved in the pre-merits phase through hearings 
and third-party interventions, albeit rarely. Besides that, (s)he becomes involved in 
execution matters through country visits/reports. This possibility for involvement, 
however, falls outside the formal boundaries of the execution process as supervised 
by the Committee. 
2 INDICATOR 2: SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES  
In the pre-merits phase, various procedural steps contribute to sharing 
responsibilities in conformity with the Convention (communication, strike-out 
procedures and hearings) and as such (hearings and third-party interventions). 
Judgments and referral are not conducive to any form of sharing of responsibilities. 
Judgments only describe how responsibilities were shared prior to their adoption 
and referral does not contribute to sharing responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention because the mere fact that a case is decided by the Grand Chamber 
rather than a chamber does not necessarily imply respect for the subsidiarity 
principle. Because the quality of the observations of the states varies, 
communication does not always contribute to the effect which indicator 2 can 
establish; when the observations are not up to scratch, the respondent state cannot 
share responsibilities with the Court. Furthermore, if a friendly settlement proposal 
is ready-made, sharing responsibilities is hardly enhanced, because the Registry is 
the initiator and author of the settlement rather than the respondent state together 
with the applicant. Finally, the potential which observations of the respondent state 
and third parties have at hearing to contribute to sharing responsibilities with the 
Court is not entirely realised as a result of the limited added value of hearings.  
Responsibilities are shared as such, namely irrespective of how the Convention 
dictates that they should be shared, and in conformity with the Convention, or more 
precisely in line with the principle of subsidiarity and the procedural task division 
between the Court and the Committee, during execution. Depending on the 
procedure, the responsibilities are shared between different sets of interlocutors.  
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Responsibilities are shared in conformity with the Convention as the result of 
action plans/reports and DH meetings. Both procedural steps namely encourage the 
respondent state to be the first to determine which execution measures are 
warranted. The Court’s opportunities for involvement in the execution phase, 
together with action plans/reports as well as DH, bi- and multilateral meetings 
contribute to the sharing of responsibilities as such. Although the Court’s means for 
participating in the execution phase are advantageous to the sharing of 
responsibilities as such, they are contrary to the sharing of responsibilities in 
accordance with the Convention. The Commissioner’s procedural steps also 
stimulate sharing responsibilities, although not in a very relevant manner. 
In the course of the PJP, the Court’s involvement runs counter to sharing 
responsibilities in line with the subsidiarity principle, but not to a great extent.  
Paradoxically, its involvement also contributes to sharing responsibilities in 
conformity with this principle. Further, the PJP enhances, albeit limitedly, the 
sharing of responsibilities as such between the respondent state and the Court, 
because the Court assists the respondent state with finding the appropriate execution 
measures in the pilot judgment. Its assistance remains, however, limited because the 
Court does normally not analyse the problem giving rise to the measures and its 
causes. As regards the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
Committee in conformity with the Convention, the conclusion is that, although the 
PJP seems to run counter to that at first glance, it does not do so in practice. Further, 
the sharing of responsibilities between the Committee and the Court is stimulated. 
The PJP therefore contributes to the sharing of responsibilities as such, and hardly 
conflicts with the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention. 
3 INDICATOR 3: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING  
In the (pre-)merits phase, mutual understanding is forged by communication. 
Especially the Court’s understanding increases if it asks questions of a general 
nature, provided they are answered by the state in observations of sufficient quality. 
Hearings also stimulate the Court’s understanding, albeit not greatly and the 
potential of third-party interventions to increase the Court’s understanding 
materialises in practice. Further, referral contributes to in particular understanding 
of the states. Their understanding also increases by way of judgments, albeit less so 
if a judgment is said to lack quality or is not comprehensively reasoned. Further, 
although strike-out procedures generally do not contribute to mutual understanding, 
states may occasionally learn something of the Convention system as the result of a 
strike-out decision.  
Understanding increases through different procedures and the participation of 
different actors in the execution phase. The states’ and the Committee’s/Execution 
Department’s understanding expands due to action plans/reports, although not of 
internal tension, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings and Commissioner country 
visits/reports. Further, follow-up cases enhance the understanding of the Court as 
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well as of the states and Article 46-indications boost understanding of in particular 
execution measures of the latter.  
In the course of the PJP, understanding of the Court and the Committee 
increases. Further, the respondent state’s understanding increases; it is clarified to 
the state that it must resume its primary responsibility in the Convention system, 
both in the pilot judgment and during the process of execution of the judgment.  
4 INDICATOR 4: BALANCED DECISION-MAKING  
The Court’s balanced decision-making in the (pre-)merits phase is prompted by 
communication, provided that the states indeed submit observations of sufficient 
quality. Although indicator 4 is generally not relevant to the strike-out procedures, 
two aspects of them may result in – not overly problematic – unbalanced decisions. 
Hearings also contribute to balanced decision-making, but not considerably because 
they are generally of limited added value. Third-party interventions’ potential to 
enhance the balancedness of the Court’s judgments was confirmed in part 2. 
Judgments also have this effect, but separate opinions hardly. Finally, referral 
stimulates balanced decision-making in practice to some extent.  
Neither procedure by means of which the Court becomes involved in the 
execution phase (Article 46-indications and follow-up cases) stimulates it to engage 
in balanced decision-making. On the contrary, these procedures may promote the 
adoption of decisions which the states perceive as unbalanced. As for the 
Committee, action plans/reports and Commissioner visits/reports do not stimulate it 
to make balanced decisions, but nor do they cause the opposite effect. Decisions 
and interim resolutions can lead to somewhat unbalanced decision-making. The 
decisions of the Committee are, however, made more balanced by DH, bi- and 
multilateral meetings.  
The PJP does not have the effect which indicator 4 was devised to assess. It does 
not contribute to balanced decision-making, although this effect can be justified; the 
Court takes rather far going measures to stimulate remedying a widespread 
domestic problem. The procedure is, however, not in all circumstances unbalanced. 
Moreover, several counterbalancing factors exist mitigating the negative effect. 
Considering the foregoing, although the PJP does not contribute to balanced 
decision-making, the extent to which it contributes to the opposite result should not 
be overstated.  
5 INDICATOR 5: REASON-GIVING  
In the pre-merits phase, communication stimulates states to engage in external 
reason-giving, and the Court to engage in the same exercise indirectly. The 
observation that reason-giving is not potentially stimulated by strike-out decisions 
in part 2 does not completely hold in practice as decisions taken under subparagraph 
b and in response to a unilateral declarations are reasoned rather elaborately. 
Hearings contribute to reason-giving by the state, although they do not always add 
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much to the reasons given through communication. Third-party interventions 
contribute to the Court’s reason-giving, but the requirement on the states to engage 
in internal reason-giving did not translate into reason-giving in practice. Judgments, 
including separate opinions, are generally, albeit not always, conducive to reason-
giving by the Court. Referral does not contribute to reason-giving in any manner.  
Article 46-indications, as well as follow-up cases stimulate the Court to engage 
in reason-giving in the execution phase, although its reasoning regarding the 
indications seems to be based on a case-by-case approach and is not always 
consistent. Action plans/reports, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings stimulate the 
respondent states to engage in reason-giving regarding their execution record. 
However, the reason-giving by way of action plans/reports does not always come to 
full bloom due to the low quality of the submissions and bilateral meetings promote 
reasoning more than multilateral meetings do.  
The examination regarding the PJP focussed on the Court’s reason-giving. The 
Court reasons its pilot judgments, but its reasoning is limited in three regards and 
has also been criticised more generally. Its follow-up judgments (dis)approving a 
friendly settlement are also reasoned. On the whole, reasoning by the Court is 
stimulated in the PJP. 
6 INDICATOR 6: ROOM FOR A RESPONSE  
As for the (pre-)merits phase, communication offers states room for a response. 
Additionally, the description of practice reveals that the Court has room for a 
response within this procedural step by way of recommunicating a case. Strike-out 
decisions provide states room for a response, except when friendly settlements take 
the form of a routine settlement. Further, hearings, Article 36(2) third-party 
interventions and referral offer room for a response by the states and judgments and 
referral for the Court.  
Each procedure in the execution phase provides room for a response. The Court 
has room for a response through Article 46-indications and follow-up cases. 
Follow-up cases provide respondent states room for a response, as do action plans/ 
reports, DH and bilateral meetings (and to a lesser extent multilateral meetings) and 
decisions/interim resolutions. Further, the Execution Department/Committee have 
room for a response by virtue of action plans/reports, bilateral meetings (and to a 
lesser extent multilateral meetings) and decisions/interim resolutions. Finally, the 
Commissioner responds by way of country visits/reports to efforts of the states 
relating to execution.  
The PJP gives the Court room to respond to various developments in the 
respondent state or a lack thereof. It can respond to domestic problems, failures to 
execute previous judgments and execution measures taken in respect of previous 
judgments or of the pilot judgment. The respondent state can give its opinion about 
the suitability of a case for treatment under the PJP. This possibility for 
involvement is however not of great importance, considering that the Court does not 
need to follow the state’s opinion. Generally, the respondent state has less external 
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room for a response if the PJP applies than outside the context of the procedure, 
because the application of the procedure means that the respondent state must, 
within a deadline, implement general measures and that the implementation of these 
measures is supervised by not only the Committee but also the Court. The Court’s 
generally cautious approach to the PJP however also means that the room for a 
response is not curtailed extensively.  
7 INDICATOR 7: PREVENTING, MITIGATING AND ENDING CONFLICT  
Communication, strike-out procedures, hearings, third-party interventions, 
judgments and referral all have the effect which indicator 7 facilitates establishing 
in the (pre-)merits phase. However, routine friendly settlements have some potential 
to cause conflict. Additionally, the potential of hearings does not come to full 
bloom in practice because their added value is limited and the effect of judgments is 
compromised if the respondent states question their quality.  
In the execution phase, action plans/reports, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings 
are advantageous to dealing with (potential) conflict between the states and the 
Committee. The other procedures are not advantageous in that sense. Article 46-
indications and decisions/interim resolutions may even cause conflict, although it is 
not likely that the procedural steps have this effect and although their conflict-
provoking potential is muted to some extent. Commissioner country visits/reports 
do not, not even limitedly, contribute to the effect that indicator 7 helps establish.  
The PJP has some potential to cause conflict, as was established in part 2. In 
practice, however, the potential of the PJP to cause conflict is offset in the majority 
of cases. 
8 OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS PER PROCEDURE  
A procedure is limitedly, clearly or somewhat dialogic. Figure 5 brings together the 
labels assigned to the procedures of which their dialogicness in practice was 
assessed in chapters IX-XI. Unlike as was done part 2, a distinction must be made 
between two types of friendly settlements, namely routine friendly settlements and 
non-paper friendly settlements, because the level of their dialogicness turned out to 
be different in practice. Of all these procedures, Article 46-indictions are new in the 
sense that they were not assessed in part 2. Further and also unlike in part 2, 
Assembly questions/recommendations, infringement proceedings and requests for 
interpretation cannot be found in the figure 5, because the Assembly cannot become 
effectively involved through that procedure and because the other procedures have 
not yet been employed.  
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Figure 5: Overview Dialogicness per Procedure 
 
Limitedly dialogic    
1.  Routine friendly settlements     
 
Somewhat dialogic  
  
2.  Hearings  3.  Judgments  
4. Referral  5. Article 46-indications  
6. Commissioner country visits/reports  7. Decisions/interim resolutions  
8. Individual follow-up cases 9. General follow-up cases  
10. Pilot-judgment procedure    
 
Clearly dialogic  
  
11. Communication  12. Non-paper friendly settlements 
13. Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions 14. Unilateral declarations  
15.  Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions  16. Third-party interventions  
17. Action plans/reports  18. DH meetings  
19. Bi-and multilateral meetings   
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CHAPTER XIII 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1 MAIN FINDINGS  
1.1 Part 1  
1.1.1 A Characterisation of the Convention System  
The first question which this research set out to answer was the normative question 
whether and, if so, for what reasons, the notion of dialogue can be of added value to 
the Convention system. To answer this question, some understanding and a 
characterisation of the Convention system were required. Chapter II characterised 
the Convention system in terms of its establishment, functioning, developments and 
reforms, with a focus on how these matters have influenced the relation and 
distribution of powers and responsibilities between the interlocutors which take part 
in the Convention dialogue. Chapter III zoomed in on those characteristics which 
were particularly important to giving an account of the added value of the notion of 
dialogue to the Convention system.  
 
The short narrative on establishment explained how both the concept of human 
rights and that of democracy played an important role in the minds of the drafters of 
the Convention. The current object and purpose of the Convention system, which 
are key to understanding its functioning, can still be summarised as maintaining and 
further realising individual human rights and protecting democracy.  
 
To understand the system’s functioning, one must also become acquainted with the 
institutions, or interlocutors as they were called in this study, which are the system’s 
driving forces. The states parties are to play the most important role, for they should 
secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the 
Convention. This responsibility carries with it the obligation to execute any adverse 
judgment adopted by the Court to which a state is a party, which involves ending 
and remedying the violation found and preventing future violations. Not all states 
discharge their important role adequately; they sometimes act in bad faith or fail to 
solve widespread problems, which imply that they fail to fully execute the Court’s 
judgments and to implement the Convention.  
The guardian of the Convention is the Court and its task is to ensure that the 
states observe their engagements undertaken under the Convention. Over the course 
of its existence, the Court has stepped up and assumed new responsibilities, 
something which can cause tension between itself and the states.  
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Like the Court, the Committee has a supervisory task: it must supervise the 
execution of the Court’s judgments and formally closes the execution process. This 
interlocutor is therefore formally in a hierarchically higher position than the states 
parties. The Committee is aided in its task by the Execution Department and its 
Secretariat. The task division between the Court and the Committee is rather clear-
cut because they are each responsible for a different stage of Strasbourg 
proceedings. However, because the Court has assumed some responsibilities in the 
field of execution, the task division has grown to be less clear-cut recently.  
Another Council of Europe interlocutor, the Assembly, is the deliberative organ 
of the organisation and represents national parliaments. The Convention only 
mentions this interlocutor because it is responsible for electing the Court’s judges. 
Nevertheless, the Assembly has some possibilities to become involved in the 
Convention dialogue and has taken an interest in execution matters in particular.  
The youngest institution of the organisation, the Commissioner, is a non-judicial 
institution, established to promote education in, awareness of and respect for human 
rights as embedded in documents such as the Convention. The Commissioner 
focuses on structural problems rather than on individual complaints and has the 
right to submit third-party interventions to the Court.  
 
The principles of subsidiarity and effectiveness are equally essential to grasping the 
functioning of the Convention system and especially the division of responsibilities 
between the Court and the states. The states bear primary responsibility for 
implementing the Convention, implying that subsidiary responsibility is placed with 
the Court (and the Committee). The subsidiarity principle prescribes that the states 
have in place an effective national system for the protection of the Convention 
rights, including avenues for redress of alleged violations of these rights. The 
Court’s subsidiary role is at its core supervisory: it rules on the compatibility with 
the Convention of national measures in the case before it. This institution’s 
supervisory task, taken in conjunction with its power to adopt legally binding 
judgment, gives it some power over the states. Although the relationship between 
the Court and the states is therefore formally hierarchical, the Court cannot in fact 
exercise much power over the states. On the contrary, the states retain some 
decision-making power at all times, which is ensured by the subsidiarity principle 
and its manifestations. The principle manifests itself in the exhaustion of domestic 
remedies rule, the first instance doctrine, the margin of appreciation and the 
essentially declaratory nature of the Court’s judgments. The effectiveness principle 
requires that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders 
its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. The Court relies on the 
principle as a safety net in situations where relying solely on the subsidiarity 
principle could render the protection of the Convention rights practically 
ineffective. This risk arises when a domestic legal system does not protect the 
Convention rights in an effective manner at all. In these circumstances, the Court 
usually subjects the respondent state to stricter scrutiny and tells it in comparably 
clear terms how it should execute a judgment. The Court therefore steps up its 
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responsibility and, thereby, likely extends its power of review and may go beyond 
its supervisory function. The effectiveness principle manifests itself in, for example, 
exceptions which the Court allows to the admissibility rules, its dynamic 
interpretation of the Convention, and follow-up cases and pilot judgments. When 
one of these manifestations occurs, the subsidiarity principle is disregarded in part 
or at least corrected for the purpose of respecting the effectiveness principle. 
 
The developments in the system that have occurred since the Convention’s entry 
into force in 1953 show that the system has faced many challenges and reached 
great achievements, as well as that the state of the system has changed thoroughly 
and, in fact, is in a continuous state of turmoil. Up to the 1990s, the individual 
applicant was of little importance, inter alia because the right to individual petition 
was optional and not widely opted in to. Now, however, acceptance of the right is 
mandatory, giving over 800 million individuals direct access to the Court.  
Not only the right to individual petition has gained importance, also the number 
and scope of material Convention rights has expanded. The states took the initiative 
to expand the catalogue of rights by adopting additional Convention protocols and 
the Court has been in charge of increasing the scope of protection offered by these 
rights by means of the way in which it interprets the Convention. These twin 
developments have exacerbated the turmoil, because they open up possibilities for 
ever more complaints.  
Another side effect of the increased scope is that legitimacy questions have been 
posed by politicians, judges, parliamentarians and the media with increasing 
frequency, intensity and sometimes hostility. They do usually not so much question 
the legitimacy of the Convention system but more precisely that of the Court and its 
judgments, because it has interpreted the rights extensively and for other reasons, 
such as, not taking the margin of appreciation far enough. According to its critics, 
the Court should exercise more self-restraint and some have tabled proposals to 
move the Court in that direction.  
A development of a different nature is the enlargement of the Convention 
system from 13 founding states to 47. Over the past 25 years, the area under 
supervision of the Court has expanded vastly towards the east, thus increasing 
significantly the number of potential applicants.  
The enlargement is one explanation for another much discussed development: 
the increased workload on both the Court and the Committee. The expanded 
catalogue of rights, the larger scope of protection afforded by existing rights and the 
confirmation of the right to individual petition have also supplied more cases. 
Although the increased workload has been coupled with a higher output, backlogs 
remain to exist. Currently, the high number of pending repetitive and chamber cases 
form the most problematic aspects of the Court’s docket. It is also well-known that 
only a small number of states are responsible for the great majority of cases pending 
before the Court.  
The last observation points to two other problematic and intertwined 
developments. These developments are a failure of the states to, on the whole, 
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effectively implement the Convention and the problem of delayed and partial 
execution of the Court’s judgments.  
Not only the quantity, also the content of the cases has changed. During the first 
40 years approximately, the Court mostly dealt with rather technical problems and 
thus contributed to fine-tuning domestic legal systems which functioned by and 
large in conformity with the Convention. Since the 1990s, violations of a different 
nature have flooded the Court. These violations were grave and often widespread, 
related to transitions from communism to democracy or were repetitive. Violations 
of the first category occur because states act in bad faith. Although the Court was 
established in part to respond to such acts, it is not equipped to handle them 
effectively. Nevertheless, the Court has relied on the effectiveness principle to deal 
with these acts. ‘Transitional violations’ bring with them cases with a different 
background from older case and problems with a broader scope than before. The 
high number of repetitive cases is the result of structural and widespread domestic 
problems which remain unresolved in spite of judgments finding violations for the 
same problems.  
 
A development that warrants separate examination is the many reforms to the 
Convention system. The reforms are a response to the developments briefly 
mentioned above, existing mainly of measures meant to better equip the Court to 
handle its caseload and to thus maintain and improve the efficiency of the system. 
The Commission and the part-time Court were replaced by the current full-time 
Court in 1998 and single-judge formations were established in 2010. Further, the 
quasi-judicial powers of the Committee were abolished, but it gained the power to 
ask the Court to interpret a judgment and to start infringement proceedings against 
states failing to execute a judgment. The reforms have, by and large, not changed 
the object and purpose of the system and the Court continues to deliver individual 
as well as constitutional justice, in spite of voices in the reform debate arguing that 
it should become more of a constitutional court. Nor have the reforms yet proven to 
be sufficient to secure the system’s long term effectiveness. The latest reform 
measures are laid down in Protocol 15 and Protocol 16. Upon its entry into force, 
Protocol 15 will inter alia add a reference to the subsidiarity principle and the 
margin of appreciation to the Convention’s preamble. The other Protocol will give 
the highest domestic courts the power to seek an advisory opinion of the Court on 
questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application of the Convention 
rights.  
 
This sketch of the Convention system’s establishment, functioning, developments 
and reforms formed the point of departure for a more general characterisation of the 
system. In chapters II and IV, it was explained that the system is characterised by 
two categories of tension: internal and external. The former category derives from 
the Court’s power to impose binding and unifying norms over a diverse pool of 
national authorities that are normally more knowledgeable of the national situation, 
that may be democratically elected and accountable and that wish to see their 
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diversity to be respected. The sources of internal tension can therefore be 
summarised as uniformity v. diversity (the unifying diversity difficulty); 
international supervision v. domestic superior knowledge (the knowledge gap 
difficulty); and supervision by unelected and not directly democratically 
unaccountable judges v. comparably more direct democratic national decision-
making (the countermajoritarian difficulty). These three difficulties emphasise that 
the national authorities fare in principle most competent and knowledgeable and 
therefore best placed to decide how to protect the Convention rights. Because this 
will always be the case, the tension created by the difficulties is inherent or 
‘internal’ to the system and cannot be solved. The outcome of the tension is, 
however, not determined beforehand. With each adverse judgment, the risk arises 
that the tension escalates into conflict, which can be outspoken or less visible. 
Conflict can develop when the Court, in the eyes of a state, insufficiently pays 
regard to the domestic democratic decision-making process, the knowledge of 
national authorities or diversity across the Council of Europe. Conflict can, in turn, 
lead to a deterioration of the implementation and execution record, in particular 
because none of the Council of Europe institutions can force a state to act. Any such 
deterioration puts at risk the effective and smooth functioning of the Convention 
system and would jeopardise eventually the protection of individual human rights. 
Internal tension can also have a more positive outcome, however, which is more 
balanced and therefore improved decision-making by the Court. The tension can be 
channelled towards this alternative outcome rather than to conflict if it stimulates 
the Court to respect the democratic legitimacy of the states, takes into account 
national (superior) knowledge and leaves room for diversity.  
External tension is caused by serious and widespread problems that have forced 
the Court to choose between respecting either the subsidiarity principle or the 
effectiveness principle. When such problems are brought to its attention, the Court 
is informed of instances of manifestly deficient implementation of the Convention. 
In the context of such problems, the Court cannot respect both principles equally 
and it usually chooses in favour of the effectiveness principle. This choice is 
accompanied by the assumption of wider and additional responsibilities, which 
means that the states are subjected to stricter supervision and that the Court 
exercises more power over them. This choice can, moreover, reinforce internal 
tension. External tension is therefore tension that can arise between the subsidiarity 
principle and the effectiveness principle. This tension is accompanied by decreased 
effectiveness of the Convention system, mostly because the system is founded on 
the assumption that the states fulfil their primary responsibility for implementing 
the Convention. This category of tension is labelled ‘external’, because it is caused 
by developments originating from outside the system. It can therefore be 
eliminated; when the states would implement the Convention adequately, external 
tension would hardly surface. Eliminating it is, however, difficult, for neither 
simply increasing the power of the Court over the states parties would help, nor can 
the problems causing the tension be solved in the short term.  
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In chapter IV it was further explained that cooperation between the interlocutors is 
instrumental to the effective functioning of the Convention system. Although the 
Committee and the Court are hierarchically superior on paper, they cannot impose 
their will on the states parties in practice. These two interlocutors can therefore not 
rely on coercion, but must inevitably rely on cooperation. Further, responsibilities 
are shared between different interlocutors: the states and the Court are responsible 
for the implementation of the Convention and the states and the Committee for 
executing the Court’s judgments. In addition to that, the Court sometimes becomes 
involved in execution measures and the Assembly and the Commissioner also feel 
they should contribute to in particular ensuring that the judgments are executed. A 
system that is characterised by the sharing of responsibilities to such an extent can 
only function when each interlocutor does its part and this can likely greatly be 
facilitated by cooperation. The last characteristic relied upon in this study is that of 
interconnectedness between the national and the European level, due to the 
composition of the Committee and the Assembly and because the interlocutors 
share responsibilities.  
1.1.2 A Characterisation of Dialogue  
In addition to characterising the Convention system, this study also provided for an 
inventory of how others have applied the notion of dialogue to other legal systems. 
It thereby concentrated on what has been written about the notion in the context of 
national constitutional systems, the EU and transjudicial communication (i.e., 
communication among courts, whether national or supranational, across borders). 
Insight into the notion of dialogue was given by describing how it has been used as 
a normative and descriptive tool and by outlining some means by which dialogue 
can be attained in a practical sense.  
For national legal systems, dialogue has been advanced as a response to the 
countermajoritarian difficulty. The response is that the undemocratic nature of 
judicial review is attenuated when judges engage in dialogue with the legislature. 
To illustrate, in the Canadian constitutional system, the notion of dialogue has been 
used to demonstrate that, even though courts review legislative acts, the legislature 
can and does reverse, modify or avoid judgments. The difficulty is therefore not as 
problematic as is often thought. This descriptive account is also relied upon to 
justify the role of the judiciary in the Canadian dialogue on fundamental rights. 
Thus, the notion is used in a more normative manner. It is proposed that the courts 
play a legitimate role, because they contribute unique attributes to the dialogue, 
such as, being open to claims of injustice by vulnerable minorities. Another 
justification for the role of the judiciary is that it can undo blockages in the 
legislative process, which occur, for example, when the legislature does not have 
enough expertise to realise that a law will limit the rights of a certain group. Judicial 
review, as it takes place in for example Canada, can be made weaker and therefore 
more dialogic by requiring the judiciary to defer to the legislature when a case is 
brought a second time before it and after the legislature dealt with it twice. In 
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addition to applying the notion to the relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary, it can be used more broadly. Dialogue can also be seen between other 
branches and some theorists have developed a notion of society-wide dialogue, 
where courts are seen as participants in political life.  
It is often said that the EU’s legal system is characterised by pluralism. The EU 
and national constitutional claims exist alongside each other and EU law is arguably 
not hierarchical to national law. Therefore, the states may resist the Court of 
Justice’s attempt to assert power over them. In a system with such characteristics, 
the question is who decides which laws prevail and how EU law should be 
interpreted. This question is particularly topical to fundamental rights law, because 
fundamental rights are valued rather differently in the EU member states. It has 
been claimed that dialogue may provide the answer to this question. Dialogue could 
counterbalance the risk that fundamental rights norms are standardised too actively, 
because a dialogue between the Luxembourg Court and the domestic courts enables 
the former to consider various domestic traditions. Dialogue can also function as an 
ideal that justifies the Court of Justice’s claim to authority over fundamental rights 
cases. Thus seen, dialogue is an alternative to relying on coercive powers to ensure 
compliance with European fundamental rights judgments. Dialogue justifies this 
claim because it facilitates integrating the meaning given to fundamental rights in 
different states, which leads to better-reasoned outcomes and leaves room for 
diversity. The notion can also be given normative content by seeing it as a means to 
prevent conflict, because dialogue fosters cooperation and the voluntary acceptance 
of the European judgments. In the EU, the notion of dialogue has also been used as 
a metaphor to merely describe interaction between the Court of Justice and 
domestic courts. 
In transjudicial communication, the notion of dialogue has been applied to 
courts in a horizontal relation (two international/domestic courts) as well as to those 
in a vertical relation (when an international court reviews a national court). On the 
one hand, horizontal relations are characterised by a high degree of informality, a 
lack of hierarchy and multiple sources of law. No easy solution exists therefore for 
jurisdictional and interpretative problems. Dialogue can function to describe that 
horizontal interaction between international courts in fact takes place. Such 
interaction takes place inter alia because it helps prevent interpretative and 
jurisdictional conflict and because reinventing the wheel is inefficient. Interaction 
between domestic courts in different states involved in transnational cases also 
takes place. In order to determine which court in which state has jurisdiction, a 
concept related to that of dialogue – judicial comity, which is respect for courts as 
courts – can be relied upon. Comity can help prevent jurisdictional conflict and can 
lead to dialogue because the courts do not passively defer to each other, but actively 
and critically examine whether their counterparts live up to the standards of 
international justice. The notion of dialogue can also be used as a regulative norm 
for the emerging international legal system in which judges from different 
jurisdictions interact so actively that they form a global community of courts. This 
can be done because the notion matches the horizontal nature of the system, where 
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relations are characterised by a high degree of voluntariness, comity and the 
absence of hierarchy. By contrast, the notion may be less appropriate for vertical 
relations because they are comparably hierarchical, even though international courts 
do usually not have the power to impose their will on domestic courts. Given these 
characteristics, interaction between an international and a domestic court may be 
most appropriately described as dialectical review. Dialectical review brings with it 
a dynamic distribution of power, the existence of diverse perspectives as well as 
some commonalities and the presence of repeat players. Portrayed as such, 
dialectical review should lead to legal learning, judicial coordination and norm 
internalisation.  
When the foregoing observations are considered jointly, theoretically and 
normatively, dialogue can be seen as a useful notion for describing or regulating 
relations between interlocutors that want to be respected by their counterparts and 
that risk being in conflict over power or interpretative matters if they do not engage 
in dialogue. Such risks may occur, for example, because the interlocutors are in an 
informal relationship, without a hierarchically superior actor. Dialogue is therefore 
concerned with dividing power and channelling interaction. It is an alternative to 
more extreme regulative norms that aim to prevent conflict by appointing one 
interlocutor as hierarchically superior or by giving sovereignty to all interlocutors, 
something which likely prevents them from reaching agreement. Because dialogue 
ensures that different voices are listened to and can function to minimise conflict, it 
can legitimise the assertion of some degree of power of one interlocutor over 
another.  
 
The normative ideal of dialogue as typified above can be attained in practice 
through different means. A distinction was made in this regard between 
prerequisites, which relate to institutional features; facilitators, which enhance the 
likelihood and the quality of dialogue; and instruments, which are especially created 
to stimulate dialogue or co-operation.  
An important prerequisite clearly is willingness of all relevant interlocutors to 
engage in dialogue. The interlocutors should, furthermore, have different 
viewpoints, which elicit dialogue, and a common ground of understanding, which 
allows differences to be transcended and a dialogue to develop as a basis for 
reaching agreement. Lastly, sufficient time to engage in dialogue must be available. 
Time permits the positive outcomes of dialogue, such as the prevention of conflict, 
to mature for they cannot be achieved overnight.  
One way to facilitate dialogue is to distribute power dynamically between courts 
in a vertical relation. This ensures that the international court must rely on domestic 
courts for the execution of its judgments, which opens room for dialogue, because 
the former must acknowledge that the latter have some room for interpretation. 
Further, this distribution of power stimulates the former to listen to the viewpoints 
of the latter, or risk non-execution. Another facilitator of dialogue is deference. To 
illustrate, a domestic court can expressly defer to the legislature in cases bringing an 
issue before it that it had previously already decided on and that subsequently have 
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been dealt with by the legislature for a second time. International courts can also 
rely on comparative methods of interpretation to stimulate dialogue. These methods 
stimulate them to base the content and development of their jurisprudence on 
domestic constitutional traditions and on national law and judgments. Another way 
to facilitate dialogue is to take a procedural approach to adjudication. A court taking 
such an approach inquires into the decision-making process rather than the content 
of a right. The decision-maker is therefore free to make its own evaluation, 
provided this evaluation is made based on a procedure that meets certain standards. 
The last facilitator of dialogue discussed in this study is remedial discretion. The 
degree of remedial discretion left by domestic courts to the other branches differs 
widely in the domestic setting and determines how much room for dialogue is left. 
The wider the discretion, the more room for dialogue exists.  
Finally, two instruments for dialogue were addressed: pro-dialogic rules and 
requests for a ruling. A pro-dialogic rule advanced for international courts 
interacting horizontally is, for example, that jurisdiction is reserved to the court that 
first received a case when the issue of overlapping jurisdiction arises. Domestic 
courts in different states can apply the rule that, when they are engaged in 
interpreting international law, they follow the precedent set by their counterparts in 
other states and only decline to do so for good reason. For the domestic 
constitutional setting too, pro-dialogue rules have been developed. One such rule is 
that the legislature must formulate its intention very clearly when limiting a 
constitutional right and that the constitutional court only considers this intention and 
not the content of a limitation. This is a way to enable the procedural approach to 
adjudication, discussed as a facilitator, to be put to practice. Examples of requests 
for a ruling can also be found in different settings. Best known is the EU 
preliminary reference procedure that permits and sometimes obliges domestic 
courts to pose questions to the Luxembourg Court about the validity and 
interpretation of acts of EU organs.  
1.1.3 The Added Value of the Notion of Dialogue to the Convention System  
This study draws on dialogue as a normative ideal for interaction in the Convention 
system and as a solution for some of the problems in that system. A first reason for 
doing so is that others have applied the notion convincingly to other legal systems 
that experience difficulties comparable to those at the root of internal tension. 
Indeed, some characteristics of the Convention system correspond with those in 
other systems for which dialogue has been shown to be a valuable concept. These 
characteristics are a lack of final power, the impossibility to rely on coercion for 
compliance, the importance of sharing responsibilities and the interconnectedness 
between the Council of Europe and national level. The system is also already 
geared towards dialogue because it knows facilitators and instruments for dialogue 
which are reminiscent of the means for dialogue found in other systems, such as 
comparative methods of interpretation, and rules including the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies rule, which can be seen as a pro-dialogic rule.  
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In the Convention system, dialogue could be used to, first, direct internal tension 
away from conflict, towards improved and increasingly balanced decision-making. 
When it comes to external tension, dialogue could, second, contribute to improving 
instances of manifestly bad implementation of the Convention by rallying support 
in the states and allowing solutions to develop over time. Third, an effective 
dialogue could also contribute to cooperation by building on sharing responsibilities 
and non-coercive means to compel compliance. Thus, if implemented well, 
dialogue could contribute to the effective functioning of the Convention system and 
therefore to improved protection of the Convention rights. 
The notion of dialogue can be used to further these three purposes when it is 
seen as a norm that promotes a process of interaction between the states, the Court, 
the Committee, the Assembly and the Commissioner with a view to advancing 
respect for national democratic legitimacy, knowledge and diversity. This process 
should also lead to enhancing the understanding held by the Council of Europe 
interlocutors of the domestic legal systems and the understanding held by the states 
of the Convention system. This research accordingly sees dialogue as a norm that is 
a middle path between conflict and deference. Seen as such, it can function as a 
framework within which existing doctrines, principles and procedures may be 
applied more effectively for the purposes just outlined.  
Thinking in terms of dialogue can help direct internal tension away from conflict 
and towards improved decision-making in various ways. The Court’s engagement 
with the Committee, composed of the members of the national executive, and the 
Assembly, composed of domestic parliamentarians, may decrease the chance that 
its rulings cause much internal tension. Further, a dialogue may enable the states to 
communicate to the Court their knowledge and concerns. When the Court 
understands that the state is a lot more knowledgeable about a certain issue than 
itself or that countermajoritarian or diversity concerns exist, it can lead the 
difficulties away from conflict in different ways. It can, for example, leave an issue 
undecided or, when it must exercise supervising, leave wide room for a response. 
Dialogue can also contribute towards decreasing external tension, for example, 
when it is used to enhance cooperation between the Court and the Committee. 
Further, the Assembly’s and the Commissioner’s involvement may help the Court 
and the Committee to better understand the causes underlying external tension. Key 
to solving external tension is broad national support and a dialogue between the 
Court, the Committee and the states could advance this. Further, engaging in 
dialogue may also help legitimise the stepping up of responsibilities by the Court in 
areas of case law ravaged by external tension. Engaging in Convention dialogue can 
also stimulate cooperation, because a dialogue can be used to facilitate sharing 
responsibilities and because it is a means to try to persuade in a non-coercive 
manner.  
As others have done for dialogue in the other legal settings, this research 
introduced certain prerequisites for Convention dialogue. These prerequisites are: 
ability and willingness; different viewpoints and a common ground of 
understanding; and time and clarity. The prerequisites of ability and clarity were not 
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already mentioned above. The ability to engage in dialogue, which is particularly 
relevant to the states, requires the availability of sufficient time and resources, as 
well as awareness and knowledge of the Convention system. The prerequisite of 
clarity underlines that dialogue should be based on sufficient and sufficiently clear 
information that is communicated in an understandable way. Only when these 
prerequisites have been fulfilled, the notion of dialogue can be of any added value 
to the Convention system 
To come to a workable notion of Convention dialogue, a definition of dialogue 
for the purposes of this research was introduced. Convention dialogue was defined 
as an exchange of facts and/or viewpoints on a given subject between at least two of 
the five Convention interlocutors through one of 26 procedures with the result of 
enhancing cooperation, channelling internal tension away from conflict and towards 
balanced decision-making and/or contributing towards the elimination of external 
tension. 
1.2 Part 2 and Part 3  
Procedures are the practical interface between dialogue and its added value; they 
are the medium through which the beneficial potential of dialogue to the 
implementation of the Convention can be given effect. Based on this presumption, 
the second main question of this research was whether a set of 26 procedures and 
procedural steps potentially contribute to Convention dialogue and whether they 
make this contribution in practice. A procedure is thereby seen as a step that can be 
taken during the ‘life of an application’ by one interlocutor to communicate with 
another interlocutor. That step forms either part of the individual complaints 
procedure before the Court or is connected to it.  
The answer to the second main research question was given based on seven 
indicators for Convention dialogue developed in this study. These indicators aid a 
focussed and precise evaluation of the procedures in the light of Convention 
dialogue as envisaged and defined above. The indicators are derived from and based 
on the notion of dialogue itself, and on those of internal and external tension and 
cooperation. Indicator 1 helps establish which interlocutors can become involved 
through which procedures. If an opportunity for involvement exists, the follow-up 
question is about what and with whom the interlocutor can communicate and what 
it can achieve through a procedure. The second indicator serves to determine 
whether and, if so, how a procedure encourages sharing responsibilities as 
envisaged by the Convention.1 Indicator 2 also serves to determine whether a 
procedure encourages the sharing of responsibilities as such, meaning that 
interlocutors complement and help each other regardless of how the Convention 
prescribes that this should happen. To facilitate analysing whether a procedure 
                                                        
1  The Convention prescribes that the Court/Committee share responsibilities with the states in 
conformity with the subsidiary principle and that the Court and the Committee share 
responsibilities along procedural lines. 
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stimulates mutual understanding, the third indicator was included. Mutual 
understanding is understanding by the respondent state of the Convention system 
and of the other interlocutors of relevant problems and rules in the states parties. 
Indictor 4 aids examining whether a procedure promotes balanced decision-making. 
Balanced decision-making is the taking into account of different perspectives, in 
particular the knowledge of domestic authorities and concerns as to respect for 
diversity of the states. Further, indicator 5 was added to establish whether a 
procedure induces the interlocutors to give reasons for their decisions. Reason-
giving is particularly important when a decision of one interlocutor is potentially 
unwelcome to another interlocutor. The sixth indicator helps analyse whether a 
procedure leaves room for a response to interlocutors which must react to a decision 
made or procedural step set by another interlocutor. Room for a response exits, for 
example, when an interlocutor can air its concerns or communicate its opinion on a 
decision. Lastly, indicator 7 was designed to note down whether a procedure helps 
prevent, mitigate or end conflict. This analysis depends largely on the findings 
made under indicators 2-6, as the effects they seek to establish are potentially 
beneficial to handling conflict. The indicator, however, also serves to point out 
other aspects of a procedure that help handle conflict.  
The second main research question was divided into two separate questions. The 
first sub-question was whether the procedures have dialogic potential, that is, 
whether they have the features required to enable a dialogue to come into existence. 
The second sub-question, of a more practical nature, was whether the procedures 
with some or clear dialogic potential realise their potential in practice. The answers 
given to these questions, based on the seven indicators for dialogue, are summarised 
in Figure 6.2  
The descriptions of the procedures as they are supposed to function and as they 
function in practice are not reiterated here. Nor are the findings as summarised in 
Figure 6 discussed any further. However, the differences between the findings 
regarding the dialogic potential on paper and the dialogicness in practice are taken 
up in the next section.  
 
 
  
                                                        
2  This is a combination of Figure 2 and Figure 5.  
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Figure 6: Overview of Dialogic Potential and Dialogicness  
 
 Dialogic potential on 
paper 
Dialogicness in practice  
(Pre-)merits phase    
1.  Communication Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
2.  Interim measures Limited potential Not assessed  
3. Friendly settlements Clear potential  Limitedly dialogic (routine) 
Clearly dialogic (non-paper) 
4.  Article 37(1)(b) strike-out decisions Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
5.  Unilateral declarations Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
6.  Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
7.  Hearings Clear potential  Somewhat dialogic  
8.  Relinquishment Limited potential  Not assessed  
9.  Third-party interventions Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
10.  Investigations Limited potential Not assessed  
11.  Judgments Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
12.  Referral Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
Execution phase    
13.  Article 46-indications Not assessed  Somewhat dialogic  
14.  Article 41-awards Limited potential Not assessed  
15.  Action plans/reports Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
16.  DH meetings Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
17.  Bi- and multilateral meetings Clear potential  Clearly dialogic  
18.  Requests for interpretation Clear potential  Not assessed  
19.  Infringement proceedings Some potential Not assessed  
20.  Assembly questions and 
recommendations 
Clear potential  Not assessed  
21.  Commissioner country visits and 
reports 
Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
22.  Decisions and interim resolutions Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
23.  Final resolutions Limited potential Not assessed  
24.  Individual follow-up cases Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
25.  General follow-up cases Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
Both phases   
26.  Pilot-judgment procedure Some potential Somewhat dialogic  
2  COMPARISON BETWEEN DIALOGIC POTENTIAL AND DIALOGICNESS IN 
PRACTICE  
2.1 Findings per Procedure Compared  
A comparison between a procedure’s dialogic potential and its dialogicness in 
practice usefully points out which procedures fail to fulfil their dialogic potential 
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and which procedures are more dialogic than expected. This makes it possible to 
make recommendations for bridging any gaps existing between potential and 
practice and for maintaining and extending good practices. The findings in part 2 
and 3 can only be contrasted with respect to procedures with some or clear dialogic 
potential, since procedures with only limited dialogic potential were not analysed in 
part 3. Further, a comparison is only worthwhile for procedures which have indeed 
been used in practice. Assembly questions/recommendations, infringement 
proceedings and requests for interpretation are therefore largely excluded from the 
comparison.  
2.1.1 Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase  
Communication: The procedural step of communication encompasses in this 
research not only the Court’s initial communication of a case to the respondent 
state, but also additional communications and the respondent state’s written 
observations. Part 2 established that this procedural step has clear dialogic potential; 
part 3 found that it fulfils its potential in practice. Nevertheless, the picture 
emerging in practice is generally less positive than that on paper, mainly because 
the observations of the states are not always up to scratch. This influences 
negatively inter alia the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the 
Convention, as well as the creation of understanding and balanced decision-making. 
Besides, dialogue is not always triggered by communication in areas of well-
established case law. The Court does not usually pose questions about cases falling 
into such an area and does therefore not expect observations of the respondent state, 
meaning that these interlocutors do not become involved by way of communication. 
This lack of involvement is, however, hardly problematic, exactly because the case 
law in such areas is well-established. These areas do therefore, for example, not 
require extensive reason-giving, as reasons can be derived from previous 
judgments, or the creation of understanding, which the Court can be assumed to 
have gained by adjudicating previous, comparable cases. One aspect of practice is, 
however, more dialogic than could be expected in part 2, because the Court 
sometimes ‘re-communicates’ cases. This finding was evaluated positively in the 
light of each indicator. To illustrate, it gives the Court more room for a response. 
More generally, the description of the functioning of communication in practice has 
revealed that the Court sometimes steers the respondent state’s observations by way 
of its questions and therefore assists the state in sharing responsibilities, that it also 
poses questions of a more general nature, which are not directly required to solve 
the individual case, and that it is also indirectly encouraged to engage in reason-
giving.  
Strike-out procedures: Each strike-out procedure has both clear dialogic 
potential and is applied in a clearly dialogic manner in practice, except for routine 
friendly settlements which are dealt with separately below. It was established that 
one opportunity for involvement of the Court remains virtually unused: the 
possibility to restore a previously adjourned case.  
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Friendly-settlements: Only non-paper settlement procedures fulfil their clear 
dialogic potential; ready-made friendly settlements, the majority of settlements 
concluded, do not as they are limitedly dialogic in practice. The latter type of 
settlements could not be derived from paper. The practice of ready-made 
settlements means that responsibilities are not shared in conformity with the 
Convention, that states may regard this procedural step as somewhat unbalanced 
and that they have less room for a response. Moreover, some, but limited, potential 
for conflict is created. However, because these settlements are issued in areas of 
well-established case law, their limited dialogicness is not overly problematic. 
Indeed, from the perspective of dialogue, the increase in the number of routine 
settlements is probably less problematic than the finding that the Court no longer 
invites the parties for negotiations to Strasbourg to stimulate the conclusion of non-
paper settlements. What could, like ready-made friendly settlements, neither be 
derived from paper is the Registry’s practice to sometimes develop settlement 
strategies with a respondent state.  
Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions: Subparagraph c strike-out decisions have 
been singled out to highlight one particularly dialogic area of case law which is 
based on these decisions. This is the small but important area of judgments of 
principle. When such judgments are followed up with an Article 37(1)(c) strike-out 
decision, the dialogicness of the decision increases significantly, as it provides an 
additional opportunity for involvement to the Court, makes the sharing of 
responsibilities by way of this procedural step extra clear and enhances the 
respondent state’s understanding. 
Hearings: Hearings were found to have clear dialogic potential, but turned out 
to be only somewhat dialogic in practice. A gap between paper and practice exists 
because of the limited added value of hearings to exploring the content of a case. It 
also appeared that the respondent state cannot successfully request that a hearing is 
organised in practice, meaning it has one opportunity for involvement less in the 
course of this procedural step than on paper. Furthermore, the Assembly has never 
intervened at hearing. Nevertheless, hearings are, in some specific regards, more 
dialogic in practice than on paper, due to their contribution to the prevention of 
conflict. Hearings also create extra opportunities for involvement in practice, 
because the Court draws up additional questions prior to a hearing to which the 
parties can respond in writing. 
Third-party interventions: Third-party interventions are both clearly dialogic 
on paper and in practice. Nevertheless, practice is different from paper. States 
apparently have a de facto right to intervene under Article 36(2), which stimulates 
dialogue, while their de jure right under the first subparagraph of that Article turned 
out to not be unlimited. Also, as in the case of hearings, the Assembly has never 
intervened in writing, which implies that it cannot share responsibilities as such 
with the Court through this potential channel of communication. Lastly, it was 
found that reason-giving by the respondent state is not stimulated, because it does, 
in fact, not need to reason its request for leave to intervene. In addition to practice 
being different, it also emerged that the Court virtually never uses two sub-
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opportunities for involvement which it has in the course of the procedure: the 
possibility to ask third parties, including non-respondent states, to intervene and the 
option to pose questions to the interveners.  
Judgments: Judgments have some dialogic potential and are somewhat dialogic 
in practice. Even though the labels are akin, the findings regarding practice were 
less positive from the perspective of dialogue and comparably nuanced. These 
differences partly are the result of the alleged lack of clarity and consistency of 
some judgments, which has an impact on their quality. In addition, the less positive 
assessment results from the finding that some judgments are hardly reasoned. Both 
aspects, especially if combined, have a negative impact on increasing understanding 
and the extent to which a judgment can ease conflict. The latter finding is, however, 
less problematic than the former, provided that judgments which are hardly 
reasoned are pronounced only in areas of well-established case law. As was 
explained above, because these areas are so well-established, reason-giving is less 
important than, say, in a case raising a new Convention issue. The role played by 
separate opinions is less dialogic than initially thought, because the judges do 
normally not use them to engage with the states parties. Rather, the opinions are 
chiefly internally oriented and do therefore not contribute to balanced decision-
making. On a more positive note, the scope of the Court’s judgments is at times 
rather broad, at least broader than is required to decide a case brought by an 
individual applicant. This is particularly advantageous to expanding the states’ 
understanding of the Convention system.  
Referral: As regards referral, practice largely corresponds with the description 
of how the procedure was said to function on paper – i.e., it is rather dialogic. It was 
in particular confirmed that the panel deciding on a request for referral does not 
reason its decision on the request and that the Grand Chamber is indeed willing to 
diverge from a chamber judgment. This willingness of the Grand Chamber signifies 
that the respondent state indeed has the opportunity to change the Court’s stance in 
a particular case as a result of referral.  
2.1.2 Procedures in the Execution Phase  
Action plans/reports: In an action plan/report, the respondent state must give an 
overview of the execution measures which it intends to take or has taken to 
implement a judgment. These documents, which are to be submitted to the 
Committee, are clearly dialogic on paper and in practice. The findings as to their 
dialogicness in practice are nevertheless different from their dialogic potential in 
various respects. First, the Execution Department, not the Committee as such, 
turned out to become involved mostly, also by way of assisting states with 
preparing the documents. Further, balanced decision-making is not enhanced in 
practice as was expected. This has been found to impact negatively on the 
balancedness of the procedural steps, because the states do not usually go into the 
difficulties at the root of internal tension. Nor do states usually discuss execution 
problems encountered when executing a judgment, meaning that the understanding 
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of the Execution Department/Committee is not really enhanced in that respect. 
Lastly, the finding that the respondent states’ submissions are not always of an 
equally high quality means that the states do not always use their possibility for 
involvement to the fullest and that their reason-giving is sometimes unconvincing. 
However, action plans/reports do create room for a response for the Execution 
Department and the Committee in practice, something which adds to their 
balancedness.  
DH meetings: DH meetings realise their potential: they are clearly dialogic in 
practice. A small difference between paper and practice is that the meetings do not 
only contribute to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity with the Convention, 
but also to the sharing of responsibilities as such. Further, it turned out that the 
states do not make use of the possibility to request a debate for a certain case or 
group of cases at a DH meeting.  
Bi- and multilateral meetings: Both bilateral and multilateral meetings are 
clearly dialogic and thereby fulfil the dialogic potential part 2 already showed them 
to have. The main difference between the findings in part 2 and part 3 is that 
bilateral meetings appear to provide an opportunity for involvement of the 
Execution Department rather than the Committee. This means by implication that 
these meetings provide room for a response for the Execution Department instead 
of for the Committee and that understanding of not only the Committee but also of 
the Execution Department increases as a result of these meetings. These differences 
are not of any great importance, because the Execution Department assists the 
Committee in its supervisory task.  
Commissioner country visits/reports: The dialogicness in practice of 
Commissioner country visits/reports roughly corresponds with their potential: these 
procedural steps are somewhat dialogic. Their potential is, however, not fully 
realised, because, unlike as was expected, the visits/reports do not appear to 
contribute to balanced decision-making. In another regard, practice achieves more 
than the description of the potential predicted, because it was established that the 
respondent states’ understanding increases.  
Decisions/interim resolutions: As the preceding procedural steps, 
decisions/interim resolutions have some dialogic potential on paper and are 
somewhat dialogic in practice. The findings regarding potential and practice are 
nevertheless not entirely comparable. The first difference lies in the involvement of 
the Execution Department (in drafting and proposing the documents) and the 
respondent state (because it can and does comment on the drafts). These are 
opportunities for involvement unforeseen in part 2. The respondent state’s 
involvement means that it has room for a response, which clearly contributes to the 
procedure’s dialogicness. Further, whereas it remained unclear in part 2 whether the 
documents would involve balanced decision-making or dealing with conflict, in 
practice, it emerged that although the documents do not lead to balanced decision-
making, they do not give rise to highly unbalanced decisions either. As to conflict, 
the decisions/interim resolutions may cause conflict, but only limitedly.  
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Individual/general follow-up cases: Follow-up cases fulfil their dialogic 
potential in practice because there were found to be somewhat dialogic. The major 
difference between the findings in the two parts is that individual follow-up cases, 
unlike what was concluded in part 2, permit the Court to comment on execution 
measures. Clearly this means the involvement of yet another interlocutor, but at the 
same time, this has important consequences for the findings made with reference to 
several other indicators. It signifies that – more than expected– the respondent 
state’s discretion regarding execution decreases, meaning that responsibilities are 
less shared. It also makes that decisions are less balanced and that conflict may be 
incited. Another notable finding is that the Court becomes involved by way of 
general follow-up cases, even if this is not strictly necessary to decide on the 
individual case pending before it.  
2.1.3 The Pilot-judgment Procedure 
The Court adopted the PJP in 2004 to assist respondent states in remedying 
structural domestic problems and to induce them to resolve large numbers of cases 
arising from such problems. In a pilot judgment, the Court identifies the structural 
problem and orders remedial execution measures. One of the special features of the 
procedure is that the Court becomes involved in verifying whether the respondent 
state has satisfactorily executed its judgment. When the indictors for dialogue were 
applied to this procedure, it turned out that the procedure has some dialogic 
potential and is somewhat dialogic in practice. The procedure is nevertheless in 
various ways more dialogic than envisaged in part 2.  
One explanation for this finding is that more dialogic opportunities for 
involvement exist in practice than spring from paper. These opportunities are the 
Court’s comments on ongoing reform, giving it extra room for a response, and its 
involvement in consultations with the respondent state about the execution 
measures alongside the Execution Department. Other such opportunities are the 
respondent states’ oftentimes successful requests for an extension of the time limit 
set in the pilot judgment. Another explanation for why the PJP appears to be 
comparably dialogic in practice is that the description of the procedure’s 
functioning in practice necessitated adding nuance to several findings made in part 
2. To begin with, the Court’s remedial orders, although indeed imposed, usually 
remain general because it does not specify how they are to be executed or what 
exactly their outcome should be. Furthermore, although the Court does not shy 
away from reviewing execution measures, its review is limited and leaves ample 
room for the Committee’s involvement. Further, the Court pays due regard to the 
position of the Committee. Considering the foregoing, the PJP is a lot less contrary 
to the idea of sharing of responsibilities than was expected based on paper. These 
findings also mean that, unlike expected, the PJP does not in any significant manner 
go against the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the Committee in 
conformity with their task description in the Convention – even quite to the 
contrary.  
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Both on paper and in practice, the respondent state has less external room for a 
response within the sphere of the PJP than in a non-pilot case. However, the 
difference is less in practice than on paper, making the procedure more dialogic 
than expected. Likewise, the procedure’s potential to cause conflict has hardly 
translated itself into outright conflict in practice.  
When taking together the descriptions in part 2 and 3, it can further be observed 
that the states rarely use the possibility to request the application of the PJP and that 
they seldom reach friendly settlements including clauses on general measures. It 
was confirmed that a state can respond to the Court’s intention to apply the PJP, but 
this possibility is not of great relevance. Further, it was thought in part 2 that the 
Committee’s role in the PJP is no different from its role outside that procedure, but 
it appeared that differences of degree exist. On a more negative note, it is 
questionable whether the Court indeed shares responsibilities as such with the 
respondent state in practice and it does so only limitedly with the Committee. 
Further, although the PJP on paper generally stimulates the Court to engage in 
reason-giving, its reason-giving is limited in practice.  
2.2 Findings per Indicator Compared  
2.2.1 Indicator 1: Procedural Opportunities for Involvement of All Relevant 
Interlocutors 
When comparing the different procedures in the light of opportunities of 
involvement, it is clear that there is a discrepancy between paper and practice. On 
the one hand, some opportunities for involvement have been shown to exist which 
are not described in documents, such as, the Convention. On the other hand, 
opportunities for involvement laid down in such documents remain unused. 
Furthermore, various procedures are only used rarely.  
When interlocutors communicate with each other informally, it is clear that such 
an opportunity for involvement is described nowhere. Informal exchanges take 
place between different actors and at two occasions: between the Registry and the 
government agents during and after the communication of a case and between the 
Registry and the Execution Department in the execution phase. The practice of 
friendly settlements has developed to include ready-made friendly settlement and 
settlements strategies, both proposed by the Registry. These developments make the 
role of the Registry even more important in practice than could already be imaged 
based on the descriptive analysis in part 2. Further, the possibility for the Court to 
re-communicate, which was shown to be conducive to dialogue, could not be found 
on paper. Two strike-out procedures also give the Court extra means to become 
involved. It namely sometimes encourages states to adopt unilateral declarations in 
the context of the PJP and at times asks states which consequences they will draw 
from a judgment of principle. Again in the context of the PJP, the Court has taken 
the liberty of commenting on ongoing domestic reform and, in follow-up cases, on 
individual execution measures. The Court also gives Article 46-indications and asks 
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written questions prior to a hearing in response to which the state can send 
additional written observations. For their part, respondent states have frequently 
successfully asked the Court to extend a pilot-judgment deadline and they have 
commented on draft decisions and interim resolutions. One opportunity for 
involvement of the states turned out to be a de facto right to intervene: interventions 
under Article 36(2). More generally, from the finding that various opportunities for 
involvement exist which could not be derived from ‘paper’, it can be concluded that 
the procedures are not set in stone. On the contrary, the Court and other 
interlocutors are prepared to apply the procedures with a certain degree of 
flexibility. 
Other (parts of) opportunities for involvement are not always or not fully 
employed. First of all, the Court does not always pose questions to the parties when 
communicating a case pertaining to well-established case law and nor does it use 
the possibility to restore a case that it struck out. Further, the Court virtually never 
invites states or others to intervene as third parties and it does not ask them 
questions when they intervene. The Court’s involvement in execution is limited as it 
is not represented at DH meetings. The states’ involvement also may be limited for 
different reasons. They do not always take full advantage of their right to submit 
observations to the Court and of their obligation to submit action plans/reports to 
the Committee, because of the at times low quality of their submissions. They also 
become involved less substantially in routine friendly settlements than in real 
settlements, cannot request successfully that a hearing is organised and do not 
propose cases for debate at DH meetings. Moreover, two opportunities for the 
involvement of different interlocutors in the execution phase have not been used at 
all: infringement proceedings and requests for interpretation. Potential opportunities 
for the Assembly turned out to be non-existent in practice. The Assembly has never 
intervened at hearing and it has never been given leave to intervene in writing 
before the Court. Additionally, it cannot become involved in any meaningful 
manner in execution matters through questions or recommendations addressed to 
the Committee. The foregoing means that the Assembly has, in practice, not 
become involved in the Convention dialogue. Hence, it can be concluded that the 
various interlocutors therefore either have or use less opportunities for involvement 
than foreseen. 
Related to this, it has been found that various opportunities for involvement 
arise only rarely in practice. This applies to real settlements and to state and 
Commissioner third-party interventions, especially to their oral interventions. It also 
holds for referral, in particular when the number of requests is compared to the 
actual number of referred cases. Additionally, the number of hearings is low 
compared to the total number of judgments and, moreover, it is decreasing. Also 
opportunities for involvement of inter alia the Court in the execution phase 
(multilateral meetings, Article 46-indications and follow-up cases), do not lead to 
much dialogue. Another procedural step in the execution phase, DH meetings, is 
relevant to a rather limited number of cases compared to the total number of cases 
pending before the Committee. Lastly, the PJP is in itself already not applied often. 
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Moreover, within the contours of the procedure, the respondent states hardly ever 
use the possibility to request the application of the procedure and they rarely 
conclude a friendly settlement including an agreement about general remedial 
measures. These observations do not negate the significance of these procedural 
steps to Convention dialogue, but they do put them into perspective.  
2.2.2 Indicator 2: Sharing Responsibilities 
When practice is compared to the potential of procedures in the light of indicator 2, 
certain aspects of procedures turn out to be even more dialogic in practice than their 
potential could reveal. One such aspect is the possibility for the Court to adopt an 
Article 37 subparagraph c strike-out decision because the respondent state has taken 
measures in reaction to a judgment of principle, possibly upon the Court’s 
invitation. Further, it has appeared that DH meetings not only permit the sharing of 
responsibilities in accordance with the Convention, but that they, in practice, also 
stimulate the sharing of responsibilities as such due to the collective nature of the 
supervisory exercise performed there. As for the PJP, part 2 established that this 
procedure is potentially contrary to the sharing of responsibilities in conformity 
with the principle of subsidiarity, because the Court clarifies which execution 
measures must be taken and can review their implementation. Although the way in 
which the procedure functions in practice does not alter this image fundamentally, it 
does refine it. It emerged that the Court does not give highly detailed indications 
and that its review is limited, thereby leaving room to the states to take their own 
responsibilities seriously. Part 2 also concluded that the PJP is potentially contrary 
to the task division between the Court and the Committee. The description of the 
functioning of the procedure in practice also negates this conclusion, perhaps even 
completely, because the Court leaves much room for the Committee’s involvement.  
Contrasting paper and practice also clarifies that the potential of procedures in 
terms of sharing responsibilities is at times not (fully) realised. This holds for 
communication when the states submit observations which lack quality, because 
such observations cannot lead to any meaningful sharing of responsibilities with the 
Court. Also in case of ready-made friendly settlements, sharing responsibilities 
hardly occurs, due to the dominant role of the Registry in the conclusion of such 
documents. The potential of hearings in the light of indicator 2 only materialises to 
a certain extent: since hearings are considered to be of limited added value, they 
cannot contribute to the sharing of responsibilities significantly. Further, the 
potential of third-party interventions to contribute to the sharing of responsibilities 
does not come to full bloom because of two findings in part 3. Due to the lack of 
involvement of the Assembly, this interlocutor cannot contribute to the sharing of 
responsibilities as such, and the Court hardly ever stimulates sharing responsibilities 
by inviting third parties to intervene. In respect of individual follow-up cases it was 
concluded that, in practice and more than expected, responsibilities are not shared 
in conformity with the Convention, because the Court directly reviews the 
execution measures and not just their effects. Finally, the PJP stimulates in practice 
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only to a limited extent the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the 
state as such, although it does allow more for the sharing of responsibilities as 
envisaged by the Convention than expected, inter alia because the Court’s 
identification of the dysfunction warranting the procedure’s application is not given 
much attention and therefore of limited help to the state. Comparably, the PJP’s 
contribution to the sharing of responsibilities between the Court and the Committee 
should not be overstated in practice, because the Court’s orders are not very 
specific.  
The sharing of responsibilities, in sum, takes place by and large in accordance 
with the description of the potential on paper. Many procedures which contribute to 
the sharing of responsibilities in one way or the other on paper do so as well in 
practice. Also, procedures which are not conducive to sharing responsibilities 
according to part 2 do not attain this goal in practice either. Surely, as the above 
demonstrates, the findings in parts 2 and 3 do not correspond completely. The 
enumerated differences are however mostly differences of degree rather than 
fundamental differences; they stem from nuances which had to be made, unforeseen 
opportunities or not wholly fulfilled possibilities.  
2.2.3 Indicator 3: Mutual Understanding 
Various elements of procedures turned out to be more dialogic from the perspective 
of contributing to mutual understanding than expected when describing how they 
are supposed to function on paper. Practice has shown that, already when 
communicating a case, the Court can ask broader questions than those strictly 
required to decide the case at stake. Further, the Court’s judgments are sometimes 
rather broad in scope, when it decides on more or broader matters than necessary to 
decide the individual application before it. These two ways of expanding the scope 
of its findings are advantageous to increasing the state’s understanding of the 
Convention system. Strike-out decisions also contribute more to mutual 
understanding than expected when the Court asks respondent states how they will 
act on a judgment of principle. In part 2, it was already observed that action 
plans/reports are a means to increase the Committee’s understanding of the national 
situation. Part 3 added to this observation that these documents mainly increase the 
Execution Department’s understanding, but also that of the respondent state if aided 
by the Execution Department in the process of drafting such a document. The last 
positive difference which can be registered is that the Commissioner, by way of its 
country reports/ visits, uses his/her position to point out to the states how they 
should act in accordance with the Convention, thereby contributing to their 
understanding of the system.  
On a more critical note, it must be added that the quality of the respondent 
states’ observations and of the judgments can mean that the potential of these two 
procedural steps to contribute to mutual understanding is at times undermined. 
Practice has shown that the quality of these documents sometimes leaves something 
to be desired, although the quality of judgments in particular is generally good. In 
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the case of hearings, it has appeared that they do not always have any significant 
effect on increasing the Court’s understanding of the national situation, although 
part 2 proposed they would. In the execution phase, action/plans reports and bi- and 
multilateral meetings turned out to not give much insight into domestic problems 
caused by the need to execute a judgment. The Court’s understanding as the result 
of the PJP also seems to increase less in practice than on paper, because it does not 
elaborately analyse domestic problems or their causes in its judgments. Possibly, 
however, the Court may gain great knowledge, but it simply does not present this in 
its judgments. Whether the respondent state’s understanding increases in the PJP 
depends on the judgment and the follow-up rulings in question. One judgment in 
particular (Kurić and Others on Article 41) may have caused some confusion as to 
what the states should expect when executing a pilot judgment.  
In addition to the small differences just outlined, it can be noted that Article 46-
indications boost the respondent states’ understanding of in particular execution 
measures, a finding that could not be made in part 2 because these indications could 
only be found in practice. Overall, however, the observations in part 3 are largely 
comparable to those made in part 2, regarding both the (pre-)merits and execution 
phases and the PJP. In particular the findings regarding referral, third-party 
interventions, DH, bi- and multilateral meetings, decisions/interim measures and 
follow-up cases were confirmed. 
2.2.4 Indicator 4: Balanced Decision-making 
The differences between potential and practice which can be listed here disclose 
mostly that decisions are not made in the same balanced manner in practice as is to 
be expected based on paper. Regarding the first procedural step (communication), it 
turned out that because the states do not always submit observations of a high 
quality, this step does then not contribute to influencing the Court’s judgments so as 
make them balanced. It was also found that separate opinions do not fulfil their 
potential to contribute to balanced decision-making, because of their internal focus. 
Further, part 3 could even more strongly than part 2 conclude that individual 
follow-up cases promote the adoption of decisions that the states can perceive as 
unbalanced. Further, both action plans/reports submitted by the respondent states 
and Commissioner country visits/reports do not fulfil the said potential in respect of 
Committee decisions because neither the states nor the Commissioner usually go 
into issues relating to internal tension. Finally, routine friendly settlements and 
certain aspects of strike-out procedures may lead to unbalanced decisions, which 
will, however, be of little consequence.  
Although in relation to the other procedural steps the potential of most 
procedures is generally fulfilled as regards balanced decision-making, the image 
that arose in practice is generally less positive than that arose based on the 
description of the procedures on paper. In respect of hearings, it should be added, 
for example, that they do not considerably contribute to balanced decision-making 
by the Court. Additionally, while it could not be established in part 2 whether 
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decisions/interim measures contribute to the effect which indicator 4 envisages to 
establish, part 3 concluded that these decisions indeed do not contribute thereto. 
Further, in respect of pilot judgments, it was noted that they are not unbalanced 
when they are requested by the respondent state, but practice revealed that this 
happens only exceptionally. To end with a somewhat positive observation, even 
though the PJP neither on paper nor in practice was said to be conducive to 
balanced decision-making, it has turned out that several factors mitigate the 
negative effect in practice. One such factor is that the Court’s review of the 
measures taken by the respondent state to execute the pilot judgment is oftentimes 
limited and deferential to the Committee, thus making its review less intense than it 
could be potentially and hence more balanced. 
2.2.5 Indicator 5: Reason-giving 
Communication turned out to not only encourage the respondent state to engage in 
reason-giving, as was expected in part 2, but also the Court, albeit indirectly. Only 
one negative difference was found: states requesting leave to intervene as a third 
party are not required to reason their requests. They therefore have a de facto right 
to intervene, meaning that the requirement on paper that a request is reasoned has 
little practical significance.  
Generally, the picture arising in practice is more positive than that on paper, as 
the Court engages in reason-giving more than could be predicted based on the 
description of the dialogic potential of the procedures. Apart from the differences 
just enumerated, practice corresponds with the potential of the procedures. This 
holds for referral, Commissioner country visits/reports and decisions/interim 
resolutions in the sense that they were said to have no dialogic potential from the 
perspective of indicator 5 and indeed turned out to not have this potential. Further, 
it applies to third-party interventions, DH and bi- and multilateral meetings, and 
individual and general follow-up cases, for they accomplish their potential. 
Hearings, judgments, action plans/reports and the PJP also function in line with 
their potential, but in some respects, these procedures do not always come to full 
bloom. To illustrate, the Court does not normally analyse the problem causing the 
need for the application of the PJP and nor does it extensively reason its decisions 
to employ the procedure with reference to the conditions for applying the 
procedure. 
2.2.6 Indicator 6: Room for a Response 
The first procedural step that gives more room for a response than its potential 
brought to light is communication, because the Court sometimes responds to the 
observations of the respondent state by re-communicating a case. Besides that, it 
was clarified that action plans/reports not only give the respondent state room for a 
response, but also the Committee together with the Execution Department. The 
Court as well, by way of individual follow-up cases, has in practice more room for a 
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response in the execution phase than foreseen. As for the PJP, in its pilot judgments, 
the Court sometimes takes the liberty of commenting on ongoing domestic reform, 
thus creating an opportunity to respond to measures taken on the domestic level to 
execute a previous judgment. More generally, although it holds both on paper and 
in practice that the PJP curtails the respondent states’ possibilities of reacting to a 
judgment in the way it sees fit, this curtailment is not as firm as expected in part 2.  
Other differences between part 2 and 3 come down to comparably less room for 
a response in practice. This concerns communication, because although this 
procedural step is a means for the states to respond, the states neither always use it 
nor are always stimulated to do so because the Court sometimes does not ask 
questions in cases pertaining to well-established case law. Further, when a friendly 
settlement is ready-made, it is not really a response of the respondent state as 
envisaged in part 2. It was finally established that internal room for a response of 
the respondent state in the PJP has little practical significance.  
Again, most procedures function (largely) in accordance with their potential 
(hearings, third-party interventions, judgments, referral, DH and bi- and multilateral 
meetings, Commissioner country visits/reports, decisions/interim measures and 
follow-up cases). This also holds for strike-out procedures and the PJP generally, 
even though some differences were detected as well. Room for a response is 
therefore provided largely as could be derived from the description of the potential 
of the procedures in part 2.  
2.2.7 Indicator 7: Preventing, Mitigating and Ending Conflict 
The PJP, although it has some potential to cause conflict, has hardly caused any 
outright conflict in practice. Ready-made friendly settlements however, a type of 
settlement only found in part 3, have limited potential for conflict and individual 
follow-up cases are more likely to cause conflict in practice than was thought in 
part 2. Additionally, the potential of hearings under this indicator does not fully 
materialise in practice and this also applies to judgments when they fall short of 
their usual high standard.  
The potential of decisions/interim resolutions to counter conflict could not be 
established in part 2 because their effect was not unequivocal. In practice, it 
appeared that these documents can cause conflict, but only limitedly. The findings 
made in respect of the other procedures were comparable in parts 2 and 3. This goes 
for communication, strike-out procedures generally, third-party interventions, 
referral, action plans/reports, DH and bi and multilateral meetings, and the country 
visits/reports of the Commissioner.  
2.3 General Observations about the Comparison  
Some additional, cross-cutting observations can be made concerning the above 
comparison between the procedures’ dialogic potential and their functioning in 
practice. As Figure 6 demonstrates and as was already noted several times, most 
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procedural steps fulfil their dialogic potential in practice. Only hearings and one 
type of friendly settlements – routine friendly settlements – were given a different 
label in part 3 than in part 2. Furthermore, the differences that were detected when 
analysing the other procedures are small rather than fundamental. Nevertheless, 
even though the same label was assigned many times, this is not to say that no 
differences exist between potential and practice in certain respects, nor that they are 
not of any relevance.  
Another observation that can be made is that the procedural Convention 
dialogue is becoming less and less a face-to-face dialogue, and increasingly a ‘paper 
dialogue’. Two developments in two different procedures explain this gradual 
change. The first development is the decline in the number of hearings held per 
year, meaning that the parties’ only opportunity to interact directly with the Court’s 
judges arises less often. It is, moreover, notable that hearings are currently 
considered to be of limited added value anyway when compared to the written part 
of the proceedings. The second development is that the Registry is less involved in 
face-to-face settlement negotiations than it used to be, especially when compared to 
the large number of routine friendly settlements which have been concluded on the 
Registry’s initiative the past years. The question whether this change into a ‘paper 
dialogue’ is a problematic development, is one that cannot be answered here based 
on the findings of this study, but it could be the subject of future research. 
Further, it can be noted that the dialogicness in practice of different procedural 
steps is undermined because the submissions of some interlocutors, which are the 
backbone of any dialogue, are not up to scratch. This observation bears on 
communication and action plans/reports, since the observations of the respondent 
state leave at times much to be desired, and also – to a much lesser extent – to the 
Court’s judgments. The limited added value of hearings may also be explained by a 
lack of quality in the submissions of the states parties and perhaps in the judges’ 
questions.  
The factor that a case concerns an area of well-established case law can also 
significantly decrease the dialogicness of a procedure in practice. Already when 
communicating a case, the Court can decide to ask no questions and to not expect 
observations of the respondent state because a case falls into that area. 
Subsequently, when a case can be resolved based on well-established case law, the 
Court’s Registry can, and often does, send a ready-made friendly settlement, which 
has consequences for the findings made under various indicators. Moreover, the 
Registry can discuss with the respondent state a friendly settlement strategy when 
many such cases are pending. Even when the Court eventually decides a case on its 
merits, the judgment is hardly reasoned, exactly because well-established case law 
already exists. As was explained previously, however, because the Court relies in its 
judgment on well-established case law, the decrease in dialogicness that results 
from decisions made by relying on that case law is not overly problematic.  
Finally, it is important to see that the Court, in its dialogue with the respondent 
state, is not only interested in the individual case before it, but also in matters with a 
broader scope, including in problems relating to external tension. This springs from 
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the questions of a general nature which the Court may ask when communicating a 
case to the parties, its judgments of principle and the finding that the scope of its 
judgments is at times broader than required to solve the individual application 
before it. General follow-up cases permit the Court’s involvement too, even if this 
is not strictly needed to decide on the case of the individual applicant. Furthermore, 
the entire PJP can also be placed in this perspective, as well as separate aspects of 
the procedure, such as the Court’s practice to sometimes also evaluate already 
ongoing domestic reform.  
3 RECOMMENDATIONS  
Building on part 2 and part 3 and on the comparison in this chapter, some 
recommendations are made as to how the already existing Convention dialogue can 
be, where relevant, maintained, improved and further developed. Not only change is 
therefore recommended, but good practices are also pointed out, so these practices 
can be maintained and possibly extended to, for example, new branches of case law 
or additional interlocutors. Recommendations are made both as to how the 
procedural steps can be made more dialogic on paper and how their dialogicness in 
practice, if they featured in part 3, can be maintained and enhanced.  
Figure 6 demonstrates that many procedures have clear dialogic potential and 
contribute clearly to dialogue in practice. Recommendations therefore need not be 
made in respect of each procedure. Further, for some procedures it is simply hard to 
make any recommendations because they have so little dialogic potential and 
sometimes only aspects of a procedure can be made more dialogic. Therefore, this 
section is limited to making recommendations in respect to those procedures and 
procedural steps where this really would make a difference from the perspective of 
dialogue. 
In making recommendations, moreover, a few important caveats have to be kept 
in mind. One first consideration is that any far-going adaptation of a procedure 
could require changing its entire nature. This is not always desirable, because a 
procedure in its current form could contribute to the implementation of the 
Convention through another means than dialogue and can have another important 
objective than dialogue.  
It is also important to recall at this point the prerequisites for Convention 
dialogue. These prerequisites were included to emphasise inter alia that various 
stumbling blocks to dialogue exist, which may differ per state and per case. These 
stumbling blocks cannot only make that a procedure with clear dialogic potential 
does not contribute much in terms of dialogue to a certain case, but also that a 
recommendation is made in vain. The recommendations are therefore not of much 
or only of little use if the prerequisites are not fulfilled (at all).  
The recommendations are therefore brought tentatively, as they are all made 
from one perspective: dialogue as defined and researched in this study. Dialogue 
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may have been the major interest of this study, it is not the only interest of the 
Court, although the Court clearly attaches importance to dialogue.3 It may very well 
be the case that, because the recommendations only take into consideration the 
added value of dialogue as proposed in this study, they leave aside important 
considerations which can be made from another perspective and which would argue 
against a recommendation. Such other interests are, for example, decreasing the 
Court’s caseload, a purpose of routine friendly settlements, or showing the Court’s 
public face, a purpose of hearings. Also financial considerations are an important 
interest and could prove to be a bar to the feasibility of a recommendation. As an 
interviewee noted, anything innovative, even if it comes at little cost, tends not to be 
funded.4 There may also be practical difficulties of implementation.  
It should, however, be emphasised that dialogue is not a goal in itself, but that it 
an instrument that serves to enhance cooperation between the interlocutors, to 
channel internal tension away from conflict towards balanced decision-making 
and/or to contributing towards the elimination of external tension. Ultimately 
therefore, dialogue serves to improve the effective functioning of the Convention 
system, which leads to improved Convention implementation. Consequently, the 
recommendations should not be seen as recommendations to increase dialogue but 
as recommendations to, by means of dialogue, achieve these other goals. When this 
nuance is taken into consideration, the interest of dialogue to the Convention system 
certainly carries great weight, even though sometimes it will need to be balanced 
against other interests.  
The recommendations will not only point out what should be maintained or 
enhanced, they will also add how this can be achieved, by whom this should be 
achieved and why this is desirable and worth striving after. A number of 
counterarguments against making a procedure more dialogic were already discussed 
above and some such arguments are also addressed when making specific 
recommendations.  
3.1 How to Give the Convention-related Procedures more Dialogic 
Potential on Paper  
3.1.1 Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase  
Interim measures: There is no requirement on the Court to reason its interim 
measures and, in practice, interim measures are ‘usually’ not underpinned with 
reasons.5 On the face of it, to enhance the dialogicness of this procedural step, the 
Court could be recommended to start reasoning its refusals to grant an interim 
                                                        
3  See: section IV.4.1.2.  
4  Registry interview 5.  
5  Haeck et al. (2011), 401; See also: ECRE/ELENA, (2012), 14; CDDH (2013c), para. 33: See for 
exceptions: CDDH (2013c), Appendix.  
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measure as well as the imposed interim measures.6 As was noted by the CDDH, this 
would ‘allow states to better understand what amounts to irreparable harm, to 
address necessary issues at the domestic level (i.e. the need for a more thorough 
examination of risk by domestic courts) and to enable states to more appropriately 
challenge the imposition of interim measures’.7 However, as was noted above, other 
interests than dialogue can be at stake which form an argument against a certain 
recommendation. Interim measures are a case in point. It is normally of great 
importance to the efficiency of these directives that they are made without delay. 
Because reason-giving can cause an additional delay, it may be impractical. The 
recommendation may also be inappropriate if it would mean that the Court enlarges 
its ‘Rule 39 assessment stage beyond the question of whether or not there is a prima 
facie risk to an examination of the merits of the case’.8 Reason-giving can further 
also be regarded as superfluous because Rule 39 indications are not permanent and 
are followed-up by a judgment on the merits, if the complaint is not addressed in 
the meantime. Moreover, reason-giving would add to the Court’s workload.9 
Considering all of these arguments against the above recommendation, the Court is 
recommended alternatively to publish ‘additional, generic information on interim 
measure requests, including on the reasons for refusals’.10 
When an interim measure is imposed, the states do not have any room for a 
response. For that reason, the CDDH has discussed the possibility of introducing 
‘an adversarial stage before the imposition of an interim measure [...], [permitting] 
States to submit observations, including relevant factual information, to the Court 
on the necessity or otherwise of imposing an interim measure’.11 This possibility 
would indeed be desirable from a dialogic perspective, but again appears to be less 
desirable when taking into consideration the purpose of the procedure. The 
introduction of such a stage would cause additional delays, meaning for example 
that an applicant is held in (unlawful) detention longer, and also workload for the 
Court.12 When taking into account current practice, the question can be raised 
whether any formal adversarial element would be a meaningful addition. In 
practice, the Court sometimes requests information from the respondent state either 
prior to indicating an interim measure13 or thereafter, which can lead it to lift the 
                                                        
6  See for others arguing in favour of this: Haeck et al. (2008), 57; Rieter (2010), 1083; See also: 
Assembly, ‘Preventing Harm to Refugees and Migrants in Extradition and Expulsion Cases: Rule 
39 Indications [...]’, Res(2011)1788, 26 January 2011, para. 12(3).  
7  CDDH (2013c), para. 32.  
8  Darchiashvili (2010), para. 48.  
9  CDDH (2013c), para. 32.  
10  Ibid., para. 46.  
11  CDDH (2013e), para. 29. 
12  Ibid., para. 29. 
13  See, e.g.: Aliyev and Gadzhiyeva v. Russia (Comm.), No. 11059/12, 6 June 2012; Giorgi 
Mazanashvili v. Georgia (Comm.), No. 19882/07, 26 June 2012; Dukuly v. Netherlands (Dec.), No. 
62081/10, 9 October 2012, paras. 13-14.  
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measure.14 Additionally, when a state disagrees with an interim measure, it can 
express this at any time by submitting a request to the Court explaining why the 
measure should be lifted.15 The Court can grant the request based on new factual 
developments16 or on additional information set out in the request.17 The 
respondent state therefore is occasionally already given room for a response. 
Expressing disagreement is also facilitated by the Court’s new policy to 
communicate a case immediately when granting an interim request or rapidly 
thereafter, because the communication gives the state factual information to which 
it can respond.18 Therefore, there may be some room for a ‘“prior dialogue” 
between the Registry and the State concerned during the examination of the request 
for interim measures’, but this, according to the CDDH, can ‘and should in no way 
be systematic’, but rather a ‘solution for use on an ad hoc basis, on the basis of the 
Court’s decision and if the latter considers it useful to obtain specific, factual 
information’.19 The above recommendation could therefore also be replaced by the 
recommendation that the Court maintains its practice to, when relevant, already 
give the state room for a response or to facilitate this.  
Unilateral declarations: The Committee has at present no opportunity to 
become involved in unilateral declarations by supervising their execution, if they 
are not approved in a judgment or in a decision in which the Court orders costs.20 
These restrictions mean that the Committee normally does not become involved as 
most unilateral declarations are approved in a decision without an award of costs.21 
To ensure the Committee’s involvement and to thus create an additional opportunity 
for involvement, two courses of action can be taken.22 First, the Court could start 
approving unilateral declarations in judgments rather than in decisions. The Court 
took this approach previously, to bring about the Committee’s supervision of 
friendly settlements.23 The other course of action would be, possibly in response to 
the first, to amend Article 39 to empower the Committee to supervise the execution 
of unilateral declarations, regardless of whether they are approved in a judgment or 
decision. This also happened with friendly settlements, after the Court started to 
approve settlement proposals in judgments instead of in decisions.24 One 
                                                        
14  See, e.g.: B.S. and 232 Other Applications v. UK (Dec.), No. 7935/09 et al., 30 November 2010.  
15  Paladi v. Moldova (GC), No. 39806/05, 10 March 2009, para. 90.  
16  E.g., a development in the political situation in the applicant’s destination country, see: CDDH 
(2013c), para. 29.  
17  E.g., information about the detention conditions of the applicants and their children, see: Idem. 
18  Idem. 
19  CDDH (2013c), para. 51.  
20  The Committee only supervises the execution of adverse judgments and friendly settlements, see: 
section V.1.3; See also: Europe of Human Rights, ‘Unilateral Declarations under the Supervision of 
the Committee of Ministers’, 9 July 2012, (<www.europapraw.org/en/news/apel-o-poddanie-
jednostronnych-deklaracji-etpcz-nadzorowi-komitetu-ministrow>).  
21  See: section IX.1.4.5.  
22  See also: Lambert Abdelgawad (2014), 155, 160.  
23  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 94.  
24  Idem. 
 
 
 
 Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
559 
interviewee even wondered whether giving the Committee the competence to 
supervise the execution of unilateral declarations was overlooked when redrafting 
the Convention.25 It may be doubtful, as another interviewee noted, whether there 
are indeed many execution problems, considering that the respondent states make 
the declarations themselves.26 However, the states also voluntarily agree to a 
friendly settlement, and yet the Convention was amended make the Committee’s 
supervision of these settlements obligatory.  
Third-party interventions: It was repeatedly noted that interventions under 
Article 36(2) are particularly dialogic, while interventions made under the first 
paragraph of that Article are often a kind of diplomatic service to the applicant and 
therefore of less interest to dialogue. Under the latter paragraph, there is a right to 
intervene for those states of which one of their nationals is the applicant. Yet, 
although interventions under the second paragraph of Article 36 are more dialogic, 
states do not have such a right on paper. In practice however, they have a de facto 
right to intervene under the second paragraph as they are virtually never refused 
leave to intervene. It is suggested to amend the Convention to reflect this practice. 
This amendment would give the states a right to intervene in any chamber or Grand 
Chamber case, regardless of whether they are connected to the case by the 
nationality of the applicant. The states can then decide themselves whether their 
connection is sufficiently strong to submit an intervention. Such a connection can, 
for example, exist in that comparable legislation that causes the alleged violation in 
the respondent state can also be found in the intervening state. The proposed 
amendment would remove an extra procedural step towards an intervention, which 
possibly encourages the states to indeed intervene. Such encouragement is desirable 
considering that the states do not often intervene.27 Of course, states would not be 
given an unconditional right to intervene, which they also do not have under Article 
36(1).28 Their interventions can be made conditional on the requirement, which they 
are already, that they are detached from the facts of the case. This gives the Court 
the possibility to refuse interventions which do not comply with this requirement or 
to ask a state to redo its intervention. The amendment is not only desirable from a 
dialogic perspective. It is also a way to further implement and legitimise the de 
facto erga omnes effect of the Court’s judgments, because the states will always 
have the possibility to give their opinion on important developments in the Court’s 
case law that could have such an effect.29 After all, a judgment against one state 
may mean that other states also have to adapt domestic law or practice. The 
amendment can also be advocated from a practical perspective, because the deletion 
of an additional procedural step decreases the workload on the Court.  
                                                        
25  Execution interview 2.  
26  Judge interview 6.  
27  See: section IX.1.7.3.  
28  See: section IX.1.7.2.  
29  See also: section IX.1.7.3. 
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3.1.2 Procedures in the Execution Phase  
Article 46-indications: As was described, Article 46-indications are not very 
conducive to dialogue from the perspective of some indicators. This could in some 
cases be remedied when the Court would issue separate Article 46-judgments. It 
would then first find a violation in its judgments on the merits, conclude that the 
question of Article 46 is not yet ready for decision and decide on that question in a 
subsequent Article 46-judgment. Comparable proceedings are already possible for 
Article 41-awards. The Rules of Court provide that, when a violation is found and 
the question of the application of Article 41 ‘is not yet ready for decision’, the 
question is reserved in whole or in part and addressed in a friendly settlement, or, if 
such agreement is not reached, in a separate judgment.30 The Court uses this 
possibility in ‘a minority of cases’.31 A comparable provision could be added to the 
Rules of Court for Article 46-indications. This proposal gives the respondent state 
the possibility to give its opinion on which measures of a non-monetary nature 
would be needed to execute the judgment. It is particularly useful to pose this 
question after the Court has adopted an adverse judgment and not when 
communicating a case, because respondent states may think that any premature 
contemplation on this question could be interpreted as an admission of a violation.32 
Clearly, this measure would also increase respect for the subsidiarity principle, 
because it gives the respondent state the possibility to propose execution measures, 
possibly in a friendly settlement agreed with the applicant, which renders 
unnecessary issuing an Article 46-judgment. Additionally, it could even be 
envisaged to give the Committee, represented by the Execution Department, the 
possibility to become involved in Article 46-proceedings, so it can give its opinion 
on the desirability of execution measures and, when relevant, the required 
measures. This would create an extra opportunity for involvement, gives the 
Execution Department the possibility to share its expertise of execution matters and 
is advisable because Article 46(2) makes the Committee responsible for supervising 
execution matters. Because issuing additional Article 46-judgments further prolongs 
the already lengthy proceedings and means more work for the interlocutors as well 
as for the applicant, such judgments are only recommended when it is open to 
debate which execution measures, if any at all, should be implemented or when they 
could be controversial. Consequently, such judgments would, if the proposal would 
be implemented, mostly be issued in cases which underscore the need to implement 
                                                        
30  Rule 75(1),(4) of Court; See also: section VI.1.1. 
31  Harris et al. (2014), 157.  
32  See also: section XI.1.3.2 (explaining that states apparently feel restraint in genuinely answering 
the Court’s question whether a case is suitable for the PJP when they think acknowledging that a 
case is suitable for the PJP can be interpreted as an admission of a violation) and section IX.1.4.2 
(explaining that the required acknowledgement of a violation can form an obstacle to filing a 
unilateral observation).  
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general measures. Using the possibility to issue an extra judgment is not 
recommended if individual measures are required at once.  
3.2 How to Make the Convention-related Procedures more Dialogic in 
Practice  
3.2.1 Procedures in the (Pre-)Merits Phase  
Communication: The respondent states’ observations at times lack in quality. They 
therefore neither make full use of the opportunities for involvement offered by 
communication nor stimulate that the beneficial effects of this procedural step, 
established by relying on the indicators for dialogue, come to bloom. Respondent 
states with this problem are therefore recommended to pay more attention to the 
quality of their observations. Clearly, this would require an investment in time and 
resources.  
The interviewees explained that when the Court poses detailed questions when 
communicating a case, this tends to facilitate the work of the respondent state as 
well as of the Court, because usually clearer and more focussed information is 
submitted to Strasbourg.33 In view of these explanations, the Court could consider 
maintaining and, where possible, extending its practice of asking rather detailed 
questions in its communication to the parties. The result of this recommendation 
would be a (more) focussed dialogue, which helps ensure that the respondent state 
indeed shares responsibilities with the Court in an effective manner, as it is 
supposed to do in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. Another result may be 
that the reason-giving by the respondent state becomes clearer because it is more 
focussed. In the same vein and for the same purposes, the Court could maintain and 
perhaps even develop its practice to, in the letter accompanying the communication, 
direct the respondent state to only answer its questions and to explain that the 
remainder of the application may be declared inadmissible by a single judge.34 
These recommendations do not restrict the respondent state’s room for a response, 
because the Court’s questions and indications function as guidelines for its 
observations, meaning that it can explore matters going beyond what the Court asks 
for, if it considers this to be necessary to make a convincing case. To continue on 
the Court’s questions, it was also established that the Court sometimes asks 
questions of a rather general nature, which do not relate solely to the case of the 
applicant. The Court could continue this practice in particular when it comes to 
addressing execution and implementation problems. This practice is a means to 
explore problems causing external tension and, thereby, to increase the respondent 
state’s understanding of the Convention system and to emphasise how 
responsibilities are to be shared.  
                                                        
33  See: section IX.1.1.3.  
34  See: section IX.1.1.3. 
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For cases in which a state does not satisfactorily answer the questions posed by 
the Court, the latter has developed a practice of re-communicating a case to ask for 
additional observations.35 The Court could maintain and, where possible, extend 
this practice in order to point out to the respondent state that responsibilities can 
only be shared when observations of sufficient quality are submitted and, more 
generally, that a dialogue can only take place when each interlocutor takes the 
dialogue seriously. Re-communicating cases perhaps also stimulates states to pay 
more attention to the quality of their observations as was just recommended some 
states should.  
Friendly settlements: To increase the dialogicness of friendly settlements in 
practice, the Court could start reasoning its decisions to strike a case out under 
Article 39 more extensively, by relying on the human rights condition and by 
explaining why this condition would or would not require accepting the settlement. 
Enhanced reason-giving in and of itself makes the procedure more dialogic and it 
would also clarify to the respondent state and the applicant the standards to which a 
friendly settlement should live up, which could facilitate these settlements. Other 
researchers have also made this recommendation, mostly to protect the applicant 
party. They advised the Court to make ‘its reasoning more apparent in the text of 
the published friendly settlement’, in particular in Article 2 and 3 cases.36 
According to them, it is possible to both respect the confidentiality of friendly 
settlement proceedings and explain why ‘a friendly settlement is more appropriate 
than an authoritative judgment in the case of an applicant who has been allegedly 
ill-treated or tortured’.37 These researchers further recommended that ‘the Court 
formulates a self-binding internal rule where the justification for friendly 
settlements of such a sensitive nature is spelled out’.38  
Unilateral declarations: As unilateral declarations have clear dialogic potential 
and effect, states should continue to employ the procedure. The description of the 
functioning in practice of this procedural step leads to three suggestions as to how 
the number of approved unilateral declaration could be increased. First, the Court 
could more often invite the states to issue unilateral declarations in repetitive cases, 
as it did in the context of Kharuk and Others v. Ukraine.39 In this way, the external 
tension that is a result of such cases can also be addressed, because the invitation 
stimulates the respondent state to solve repetitive cases itself, meaning the Court 
does not have to take on this task, which should really not be its task. Second, the 
Court could adopt a policy of accepting the amounts of money offered by the 
respondent state in a unilateral declaration when they correspond to the amounts 
proposed by the Registry in a routine friendly settlement. Such a policy provides 
clarity to the respondent state as to which amounts are considered sufficient, 
                                                        
35  See: section IX.1.1.3. 
36  Keller et al. (2010), 148. 
37  Idem. 
38  Idem. 
39  See: section IX.1.4.1.  
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something which could stimulate that it indeed uses the procedure. This 
recommendation is born of the finding that a reason to not issue a unilateral 
declaration may be that the Court did not accept a past unilateral declaration, even 
though the state copied the amount proposed by the Registry. Third, the states 
themselves can take better care of their declarations, in order to make their content 
sufficient to justify a strike-out decision. In particular, they could state more clearly 
which remedies they intend to implement and ensure that these remedies are 
unconditional and not ex gratia in nature.  
Article 37(1)(c) strike-out decisions: A comparable recommendation as was 
made regarding friendly settlements can be made for Article 37(1)(c) strike-out 
decisions: the Court could reason more extensively why respect for human rights 
does not require it to continue examining an application. Currently, the Court does 
usually not explain in much detail why the human rights condition does not stand in 
the way of striking a case out, and changing this would make such decisions more 
dialogic. It is also suggested that the Court continues its practice of issuing 
judgments of principle. This enables states to, on their own initiative or in reaction 
to the Court’s proposal, take steps making subparagraph c strike-out decisions 
possible. The judgments of principle that made this possible and which were 
discussed in part 2 were all deportation cases.40 It is relatively easy for states other 
than the respondent state to react to judgments of principle in such cases, because 
the Court’s pronouncements are of a high level of generality (applicants cannot be 
deported to state X) and because the situation in their states is so similar to that in 
the respondent state (pending deportations of applicants to state X). Possibly, the 
Court could identify additional cases in respect of which such strike-out decisions 
are feasible in reaction to a judgment of principle.  
Hearings: Hearings have been found not to fully realise their dialogic potential 
in practice, because their content turned out to be of limited added value when 
compared to the written proceedings. The question therefore presents itself how this 
potential added value can be realised. One means would be, as suggested by an 
interviewee, to prolong the time during which the judges can ask questions at 
hearing.41 Another interviewee agreed, because hearings have no added value if no 
questions are posed.42 The Court could also ask the judges to ensure that at least 
some of them have prepared a question43 and to not ask questions the answer to 
which can be found in the written submissions of the parties.44 More generally, 
more different perspectives could be brought together at hearing so as to increase 
                                                        
40  See: section IX.1.5.1.  
41  Judge interview 1. 
42  Government agent interview 1.  
43  It at least happened once that not a single question was posed, see: webcast of the hearing in the 
case of Kononov v. Latvia (GC), No. 36376/04, 17 May 2010. 
44  The third Judge asking a question in Eweida and Others and the second Judge asking a question in 
Jaloud; Two interviewees confirmed that the judges sometimes ask rather basic questions at 
hearing: Government agent interview 3; Registry interview 5. 
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the likelihood that a hearing is of added value content-wise. The oral pleadings in 
the case of Al Nashiri v. Poland were delivered by the government agent together 
with the relevant domestic authority (the prosecutor). Making joint pleadings could 
be worthwhile, because it gives the judges the opportunity to interact directly with 
the responsible authority, rather than only with the government agent, who is 
usually also already responsible for drafting the written observations. Another way 
to bring in more voices would be to invite states that intervene in writing to also 
make an oral contribution. If there are various interveners with comparable 
arguments, they could choose a representative for the hearing to not unnecessarily 
prolong the procedure. Making such practical changes could help make hearings 
more than mostly a means to show the Court’s public face. Considering the 
significant amount of time and resources needed for a hearing, the Court could just 
as well consider these and additional ways in which this element of the procedure 
can be made more valuable from a dialogic perspective.  
Third-party interventions: The finding that that third-party interventions by 
states, and Article 36(2) interventions in particular, are clearly dialogic on paper 
and in practice, combined with the finding that that states do not intervene often, 
elicits the recommendation that states should use this opportunity for involvement 
more often. Consequently, the states would become increasingly involved in a 
dialogue that takes place on the basis of a case brought against another state. The 
outcome in that case can, however, become of relevance to more states than just the 
respondent states, which is the reason for their intervention. A President of the 
Court, writing extra-judicially, even argued that states bear some responsibility for 
the Court’s awareness of the consequences of its judgments in the different 
domestic legal systems.45 The drafters of Protocol 14 seem to agree with the 
recommendation; amongst them ‘there was wide agreement as to’, inter alia, ‘the 
need to encourage more frequent [...] interventions [...] in cases [...] which raise 
important general issues’.46 The Assembly and the Venice Commission are also 
proponents of state third-party interventions47 and the CDDH has advanced these 
interventions as ‘an important tool in the development of principles of general, or 
wide, application in the Court’s case law’.48 More specifically, the CDDH proposed 
that such interventions could be made ‘possibly following consultations with 
relevant national authorities, which may where appropriate include the judiciary’.49 
The states ‘should also consider taking action to inform other potentially interested 
States of forthcoming cases in which they may wish to’ intervene.50 As the research 
interviews revealed, government agents indeed ask each other to submit 
                                                        
45  Bratza (2011), 510-511; See also: Donald et al. (2012), 170. 
46  Explanatory Report to Protocol 14 ECHR, para. 19; CDDH (2012c), paras. 81, 94.  
47  Venice Commission, ‘Opinion 209/2002 on the Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, 
CDL-AD(2002)34, 18 December 2002, paras. 86-88.  
48  CDDH (2012c), para. 81.  
49  Ibid., para. 94. 
50  Idem. 
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interventions.51 This practice should therefore be maintained and possibly extended. 
The CDDH has also made the practical recommendation that states ‘should 
investigate and pursue means for sharing information on communicated cases 
amongst themselves, with a view to identifying those cases suitable to third-party 
interventions systematically and at the earliest possible stage’.52 For this purpose, ‘a 
“network of Agents” should be established, supported by an on-line discussion 
forum’.53  
Although the interventions are first and foremost an opportunity for the 
involvement of the states, the Court could play a role in encouraging them to 
intervene and to address certain matters in their interventions. Most proactively, the 
Court could ask states to intervene, as it has already done twice.54 Sending an 
invitation could be motivated by, for example, the fact that the respondent state and 
the invited state both know a certain legal phenomenon or by the fact that the way 
in which the law works in the invited state is relevant to resolving a case. The Court 
could also facilitate interventions by applying the time limits for requesting and 
making an intervention flexibly and by issuing press releases in which it identifies 
cases of great general importance.55 When a state already intends to intervene of its 
own motion, the Court can make the most of the intervention by asking specific 
questions to the intervener, which it has done at least once before.56 
As for interventions by the other interlocutors, it is suggested that the 
Commissioner continues to intervene on the same basis as the office does presently: 
seeking out cases where an intervention can make a significant contribution. A 
wholly different matter is whether the Assembly should ever be given leave to 
intervene under Article 36(2). There is no precedent for this. On the contrary, when 
an Assembly member requested leave to intervene, he was refused leave.57 During 
the interviews, the judges responded generally cautiously to the question whether 
interventions by individual parliamentarians or Assembly committees would be of 
added value and should be permitted.58 To illustrate, one judge noted that, if the 
majority of the Assembly agrees about a certain matter, it can already express its 
agreement in a recommendation to the Committee.59 The Court can then, as it 
already does sometimes, mention this recommendation or even rely on it in its 
                                                        
51  See: section IX.1.7.3. 
52  CDDH (2009), para. 28. 
53  Idem.  
54  See: section IX.1.7.3. 
55  Venice Commission, ‘Opinion 209/2002 on the Implementation of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, 
CDL-AD(2002)34, 18 December 2002, para. 88; See also: CDDH (2009), para. 30 (similar 
recommendations but concerning NHRIs, non-governmental organisations and other civil society 
actors).  
56  See: section IX.7.3. 
57  See: section IX.7.4. 
58  Judge interview 1; Judge interview 2; Judge interview 3; Judge interview 6. 
59  Judge interview 3.  
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judgment.60 Another judge was, however, slightly more positive in case the 
Assembly has published a relevant report, as the Court cannot engage in fact-
finding itself and should therefore take into consideration the fact-finding work 
carried out by others.61 The reports on human rights matters are generally of a good 
quality, making interventions based on these reports a way to assist the Court.62 To 
this it can, however, be added that the Court can also rely on a report in the absence 
of an intervention. Considering the foregoing, it is proposed that the Court decides 
on a case-by-case basis whether an intervention by the Assembly should be 
admitted, but that it does not exclude this possibility altogether.  
Judgments: To maintain and to continue to develop the dialogic nature of its 
judgments, the Court could pay attention to in particular the quality and consistency 
of its judgments. It could also cultivate its searching and elaborative style and the 
techniques upon which it relies to avoid offending sensibilities. Further, it would be 
beneficial for the purpose of dialogue if the Court were to carry on issuing 
judgments with a scope that is broader than strictly required to decide the individual 
case. A broader scope namely increases the understanding of the functioning of the 
Convention system of not only the respondent state but also of other states.63 It 
would also be beneficial for the same purpose if the Court continues to rely on 
domestic judgments as well as on reporting and standard-setting documents 
compiled by the other interlocutors. Even though these documents are relied upon 
by the Court of its own motion, they can help substantiate its reasoning, increase 
understanding and balanced decision-making. The Court could also consider 
thinking ahead more than it already does and to think about the impact on the 
execution process of the way in which a judgment is phrased. Taking such an 
‘execution perspective’ would ease the dialogue between the Committee, as aided 
by the Execution Department, and the respondent state upon a judgment’s adoption. 
Referral: A recommendation that follows logically from this study is that the 
panel that decides on requests for referral starts reasoning its refusals. Making this 
recommendation is, however, of little practical use considering that the Izmir 
Declaration already made this recommendation in vain.64  
3.2.2 Procedures in the Execution Phase  
Article 46-indications: It was established that is not always possible to derive from 
the Court’s reasoning why it makes an Article 46-indication in one case, but not in 
another. Nor is it always clear why it indicates general measures without adopting a 
pilot judgment in some cases and orders such measures in a pilot judgment in other 
cases. Although it is understandably difficult to make its reasoning more explicit in 
                                                        
60  See: section IX.1.8.2. 
61  Judge interview 2. 
62  Judge interview 7.  
63  See also: Harmsen (2001), 32-33; Helfer (2008), 139.  
64  See: section IX.1.9.3.  
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these regards, the Court is nevertheless recommended to consider whether it could 
motivate more clearly its choices under Article 46. On another note, the description 
in part 2 revealed that the Court exceptionally indicates what is not required in 
terms of execution or even that no execution measures are required at all, thus 
making a ‘negative’ Article 46-indication. These indications remain rare.65 To 
enhance the clarity of its judgments for the purpose of execution, the Court could 
perhaps use Article 46 more often in a negative manner, if relevant cases present 
themselves. This is also a means to give judgments more of an execution 
perspective, a recommendation which was made above. The Court seems to agree 
with these suggestions, as it has stated that ‘indicating in the judgment ‘that apart 
from the payment of any just satisfaction awarded, no other measure [...] is 
required’ is ‘one possibility for bringing greater clarity to the execution stage of 
proceedings’.66  
Action plans/reports: The respondent states are recommended to, where 
necessary, improve their efforts to submit complete and updated action plans/ 
reports of a high quality on time.67 Participants in a round table dedicated to these 
documents also ‘agreed that the quality and visibility both at national and European 
level could be further improved’.68 If a delay nevertheless occurs, the states could 
better explain why this happened, by pointing out, for example, practical difficulties 
and difficulties relating to internal tension. Clearly, such difficulties should not be 
relied upon as an excuse for a failure to execute a judgment fully and timely. The 
quality of the documents also might improve when the states explain more than they 
do now how exactly their execution measures secure that a judgment is executed, 
by referring to the judgment at issue.  
Clearly, these proposals normally require resources. Indeed, a large number of 
the participants in the round table also ‘drew attention to the need for States to 
allocate sufficient resources (in the broad sense) at the national level, deployed at an 
appropriate level of authority’.69 Additional resources are not necessarily required, 
however, if the states provide for efficient organisation of the action plans/reports. 
States can, for example, ensure that the person who is in charge of drafting action 
plans/reports remains in charge for a substantial period so as to ensure that 
knowledge is not lost, something which would inevitably undermine the quality of 
the submissions.  
                                                        
65  Execution interview 9.  
66  ECtHR (2015e), para. 18.  
67  See also: HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action 
Plan para. B(2)(a); See more generally and elaborately: Directorate General of Human Rights and 
Rule of Law, Directorate of Human Rights and Execution Department, ‘Guide for the Drafting of 
Action Plans and Reports for the Execution of Judgments of the [ECtHR]’, Series ‘Vade-mecum’, 
n° 1, 2015, (<www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/Source/Documents/Tables_rondes/CONF_ 
Bruxelles_mars_2015/Guide%20for%20the%20drafting%20of%20action%20plans%20and%20rep
orts_06.07.2015_EN.pdf>).  
68  Committee (2015), 205.  
69  Idem.  
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DH meetings: The dialogicness of DH meetings could be enhanced when the 
states would extend their practice of sending other officials than only their deputy to 
these meetings. This is beneficial to increasing their understanding of the 
Convention requirements and, specifically, the need to execute the judgment fully 
and timely. The involvement of more different persons may also be a way to 
decrease the extent to which the meetings are politically charged.70 Supervision is 
now ‘too often [...] left only to Foreign Ministries, where quite naturally diplomatic 
considerations and the need to preserve good bilateral relations play a strong role’.71 
It would therefore ‘really help maintain and develop the common European legal 
space created by the Convention and the quasi-judicial nature of the role of the 
[Committee] if [...] other ministries would feel more concerned by the execution 
process and were aware of its real nature and spirit’.72 In addition to this, the states 
are recommended to preserve their practice to hold thematic debates once in a 
while. These debates help elaborate principles that steer the Committee’s practice, 
which can guide national authorities in solving complex execution problems. 
Moreover, experiences and solutions can be shared.73 
Bi- and multilateral meetings: It is clearly desirable that the Execution 
Department continues to interact with respondent states through bilateral meetings 
as well as through multilateral meetings. Regarding bilateral meetings specifically, 
the Director General of the Directorate General of Human Rights and the Rule of 
Law of the Council of Europe remarked that a ‘better capacity to respond to 
requests from respondent States’ for assistance programmes’ needs to be 
developed.74 This need exists because ‘[i]n many situations there is a window for 
opportunity for change and if it cannot be seized immediately it is lost (e.g. the 
opportunity to participate in the assessment of draft legislation before it is passed, 
perhaps, in a rush, through parliament)’.75 In the Brussels Declaration too, it is 
remarked that the ‘Secretary General and, through him, the Execution Department’ 
should ‘enhance, when necessary, bilateral dialogue with States Parties, in 
particular by means of early assessment of action plans or action reports and 
through working meetings, involving all relevant national stakeholders, to promote, 
in full respect of the principle of subsidiarity, a common approach concerning 
judgments with regard to the measures required to secure compliance’.76 
Considering these remarks, the practice of bilateral meetings should not only be 
maintained, but may also be improved at points.  
                                                        
70  See: section X.2.3.5.  
71  Imbert (2004).  
72  Idem.  
73  See: section X.2.3.5.  
74  Committee (2013a), 16.  
75  Idem.  
76  HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
para. C(2)(d).  
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Requests for interpretation: Since requests for interpretation have clear 
dialogic potential, the Committee could consider starting to use this procedure when 
an appropriate case is available. The Brussels Declaration has also encouraged the 
Committee to ‘consider the use, where necessary, of the procedures foreseen under 
Article 46 of the Convention, when the conditions have been satisfied’.77 According 
to the Court, the potential of requests for interpretation ‘to aid the execution process 
deserves fresh appraisal’.78  
Infringement proceedings: The same recommendation can be made in relation 
to infringement proceedings as was made for requests for interpretation: it would be 
valuable for the Committee to start using the infringement procedure, since this 
procedural step certainly has some dialogic potential on paper. As was just noted, 
the Brussels Declaration made a recommendation to the same effect. Further, a 
President of the Court underlined at two occasions, albeit in general and careful 
language, that invoking this procedure is certainly an option worth exploring. At a 
conference on the long-term future of the Court, he stated that: ‘[j]e ne peux que 
regretter qu’à ce jour, le Comité des Ministres n’a pas usé de cette faculté’ offered 
by Protocol 14.79 Second, in a speech delivered at an ordinary session of the 
Committee, he noted that ‘[c]et outil, resté inexploité jusqu’à présent, pourrait 
s’avérer utile dans le futur’.80 Additionally and was cited before,81 the Court has 
stated that ‘[t]he potential of Article 46 §§ 4-5 to formally involve the Court at the 
execution stage, along with the type of circumstances in which recourse to this 
procedure would be appropriate, deserve in-depth reflection’.82 An NGO has made 
a comparable recommendation, suggesting that the Committee holds a debate to 
explore the circumstances under which it should resort to infringement proceedings. 
The NGO also proposed something more far-reaching: the Committee could 
consider rendering the procedure automatic ‘in specified grave instances’.83 
When the procedure is invoked eventually, it would be important for the Court 
to opt for a certain interpretation of Article 46. A strict reading of the Article would 
give the Court only the choice between finding a violation or instructing the 
Committee to end its supervisory exercise.84 Alternatively, however, the Court 
could interpret Article 46 so as to also make it an option to instruct the respondent 
state to continue executing the judgment, when the state is already in the process of 
fulfilling its Article 46-obligation but had not completed it when infringement 
proceedings started. Possibly, the Court could give the state instructions when it 
uses this option, in a comparable manner as when it makes an Article 46-indication. 
                                                        
77  Idem, Action Plan para. C(1)(a).  
78  ECtHR (2015e), para. 17.  
79  Spielmann (2014b).  
80  Spielmann (2014c).  
81  See: section X.2.6. 
82  ECtHR (2015e), para. 16.  
83  Goldstone (Open Society Justice Initiative), ‘Summary of the Main Points’, (<www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
standardsetting/cddh/reformechr/gt-gdr-f/Goldston.pdf>), 3.  
84  See also: section VI.2.6. 
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If the Court would follow this recommendation, it would extend its room for a 
response, thereby enhancing the dialogicness of the proceedings.  
Assembly questions and recommendations: The Assembly feels duty-bound 
to contribute to the execution of the Court’s judgment and Assembly questions and 
recommendations have clear dialogic potential.85 These two procedural steps are 
nevertheless of little practical significance, meaning that the Assembly cannot fulfil 
its duty, at least not by these steps. These reflections beg the question how the 
significance of these means of communication with the Committee about the 
execution of the Court’s judgments can be give more significance. One way of 
going about this may be to ask less basic questions and to ask them more often. 
Currently, the Assembly asks few questions and the answers to the questions can 
often be found in documents, such as decisions, which the Committee makes 
publicly available. It could, for example, ask whether the Committee will ensure 
that a certain indispensable execution measure will be implemented, thus signalling 
to the Committee which measures it thinks are important to the full execution of a 
judgment. The Committee, for its part, could reply to each question and reply to the 
questions swiftly, as this does not always happen. The Committee should also reply 
to the Assembly’s recommendations more promptly. To continue on 
recommendations, it is suggested that the Assembly continues to adopt these 
documents and maintains its practice to issue accompanying reports on the 
implementation of the Convention which are based on states visits. Especially state 
visits, where the rapporteur discusses Convention matters with the domestic 
authorities, could be of added value, because these authorities will rarely directly 
discuss such matters with Council of Europe representatives. The Assembly could 
also further develop its practice to mention the implementation of the Convention or 
the (delayed or incomplete) execution of a specific judgment in a recommendation 
on human rights, as there will virtually always be relevant case law available.  
Commissioner country visits and reports: The Commissioner could be 
encouraged to advance its practice to point out already identified and future 
execution and implementation problems during the visits and in the reports. In line 
with the foregoing, the Brussels Conference advised the Commissioner ‘in the 
exercise of his/her functions – and in particular in his/her country visits – to 
continue to address with the States Parties, on a case-by-case basis, issues relating 
to the execution of judgments’.86 The CDDH has also concluded that the 
Commissioner can usefully promote the execution of the Court’s judgments and the 
Assembly thinks that co-operation with the Committee could be stepped up in the 
area of execution.87 
Decisions and interim resolutions: It is recommended that the Committee 
maintains its practice, which is beneficial for the purposes of dialogue, to give room 
                                                        
85  See: section X.2.7.  
86  HLC on the Implementation of the ECHR, ‘Brussels Declaration’, 27 March 2015, Action Plan 
para. C(3)(e).  
87  CDDH (2004), para. 26; Gardetto (2007), para. 83.  
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for a response to the respondent state under scrutiny prior to adopting a draft 
document. The Committee should also continue to make positive remarks, in 
addition to more critical remarks, and to address various states, and not just the 
usual suspects, in these documents.  
Follow-up cases: The Committee seems to be willing to facilitate the adoption 
of follow-up cases and to take them into account when supervising the execution of 
a judgment. It is recommended that the Committee preserves its facilitative 
approach towards follow-up cases, which have some dialogic potential and are 
somewhat dialogic. This approach includes suspending its supervisory exercise in 
response to the filing of a follow-up case, as it did at least once,88 and relying on 
and referring to the Court’s follow-up cases. The first measure should only be taken 
exceptionally, because it means further lengthening an already lengthy process of 
execution. For this reason, the CDDH has proposed that taking account of a 
subsequent judgment could ‘only be justified in exceptional circumstances and 
should not involve suspending closure of a case, at the risk of unduly prolonging the 
process’.89 It is nevertheless recommended that the Committee takes this measure 
only in exceptional cases, especially because when executing a judgment is already 
a troublesome and lengthy process, the deadlock between the Committee and the 
respondent state may be broken by a new (follow-up) judgment.  
A suggestion of a different nature is that the Court rethinks its approach to 
individual follow-up cases. It now repeatedly states in these cases that it has no 
power to examine execution measures; it only pronounces on their consequences. In 
practice, it has appeared, however, that the distinction between, on the one hand, the 
execution measures, and, on the other hand, their consequences, is artificial, 
perhaps even too artificial to be maintained. In order to remove this artificial 
element from the Court’s dialogue with a respondent state and to thus increase the 
clarity and predictability of its case law, this suggestion is made. It carries however 
too far to address the question how the Court could change its approach.90  
Regarding general follow-up cases specifically, it is proposed that the Court 
sustains its practice to address in these cases general follow-up measures, even if 
this is not really needed to make a decision in the applicant’s case, and to clarify its 
own case law.91 
3.2.3 The Pilot-judgment Procedure 
It was concluded that the PJP is already dialogic in practice. Nevertheless, different 
improvements still could be made. In particular, the Commissioner could be 
encouraged to become more involved in the PJP. This would fit well with the 
                                                        
88  See: section X.2.10.5.  
89  CDDH (2013h), para. 14. 
90  See for suggestions: Sidabras and Others v. Lithuania, No. 50421/08 et al., 23 June 2015, 
Concurring Opinion of Judge Keller and Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Spano and Kjølbro.  
91  See: section. X.2.11.2.  
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office’s function and mandate. The question can also be addressed whether the 
Committee should be given an additional opportunity for involvement in the PJP.  
The Commissioner is especially well placed to become more involved in the PJP 
since his mandate prevents him from taking up individual complaints.92 (S)he must 
therefore concentrate on dysfunctions and general measures to address such 
problems, which is exactly what the Court concentrates on and addresses in a pilot 
judgments To illustrate, Commissioner Muižnieks announced that one of his 
priorities would be ‘seeking to assist some countries address the structural causes 
behind high numbers of complaints’ before the Court.93 His office can furthermore 
‘play a critical role in assisting member states in improving their judiciaries and [in] 
addressing systemic problems leading to many applications before the [Court]’.94  
The Commissioner has, neither on paper nor in practice, an opportunity to 
become involved prior to the Court’s decision to apply the PJP. It is therefore 
suggested to give the Commissioner the right to suggest that a domestic dysfunction 
is addressed in a pilot judgment and to comment on the suitability of processing an 
application in accordance with the PJP. Commissioner Hammarberg supported this 
suggestion, for he stated that, ‘with the assistance of NHRIs, [he] could assist the 
Court in identifying cases that should give rise to a pilot judgment’.95 Comparably, 
a legal advisor to the Commissioner remarked that the Commissioner may ‘play a 
particular role in identifying candidates for ‘preventive’ pilot judgments where 
there is a clear systemic problem but repetitive applications have not yet 
proliferated’.96  
Third-party interventions already give the Commissioner the right to participate 
in the PJP once the procedure is initiated and before the Court issues a pilot 
judgment. The Commissioner could be encouraged to indeed submit such 
interventions and to use them to comment on the problem at stake and the remedial 
measure which should be implemented. In spite of the office’s mandate and 
Hammarberg’s statement that he could help define ‘realistic, inventive and precise 
prescriptions’ of the execution measures and create understanding of difficulties 
which may prevent the implementation of these measures,97 the Commissioner has 
not yet intervened in a pilot case.  
Lastly, the Commissioner could, more than (s)he is already, become concerned 
with the execution of the Court’s pilot judgments, something which does not 
necessarily require his/her involvement in proceedings at the level of the Council of 
Europe. The Commissioner could, as suggested by Hammarberg, ‘offer his good 
                                                        
92  Committee, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’, Res(1999)508, 7 May 
1999, Art. 1(2); See also: section X.2.8. 
93  Muižnieks (2013a), 3.  
94  Muižnieks (2013c).  
95  Commissioner Hammarberg cited in: Leach et al. (2010), 182; See also: Kitsou-Milonas (2009), 95; 
Weber (2010), 2.  
96  Weber (2010), 3. 
97  Commissioner Hammarberg cited in: Leach et al. (2010), 182.  
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offices to the Member State(s) concerned, either specifically or in the course of his 
visits, bilateral contacts or via his privileged relations with national Ombudspersons 
and/or National Human Rights Institutions’.98 The problem which the respondent 
state must solve to execute the pilot judgment can then ‘become a priority in the 
continuous dialogue between the Commissioner and the member State’.99 (S)he 
could ‘in particular, suggest or validate the means proposed to redress the systemic 
defect’.100 Further, the Commissioner could inform the Court and the Committee 
‘as to whether or not practices or situations declared in breach of the Convention by 
the Court persist or have actually been discontinued.’101 Clearly, the Commissioner 
could also take such steps outside the context of the PJP when relevant.102 
The proposal made by some scholars to also give the Committee (represented by 
the Execution Department) an opportunity for involvement in the PJP can also be 
repeated here, in particular the suggestion for the Committee to become involved in 
the negotiations leading to the adoption of a friendly settlement.103 The Committee 
can thus give its opinion on the required general remedial measures, because 
friendly settlements concluded in the context of the PJP ‘shall [...] comprise a 
declaration [...] on the implementation of the general measures identified in the pilot 
judgment’.104 This recommendation is comparable to the one made above for 
Article 46-indications, where it was recommended that the Committee could give 
its opinion on required execution measures prior to the adoption of an Article 46-
judgment. It makes sense to permit the Committee’s involvement in negotiations on 
general measures, because it must supervise the execution of these measures and 
because the Execution Department discusses these measures with the respondent 
state. The proposal would also better ensure that responsibilities are shared in 
accordance with the Convention in the PJP. It is the Committee’s job to supervise 
execution after all. It is, furthermore, particularly important to give the Committee a 
say in the choice of general measures, because the Convention does not give the 
Court the power to rule on such measures in the same way as it gives the Court the 
power to, for example, award just satisfaction. This opportunity will, however, 
probably only arise rarely because it only arises when the Court adjourns dealing 
with the question of just satisfaction in its pilot judgment, which happened only five 
times so far. Moreover, a friendly settlement including general measures gained the 
Court’s approval only twice.105 Considering these remarks of a practical nature and 
the above reasons for giving the Committee a say in the choice of (general) 
execution measures, it may be more appropriate to give the Committee a broader 
                                                        
98  Hammarberg (2006), para. 13.  
99  Idem.  
100  Idem.  
101  Hammarberg (2007), para. 7.  
102  Hammarberg (2006), para. 14.  
103  Keller et al. (2010), 152. 
104  Rule 61(7) of Court.  
105  See: section XI.2.1.2.  
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opportunity for involvement. It could be permitted to become involved in 
negotiations on general measures between the Court (represented by the Registry) 
and the respondent state, also when these take place outside the context of friendly 
settlement negotiations. This has already happened in the case of Maria Atanasiu 
and Others v. Romania where representatives of the respondent state, together with 
the Execution Department and the Registry carried out consultations of a draft 
law.106 
The Court could consider continuing its practice to not give overly detailed 
instructions on the remedial measures that the respondent state must implement. In 
this way, responsibilities are shared – as much as is possible in a procedure like the 
PJP – in conformity with the Convention, the state has room to respond and the 
Committee can flesh out the exact content of the remedies with the state. It is also 
recommended that the Court preserves its practice of rather non-intrusive review of 
the implemented remedial measures in order to also respect the prescribed division 
of responsibilities. More specifically, it was found that the Court adjourned dealing 
with comparable applications (in part) in 18 out of the 22 pilot judgments. The 
Court should certainly maintain this practice, as it gives the respondent state inter 
alia room for a response and a way to become involved. It was also established that 
the Court does not always identify the problem necessitating the PJP in the 
operative provisions of its judgment. It is recommended that the Court makes an 
identification to this effect at all times, in conformity with the Rules of Court, 
because it gives a clear signal to the respondent state, pointing out that the 
dysfunction must be remedied. Lastly, the Court could expand its reasoning in three 
regards. First, it could analyse the domestic problem and its causes more 
extensively in its pilot judgment. This would enhance the respondent state’s 
understanding that not only the consequences of the problem should be remedied, 
but also the problem itself. This would furthermore shed light on the scope of the 
problem that needs to be solved.107 Such an analysis could be a(n) (partial) answer 
to the criticism that it is not always clear why the PJP is applied to some domestic 
problems and why a certain application, usually from a large pool of suitable 
applications, is selected for treatment under the PJP. The Court could also motivate 
more elaborately its decision to apply the PJP and its reasons for imposing a time 
limit (of a certain length). 
 
 
                                                        
106  See: section XI.1.5.1.  
107  This was also suggested in: Execution interview 12.  
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APPENDIX I 
INTERVIEWEES RESEARCH INTERVIEWS1 
 
 
 
Judges  
 
1. Helen Keller 
2. Paul Lemmens 
3. Paul Mahoney 
4. Angelika Nußberger 
5. András Sajó 
6. Johannes Silvis 
7. Dean Spielmann  (President of the Court)  
 
Registry 
 
8. Guillem Cano-Palomares  (Lawyer Research Division)  
9. Claire Dubois-Hamdi (Lawyer) 
10. Lawrence Early  (Jurisconsult) 
11. Erik Fribergh  (Registrar) 
12. Nico Mol  (Senior Lawyer)  
13. Clare Ovey  (Head of Division)  
14. Michael O’Boyle  (Deputy Registrar) 
15. Ellen Penninckx  (Assistant Lawyer) 
 
Execution  
 
16. Corinne Amat  (Head of Division, Execution Department) 
17. Anna Austin  (Human Rights and Monitoring Mechanisms,  
  Secretariat of the Committee of Ministers) 
18. Ellen Berends  (Permanent Representative of the Netherlands  
  to the Council of Europe) 
19. Zoé Bryanston-Cross  (Head of Section, Execution Department) 
20. Özgur Derman  (Head of Division, Execution Department) 
                                                        
1 The numbers do not correspond with the numbers used to refer in the footnotes to the research 
interviews so as to ensure the anonomity of the interviewees. Because two interviewees were 
interviewed in one interview, these interviewees are referred to with the same number; The function 
in brackets is the function of the interviewee at the time of the interview and therefore in June/July 
2014. 
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21. Frédéric Dolt  (Legal Officer, Execution Department) 
22. Selma de Groot  (Legal Adviser to the Permanent  
  Representation of the Netherlands to the  
  Council of Europe)  
23. Laura Ielciu  (Legal Officer, Execution Department) 
24. Szymon Janczarek  (Legal Officer, Execution Department) 
25. Irène Kitsou-Milonas  (Head of Section, Execution Department) 
26. Dimitrina Lilovska  (Head of Section, Execution Department) 
27. Geneviève Mayer  (Head of Department, Execution Department) 
28. Patrick Schafer  (Legal Officer, Execution Department) 
29. Fredrik Sundberg  (Deputy Head of Department, Execution  
  Department) 
 
Government Agents  
 
30. Roeland A.A. Böcker  (The Netherlands) 
31. Hans-Jörg Behrens  (Germany) 
32. Arto Kosonen  (Finland)  
33. Kristīne Līcis  (Latvia) 
34. Maris Kuurberg  (Estonia) 
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APPENDIX II 
SAMPLE OF QUESTIONNAIRE1 
 
 
 
Pre-merits: The respondent state’s written and oral observations  
Category The observations  
Question 1. Do the respondent states normally answer the questions 
satisfyingly, in the sense that the requested factual information 
is given and that the questions regarding the merits are fully 
answered?  
Follow-up - Does it matter whether the observations are made orally at a 
hearing or in writing in response to the ‘Statements of Facts and 
Question to the Parties’? 
Category The Court’s reliance on the observations  
Question  2. What is the influence of the respondent state’s observations 
on the Court’s reasoning and findings? 
Follow-up  - What it the consequence incompletely or not answering a 
question?  
- Is it e.g. more likely that a violation will be found?  
- Is it e.g. a judgment that is potentially be problematic for the 
respondent state because the Court did not have the benefit of the 
respondent state’s observations?  
- Does it matter whether the observations are made orally at 
hearing or in writing in response to the ‘Statements of Facts and 
Question to the Parties’?  
Pre-merits: Hearings  
Category Reasons to hold a hearing  
Question 3. When does the Court consider ‘that the discharge of its 
functions under the Convention’ requires it to hold a hearing 
(Rules of Court 54(5) and 59(3))?  
Follow-up  - How does the decision-making process work? 
- Does the Court seek the views of the respondent state on the 
suitability of a case for a hearing? 
- Do respondent states request hearings?  
- Which reasons play a role in the decision to hold a hearing?  
- If respondent states request hearings, is a request to that effect a 
                                                        
1  This questionnaire was sent to the judges and relied upon during the interviews with the judges. 
The questionnaires sent to other categories of interviewees are on file with the author. 
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reason to hold a hearing? 
Category The hearing  
Question 4. What is the added-value of hearings as compared to asking 
questions and filing observations in writing?  
Follow-up  - If hearings have added-value, are they most useful to illuminating 
the facts or the state’s view on the merits or to both? 
- If hearings have added-value, how can they be used to their 
fullest potential?  
Category  Frequency 
Question 5. The number of hearings, in particular Chamber hearings, 
seems to be decreasing since 2005. Is this the consequence of a 
policy of the Court to hold less hearings, in particular 
Chamber hearings?  
Follow-up  - If so, why does the Court intend to decrease the total number of 
hearings? 
- If so, why does the Court focus on Grand Chamber hearings?  
Pre-merits: Third-party interventions  
Category State third-party interventions  
Question 6. Do state third-party interventions have added-value?  
Follow-up  - Do they help to increase the balancedness of the merits?  
- Do they help to establish whether consensus or, the opposite, a 
diversity of viewpoints exists on a certain issue?  
- Do they help to gain insight into the political and legal situation in 
states other than the respondent state for which the judgment may 
be of relevance?  
- Do they help to decrease the burden on the Court as regards fact-
finding? 
- Do they provide the Court with information which it, in the 
absence of an intervention, would not have? 
- Do your answers apply to both oral interventions at hearing and 
written interventions? 
Question 7. Would you welcome more state third-party interventions?  
Follow-up  - If so, how could states be encouraged to intervene?  
- Does your answer apply to both oral interventions at hearing and 
written interventions?  
Category Third-party interventions by the Commissioner for Human Rights 
(CHR)  
Question 8. Do interventions of the CHR have added-value? 
Follow-up - If so, for which reasons?  
Question 9. Would you welcome more frequent interventions of the 
CHR?  
Follow-up  - If so, how could the CHR be encouraged to intervene?  
- Does your answer apply to both oral interventions at hearing and 
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written interventions? 
Category Third-party interventions by the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE)  
Question 10. Would you welcome interventions by PACE committees 
and/or individual members?  
Follow-up  - If so, what would be the added-value of PACE interventions?  
- If so, how could the PACE be encouraged to intervene? 
- Does your answer apply to both oral interventions at hearing and 
written interventions? 
Pre-merits: Unilateral declarations  
Category  Expedited Committee procedure  
Question  11. Will the Court use the expedited Committee procedure 
which it used after Kharuk and Others V Ukraine more often?  
Merits: Judgments  
Category  The Court’s reliance on other interlocutors  
Question  12. Does the factual information submitted by the respondent 
state generally suffice for the Court to establish the facts?  
Question  13. How much weight does the Court attach to the findings of 
domestic authorities?  
Follow-up - Which factors determine the weight which the Court attaches to 
these findings?  
- What are reasons to depart from these findings?  
- Does it matter whether the findings were made by the domestic 
courts or by other authorities?  
- Do your answers apply to both the findings of fact and the 
findings regarding the merits?  
- It seems the Court normally only indicates where it disagrees 
regarding the merits with the observations of the respondent state, 
whilst it does indicate where it agrees with domestic judges on this 
point. If this observations is correct, why is this the Court’s 
practice?  
Question  14. What role do documents of the CM, the Commissioner for 
Human Rights and the Parliamentary Assembly, which the 
Court sometimes mentions in its judgments, play?  
Follow-up  - Are they used to supplement or verify the factual information 
submitted by the respondent state?  
- Are they instrumental in forming the Court’s view on the merits of 
the case? 
Category  Reasoning  
Question  15. Why does the Court reason its judgments quite elaborately?  
Follow-up  - In order to avoid offending sensibilities?  
- In order to ‘educate’ the respondent state and other states parties 
about the Convention guarantees?  
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Question  16. With which audience in mind is a judgment written?  
Category  Separate opinions 
Question  17. With which audience in mind do you write a separate 
opinion?  
Follow-up  - Is the audience different from that of a judgment?  
- Would you/do you use separate opinion to speak to the state 
and/or certain domestic authorities?  
Question  18. Are separate opinions read by the other judges on a case 
prior to adopting the judgment?  
 - If so, does this sometimes lead to adjustments to the judgment? 
- If they lead to adjustments, what type of adjustments are made?  
- Or do, if at all, separate opinions only influence future majorities?  
Merits: Referral  
Question  19. Why is the acceptance rate of requests for referral only 
about five percent?  
Execution: The role of the Committee of Ministers under Article 46 
Question  20. How do you see the role of the CM under Article 46(2)?  
Follow-up  - Do you, for example, expect the CM to not only verify that it is 
possible to reopen a case, but to also await and examine the 
outcome of a reopening procedure?  
- Do you think the Court sometimes has a different expectation of 
how the CM should fulfil its role form how the CM fulfils its role in 
practice?  
Question  21. Should the Committee of Ministers be entrusted with a 
general competence to supervise compliance with decisions 
based on unilateral declarations? 
Execution: The role of the Court under Article 46 
Question  22. Why does the Court, seemingly with increasing frequency, 
precision and force indicate individual and general execution 
measures under Article 46? 
Follow-up - Is your answer different depending on whether the measure is an 
individual measure or a general measure?  
Execution: The Pilot Judgment Procedure (PJP) 
Question  23. Is the existence of a practice incompatible with the 
Convention a factor warranting the application of the PJP? 
Question  24. How does the respondent state’s view on the suitability of a 
case for the application of the PJP affect the decision to apply 
the PJP?  
Follow-up - Is some willingness to cooperate with the PJP a condition for 
applying the PJP?  
- Would a request be factor warranting the application of the PJP?  
 
 
 
 Appendix II 
 
 
581 
Question  25. Which factors determine whether the Court issues a pilot 
judgment or indicates general measures outside the context of a 
pilot?  
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APPENDIX III 
FULL PILOT JUDGMENTS1 
 
 
 
2004 
 
1. Broniowski v. Poland (GC), No. 31443/96, 22 June 2004 
 
2006 
 
2. Hutten-Czapska v. Poland (GC), No. 35014/97, 19 June 2006 
 
2009 
 
3. Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), No. 33509, 5 January 2009 
4. Olaru and Others v. Moldova, No. 476/07 et al., 28 July 2009 
5. Ivanov v. Ukraine, No. 40450/04, 15 October 2009  
6. Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, No. 27912/02, 3 November 2009 
 
2010 
 
7. Rumpf v. Germany, No. 46344/06, 2 September 2010 
8. Atanasiu and Others v. Romania, No. 30767/05 et al., 12 October 2010 
9. Greens and M.T. v. UK, No. 60041/08 et al., 23 November 2010 
10. Athanasiou and Others v. Greece, No. 50973/08, 21 December 2010 
 
2011 
 
11. Finger v. Bulgaria, No. 37346/05, 10 May 2011 
12. Dimitrov and Hamanov v. Bulgaria, No. 48059/06, 10 May 2011 
 
2012 
 
13. Ananyev and Others v. Russia, No. 42525/07 et al., 10 January 2012 
14. Ümmühan Kaplan v. Turkey, No. 24240/07, 20 March 2012 
15. Michelioudakis v. Greece, No. 54447/10, 3 April 2012 
16. Kurić and Others v. Slovenia (GC), No. 26828/06, 26 June 2012 
                                                        
1  From June 2004 to July 2014. 
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17. Puto and Others v. Albania, No. 604/07 et al., 31 July 2012 
18. Glykantzi v. Greece, No. 40150/09, 30 October 2012 
 
2013 
 
19. Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, No. 43517/09 et al., 8 January 2013 
20. M.C and Others v. Italy, No. 5376/11, 3 September 2013 
 
2014 
 
21. Gerasimov and Others v. Russia, No. 29920/05 et al., 1 July 2014 
22. Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 
and the FYROM, No. 60642/08, 16 July 20142 
 
 
                                                        2  Two pilot judgments were issued in this case: one by a chamber and, upon referral, one by the 
Grand Chamber. Only the Grand Chamber judgment is relied upon and included in the number of 
22.  
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SUMMARY IN ENGLISH 
 
 
 
Long before ‘dialogue’ became a buzzword for the Convention system, it was 
already being employed by academics researching other legal systems to describe 
interaction between, such as domestic courts from different states. Others have 
relied on the notion to construct a normative framework to regulate exchanges 
between courts. Indeed, the notion of dialogue crops up with increasing frequency 
in discussions of relationship between the judges of the European Court of Human 
Rights (Court) and the states parties to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Convention). The notion can, however, also be usefully applied in research into, 
for example, the relationship between the Court and the Committee of Ministers 
(Committee).  
This study examines dialogue in the Convention system between the Court, the 
states parties, the Committee, the Parliamentary Assembly (Assembly) and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights (Commissioner). More specifically, the normative 
question covers the reasons why dialogue should take place, with descriptions of 
whether and to what extent a procedural dialogue indeed does take place for the 
reasons given. Thus, the common sense realisation that dialogue can add value to 
the Convention system, which can be found in many references to dialogue, is 
dissected. This is done by developing a concept of dialogue that can serve as a 
normative framework for interaction in the Convention system. The research, 
although it focuses on the relationship between the Court and the states, also takes 
account of these other Council of Europe interlocutors: the Committee, the 
Assembly and the Commissioner.  
To avoid repetition, the reader is referred for a further summary to the main 
findings of this research, presented in section 1 of chapter XIII (Conclusions and 
Recommendations). This section can be read as a summary of the entire volume. 
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
 
 
 
Theorie, potentieel en praktijk van procedurele dialoog in het systeem van het 
Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens 
 
Lang voordat het begrip dialoog werd toegepast op het Verdragssysteem, 
gebruikten academici die andere rechtssystemen bestuderen het al om bijvoorbeeld 
interactie tussen hoven uit verschillende staten te beschrijven. Anderen gebruikten 
het begrip al als onderdeel van een normatief kader voor de regulering van relaties 
tussen hoven. Inmiddels zijn steeds meer rechters, academici en andere Court 
watchers gaan verwijzen naar ‘dialoog’ wanneer zij de relatie tussen het Europees 
Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (Hof) en de lidstaten bij het Europees Verdrag 
voor de Rechten van de Mens (Verdrag) bespreken. Daarnaast blijkt de notie nog 
andere functies te kunnen hebben, bijvoorbeeld om de relatie te duiden tussen het 
Hof en andere instituties van de Raad van Europa, zoals het Comité van Ministers 
(Comité).  
In dit onderzoeksproject is de notie van dialoog bestudeerd in het 
Verdragssysteem tussen de volgende ‘gesprekspartners’: de verdragsstaten, het Hof, 
het Comité, de Parlementaire Vergadering van de Raad van Europa (Vergadering) 
en de Commissaris voor de Rechten van de Mens (Commissaris). Gezocht is naar 
een antwoord op de vraag waarom een dialoog plaats zou moeten vinden en op de 
vraag of zo’n dialoog inderdaad om die redenen plaatsvindt. De intuïtie is dat 
dialoog goed is voor het Verdragssysteem, en deze klinkt door in veel verwijzingen 
naar het begrip. Doel van dit onderzoeksproject was om die intuïtie juridisch en 
empirisch nader te onderzoeken. Dit is gedaan door de notie van Europese dialoog 
zo te conceptualiseren dat deze kan dienen als een normatief raamwerk voor het 
onderzoeken van de interactie in het Verdragssysteem tussen de zojuist genoemde 
gesprekspartners.  
 
Meer precies is de eerste vraag die in dit onderzoeksproject centraal staat de 
normatieve vraag waarom de notie ‘dialoog’ van toegevoegde waarde kan zijn voor 
het Verdragssysteem. De beantwoording van deze vraag vereist enig begrip van het 
systeem. Daarom karakteriseert hoofdstuk II het Verdragssysteem in het licht van 
zijn oprichting, werking en de ontwikkelingen en hervormingen die het heeft 
meegemaakt. Deze karakterschets concentreert zich op de manier waarop deze 
context invloed heeft gehad op de verdeling van bevoegdheden en 
verantwoordelijkheden tussen de gesprekspartners.  
De beknopte beschrijving van de geschiedenis van het Verdrag laat zien hoe èn 
het concept mensenrechten èn dat van de democratie voor de ontwikkeling van het 
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systeem een belangrijke rol speelden. Het huidige voorwerp en doel van het 
Verdragssysteem, die de sleutel zijn tot een goed begrip van zijn werking, kunnen 
nog steeds worden samengevat als de handhaving en verdere verwezenlijking van 
de rechten van de mens en het beschermen van de democratie.  
 
Om de werking van het Verdragssysteem te kunnen doorzien, moet men 
kennismaken met de instituties, of, zoals zij in deze studie worden genoemd, de 
gesprekspartners, die de drijvende kracht zijn achter het systeem. De staten die 
partij zijn bij het Verdrag spelen de belangrijkste rol, want zij moeten een ieder die 
onder hun rechtsmacht ressorteert de rechten en vrijheden die in het Verdrag zijn 
vastgesteld verzekeren. Daarnaast moeten zij elke uitspraak waarin het Hof een 
schending vaststelt en waarbij zij partij zijn ten uitvoer leggen. Dit houdt in dat zij 
de vastgestelde schending beëindigen en zoveel mogelijk rechtsherstel bieden, en 
dat zij toekomstige schendingen voorkomen. Een tweede belangrijke speler is het 
Hof, de hoeder van het Verdrag. Het is zijn taak om erop toe te zien of de staten de 
verplichtingen die ze uit hoofde van het Verdrag op zich hebben genomen 
daadwerkelijk nakomen in individuele gevallen. In de loop van zijn bestaan heeft 
het Hof een aantal nieuwe verantwoordelijkheden aangenomen, zoals het doen van 
suggesties voor tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen. Net als het Hof heeft de derde 
gesprekspartner, het Comité, een toezichthoudende taak: het ziet toe op de 
tenuitvoerlegging van de Straatsburgse uitspraken door de staten. Het Comité, dat 
bestaat uit de nationale ministers van buitenlandse zaken, wordt in zijn 
Verdragstaak bijgestaan door zijn secretariaat en het Department for the Execution 
of Judgments of the Court (Execution Department). De taakverdeling tussen het Hof 
en het Comité is redelijk duidelijk omdat ze beiden verantwoordelijk zijn voor een 
ander stadium van de klachtprocedure: het doen van een uitspraak en alles wat 
daaraan vooraf gaat of het toezien op de tenuitvoerlegging van die uitspraak. Een 
vierde gesprekspartner is de Vergadering. Zij functioneert als het overlegorgaan van 
de Raad van Europa en bestaat uit nationale parlementariërs. De enige taak die het 
Verdrag aan deze gesprekspartner geeft is het kiezen van de rechters bij het Hof. 
Desondanks beschikt de Vergadering over de mogelijkheid om indirect bij de 
Verdragsdialoog betrokken te raken, namelijk door het stellen van vragen en doen 
van aanbevelingen aan het Comité. De vragen en aanbevelingen hebben, wanneer 
zij op het Verdrag ingaan, dikwijls betrekking op de tenuitvoerlegging van 
uitspraken. Ten slotte is het jongste instituut van de Raad van Europa, de 
Commissaris, ingesteld ter bevordering van educatie in, bewustzijn van en respect 
voor mensenrechten zoals die onder andere in het Verdrag zijn vastgelegd. De 
Commissaris heeft het recht om schriftelijke conclusies in te dienen en deel te 
nemen aan hoorzittingen en richt zich daarbij eerder op structurele problemen dan 
op individuele klachten. Daarnaast kan de Commissaris door middel van 
landenbezoeken en rapporten indirect betrokken raken bij de Verdragsdialoog.  
Om de werking van het Verdragssysteem te begrijpen, in het bijzonder de 
verdeling van verantwoordelijkheden tussen het Hof en de staten, is het verder 
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noodzakelijk om aandacht te besteden aan de beginselen van subsidiariteit en 
effectiviteit.  
Uitgangspunt is dat de staten primair verantwoordelijk zijn voor de 
implementatie van het Verdrag. Dit betekent dat de verantwoordelijkheid bij het 
Hof (en Comité) van subsidiaire aard is. Het subsidiariteitsbeginsel vat deze 
verdeling van verantwoordelijkheden samen en schrijft voor dat de staten een 
efficiënt werkend rechtssysteem moeten onderhouden dat het mogelijk maakt om 
vermeende Verdragsschendingen aan de kaak te stellen. De subsidiaire taak van het 
Hof is in de kern toezichthoudend: deze gesprekspartner beslist over de 
verenigbaarheid van nationale maatregelen met het Verdrag in zaken die bij hem 
voorliggen. Deze taak, in combinatie met de bevoegdheid om juridisch bindende 
uitspraken te doen, geeft het Hof enige macht over de staten. Alhoewel de relatie 
tussen het Hof en de staten daardoor hiërarchisch lijkt, kan het Hof in feite niet veel 
macht uitoefenen over de staten. De staten behouden altijd enige beslissingsruimte 
en het subsidiariteitsbeginsel en zijn verschijningsvormen helpen te garanderen dat 
die ruimte inderdaad bestaat. Het beginsel manifesteert zich onder andere in het 
ontvankelijkheidsvereiste dat nationale rechtsmiddelen worden uitgeput, in de door 
het Hof ontwikkelde margin of appreciation-doctrine en in de declaratoire aard van 
zijn uitspraken. 
Volgens het effectiviteitsbeginsel moet het Verdrag worden geïnterpreteerd en 
toegepast op een manier die maakt dat de Verdragsrechten op een praktische en 
effectieve manier worden beschermd en niet theoretisch of illusoir blijven. Het Hof 
gebruikt dit beginsel als vangnet in de situatie waarin, wanneer het zich enkel zou 
laten leiden door subsidiariteitsoverwegingen, het de Verdragsrechten niet op 
doeltreffende wijze zou beschermen. Deze situatie ontstaat wanneer in een nationaal 
rechtssysteem de rechten niet effectief worden beschermd. Ondanks zijn subsidiaire 
rol, maar in overeenstemming met het effectiviteitsbeginsel, onderwerpt het Hof 
een staat in deze situatie gewoonlijk aan relatief streng toezicht en vertelt het de 
staat in vrij duidelijke bewoordingen hoe een uitspraak ten uitvoer gelegd moet 
worden. Het beginsel van effectiviteit manifesteert zich verder in bijvoorbeeld de 
uitzonderingen die het Hof toestaat op de ontvankelijkheidsvereisten, in zijn 
dynamische en evolutieve interpretatie van het Verdrag en in de ontwikkeling en 
toepassing van de pilotprocedure.  
 
De ontwikkelingen die het systeem heeft doorgemaakt sinds de inwerkingtreding 
van het Verdrag in 1953 laten zien dat het vele successen heeft geboekt, maar dat 
het zich ook geconfronteerd ziet met problemen. Daarnaast maken de 
ontwikkelingen duidelijk dat het systeem in de loop van de tijd grondig is veranderd 
en dat het bovendien in voortdurende staat van verandering is.  
Een van de belangrijke ontwikkelingen die in de afgelopen decennia zichtbaar is 
geworden, betreft de rol van de individuele klager. Tot de jaren negentig speelde de 
klager een rol van geringe betekenis, vooral doordat het individuele klachtrecht 
optioneel was en het niet op grote schaal werd erkend. Tegenwoordig is erkenning 
van dat recht verplicht, waardoor meer dan 800 miljoen Europeanen directe toegang 
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tot het Hof hebben. Naast dat het klachtrecht in belang is toegenomen, geldt dat het 
aantal en de beschermingsreikwijdte van de materiële Verdragsrechten is 
uitgebreid. De staten hebben de rechtencatalogus uitgebreid door middel van 
verschillende protocollen en het Hof heeft de beschermingsreikwijdte van de al 
bestaande rechten vergroot door zijn ruime verdragsinterpretaties. Een neveneffect 
van het toegenomen beschermingsbereik is dat politici, nationale rechters en de 
media in toenemende mate de legitimiteit van de uitspraken van het Hof en soms 
van het Hof zelf in twijfel trekken. Volgens zijn critici zou het Hof de rechten 
minder breed moeten interpreteren en een ruimere margin of appreciation aan de 
staten moeten laten.  
Een ontwikkeling van andere aard is de toegenomen geografische omvang van 
het Verdragssysteem, van 13 staten bij oprichting naar 47 staten tegenwoordig. 
Vooral in de afgelopen 25 jaar is het gebied dat onder toezicht van het Hof staat 
sterk uitgebreid, waardoor het aantal potentiële klagers aanzienlijk is toegenomen. 
Deze ontwikkeling verklaart deels een andere veelbesproken ontwikkeling: de hoge 
werkdruk op zowel het Hof als het Comité, waarvoor een klein deel van de 
verdragsstaten grotendeels verantwoordelijk is. Andere verklaringen voor de 
toegenomen zakenlast zijn de uitgebreidere rechtencatalogus, het grotere 
beschermingbereik van de rechten en het toegenomen belang van het klachtrecht. 
Alhoewel naast de input ook de output de afgelopen paar jaar sterk is toegenomen, 
blijven achterstanden bestaan. Vooral het hoge aantal repetitieve kamerzaken is 
lastig terug te dringen.  
Naast het aantal is ook de inhoud van de aangebrachte zaken veranderd. In zijn 
beginjaren hield het Hof zich in belangrijke mate bezig met doctrinevorming, die 
leidde tot het steeds beter afstemmen van nationale rechtssystemen op de EVRM-
vereisten. Deze convergentie en verfijning konden vooral ook worden 
bewerkstelligd doordat de verdragsstaten grotendeels al in overeenstemming met 
het Verdrag functioneerden. Sinds de jaren negentig is het Hof echter overspoeld 
met zaken van een andere aard. Deze zaken vonden hun basis in ernstige en 
wijdverspreide schendingen, hadden betrekking op de transitie van communisme 
naar democratie, en/of waren repetitief. Alhoewel het Hof juist voor ernstige 
verdragsschendingen is opgericht, en hoewel het ze in overeenstemming met het 
effectiviteitsbeginsel zo goed mogelijk behandelt, blijkt het niet goed toegerust om 
deze schendingen aan te pakken in hun huidige omvang. De ‘transitiezaken’ 
brengen nieuwe vraagstukken en vaak bredere problemen met zich mee dan 
zichtbaar waren in de eerdere zaken. Het hoge aantal repetitieve zaken ten slotte is 
het resultaat van grote mensenrechtenproblemen op nationaal niveau die onopgelost 
zijn gebleven in weerwil van uitspraken waarin steeds weer dezelfde schendingen 
worden geconstateerd. De twee laatste problemen zijn het falen van de staten om 
het Verdrag volledig te implementeren en de vertraagde en gedeeltelijke 
tenuitvoerlegging van de uitspraken.  
 
Een ontwikkeling die aparte bespreking verdient betreft de vele hervormingen van 
het Verdragssyteem. De hervormingen zijn een reactie op de zojuist besproken 
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ontwikkelingen en bestaan voornamelijk uit maatregelen die het Hof beter in staat 
stellen om de zakenlast aan te kunnen; zij beogen vooral het systeem efficiënter te 
maken. In 1998 verving het huidige fulltime Hof de voormalige Europese 
Commissie voor de Rechten van de Mens en het destijds bestaande parttime Hof. In 
2010 werden alleenzittende rechters ingesteld als verdere efficiency-bevorderende 
maatregel. Daarnaast zijn de semi-rechterlijke bevoegdheden van het Comité 
afgeschaft, en kreeg het de bevoegdheid om het Hof te vragen een uitspraak te 
interpreteren en om een inbreukprocedure voor het Hof te starten tegen staten die 
een uitspraak niet ten uitvoer leggen. Deze hervormingen hebben het doel en 
onderwerp van het Verdragssysteem grotendeels onaangetast gelaten. Voor het Hof 
blijft individuele rechtsbescherming, naast zijn meer constitutionele functie, 
bijvoorbeeld een kerntaak, ook al hebben sommigen zich uitgesproken voor een 
verdere ontwikkeling in de richting van een constitutioneel hof. De nieuwste 
hervormingsmaatregelen zijn neergelegd in Protocol 15 en Protocol 16. Met zijn 
inwerkingtreding zal Protocol 15 onder andere een verwijzing naar het 
subsidiariteitsbeginsel en de margin of appreciation toevoegen aan de preambule 
van het Verdrag. Protocol 16 zal de hoogste nationale rechters de bevoegdheid 
gegeven om een adviesverzoek aan het Hof voor te leggen over principiële kwesties 
die de interpretatie of toepassing van het Verdrag aangaan. Hoewel deze 
hervormingen waardevol zijn, lijken ze vooralsnog onvoldoende om het goed 
functioneren van het systeem op de lange termijn te waarborgen. Momenteel wordt 
dan ook gewerkt aan de ontwikkeling van een langetermijnvisie voor de toekomst 
van het Verdragssysteem. 
 
Deze schets van de oprichting, werking, ontwikkelingen en hervormingen vormt het 
uitgangpunt voor een karakterisering van het Verdragsysteem in meer algemene 
termen in de hoofdstukken II en IV. Hierin wordt uitgelegd dat het systeem wordt 
gekenmerkt door twee soorten spanning: interne en externe.  
Interne spanning wordt veroorzaakt door de bevoegdheid van het Hof om 
bindende uitspraken te doen en het EVRM op een gezaghebbende en uniforme 
manier te interpreteren, terwijl de nationale autoriteiten vrijwel altijd meer kennis 
hebben van de situatie in hun land, democratisch gelegitimeerd zijn en de wens 
hebben dat het Hof hun diversiteit respecteert. De bronnen van spanning kunnen als 
volgt worden samengevat: uniformiteit v. diversiteit (het ‘uniformiteitsdilemma’); 
internationaal toezicht v. nationale superieure kennis (het 
‘kennisachterstandsprobleem’); en toezicht door niet direct gekozen en 
democratisch gecontroleerde rechters v. meer direct democratische nationale 
besluitvorming (het countermajoritarian probleem). Deze spanningsbronnen laten 
zien dat de nationale autoriteiten in principe het beste zijn toegerust en daarom als 
eerste zijn aangewezen om de Verdragsrechten te beschermen. Nu dit vrijwel steeds 
het geval zal zijn, is interne spanning inherent aan het systeem. Waar deze interne 
spanning toe leidt staat echter niet op voorhand vast. Met elke uitspraak waarin het 
Hof een schending vaststelt, bestaat enig risico dat de spanning escaleert in 
(on)uitgesproken conflict tussen het Hof en de staten, namelijk wanneer het Hof 
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zich onvoldoende baseert op nationale kennis of onvoldoende democratische 
besluitvorming of nationale diversiteit respecteert. Een dergelijk conflict kan op zijn 
beurt leiden tot een verminderde bereidheid tot implementatie van het Verdrag en 
tot minder goede tenuitvoerlegging van de Straatsburgse uitspraken. Dit wordt nog 
versterkt door het feit dat geen enkele gesprekspartner een staat kan dwingen om te 
handelen. Dit kan de effectieve werking van het Verdragssysteem in gevaar brengen 
en zou uiteindelijk de bescherming van de Verdragsrechten kunnen aantasten. 
Interne spanning kan echter ook een meer positieve uitkomst hebben, in die zin dat 
besef van de onderlinge verhoudingen kan leiden tot meer evenwichtige, doordachte 
en goed in het systeem passende Hofuitspraken. Juist de bestaande spanning kan het 
Hof er immer toe aanzetten om de democratische legitimiteit van nationale 
besluitvorming te respecteren, te steunen op nationale (superieure) kennis en ruimte 
te laten voor diversiteit.  
Externe spanning komt voort uit de serieuze en wijdverbreide problemen die het 
Hof voor de keuze stellen om ofwel het subsidiariteitsbeginsel, ofwel het 
effectiviteitsbeginsel te respecteren. Omdat het Hof vooral bij gebrekkige nationale 
implementatie van het Verdrag niet beide beginselen tegelijk kan respecteren, kiest 
het doorgaans voor effectieve rechtsbescherming. Deze keuze gaat gepaard met het 
aannemen van uitgebreidere bevoegdheden, wat betekent dat de betrokken staat aan 
strikter toezicht wordt onderworpen. Dit kan de al bestaande interne spanning 
versterken. Dit type spanning is extern omdat het wordt veroorzaakt door oorzaken 
die zijn gelegen buiten het systeem als zodanig. Daarom is deze spanning 
elimineerbaar; wanneer de staten het Verdrag adequaat zouden implementeren zou 
het nauwelijks aan de oppervlakte komen. Toch is het moeilijk om de spanning 
daadwerkelijk weg te nemen, vooral nu de problemen die de spanning veroorzaken 
niet gemakkelijk oplosbaar blijken.  
 
Hoofdstuk IV onderstreept dat samenwerking tussen de gesprekspartners van groot 
belang is voor het effectief functioneren van het Verdragssysteem. Alhoewel het 
Comité en het Hof op papier hoger op de hiërarchische ladder staan dan de staten, 
kunnen zij in de praktijk niet hun wil aan hen opleggen. Omdat deze twee 
gesprekspartners geen dwang kunnen toepassen, moeten zij onvermijdelijk een 
beroep doen op samenwerking. Samenwerking is ook belangrijk omdat de 
verantwoordelijkheid tot effectieve rechtsbescherming worden gedeeld tussen de 
verschillende actoren binnen het Verdragssysteem en zij verregaand op elkaar zijn 
betrokken. De staten en het Hof zijn verantwoordelijk voor de implementatie van 
het Verdrag en de staten en het Comité voor de tenuitvoerlegging van de uitspraken. 
Bovendien houdt het Hof zich nu soms ook bezig met tenuitvoerleggingskwesties 
en willen de Vergadering en de Commissaris bijdragen aan de implementatie van 
het Verdrag. Een systeem dat in deze mate wordt gekenmerkt door gedeelde 
verantwoordelijkheden kan alleen goed functioneren wanneer elke actor zijn rol op 
een adequate manier vervult en als actief wordt samengewerkt.  
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De studie omvat echter niet alleen een karakterschets van het Verdragssysteem. Om 
antwoord te geven op de vraag in hoeverre de notie van dialoog bij kan dragen aan 
een goede samenwerking tussen de gesprekspartners, en aan een effectieve 
rechtsbescherming, onderzoekt het ook hoe in andere contexten het begrip dialoog 
is toegepast. Daarbij zijn drie verschillende rechtssystemen onderzocht: nationale 
constitutionele systemen, het rechtssysteem van de EU en de zogenoemde 
transjudicial communication (communicatie tussen hoven, of zij nu nationaal of 
supranationaal zijn, over grenzen heen). Hoofdstuk III beschrijft daarbij in het 
bijzonder hoe in de theoretische literatuur met betrekking tot deze drie 
rechtssystemen het concept is ontwikkeld als normatief of beschrijvend instrument.  
Voor de nationale rechtssystemen is dialoog in de literatuur primair naar voren 
gebracht als een antwoord op het countermajoritarian probleem. Het antwoord is 
dat de ondemocratische aard van rechterlijke toetsing minder problematisch is 
wanneer wordt aangenomen dat de rechter in dialoog is met de wetgever. In het 
Canadese constitutionele systeem wordt het begrip dialoog bijvoorbeeld gebruikt 
om aan te tonen dat, alhoewel rechters wetten toetsen, de wetgever rechterlijke 
uitspraken kan wijzigen of terzijde kan stellen. Verschillende theoretici hebben deze 
beschrijving van constitutionele dialoog als uitgangpunt genomen om de rol van de 
rechter in het Canadese rechtssysteem te rechtvaardigen. Het begrip kan zo dus ook 
op een meer normatieve manier worden gebruikt.  
Het EU-rechtssysteem is veelvuldig gekenschetst als pluralistisch, omdat 
nationale constitutionele en EU-aanspraken naast elkaar bestaan en het EU-recht 
niet door iedereen wordt gezien als hiërarchisch verheven boven het nationale recht. 
Dit verklaart waarom de staten soms proberen om pogingen van het Hof van Justitie 
om zijn macht over hen te laten gelden te weerstaan. In een dergelijk systeem is het 
maar de vraag wie in laatste instantie beslist welke norm voorrang heeft en hoe EU-
recht geïnterpreteerd moet worden. Deze vragen zijn vooral van belang in de 
context van zaken over fundamentele rechten, nu de lidstaten deze rechten 
verschillend invullen. Volgens de theoretische literatuur kan dialoog een antwoord 
zijn op deze vragen. Het concept kan een tegenwicht vormen voor het risico dat het 
Luxemburgse Hof normen over fundamentele rechten te vergaand standaardiseert, 
nu een dialoog de nationale rechters in staat stelt om verschillende juridische 
tradities onder de aandacht te brengen van dat Hof. Daarnaast kan dialoog een 
rechtvaardiging vormen voor de bemoeienis door het Hof met fundamentele 
rechten, omdat een dialoog het mogelijk maakt om in de uitspraken rekening te 
houden met de eigen betekenis en waarde die in verschillende staten aan 
fundamentele rechten wordt gegeven. Ten slotte is dialoog voor het EU-
rechtssystem wel beschreven als een middel om conflict te voorkomen, nu hierdoor 
samenwerking en de vrijwillige aanvaarding van Europese rechtspraak kunnen 
worden bevorderd.  
In de context van transjudicial communication wordt het begrip dialoog zowel 
gebruikt om de relatie te beschrijven tussen hoven die in een horizontale 
verhouding tot elkaar staan (twee internationale/nationale hoven) en tussen hoven 
die in een verticale verhouding tot elkaar staan (wanneer een internationaal hof 
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toezicht uitoefent op een nationaal hof). De horizontale verhoudingen worden 
gekenmerkt door een grote mate van informaliteit, een gebrek aan hiërarchie en een 
aanwezigheid van verschillende rechtsbronnen. Er bestaat in deze relatie geen 
eenvoudige oplossing voor bevoegheids- en interpretatieproblemen. In deze context 
kan dialoog de horizontale interactie beschrijven die feitelijk plaatsvindt tussen 
internationale hoven. Interactie tussen nationale hoven uit verschillende staten die 
betrokken zijn bij transnationale zaken vindt ook plaats. Om te bepalen welk hof 
rechtsmacht heeft, kan gebruik worden gemaakt van een begrip dat verwant is aan 
dialoog: comity. Door recht te doen aan de notie van comity kan ook dialoog 
worden bevorderd, nu nationale hoven die comity hanteren zich niet passief of 
terughoudend gedragen, maar actief en kritisch onderzoeken of hun collega’s zich 
aan het internationale recht houden. Voor het beschrijven van verticale relaties 
wordt het begrip dialoog soms minder geschikt gevonden, nu die relaties relatief 
hiërarchisch zijn, ook al kunnen internationale hoven doorgaans niet hun wil 
opleggen aan de nationale hoven. De notie dialectical review kan volgens 
sommigen daarom wellicht beter verticale interactie beschrijven. Dialectical review 
is gebaseerd op een dynamische bevoegdheidsverdeling en gemeenschappelijke 
uitgangspunten, wat zou moeten leiden tot een zekere coördinatie tussen de 
verschillende actoren.  
Wanneer de toepassingen in deze drie contexten in onderlinge relatie worden 
beschouwd, kan dialoog in theoretische zin gezien worden als een nuttige term om 
relaties te beschrijven en te reguleren tussen institutionele actoren, die door elkaar 
gerespecteerd willen worden, maar die in conflict kunnen komen over 
bevoegdheids- en interpretatiekwesties. Het risico op conflict ontstaat bijvoorbeeld 
doordat de relatie informeel is en de ene gesprekspartner niet hiërarchisch hoger 
staat dan de andere. Het begrip dialoog heeft daarmee betrekking op het verdelen 
van bevoegdheden en het in goede banen leiden van interactie. Omdat in een 
dialoog verschillende stemmen worden gehoord en een goede uitwisseling  van 
standpunten de kans op conflict kan minimaliseren, kan dialoog het uitoefenen van 
bevoegdheden van de ene actor over de andere helpen rechtvaardigen. Dialoog is 
daarmee een waardevol alternatief voor andere oplossingen om de onduidelijkheid 
over bevoegdheidsverdeling weg te nemen, zoals de keuze om één actor 
hiërarchisch boven de andere te plaatsen.  
 
De notie van dialoog, zoals die zojuist is getypeerd, kan met verschillende middelen 
in de praktijk worden gebracht. Deze studie maakt daarbij een onderscheid tussen 
drie ‘dialoogmiddelen’, namelijk voorwaarden, facilitatoren, en instrumenten.  
Een belangrijke voorwaarde voor dialoog is dat alle relevante gesprekspartners 
bereid zijn om daadwerkelijk met elkaar in dialoog te gaan. De gesprekspartners 
moeten bovendien verschillende standpunten hebben, maar moeten het tegelijkertijd 
eens zijn over een paar gemeenschappelijke uitgangspunten. Juist het verschil in 
standpunten lokt een dialoog uit, terwijl de gedeelde uitgangspunten het mogelijk 
maken om verschillen te overbruggen en uiteindelijke overeenstemming te bereiken 
over bepaalde punten. Ten slotte is het nodig dat er voldoende tijd is om in dialoog 
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te gaan. Deze voorwaarde maakt het mogelijk dat de positieve uitkomsten van 
dialoog, zoals het voorkomen van conflict, kunnen rijpen, aangezien zij er niet van 
de ene dag op de andere zijn.  
Een manier om dialoog te faciliteren in verticale verhoudingen is door 
bevoegdheden tussen de spelers dynamisch te verdelen. In die constructie moet het 
internationale hof bijvoorbeeld vertrouwen op de nationale hoven voor de 
tenuitvoerlegging van zijn uitspraken. Zo ontstaat er ruimte voor dialoog, aangezien 
de internationale gesprekspartner moet erkennen dat de nationale actoren enige 
ruimte voor interpretatie nodig hebben. Bovendien stimuleert deze 
bevoegdheidsverdeling het internationale hof te luisteren naar de standpunten van 
zijn nationale collega’s, want anders loop hij het risico dat zijn uitspraken niet ten 
uitvoer worden gelegd. Een andere facilitator is de keuze voor rechterlijke 
terughoudendheid of het zich voegen naar de keuze van de andere actor, omdat die 
actor nu eenmaal beter is uitgerust om bepaalde beslissingen te nemen. 
Internationale hoven kunnen daarnaast vergelijkende interpretatiemethoden 
toepassen om dialoog te bevorderen. Deze methoden stimuleren hen om de inhoud 
en de ontwikkeling van hun jurisprudentie te baseren op nationale constitutionele 
tradities, nationaal recht en nationale jurisprudentie. Ook procedurele toetsing kan 
dialoog faciliteren. Een hof toetst procedureel wanneer het de besluitvorming toetst 
en niet de inhoud van een besluit. De besluitvormer staat het dus vrij om zijn eigen 
(belangen)afweging te maken, op voorwaarde dat zij het resultaat is van een 
procedure die voldoet aan bepaalde standaarden. Ten slotte is het hebben van enige 
beslissingsruimte rondom het bieden van rechtsherstel een facilitator. In het 
algemeen geldt: hoe meer beslissingsruimte, des te meer ruimte er is voor dialoog.  
Het bestaan van dialoogbevorderende regels en uitspraakverzoeken zijn twee 
instrumenten die ten goede kunnen komen aan het voeren van een effectieve 
dialoog. Een dialoogbevorderende regel is bijvoorbeeld de regel dat de rechtsmacht 
toekomt aan het internationale hof dat als eerste een zaak onder zich krijgt wanneer 
twee internationale hoven in beginsel rechtsmacht hebben. Nationale hoven in 
verschillende staten kunnen de regel toepassen dat, wanneer zij internationaal recht 
interpreteren, zij precedenten die de anderen hebben geschapen volgen en dit alleen 
niet doen wanneer zij hiervoor een goede reden hebben. In nationale systemen 
bestaan eveneens dialoogbevorderende regels. Een regel voor de wetgever kan 
bijvoorbeeld zijn dat zij haar voornemen om een constitutioneel recht te beperken 
altijd duidelijk formuleert en dat het constitutionele hof enkel het voornemen onder 
de loep neemt en niet naar de inhoud van de beperking kijkt. Voorbeelden van 
uitspraakverzoeken kunnen ook in de verschillende rechtssystemen worden 
gevonden. Het belangrijkste voorbeeld is de prejudiciële procedure in de EU die 
nationale rechters toestaat en soms verplicht om een vraag te stellen aan het 
Luxemburgse Hof over de geldigheid of betekenis van het Unierecht.    
 
In hoofdstuk IV wordt dialoog gepresenteerd als uitgangspunt en als normatief 
ideaal voor interactie in het Verdragssysteem. Dialoog wordt in deze studie gezien 
als een goede manier om met interne en externe spanning en de noodzaak tot 
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samenwerken om te gaan. De eerste reden hiervoor is dat anderen het begrip 
overtuigend hebben toegepast op andere rechtssystemen die vergelijkbare 
problemen kennen als die aan de bron staan van de interne spanning in het 
Straatsburgse systeem. Bovendien hebben de verschillende systemen vergelijkbare 
kenmerken, zoals een gebrek aan afdwingbare macht, in die zin dat de ene actor niet 
zijn wil kan opleggen aan de andere, de onmogelijkheid om dwangmaatregelen toe 
te passen, het belang van het delen van verantwoordelijkheden en de onderlinge 
verbondenheid tussen het internationale en het nationale niveau. Een andere reden 
is dat het Verdragssysteem reeds is gericht op dialoog aangezien het facilitatoren en 
instrumenten voor dialoog kent die doen denken aan de dialoogmiddelen die in 
andere systemen bestaan. Dergelijk middelen zijn bijvoorbeeld de vergelijkende 
interpretatiemethode, die als een dialoogfacilitator kan worden gezien, en het 
ontvankelijkheidsvereiste van uitputting van nationale rechtsmiddelen, dat kan 
worden omschreven als dialoogbevorderende regel.  
Meer precies kan dialoog in het Verdragssysteem gebruikt worden om te 
voorkomen dat de interne spanning tot conflict leidt en ervoor te zorgen dat die 
spanning juist op een meer positieve manier wordt benut, bijvoorbeeld om meer 
gebalanceerde besluitvorming te bewerkstelligen. Het denken in termen van dialoog 
kan op verschillende manieren aan deze meer waardevolle omgang met interne 
spanning bijdragen. Een direct onderhoud van het Hof met het Comité of de 
Vergadering kan de kans bijvoorbeeld verkleinen dat zijn uitspraken deze spanning 
laten toenemen, nu het Comité en de Vergadering bestaan uit representanten van de 
nationale autoriteiten. Daarbij kan een dialoog de staten in staat stellen om hun 
kennis en zorgen aan het Hof te uiten. Wanneer het Hof vervolgens begrijpt dat een 
staat meer kennis heeft van een bepaalde kwestie dan hijzelf, er een 
countermajoritarian probleem speelt of dat het uniformiteitsdilemma opspeelt, kan 
het via het gebruik van dialoogmiddelen op verschillende manieren ervoor zorgen 
dat deze moeilijkheden niet tot conflict leiden. Het kan bijvoorbeeld een bepaalde 
kwestie onaangeroerd laten of, wanneer dit niet mogelijk of wenselijk is, veel 
ruimte laten aan de nationale autoriteiten om hun eigen reactie op de uitspraak te 
formuleren. Daarnaast kan het denken in termen van een effectieve dialoog 
bijdragen aan het verminderen van externe spanning, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de notie 
wordt gebruikt om samenwerking tussen het Hof en het Comité te verbeteren. Ook 
kan de betrokkenheid van de Vergadering en van de Commissaris helpen om de 
oorzaken van externe spanning bij het Hof en het Comité onder de aandacht te 
brengen. Een dialoog tussen het Hof, het Comité en de staten zou kunnen bijdragen 
aan het bewerkstelligen van een brede nationale steun voor een bepaald, 
verdragsconform handelen. Dit is waardevol, omdat juist daarin uiteindelijk de 
sleutel tot het oplossen van externe spanning is gelegen. Daarbij kan op basis van 
aan de notie van dialoog ontleende argumenten een rechtvaardiging worden 
gevonden voor de uitoefening van extra en uitgebreidere bevoegdheden door het 
Hof. Ten slotte zou omarming van de notie van dialoog kunnen bijdragen aan 
effectieve samenwerking tussen de verschillende actoren binnen het 
verdragssysteem, nu deze notie goed aansluit bij het delen van 
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verantwoordelijkheden en het de vrijwillige naleving van de verdragsnormen kan 
helpen stimuleren.  
Op deze manieren kan het erkennen van dialoog als centraal element binnen het 
Verdragssysteem bijdragen aan het functioneren van het systeem en daarmee ook 
aan de bescherming van de Verdragsrechten. De notie kan die functie vooral hebben 
wanneer zij wordt gezien als een stimulans voor interactie tussen de staten, het Hof, 
het Comité, de Vergadering en de Commissaris, met als doel om respect voor 
nationale democratische legitimiteit, kennis en diversiteit te vergroten terwijl 
gelijktijdig de EVRM-rechten effectief worden beschermd. Daarnaast kan het 
omarmen van de notie van dialoog leiden tot een vergroting van de kennis bij de 
actoren binnen de Raad van Europa van de nationale rechtssystemen en de kennis 
van de staten van het Verdragssysteem. Ook een dergelijke kennisvergroting zal 
uiteindelijk kunnen bijdragen aan het verwezenlijken van de doelstellingen van het 
systeem en aan het kanaliseren van de spanningverhoudingen. Deze studie stelt 
dialoog dus voor als een norm die een middenweg vormt tussen twee uiterste 
normen, namelijk conflict en een grote mate van terughoudendheid. Dialoog vormt 
bovendien het kader waarbinnen bestaande doctrines, beginselen en procedures op 
een effectievere manier kunnen worden toegepast voor de doelen zoals die zojuist 
uiteen zijn gezet.  
 
In deze studie zijn enkele voorwaarden geformuleerd voor een effectieve dialoog in 
het Verdragssysteem, zoals anderen dat hebben gedaan voor dialoog in ander 
rechtssystemen. Deze voorwaarden zijn: bekwaamheid en bereidheid; het bestaan 
van verschillende gezichtspunten en erkenning van gemeenschappelijke 
uitgangspunten; en het bestaan van voldoende tijd en duidelijkheid. De 
voorwaarden bekwaamheid en duidelijkheid zijn hiervoor nog niet genoemd. 
Bekwaamheid is vooral relevant voor de staten en houdt in dat zij zowel voldoende 
capaciteit als een zekere bewustheid en kennis van het Verdragssysteem hebben. De 
voorwaarde van duidelijkheid onderstreept dat de dialoog gevoerd zou moeten 
worden op basis van voldoende informatie en voldoende duidelijke informatie over 
bijvoorbeeld het nationale rechtssysteem. Alleen als aan deze voorwaarden is 
voldaan kan het begrip dialoog van enige toegevoegde waarde zijn voor het 
Verdragssysteem.   
Om het begrip dialoog werkbaar te maken in de context van dit onderzoek, is op 
basis van de voorgaande beschouwingen een werkdefinitie van dialoog gegeven 
voor het Verdragssysteem. Dialoog is volgens deze definitie een uitwisseling van 
feiten en/of standpunten over een bepaald onderwerp tussen ten minste 2 van de 5 
geïdentificeerde gesprekspartners door middel van één van de 26 procedures (zie 
onderstaande tabel), met als resultaat dat samenwerking wordt bevorderd, interne 
spanning wordt weggeleid van het ontstaan van conflict en richting meer 
gebalanceerde besluitvorming, en/of een bijdrage wordt geleverd aan de eliminatie 
van externe spanning. De 26 procedures vormen de interface tussen dialoog en zijn 
toegevoegde waarde; zij zijn het medium door middel waarvan de potentie van de 
notie van dialoog voor de implementatie van het Verdrag tot uiting kan komen. Een 
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procedure is daarbij omschreven als een stap die kan worden gezet tijdens de 
behandeling van een klacht door een actor om met een andere actor te 
communiceren. Die stap maakt hetzij deel uit van de klachtprocedure voor het Hof 
of is daarmee op enigerlei wijze verbonden.  
 
In het licht van deze definitie is de tweede hoofdvraag van dit onderzoeksproject 
geweest of de bestaande procedures het potentieel hebben om bij te dragen aan de 
Verdragsdialoog en, zo ja, of zij deze bijdrage in de praktijk ook daadwerkelijk 
leveren. Deze tweede hoofdvraag is beantwoord aan de hand van zeven indicatoren 
voor Verdragsdialoog, die ten behoeve van dit onderzoek zijn ontwikkeld op basis 
van de hiervoor beschreven theoretische bevindingen. Deze indicatoren vormen een 
instrument om de verschillende procedures op gerichte en nauwkeurige wijze te 
beoordelen in het licht van het ideaal van dialoog. Ze zijn afgeleid van en gebaseerd 
op het begrip dialoog zelf, en op de centrale begrippen inherente en externe 
spanning en samenwerking zoals ze in de studie zijn gedefinieerd. Indicator 1 helpt 
te bepalen welke gesprekspartners in dialoog kunnen gaan door middel van welke 
procedure. Wanneer een mogelijkheid tot dialoog bestaat, is de vervolgvraag 
waarover en met wie de gesprekspartner kan communiceren en wat hij kan bereiken 
door een procedure. De tweede indicator dient om te bepalen of, en zo ja, hoe een 
procedure het delen van verantwoordelijkheden in overeenstemming met het 
Verdrag bevordert. Het Verdrag schrijft voor dat het Hof of het Comité 
verantwoordelijkheden delen met de staten, in overeenstemming met het 
subsidiariteitsbeginsel, en dat het Hof en het Comité verantwoordelijkheden delen 
langs procedurele lijnen. Indicator 2 dient er ook toe om vast te stellen of een 
procedure het delen van verantwoordelijkheden als zodanig bevordert, en dus of de 
gesprekspartners elkaar aanvullen en helpen, ongeacht hoe het Verdrag voorschrijft 
dat dit eigenlijk zou moeten. Teneinde vast te kunnen stellen of een procedure 
wederzijds begrip bevordert, is de derde indicator opgenomen. Wederzijds begrip 
betekent voor deze indicator dat een procedure leidt tot een beter begrip bij een 
staat van het Verdragssysteem en bij de anderen van problemen en regelgeving in 
de staten. Indicator 4 helpt te bepalen of een procedure evenwichtige 
besluitvorming bevordert. Evenwichtige besluitvorming bestaat erin dat aan 
verschillende perspectieven aandacht wordt geschonken en in het bijzonder aan de 
kennis van nationale autoriteiten en hun zorgen omtrent respect voor diversiteit. 
Indicator 5 is toegevoegd om vast te kunnen stellen of de procedures de 
gesprekspartners ertoe aansporen om hun beslissingen met redenen te omkleden. 
Dat zij dit doen is vooral belangrijk wanneer de beslissing van de ene 
gesprekspartner niet welkom kan zijn bij een andere. De zesde indicator helpt te 
analyseren of een procedure ruimte laat voor de reactie van een gesprekspartner die 
een beslissing van een andere actor moet uitvoeren. Ruimte voor een reactie bestaat 
bijvoorbeeld wanneer een gesprekspartner zijn zorgen kan uiten of zijn mening over 
een beslissing kan doorgeven. Ten slotte is indicator 7 ontwikkeld om op te tekenen 
of een procedure conflict helpt te voorkomen, verminderen of beëindigen. De 
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analyse onder indicator 7 is grotendeels gebaseerd op de bevindingen die zijn 
gedaan met behulp van indicatoren 2 tot en met 6.  
 
De tweede hoofdvraag is opgesplitst in twee aparte vragen. De eerste deelvraag is 
of de procedures dialogisch potentieel hebben, dat wil zeggen of ze de kenmerken 
hebben die nodig zijn om dialoog mogelijk te maken. Deze vraag is beantwoord in 
de hoofdstukken V-VIII. De tweede deelvraag, van meer praktische aard, is of de 
procedures die enig of duidelijk dialogisch potentieel hebben dit potentieel ook 
waarmaken in de praktijk. Deze vraag komt aan de orde in de hoofdstukken IX-XII. 
Het dialogisch potentieel is onderzocht aan de hand van de manier waarop de 
procedures ‘op papier’ staan omschreven, in bijvoorbeeld het Verdrag, het 
Procesreglement van het Hof en de Rules of the Committee for the Supervision of 
the Execution of Judgments and of the Terms of Friendly Settlements. Het 
dialogische gehalte van de procedures in de praktijk is vastgesteld op grond van 
informatie zoals die te vinden is op HUDOC en in officiële documenten van het 
Comité, de Vergadering en de Commissaris. Deze informatiebronnen maakten het 
echter niet altijd mogelijk om het functioneren van de procedures geheel in kaart te 
brengen. Daarom zijn in totaal 34 onderzoeksinterviews afgenomen met personen 
die met de procedure in de praktijk werken, zoals de Straatsburgse rechters, agenten 
die de staten voor het Hof vertegenwoordigen, griffiemedewerkers en personen die 
werkzaam zijn bij het Execution Department.  
Het antwoord op deze vragen per procedure kan als volgt kort en schematisch 
worden samengevat:   
 Dialogisch potentieel 
op papier 
Dialogisch gehalte in de 
praktijk  
Fase vooraf aan uitspraak en uitspraak 
zelf 
  
1.  Communicatie  Duidelijk potentieel  Duidelijk dialogisch  
2.  Voorlopige maatregelen Beperkt potentieel  Niet onderzocht 
3. Minnelijke schikkingen  Duidelijk potentieel  Beperkt dialogisch 
(routine) 
Duidelijk dialogisch (non-
paper) 
4.  Artikel 37(1)(b)-beslissingen  Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
5.  Eenzijdige verklaringen  Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
6.  Artikel 37(1)(c)-beslissingen Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
7.  Hoorzittingen  Duidelijk potentieel Enigszins dialogisch  
8.  Afstand van rechtsmacht ten gunste 
van de Grote Kamer  
Beperkt potentieel  Niet onderzocht 
9.  Tussenkomsten door derden  Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
10.  Onderzoek Beperkt potentieel  Niet onderzocht 
11.  Uitspraken  Enig potentieel  Enigszins dialogisch 
12.  Verwijzingen naar de Grote Kamer  Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
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Fase van tenuitvoerlegging     
13.  Artikel 46-aanwijzingen  Niet onderzocht  Enigszins dialogisch 
14.  Artikel 41-toekenningen  Beperkt potentieel  Niet onderzocht 
15.  Actieplannen en -rapporten  Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
16.  DH (droit humain) vergaderingen  Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
17.  Bi- en multilaterale bijeenkomsten Duidelijk potentieel Duidelijk dialogisch 
18.  Verwijzingen voor interpretatie 
door Comité 
Duidelijk potentieel Niet onderzocht 
19.  Inbreukprocedure door Comité Enig potentieel Niet onderzocht 
20.  Vragen en aanbevelingen van de 
Vergadering  
Duidelijk potentieel Niet onderzocht 
21.  Landenbezoeken en –rapporten van 
de Commissaris  
Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
22.  Beslissingen en voorlopige 
resoluties  
Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
23.  Eindresoluties  Beperkt potentieel  Niet onderzocht 
24.  Individuele vervolgzaken  Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
25.  Algemene vervolgzaken   Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
Beide fases    
26.  Pilotuitspraakprocedure  Enig potentieel Enigszins dialogisch 
 
Hoofdstuk XIII maakt een vergelijking tussen het dialogisch potentieel en het 
dialogisch gehalte in de praktijk van de procedures waarvan dit is onderzocht. De 
eerste procedure waarvan het dialogisch potentieel en het dialogisch gehalte in de 
praktijk is onderzocht is tegelijkertijd een van de eerste procedurele stappen die een 
zaak in Straatsburg zet: de communicatie van een klacht door het Hof aan de staat. 
In de communicatie vat het Hof de feiten samen en stelt het vragen aan beide 
partijen. De communicatie van een klacht omvat in dit onderzoek ook de 
verweerschriften van de staat. Deze procedurele stap heeft duidelijke dialogisch 
potentieel en is duidelijk dialogisch in de praktijk. Toch wordt het potentieel niet 
geheel waargemaakt, voornamelijk doordat de verweerschriften niet altijd van even 
hoge kwaliteit zijn. Deze bevinding heeft gevolgen voor het delen van 
verantwoordelijkheden en de totstandkoming van begrip en evenwichtige 
besluitvorming. Daarbij bevordert communicatie de dialoog gewoonlijk niet 
wanneer het Hof een zaak kan oplossen op grond van gevestigde rechtspraak (well-
established case law). Het Hof stelt dan geen vragen en verwacht ook geen 
verweerschrift, juist omdat er al gevestigde rechtspraak bestaat over de schending 
die de klager aanbrengt. Daarentegen maakt de praktijk van het Hof om soms vrij 
algemene of extra vragen te stellen na de aanvankelijke communicatie de procedure 
juist meer dialogisch dan verwacht.  
Een tweede procedure betreft de mogelijkheid tot schrapping van een zaak van 
de rol van het Hof. Elke soort schrappingbeslissing brengt haar duidelijk dialogisch 
potentieel in de praktijk. Minnelijke schikkingen die de Griffie opstelt zijn hierop 
de uitzondering; zij zijn enkel beperkt dialogisch in de praktijk. De Griffie doet 
 
 
 
 Summary in Dutch 
 
 
601 
namelijk concrete schikkingsvoorstellen wanneer een zaak kan worden opgelost op 
grond van gevestigde rechtspraak, zonder de partijen hierbij te betrekken. Dit 
betekent onder andere dat verantwoordelijkheden niet worden gedeeld in 
overeenstemming met de hiervoor besproken notie van subsidiariteit en dat de 
staten de procedure als enigszins onevenwichtig kunnen zien.  
Voor de hoorzittingen geldt dat zij hun duidelijk dialogisch potentieel niet waar 
blijken te maken. Dit komt doordat zij maar weinig toevoegen aan de inhoudelijke 
beoordeling van een zaak. Bovendien is het voor de staten feitelijk onmogelijk om 
een hoorzitting aan te vragen.  
De schriftelijke tussenkomsten of interventies door derden maken wel hun 
duidelijk dialogisch potentieel waar. Toch verschilt hier de praktijk wel iets van hoe 
deze procedure geregeld is op papier. Zo hebben de staten de facto het recht om te 
interveniëren onder artikel 36 lid 2, omdat het Hof hen daarvoor eigenlijk altijd 
toestemming geeft. Het Hof maakt echter nauwelijks gebruik van de mogelijkheid 
om een staat uit te nodigen om te interveniëren of om vragen te stellen aan de 
interveniënten. Daarnaast is gebleken dat de Vergadering nog nooit heeft 
geïntervenieerd. De praktijk van de interventies is daardoor toch minder dialogisch 
dan die zou kunnen zijn.    
De eigenlijke uitspraken die het Hof doet hebben enig dialogisch potentieel en 
zijn ook enigszins dialogisch in de praktijk. Een probleem is dat de Straatsburgse 
jurisprudentie volgens sommigen niet altijd even duidelijk of consistent is en dat het 
Hof bepaalde uitspraken nauwelijks motiveert (vooral wanneer het gevestigde 
rechtspraak kan toepassen). Deze problemen maken dat het begrip van de staten van 
het EVRM-systeem niet altijd wordt vergroot en dat er spanning kan ontstaan naar 
aanleiding van een uitspraak. De persoonlijk opinies die de rechters kunnen 
toevoegen aan een uitspraak waarmee zij het (ten dele) oneens zijn, blijken niet 
dialogisch uit te werken, nu de rechters vooral op de uitspraak reageren en niet op 
de argumenten van de staat. De vrij brede reikwijdte van de uitspraken draagt wel 
weer bij aan hun dialogische gehalte, vooral omdat dit het begrip van de staten van 
het Verdragssyteem kan vergroten.   
Verwijzingen naar de Grote Kamer zijn enigszins dialogisch op papier en ze 
blijken dat ook in de praktijk te zijn. Het praktijkonderzoek heeft bevestigd dat het 
panel dat beslist over een verwijzingsverzoek zijn besluit niet motiveert en dat de 
Grote Kamer breid is om van een Kameruitspraak af te wijken en dus waarschijnlijk 
om soms naar de argumenten van de betrokken staat te luisteren.  
Als het Hof eenmaal uitspraak heeft gedaan, zet een staat in actieplannen en -
rapporten uiteen welke tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen hij zal nemen of al heeft 
genomen. Deze documenten worden toegestuurd aan het Comité en worden 
beoordeeld door het Execution Department. Het opstellen van deze actieplannen is 
duidelijk dialogisch op papier en werkt ook in de praktijk zo uit. Wel laat de 
kwaliteit van de rapporten soms te wensen over en gaan de staten gewoonlijk niet in 
op de problemen die zij ervaren met een uitspraak of tijdens het 
tenuitvoerleggingsproces. 
 
 
 
 Summary in Dutch 
 
 
602 
Tijdens de zogenaamde DH-vergaderingen bespreekt het Comité de voortgang 
van de tenuitvoerlegging van een beperkt aantal uitspaken. Bilaterale besprekingen 
vinden bovendien plaats tussen het Execution Department en een bepaalde staat. 
Tijdens deze besprekingen worden onder andere de actieplannen en -rapporten  
besproken. Daarnaast kunnen er multilaterale bijeenkomsten plaatsvinden, die 
bijvoorbeeld de vorm hebben van een seminar of conferentie, waar verschillende 
actoren tenuitvoerleggingsproblemen bespreken die meerdere staten aan gaan. Alle 
drie de typen van bijeenkomsten functioneren in de praktijk grotendeels in 
overeenstemming met hun duidelijk dialogisch potentieel op papier. 
De landenbezoeken die de Commissaris aflegt en de rapporten die hij/zij naar 
aanleiding daarvan schrijft zijn enigszins dialogisch op papier en kunnen ook in de 
praktijk zo worden beoordeeld. De rapporten laten zien dat de Commissaris vaak de 
staten wijst op (toekomstige) tenuitvoerleggingsproblemen. Daarnaast stimuleert hij 
hen om het Verdrag na te leven en legt hij uit hoe zij dit kunnen aanpakken.  
Net als de voorgaande procedurele stappen hebben de beslissingen en 
voorlopige resoluties van het Comité enig dialogisch potentieel en blijken zij ook 
daadwerkelijk een enigszins dialogisch gehalte te hebben. Het Comité neemt deze 
procedurele stappen naar aanleiding van wat is besproken op de DH-vergaderingen 
en op basis van de informatie in de actieplannen en -rapporten. In deze documenten 
vraagt het Comité bijvoorbeeld informatie aan de staten of spoort het hen aan om 
een uitspraak na te leven.  
Ook als de procedure vrijwel volledig is afgerond, kan zich de situatie voordoen 
dat een vervolgzaak aan het Hof wordt voorgelegd. Daarin stelt de klager dat de 
staat een eerdere uitspraak niet juist ten uitvoer heeft gelegd. Wanneer de klager een 
vervolgzaak brengt over een zaak die hij zelf had gebracht en daarin klaagt over 
individuele tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen, is de klacht in beginsel niet-
ontvankelijk. Het Hof mag zich namelijk niet uitspreken over tenuitvoerlegging; dit 
is de taak van het Comité. Een dergelijke individuele vervolgzaak is bij 
uitzondering wel ontvankelijk wanneer de tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen een 
nieuwe schending lijken te veroorzaken of wanneer er volgens het Hof sprake is van 
een voortdurende schending. Daarnaast kan sprake zijn van een ‘algemene 
vervolgzaak’, waarin in algemene zin wordt geklaagd over de verdragsconformiteit 
van (het ontbreken van) tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen. De klager hoeft in die 
situatie niet dezelfde persoon te zijn als die de eerdere zaak bracht, en deze 
vervolgzaken zijn vrijwel steeds ontvankelijk. Beide soorten vervolgzaken zijn 
enigszins dialogisch op papier en in de praktijk.  
Ten slotte is in het onderzoek bijzondere aandacht gegeven aan de 
pilotprocedure. Deze procedure heeft tot doel bij te dragen aan het oplossen van een 
structureel probleem in de nationale rechtsorde en om op een effectieve manier het 
hoofd te kunnen bieden aan de instroom van grote hoeveelheden vergelijkbare 
zaken. Het Hof kan een pilotuitspraak doen wanneer er in de staat een structureel 
probleem bestaat dat vergelijkbare zaken heeft veroorzaakt of kan veroorzaken. In 
zijn pilotuitspraak identificeert het Hof dat probleem en legt het een algemene 
tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregel op aan de staat (met een deadline). Daarnaast kan het 
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Hof ervoor kiezen om de behandeling van vergelijkbare zaken op te schorten. Deze 
procedure heeft zeker enig dialogisch potentieel en hij blijkt ook enigszins 
dialogisch te werken. Op basis van de praktijk is zelfs vastgesteld dat de procedure 
meer dialogisch is dan verwacht. Zo zijn er veel mogelijkheden om betrokken te 
raken voor de gesprekspartners, levert het Hof actief commentaar op reeds ingezette 
hervormingsmaatregelen en kan een staat aan het Hof vragen of het de deadline wil 
verlengen voor de tenuitvoerlegging van de uitspraak. Bovendien bleek dat de 
algemene maatregelen die het Hof oplegt niet heel specifiek zijn, waardoor de staat 
ruimte voor een reactie behoudt, en dat het veel rekening houdt met de positie van 
het Comité.  
 
De beoordeling van de praktijk aan de hand van de verschillende indicatoren van 
dialoog heeft aanleiding kunnen vormen voor een paar meer algemene observaties. 
Zoals uit de bovenstaande tabel en de korte bespreking hierboven kan worden 
afgeleid, vervullen de meeste procedures hun dialogisch potentieel. Alleen 
hoorzittingen en minnelijke schikkingen van de Griffie bleken in de praktijk echt 
minder dialogisch te zijn dan verwacht. Daarnaast laat de vergelijking zien dat de 
dialoog in steeds grotere mate schriftelijk wordt gevoerd. Dit komt vooral doordat 
er steeds minder hoorzittingen plaatsvinden en er steeds minder minnelijke 
schikkingen worden getroffen waarbij mondelinge onderhandelingen plaatsvinden 
met steun van de Griffie.  
Wanneer een procedure wat minder dialogisch is dan verwacht, blijkt dit in een 
aantal gevallen te komen doordat de bijdrage van een gesprekspartner van lage 
kwaliteit is. Dit geldt voor communicatie, actieplannen en -rapporten en in mindere 
mate zelfs voor uitspraken. Een andere verklarende factor is dat een zaak eenvoudig 
kan worden opgelost op grond van gevestigde rechtspraak. Wanneer een procedure 
hierdoor minder dialogisch wordt, is dit niet echt problematisch, juist omdat er al 
gevestigde rechtspraak bestaat. Het Hof hoeft dan immers niet uitgebreid te 
motiveren waarom hij een bepaalde beslissing neemt, maar kan simpelweg naar een 
eerdere uitspraak verwijzen. Tot slot blijkt uit verschillende procedures dat het Hof 
niet alleen geïnteresseerd is in de voorliggende zaak maar dat het ook op bredere 
vraagstukken ingaat. Hierdoor neemt het dialogisch karakter van de procedure toe 
omdat bredere vraagstukken ook relevant kunnen zijn voor meer staten en andere 
gesprekspartners dan de betrokken staat.  
 
Hoofdstuk XIII doet op basis van het uitgevoerde onderzoek ten slotte enkele 
aanbevelingen. De aanbevelingen hebben betrekking op zowel het vergroten van het 
dialogisch potentieel van de procedures op papier als het verhogen van hun 
dialogisch gehalte in de praktijk. Hier wordt een drietal voorbeelden van die 
aanbevelingen gegeven.  
Zoals hiervoor is aangegeven dragen artikel 46-aanwijzingen niet altijd evenveel 
bij aan dialoog, doordat een aanwijzing betekent dat het Hof de ruimte voor een 
reactie van de staat op een uitspraak beperkt. Het Hof geeft immers aan (in minder 
of meer duidelijke bewoordingen) wat het verwacht van de tenuitvoerlegging van 
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een uitspraak. Het dialogisch gehalte van artikel 46-aanwijzingen zou toenemen 
wanneer het Hof soms een aparte artikel 46-uitspraak zou doen, nadat het een 
schending heeft gevonden in een eerdere uitspraak. Dit kan worden vergeleken met 
de afzonderlijke artikel 41-uitspraken die het Hof soms doet over de billijke 
genoegdoening voor de klager. Een aparte artikel 46-uitspraak zou de betrokken 
staat de mogelijkheid geven om zijn mening te geven over welke 
tenuitvoerleggingsmaatregelen nodig zijn. Daarnaast zou het Comité deze 
mogelijkheid gegeven kunnen worden, zodat een extra gesprekspartner in de 
dialoog betrokken wordt.  
Nu is gebleken dat hoorzittingen in de praktijk duidelijk minder dialogisch zijn 
dan op papier, is de vraag hoe hun dialogisch gehalte kan worden vergroot. Een 
manier om dit te bereiken is door de rechters meer vragen te laten stellen tijdens een 
hoorzitting en hen de vragen beter voor te laten bereiden. Daarnaast zouden de 
staten vaker (deels) het pleidooi kunnen laten verzorgen door de specifieke 
nationale autoriteit die bij de zaak betrokken is en het Hof zou andere staten kunnen 
uitnodigen om te interveniëren. Op deze manier worden meer verschillende 
gesprekspartners betrokken en daardoor worden waarschijnlijk meer verschillende 
perspectieven op een hoorzitting samengebracht.  
Verder viel op dat interventies van staten onder artikel 36 lid 2 weliswaar heel 
dialogisch zijn, maar dat staten vrij weinig interveniëren. De staten kunnen dan ook 
worden aangemoedigd om vaker schriftelijk te interveniëren en het Hof kan hen 
vaker uitnodigen om te interveniëren. Daarnaast is het zo dat de staten enkel een de 
facto recht hebben om te interveniëren aangezien zij formeel toestemming van het 
Hof nodig hebben. Daarom zouden de staten kunnen besluiten het Verdrag te 
amenderen, zodat zij het recht krijgen om te interveniëren, ongeacht of hun 
onderdaan klager is. Zo’n amendement stimuleert interventies, vooral doordat het 
interveniëren makkelijker wordt: de staten hoeven niet langer toestemming te 
vragen en het Hof hoeft niet langer toestemming te geven.  
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